Abstract
Finland belongs to the long-standing Western democracies; indeed, a few comprehensive cross-country comparisons have produced important information on Finnish politics in relation to other democracies (Arter, 2008; Bengtsson et al., 2014). Individual journal analyses excluded, however, seldom has its political developments gained scholarly interest as a case in its own right (cf. Pesonen and Riihinen, 2002). The field has lacked a comprehensive approach that would critically evaluate the impact of political and social history of Finland to coalition formation and voting behaviour. Although implicitly comparative in character, Lauri Karvonen’s new book seeks to fill this void and succeeds with flying colours. The author seeks to ‘tell the story of what happens to parties, governments and voters when the fundamental features that conditioned party-formation and voter alignment undergo a rapid transformation’ (p. 2). The emphasis of this book is, thus, on the rapidity of development of Finnish society to a modern, advanced welfare state but, more importantly, on the lateness of this development and its fundamental consequences to the whole Finnish political system.
The book builds upon three main analytical components: parties, governments and voters. There is an explicit idea on the chain of causality between these three elements: supply guides demand and, therefore, the patterns of voting behaviour can be understood only against the background of change within parties and transformation of government coalitions. Six chapters of the book follow this causal order and form a theoretically coherent entity. Methodologically, the approach taken in the chapters varies from analytical historical review to detailed quantitative analysis of voting patterns. As to the latter approach, one might question if there is anything new to say about West European voters. However, it should be remembered that systematic analysis of Finnish citizens’ voting behaviour has only been possible recently. As for detailed survey data, Finland used to lag behind other Nordic countries, Germany and the United States – and only established a permanent National Election Study Program in 2002.
The introductory chapter provides detailed information on the main events of Finnish history, describing its basic institutional setting and main characteristics of the current parliamentary parties. Though hardly providing new information for a Finnish commentator, for those less familiar with the country’s political institutions, this overview is essential for understanding the argument developed, particularly in the second chapter that analyses the transformation of the Lipset–Rokkan model and the extent to which a frozen party system has melted down. The geopolitical position of Finland has been a key component in this transformation: the relationship with Russia as well as membership of the Nordic community have both shaped the Finnish party system and interparty relations and finally, in the late 1960s, changed the emphasis of the whole political system from conflict to consensus.
Despite these peculiarities of Finland related to geopolitics, the development of Finnish parties, introduced in the third chapter shows significant similarities with the developments of parties elsewhere in Western Europe, including weakening party-voter ties and dependence on state funding. In Finland, however, the decline of ideological polarization has been rather steep. This depolarization has also produced increasingly stable cabinets, fuelled by the stepping down of President Kekkonen and constitutional reforms related to powers of both the opposition and the President. Indeed, the extreme instability of the first three postwar decades has been replaced by an era of surplus coalitions that stay in power for full 4-year period and that are largely independent of support from the political opposition. Though guaranteeing stability in times of crisis, multiparty coalitions have also created problems of accountability. Whether this development will lead to weakening trust levels and a lack of legitimacy is left for a reader to ponder.
Even though the parties still have their specific ideological features that set them apart from each other, Karvonen’s expression in the sixth chapter – ‘The same old parties they may be but, even more, it may appear as if parties are now all the same’ (p. 107) – summarizes well the situation that Finnish citizens face in the current political system. True, structural and ideological divisions have weakened. As a by-product, however, turnout has declined and, more worryingly, more educated, better informed and more well-to-do citizens turn out to vote in polls more often. Thus, it is not the decline of turnout as such that is problematic, but the fact that this decline is biased. Added to that, the internal efficacy of Finnish citizens is comparatively low: ‘The consensual style of campaigning and governing…makes it difficult for citizens to judge what the political alternatives offered in elections really are’ (p. 143).
‘Finland is a Nordic country with a vulnerable geopolitical location’ – this is how Karvonen summarizes the two main factors in Finland’s political and social history that have affected its political system (p. 145). Cross-pressures from Nordic neighbours and a shared border with Russia have pulled Finland in opposite directions and affected party formation, interparty relations and voter alignments. In the past, Finland has been particularly vulnerable to external impulses, which have made the role of governments and parties particularly significant. Supply has indeed guided demand. Though this argument is convincingly justified and goes smoothly throughout the book (though, surprisingly, it is not imposed on the conclusions), it draws a rather passive picture of Finnish citizens who only try to adapt to the turbulence of society.
Perhaps this emphasis is partly unintentional, but the reader cannot help thinking that the role of demand is guiding supply. In contemporary Finland, new issues arose increasingly onto political agenda from civil society; for example, in the form of political parties intended to ‘shake the old party system’ (in particular, the rise of the True Finns in the 2011 ‘earthquake’ elections) and since the government’s own initiatives enabled it (for instance, a state-level citizen’s initiative, adopted in 2012). Parties are forced to react to these new, often sociocultural issues. Thus, the increase of consensus and withering of political and economic divisions may raise new conflicts that are based more on globally shared dimensions and less dependent on the societal development of the nation state.