Abstract
Nearly a year on from the general election of 2015, David Cameron’s British Conservatives are not in great shape. The economy may be growing, but their poll ratings do not reflect this. Rumours persist of a substantial body of Tory MPs poised and ready to get rid of Cameron regardless of the outcome of the European Union referendum. Quite a change from just 6 or 7 years ago, when the climate was much more favourable: Cameron’s ratings were high, in contrast with an exhausted and unpopular Brown government, and it seemed clear to many that he would bring an end to the – extremely unusual – 13 years in opposition for his party. How did the ‘natural party of government’ perform so badly in 1997, 2001 and 2005? Why was it not able to learn from its failings? With this in mind, Richard Hayton’s text examines the Conservative Party in opposition, from 1997 to 2010, its fumbles and mistakes and its slow realization that something had to be done to avoid a decline into insignificance. There is a focus on what Hayton refers to as the ‘wilderness years’, in which he looks at the party’s various leaders and their strategies while in opposition from 1997 until 2005, when Cameron became leader.
Hayton’s work is unusual in looking at a mainstream political party in opposition; it is far more common for scholarly work to consider parties in office. His consideration of how the Conservative Party made use of its time in opposition does not quite fit with current theory on the topic. As he himself states, those works that do look at the Conservatives’ ‘periodic spells in opposition [are], in the main, preoccupied with demonstrating how these were used to refresh Conservative ideas and organisations in preparation once again for government’ (p. 5). In contrast, this text argues that there was far too little refreshing of Conservative policies and structures to make them ready for government.
In order to explore contemporary conservatism, Hayton makes use of a thematic approach; he examines four issues that pose dilemmas for the party, and which were critical components of the party’s slow and painful steps towards reconstruction. Many of these debates involve truly cross-cutting issues that go beyond the left-right dimension and so are able to bring new perspectives to the Conservative Party. There are chapters on ‘social liberalism versus social traditionalism’ and the issues brought about by the political economy of 21st-century conservatism, but the more thorough and perceptive chapters are the first two. The ‘European question’ is explored thoroughly. Likewise, the chapter on national identity and what is referred to as the ‘English question’ is a proxy for immigration policy and the party’s attempts (or lack of them) to keep up with a changing, and less homogeneous, society. Hayton explains clearly how these two long-standing issues were a double-edged sword for the party: tempting to exploit in the short term, yet dangerous in the long term. After all:
(i)n one sense, it would have been perverse for the Conservatives not to campaign on Europe and immigration – opinion polls suggested public support for the Conservative positions … However, the focus on these issues reinforced the negative image of the Conservative Party, and failed to provide a convincing narrative about the purpose of the party. (p. 48)
In addition to primary policy documents, Hayton makes use of a number of personal interviews with key figures from the period in opposition, many of whom maintained their prominence, securing ministerial posts since 2010. Among them are former party leaders such as Michael Howard and the current Home Secretary Theresa May. Solid empirical data serve to illuminate certain puzzling stances that the Conservatives took. For example, why some issues the party had been associated with – to their detriment, such as Europe – had become less toxic over time but others had not. Howard saw the issue of Europe and the euro as having been ‘neutralized’ by Labour’s pledge to hold a referendum on the issue, whereas this was not the case for immigration policy, so it seemed to make sense to use the issue to show dividing lines between the parties.
The text focuses on the Conservative Party largely through the actions of significant actors – including politicians and policymakers. It considers the impact of their ‘actions, perceptions and strategies’ as they sought to get a grip on the Party’s repeated electoral failures at a national and local level during this period. There is a clear focus on the impact of different party leaders with regard to their preferred issues, their understanding of the party’s poor image and how they tried to wrestle with competing electoral pressures. It is a nuanced look that is charitable towards the leaders of the Party between 1997 and 2005; they were not as inept and misguided as popular opinion might suggest. In fact, as Hayton states, the leaders were, to some extent, successful, in gradually building the party up into a (nearly) election-winning machine once again. Hayton argues that Hague is to be thanked for ‘renewing the party organisation and reducing internal tensions over Europe’ (p. 8), whilst Duncan Smith played a role in ‘renewing policy’ (p. 8), and Howard went some way towards bringing the party together. It is a pity, perhaps, that there is little attempt to focus on the party beyond the elite level, though understandable, given constraints of space. Future work that looks at the party at the level of activists, or even, ordinary party members, during this period would be a valuable companion to this work.
The book ends with a thoughtful chapter that scrutinizes Cameronism – or should that be ‘Cameroonism’? – with a heavy emphasis on the modernization project with which Cameron has been associated. Much of Hayton’s text serves to give context for the emergence of Cameron’s particular brand of conservatism, which is regarded as a limited reconstruction, rather than a more comprehensive break with the past. For a party that often prides itself on having little interest in ideology, Hayton skilfully argues that the ‘intellectual uncertainty’ over the future of conservatism contributed to the complications that the Conservatives endured with regard to renewing their relevance.