Avoiding vote loss by changing policy positions

Abstract

This paper addresses the electoral consequences of the German government’s anti-nuclear power policy shift after the Fukushima accident. Building on a cost-benefit framework and insights from political psychology, the theoretical analysis anticipates that the policy shift could not earn governing parties additional votes but could avoid vote loss. Utilizing data from multiple surveys and employing simulation techniques, the evidence demonstrates that voters, in particular incumbents’ supporters, became more skeptical of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. At the same time, governing parties’ supporters were particularly eager to perceive a credible change in the government’s nuclear power stance. As a consequence, governing parties did not garner additional votes but inhibited their supporters from voting for other parties and thus avoided vote loss. Generally speaking, the novel approach proposed in this paper is suitable for shedding light on electoral effects of parties’ policy shifts that have thus far gone unnoticed.

Keywords

attitudes toward nuclear power Fukushima policy shift simulation

Introduction

Party competition takes place in dynamic environments. Vote-seeking parties (e.g. Strøm and Müller, 1999) thus have incentives to adapt to changes in their environment, e.g. gradual changes in public opinion (Ezrow, 2005; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Stimson et al., 1995). The success of gradual adaption to changes in public opinion appears to depend upon policy domain, however. Notwithstanding the multitude of policy and non-policy factors affecting electoral behavior (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960), policy change in the economic domain appears to be accompanied by electoral gain (MacKuen et al., 1992). In contrast, voters appear to punish parties, particularly niche parties (Adams et al., 2006), for policy shifts on value-based or ideological issues (Tavits, 2007). Parties will thus change positions in the economic domain, but may be reluctant to do so in the ideological domain.

This conclusion may give rise to an overly static portrayal of party competition in the value-based domain. Public opinion might change quickly even on ideological or directional issues as a response to external events (e.g. Birkland, 2006; Bishop, 2014; Boin et al., 2008; Kingdon, 2011). For example, terror attacks make voters more inclined to support measures that aim at curbing civil liberties (e.g. Davis and Silver, 2004; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). In this case, the shift in public opinion provides vote-seeking parties with incentives to adopt more conservative policy stances in this domain. In particular, if supporters of liberal parties adopt more conservative policy positions, these parties will have an incentive to shift their policy stance to avoid vote loss. As loss aversion is a strong motive of human beings (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1997; Sabatier, 1988), it does not come as a surprise that scholars have addressed the loss avoidance strategies of parties and candidates to which voters respond in elections (see on US midterm elections, e.g. Cohen et al., 1991; Jacobson, 2004; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983).

Some research on electoral effects of loss avoidance strategies suffers from methodological problems. By focusing on concomitant changes in party positions and electoral support from one election to the next (e.g. Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Adams et al., 2004, 2009; Tavits, 2007), it is not well-suited to measuring electoral effects of policy shifts in their entirety. For example, if a policy shift helps a party to recover from a decline in popular support between two elections but that shift does not help to increase electoral support as compared to the previous election, this positive effect will go unnoticed. Thus, if a party responds to anticipated vote loss by revising its policies this move will appear ineffective unless it manages to increase electoral support in comparison to the preceding election. Tackling electoral effects of these defensive, loss-aversive policy moves requires different research designs that allow exploring the temporal order of policy moves and shifts in public opinion in a more fine-grained fashion.

Against this backdrop, we address party and public responses in Germany to the Fukushima disaster in March 2011. This case is well-suited to explore the electoral effects of loss-aversive policy shifts because the nuclear disaster led to an anti-nuclear power shift in public opinion thereby threatening the pro-nuclear incumbent parties, i.e. Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP), with vote loss. The governing parties quickly shut down seven of Germany’s 17 nuclear power plants and announced an ultimate nuclear phase-out by 2022, thereby reversing their October 2010 decision to abandon the phase-out policy originally enacted in 2001. Looked at from a cost-benefit perspective, the electoral effect of the policy shift depends on the evolution of public opinion and the perception of the policy shift. Using survey data, we show that in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the anti-nuclear power shift in public opinion was pronounced among supporters of government parties, which in turn ran the risk of losing votes. By giving up their long-held pro-nuclear power stance, these parties did not manage to attract additional votes but avoided a considerable vote loss. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical framework on which our analysis draws. After the description of the data, we explore voters’ responses to the disaster and the electoral effects of the policy shift. In conclusion, we sum up key findings and discuss implications.

Theoretical framework

Political parties hold stable positions on many issues, particularly on issues that are of key importance for their supporters and the party’s identity (e.g. Goren, 2005; Tavits, 2007). Yet, there is also change in parties’ policy positions. Although factors like leader personalities and intra-party processes play a considerable role (e.g. Meyer, 2013: 169ff), changes in a party’s environment are a major incentive for policy changes. In particular, profound changes in public opinion on relevant dimensions give parties incentives to adapt policy positions (e.g. Adams, 2012; Stimson, 1999). Whereas such changes, generally speaking, take a considerable amount of time (Page and Shapiro, 1992), single events can play a crucial role in these processes. In particular, so-called focusing events, i.e. typically natural or human-made disasters (Birkland, 1997), have the potential to affect public opinion on policies.

Focusing events, e.g. nuclear disasters (e.g. Eiser et al., 1990; Lenz, 2012), get massive media coverage and evoke emotional responses in the electorate. The latter include anger and anxiety that motivate people to alter attitudes and question long-standing attachments (Marcus et al., 2000; Rucht, 2008). In political debates, these events serve as examples to demonstrate that a certain policy is no longer viable. Citizens who have opposed this policy may thus feel confirmed. Some of its supporters, however, may reconsider or even change their policy attitudes leading to a considerable shift in public opinion against this policy. Provided attitudes toward this policy play a role in voting behavior, this shift in public opinion poses an electoral threat to parties pleading for the policy.

Vote-seeking parties may respond to this threat by considering a revision of their policy stance. To analyze these considerations, we focus on a scenario in which an event led to a shift in public opinion against a policy supported by governing parties and rejected by opposition parties. Assuming governing parties are vote-seeking, they have an incentive to carefully consider likely electoral costs and benefits of changing their policy stance in line with the shift in public opinion. To examine costs and benefits, we assume that attitudes toward policy issues are short-term factors potentially making voters inclined to deviate from partisan attachments (Campbell et al., 1960; Downs, 1957; Rabinowitz and McDonald, 1989). An issue will affect vote choice if it arouses voters’ interest and if voters have preferences over policy options and perceive partisan differences on the issue. In addition, partisan differences on an issue are conducive to issue voting because parties are likely to campaign on controversial issues, thereby increasing their saliency (e.g. Damore, 2005; Krosnick, 1988).

Starting with benefits, by shifting their policy position governing parties might garner votes from adherents of opposition parties and unaffiliated voters. This expectation, however, rests on the assumption that all voters quickly perceive incumbent parties to have credibly changed their policy position. Building on some kind of Bayesian updating (Gerber and Green, 1998, 1999), this assumption is at odds with the notion of motivated reasoning (e.g. Kunda, 1990; Lodge and Taber, 2013). Partisan motivated reasoning implies that adherents of governing parties are likely to perceive a credible policy shift in incumbent parties. By contrast, identifiers of opposition parties might counter-argue and interpret the policy shift as a tactical maneuver rather than as a credible shift. Provided issue-voting, they will thus not consider voting for governing parties, despite their policy shift. A similar reasoning applies to partisan independents, although counter-arguing processes might be weaker as no ‘hostile’ party attachment serves as a predisposition (e.g. Visser, 1994). Taken together, governing parties are thus unlikely to garner additional votes by shifting their policy position.

An incumbent policy change in accordance with a public opinion shift, however, might prove beneficial for governing parties in avoiding vote loss. In response to external shocks, supporters of governing parties may subscribe to policy positions held by opposition, rather than governing, parties. Provided issue voting, they might vote against their long-term partisan affiliations. Issue voting would be likely if incumbent parties stick to their position, thereby providing voters a policy choice and opposition parties an opportunity and incentive to campaign on this polarized issue. Sticking to their policy position thus may cost governing parties votes. If they change their policy position in accordance with the shift in public opinion, however, their supporters, due to motivated reasoning, are likely to perceive the incumbents’ policy shift as credible and real. Moreover, the issue is likely to become a non-issue. Accordingly, by giving up their policy position, governing parties might prevent their supporters, who now prefer opposition policies, from abstention or switching to opposition parties. Put differently, a policy shift may avoid vote loss.

A policy shift may come at some electoral cost for governing parties, however. Some of their supporters may still subscribe to the governing parties’ long-held position. By giving up their position, incumbent parties might run the risk of losing the votes of these supporters. Provided parties with a congenial policy stance, these voters switch to them or, in absence of this kind of parties, they might abstain. Yet, by shifting their policy position, incumbents make this policy a non-issue, i.e. a question on which relevant parties hold similar positions and thus have no possibility to campaign on. Accordingly, the electoral salience of this policy is low, and so is the probability of vote loss due to the incumbents’ policy shift.

Putting the likely responses of three relevant subsections of the electorate together, the cost-benefit perspective suggests that by giving up a now unpopular policy stance governing parties may, on balance, avoid vote loss. We expect that this hypothesis also applies to the policy shift of German governing parties on nuclear power in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. This event is likely to have made German voters more skeptical of nuclear power, especially those adherents of governing parties supporting nuclear power. As attitudes toward nuclear power affect vote choice in Germany (Küchler, 1990; Thurner, 2010; Thurner et al., 2011), this anti-nuclear power shift in public opinion posed an electoral threat to governing parties. By adopting an anti-nuclear power stance, they could prevent these voters from switching to a different party or abstaining. At the same time, they were unlikely to garner additional votes from other voters or to lose votes of steadfast supporters of nuclear power. Thus, German governing parties might have avoided vote loss.

Data and methodology

We test our expectations using data from online and CATI surveys. The series of cross-sectional online surveys was conducted in the run-up to and after the federal election of 2009 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES, see Rattinger et al., 2011). Each survey comprises roughly 1000 respondents drawn from a nonprobability online panel. Six of these surveys include questions on nuclear power and cover a time period that ranges from two years before the Fukushima accident to about half a year after it. The survey conducted in March 2011 deserves special attention because it was fielded when the Fukushima disaster took place. In response to the events in Japan (beginning on March 11), new items were added to the questionnaire (see Figure 1). In effect, 300 respondents completed the survey on 14 March or later and were asked questions concerning nuclear power. Additionally, we rely on CATI data from the Politbarometer series (see Jung et al., 2013). Each survey includes a random sample of about 1200 respondents from the German population eligible to vote.¹

Figure 1.

Data points surrounding the Fukushima accident.

Concerning the setting, it is warranted to provide some key dates concerning political events and communication in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. As Figure 2 suggests, the incumbent parties responded in quite a timely manner to a skeptical opinion climate (see e.g. Spiegel, 2011). As questions about nuclear power attitudes in Tracking 13 were included from 14 March on, respondents in this survey were already subject to news about the accident and the immediate reactions of the government for three days. Then, the May/June 2011 survey took place between the announcement of and the decision on an ultimate phase-out, whereas the last survey was conducted two months afterwards.

Figure 2.

Political events in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster.

The main purpose of this analysis is to gauge the electoral effects of the incumbent parties’ policy shift. As discussed above, the shift might have avoided potential vote loss. Following this line of reasoning, gauging this effect requires comparing the actual evolution of public opinion to a contra-factual scenario in which incumbent parties stuck to their original position on nuclear power. To perform this comparison, we will clearly spell out underlying assumptions.

Findings

The theoretical analysis suggests that the Fukushima disaster made the German electorate more skeptical of nuclear power, with attachments to pro-nuclear power parties being incapable of reducing these effects. To examine this proposition, we utilize data from the online surveys in which attitudes toward nuclear power were measured using an 11-point scale running from –5 (‘immediate shutdown of all nuclear power plants’) to +5 (‘further construction of nuclear power plants’). Table 1 reports the mean evaluations as well as standard deviations in the whole samples and in partisan subgroups. The evidence indicates that the public was somewhat indifferent about the further use of nuclear power at the outset of the period under study. It then became gradually more skeptical until mid-2010 (–1.02). After the Fukushima disaster, support for nuclear power deteriorated as is indicated by the drop of the mean evaluation below –2.

Table 1.

Attitudes toward nuclear power in the German electorate and partisan subgroups, 2009–2011 (means).

	Apr/May 2009	Dec 2009	June/July 2010	March 2011	Difference (pre/post Fukushima)	May/June 2011	Aug/Sept 2011
Total	0.02 (3.33) 954	–0.46 (3.32) 1005	–1.02 (3.25) 1011	–2.24 (2.88) 465	–1.22***	–2.26 (2.83) 1062	–2.08 (2.85) 1090
CDU/CSU PID	1.72 (2.89) 203	0.79 (3.09) 238	1.46 (2.88) 166	–1.34 (2.65) 92	–2.80***	–1.03 (3.06) 206	–1.03 (3.06) 215
FDP PID	1.14 (3.08) 69	0.39 (3.46) 72	1.10 (2.67) 47	–0.07 (3.21) 14	–1.17	–0.90 (2.95) 37	–0.69 (2.93) 39
SPD PID	–0.58 (3.29) 237	–1.57 (2.94) 221	–1.95 (2.88) 269	–3.06 (2.52) 112	–1.11***	–2.76 (2.42) 242	–2.71 (2.54) 273
Greens PID	–3.39 (1.69) 83	–3.11 (2.11) 55	–3.10 (2.30) 113	–3.88 (1.72) 43	–0.78*	–3.63 (1.77) 166	–3.52 (1.86) 150
The Left PID	0.03 (3.17) 63	–0.70 (3.33) 124	–1.72 (3.26) 113	–1.75 (3.39) 35	–0.03	–2.26 (3.15) 111	–2.56 (2.62) 89
Non-identifiers	–0.13 (3.23) 273	–0.37 (3.26) 244	–0.62 (3.06) 253	–2.16 (2.89) 145	–1.54***	–2.34 (2.73) 263	–1.57 (3.00) 287

Notes: Cell entries are mean values, standard deviations, and numbers of observations. Differences tested using t-tests for independent samples; Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Scale from –5 (immediate shutdown of all nuclear power plants) to +5 (further construction of nuclear power plants).

Although they differ in methodology, CATI data virtually tell the same story (see Figure 3). In 2009 and 2010, respondents were asked whether they preferred sticking to the phase-out plan or continuing using nuclear power. After the Fukushima disaster, from March 2011 onward, respondents were additionally provided with the option to favor a fastest possible shutdown of nuclear power plants. As the evidence shows, in 2009 and 2010 a majority of the respondents pleaded for pursuing the phase-out agenda. Still, a sizable minority, comprising up to 40 percent of the electorate, favored further using nuclear power. As with the online data, after the Fukushima disaster public opinion looks different. The proportion of steadfast supporters of nuclear power decreased to roughly 10 percent, whereas some 35 percent preferred the phase-out plan. Majorities, however, pleaded for shutting down nuclear power plants as fast as possible.²

Figure 3.

Evaluations of nuclear power, 2009–2011 (CATI surveys).

Turning to the role of party attachments in affecting evaluations of nuclear power (Table 1), CDU/CSU and FDP identifiers exhibited positive attitudes toward nuclear energy before March 2011, whereas identifiers of opposition parties held an anti-nuclear stance.³ Turning to responses to the nuclear disaster, the evidence is clearly at odds with the hypothesis that governmental identifiers somehow resisted its impact. Rather, CDU/CSU supporters especially changed their position from a positive to a negative view of nuclear energy, whereas FDP identifiers were at least indifferent.⁴ Moreover, compared to all other subgroups, CDU/CSU identifiers made the largest shift, thereby decreasing the gap between them and oppositional supporters. Supporters of the Greens and the Left exhibit smaller variation across all surveys included. Especially for Green adherents, this might be interpreted as some kind of ceiling effect, as these voters already opposed nuclear energy unambiguously. In sum, the electorate became more skeptical of nuclear power, while partisan attachments became less effective, albeit not ineffective, in shaping attitudes toward nuclear power.⁵

Building on the notion of motivated reasoning, we anticipated that adherents of governing parties were more likely than other citizens, particularly more than supporters of opposition parties, to consider the governing parties’ policy shift as credible. Relying on data from CATI surveys, respondents were quite skeptical, as 72 and 66 percent perceived the policy shift as not credible in May and June, respectively. To examine the role of party attachments in shaping these perceptions, we ran logistic regressions with party attachments as focal predictor variables (see Table A1). The evidence suggests that CDU/CSU adherents were disproportionately likely to deem the policy shift credible, whereas FDP supporters did not differ from rather skeptical, partisan independents. Adherents of SPD and the Greens, however, questioned the credibility of the government’s policy shift. Accordingly, in May 2011 roughly 12 percent of opposition adherents believed in the government’s credibility whereas the figure for CDU/CSU supporters was 60 percent.

Given these differences in perceived credibility, it is reasonable to expect that the gap between government and opposition supporters in the perceived position of governing parties on nuclear power widened, rather than diminished, after the Fukushima disaster. Utilizing data on perceived partisan positions toward the use of nuclear power measured on the above-mentioned eleven-point scale (Table 2), the evidence suggests that before the Fukushima disaster, opposition parties were considered as rejecting nuclear power, with the Greens being the most pronounced opponents of this energy source. After that event, respondents perceived the Greens as somewhat more skeptical and the SPD as considerably more critical. However, perceptions of incumbent parties’⁶ stances on nuclear power underwent the most profound change. Before the Fukushima disaster, they were deemed staunch supporters of nuclear power. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the public considered them as slightly supportive of this energy. And the pro-nuclear image of the incumbent parties did not recover in the remainder of 2011. Moreover, the increase in standard deviations of perceived policy positions of incumbent parties suggests that citizens – as expected – differed considerably in their willingness to perceive the proclaimed policy shift as real.⁷

Table 2.

Citizens’ perceptions of party positions on nuclear power, 2009–2011 (means).

	Apr/May 2009	Dec 2009	June/July 2010	March 2011	Difference (pre/post Fukushima)	May/June 2011	Aug/Sept 2011
Perceived CDU position	2.17 (2.52) 385	1.71 (2.73) 897	2.61 (2.40) 837	0.86 (3.11) 390	–1.75***	0.35 (2.83) 893	–0.13 (3.02) 892
Perceived FDP position	1.49 (2.70) 353	1.44 (2.74) 862	2.22 (2.66) 799	0.66 (3.11) 364	–1.56***	0.74 (2.94) 844	0.51 (3.13) 840
Perceived SPD position	–0.88 (2.37) 380	–0.98 (2.62) 878	–1.28 (2.40) 828	–2.25 (2.65) 382	–0.97***	–1.54 (2.54) 864	–1.93 (2.47) 874
Perceived Greens position	–3.88 (2.25) 401	–3.11 (3.00) 907	–3.75 (2.28) 869	–3.88 (2.22) 391	–0.13	–3.82 (2.26) 921	–4.07 (2.12) 956
Perceived The Left position	–1.14 (3.07) 277	–2.00 (2.95) 813	–2.25 (2.59) 754	–2.63 (2.77) 341	–0.38	–2.26 (2.71) 797	–2.38 (2.80) 796

Thus far, the evidence suggests that the German electorate became considerably more skeptical of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. Incumbent parties responded to this change that was particularly pronounced among CDU/CSU supporters⁸ by shifting their policy stance. This shift was primarily accepted by their supporters while partisan independents and adherents of opposition parties questioned its credibility. These findings suggest that by shifting their policy position incumbent parties could hardly gain votes from adherents of other parties, but may have inhibited CDU/CSU and FDP supporters from abstaining or switching to different parties.

Exploring the electoral consequences of the changes in public opinion and party positions, we compare citizens’ actual responses to their hypothetical responses if the governing parties had not given up their pro-nuclear power position. Relying on a distance model of vote choice, we calculated the mean distance between voters’ positions and perceived CDU/CSU position in partisan subgroups in the various online surveys (upper section of Table 3). In addition, relying on a contra-factual scenario, we imputed the CDU/CSU position on nuclear power as perceived by the various partisan subgroups in the 2010 survey (Table A2). Utilizing this information, we once again calculated in partisan subgroups mean distances between voter positions’ and CDU/CSU positions as perceived by the respective subgroups (lower section of Table 3).

Table 3.

Absolute distances between voter positions and the perceived CDU position in partisan subgroups, 2009–2011 (means).

	Apr/May 2009	Dec 2009	June/July 2010	March 2011	May/June 2011	Aug/Sept 2011
CDU/CSU PID	1.33	1.83	1.74	2.46	2.10	2.21
FDP PID	2.31	1.94	2.40	2.77	2.54	2.56
SPD PID	4.35	4.54	5.53	4.83	4.37	3.90
Greens PID	6.71	6.42	6.56	5.32	4.54	4.96
The Left PID	3.28	4.37	5.57	4.81	4.52	4.37
Non-identifiers	3.98	2.60	3.66	3.91	3.35	3.14
Simulation (assuming CDU/CSU perception of June/July 2010)
CDU/CSU PID				3.86	3.94	3.95
FDP PID				3.28	3.46	3.13
SPD PID				6.04	5.63	5.66
Greens PID				7.24	7.00	6.91
The Left PID				5.18	5.43	5.57
Non-identifiers				4.67	4.72	4.19

Note: Cell entries are mean differences between voter positions and voter perceptions of party positions.

The comparison of actual and hypothetical policy distances suggests that the governing parties’ policy shift made a considerable difference to voters’ perceptions. As the results from the simulation indicate, the absolute distance between CDU/CSU and its supporters would have amounted to roughly 3.9 after the Fukushima accident. Turning to actual policy distances, the CDU/CSU’s distance to its supporters increased considerably in March 2011 (2.46). In the two successive surveys, this distance, however, decreased again. By comparing the two actual and hypothetical policy distances, it thus turns out that the governing parties’ policy shift was useful in limiting their policy distance to their supporters.⁹

Finally, we examined the electoral impact of the incumbents’ shift on nuclear power by gauging the effect of attitudes toward nuclear power on intended vote choice using alternative-specific multinomial probit models, thereby considering variable distances between voters and parties on the nuclear power issue (see Alvarez and Nagler, 1998).¹⁰ In order to avoid exaggerating the impact of attitudes toward nuclear power, we controlled for party identification and ideological self-placement. The results of multinomial probit models (Table A3) suggest that voter-party distances on the nuclear power issue affected vote choice at the individual level before as well as after the Fukushima incident. Yet, the effects are not overwhelmingly sizable. To make the results of those models more accessible, we estimated choice probabilities (Long and Freese, 2006: 330–332) that can be interpreted as vote shares for the four parties contributed by CDU/CSU identifiers (upper section of Table 4). To capture the impact of the incumbent policy shift, we calculated choice probabilities while imputing the different parties’ policy positions as perceived by CDU/CSU identifiers in 2010 (lower section of Table 4). By comparing probabilities across specifications, we aimed at gauging the electoral consequences of the incumbents’ policy shift.

Table 4.

Predicted choice probabilities for CDU/CSU identifiers with actual and simulated party positions.

	Dec 2009	June/July 2010	March 2011	May/June 2011	Aug/Sept 2011
CDU/CSU vote share	90.6%	85.1%	92.9%	84.7%	87.3%
SPD vote share	3.8%	10.0%	1.7%	7.3%	5.3%
Greens vote share	2.4%	2.5%	3.1%	7.4%	2.9%
The Left vote share	3.1%	2.4%	2.3%	0.6%	4.9%
Simulation results (perceived party positions in June/July 2010)
CDU/CSU vote share			82.1%	75.3%	73.4%
SPD vote share			3.8%	10.5%	9.7%
Greens vote share			7.2%	12.0%	7.5%
The Left vote share			7.0%	2.2%	9.8%

Notes: Group-specific mean distances for nuclear power issue and ideological self-placement imputed.

The results reported in the upper and lower rows in Table 4 suggest that the governing parties’ policy shift made a difference in voting intentions. According to the findings on CDU/CSU identifiers, some nine to 14 percent of the CDU/CSU’s core supporters would no longer have voted for it if governing parties had not given up their pro-nuclear power stance.¹¹ As CDU/CSU supporters accounted for some 80 percent of the CDU/CSU vote intentions in the period under study, the CDU/CSU would have lost some one to two percent of the total vote intentions. The main beneficiary would have been the Greens, garnering some additional four percent of CDU/CSU supporters.

The evidence thus suggests that by changing its position toward nuclear power the main governing party CDU/CSU avoided some vote loss. Yet, we have to keep in mind that the above strategy is likely to yield a conservative estimate of the quantity of interest. Using this simulation technique, it is impossible to estimate how parties would have campaigned and how salient the nuclear power issue would have been if incumbent parties had not shifted their policy position. Provided the 2010 positions on nuclear power, policy distances would have been larger and anti-nuclear power parties would have had an incentive to campaign on this issue. If anything, attitudes toward nuclear power would have become more powerful in shaping individual vote choice, resulting in a larger impact on aggregate-level election results in the 2013 German federal election.¹² Put differently, if incumbents had not downplayed the nuclear power issue by giving up their pro-nuclear power stance, they would have lost even more electoral support.

Conclusion

This paper examined the electoral effects of the incumbent policy shift in Germany after the Fukushima disaster. Building on the notion of differential voting functions, we anticipated that by giving up their pro-nuclear power stance incumbents may have avoided vote loss. The evidence suggests that the Fukushima disaster rendered German voters, particularly the supporters of pro-nuclear power incumbent parties, more skeptical of nuclear power. Moreover, government supporters were quick to perceive the incumbents’ policy shift as real whereas adherents of opposition parties and partisan independents had considerable doubts. By adopting an anti-nuclear power stance, incumbent parties thus could not garner additional votes from partisan independents or opposition supporters but avoided vote loss among their supporters. As the analysis could not quantify the impact of downplaying the nuclear power issue and ultimately transforming it into a non-issue, the estimate of the avoided vote loss is likely to be conservative.¹³ We thus conclude that the policy shift of the Merkel government on the nuclear power issue in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster served as a means to avoid likely vote loss.

In analyzing electoral effects of policy shifts that are driven by loss aversion, we proposed a research design that permits to study public opinion in a more fine-grained way than the widely used comparison of election results. Employing this methodology in other cases may show that loss-aversive policy shifts are more effective than previous research suggested. By capitalizing on rather fine-grained overtime variation in survey responses, the research design is well-suited to capturing the temporal sequence of policy shifts and potential effects. At the same time, it implies that we utilize voting intentions as indicators of actual votes. Assuming that voting intentions are more volatile than voting behavior, it may be objected that this strategy exaggerates the electoral impact of policy shifts. To alleviate this problem, one might suggest employing the simulation technique to data on vote choice gathered in the next election. Leaving aside problems arising from longer intervals, election studies are unlikely to include survey items tapping attitudes toward policies that parties have made non-issues by shifting policy positions. Taken together, there is no simple solution to the analysis of electoral effects of policy shifts and we thus suggest clearly spelling out underlying assumptions.

The electoral outcomes of these kinds of policy moves depend on the responses of various subsections of the electorate. At the voter level, we identified motivated reasoning as a key obstacle to strategies aiming at attracting additional votes by giving up long-held positions on salient policy issues. To be sure, leaders might change policy positions of their supporters as the latter are eager to perceive the leaders’ shift as credible and to follow it (e.g. Lenz, 2012). Non-supporters, however, will question the credibility of this policy shift and will hardly vote for a party because of its recently adopted policy position. Yet, we cannot take it for granted that this pattern applies to all shifts in public opinion (e.g. those triggered by external shocks or secular changes), contexts, policies, and parties alike. Rather, we suggest carefully exploring popular responses to partisan policy shifts in various contexts to better understand the, potentially, conditional nature of voter responses to partisan policy shifts. These findings, in turn, may fuel research on elite strategies.

At the elite level, this analysis builds on several motivational and cognitive assumptions whose appropriateness we cannot take for granted. In particular, by exploring the impact of the governing parties’ policy shift from a cost-benefit perspective the analysis suggests that the policy shift resulted from strategic behavior. Lacking appropriate information, we cannot determine whether party leaders acted strategically or were driven by other motivations including policy concerns. Future research on elite decision-making may provide valuable insights on this issue. Even if it turned out that elites did not respond to strategic incentives, this would not invalidate the conclusion that their policy shift served as means to avoid vote loss. Irrespective of this specific question, as leaders differ in risk aversion as well as in motives, time frame, and perceptions of voter responses, future research may explore the interplay of elite responses, events, and public opinion from this angle. Although this research is plagued with methodological problems (Richards, 1996), it is likely to yield crucial insights into processes of opinion formation in democratic politics.

In this analysis, we capitalized on rather fine-grained overtime variation in public opinion data to explore voter responses to a focusing event and partisan policy shifts. This strategy enabled us to glean new insights into the dynamics of issue attitudes, partisan perceptions, and voting behavior. Yet, the data are far from perfect. The rather long inter-survey intervals as well as the cross-sectional nature of the surveys inhibit more detailed analyses of the individual-level dynamics of voters’ responses to parties’ policy shifts. To overcome these limitations, data from fine-grained panel surveys are useful. Still, we are quite confident that these more refined analyses would not alter the conclusion that the German governing parties managed to avoid some vote loss by giving up their pro-nuclear power stance in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster.

Footnotes

Appendix

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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