Abstract
Many of the criticisms commonly made of modern political parties concern their alleged lack of transparency and use of informality in their inner organization. Yet, little is known about the extent to which parties really bend their rules. This article investigates whether and how political parties use informality in one central aspect of intra-party life: candidate selection. More specifically, selection procedures for European elections are examined since party actions at the European level are still under little scrutiny from the media and the voters, hence granting them much leeway. To compare rules with practices, actors and levels cited in 51 party statutes are matched with their uses in 2014, gathered through a survey and interviews of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Even though informal processes are found to be generally less inclusive than the rules prescribed, divergences are often modest, suggesting that parties do not necessarily rely on informality in their day-to-day functioning.
Introduction
Are rules meant to be bent? Although the importance of informality in politics in general, and in political parties more specifically is often alluded to, there has been only few attempts to account for informal practices in some of the central aspects of intra-party life, such as, candidate selection (Bille, 2001; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris, 1996). If the first research on political recruitments has compared selection committees to ‘smoke filled rooms’ and intra-party processes of nominations to ‘secret gardens’ (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), few studies since then have tried to push open these room doors and garden gates. Formal rules exist and can be identified in written party documents, but there might be differences between de jure and de facto decision-making organs (Norris, 2006: 93). The issue of informality, however, is crucial, as the consequences associated with candidate selection – in terms of intra-party competition and party cohesion (Serra, 2011), composition and functioning of parliaments (Erickson and Carty, 1991) and governments (Norris, 1997: 3; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008) – all develop from what has in fine been done during the nominations, not from what should have been done according to the rules. There is hence a need to mine below the surface of the statutory rules and to account for how informality operates in recruitments. 1
This article addresses this challenge by examining the way candidates are selected for the European elections. The little public scrutiny over European electoral processes makes list drafting ahead of European elections a privileged case for such analysis. First, since voters and media allegedly still devote little time to and interest in European Parliament (EP) elections (de Vreese et al., 2007; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011), political parties have a certain leeway in putting in place their selection processes at this level. Second, even when some attention is granted, it is often concerned with the outcome only, repeatedly showing that second-class politicians or even ‘political pensioners’ fill the EP’s ranks (Edinger, 2015). Attempts to understand how recruitment processes to the EP are conducted are relatively scarce and unsystematic (see Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger, 2015). A third and related reason to study these processes is that many studies simplistically rely on the postulate that candidate selection for European elections accrues to the party elites (Hix, 2002; Pemstein et al., 2015), while others have argued that candidate selection is a diverse phenomenon with a variety of procedures and effects (Bille, 2001; Field and Siavelis, 2008), and that there is no specific reason to assume that all parties would behave the same way and according to the exact same logics when choosing candidates at the European Union (EU) level (Faas, 2003). Last but not least, previous works suggest that the strong hold of national parties on their Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the legislature (in terms of voting behaviour) is due to their power in the candidate selection processes through which they can reward or punish incumbents (Frech, 2016; Hix, 2002, 2004). This article aims to analyse the exact patterns underlying these claims, by shedding light on how parties in fact select their candidates to the EP.
Parties control the access to elected offices through two subsequent processes: They establish the selection rules, by choosing between several possible procedures, and then use these rules to designate candidates (Pennings, 1999). When asking how candidates are really nominated, two empirical questions are more specifically raised: Do practices differ from rules in candidate selection processes? And if so, how? To the best of my knowledge, there has so far been no systematic cross-country study examining the extent to which national parties implement the formal rules they have set for themselves regarding candidate selection (with the exception of Meserve et al., 2017). To address this gap, this article compares the party documents of 51 parties (statutes, regulations) with the opinions of those who underwent the processes: the MEPs. This article is concerned with recruitment processes – that is, the different steps candidates have to go through to be designated as candidates for their party in European elections. It should be noted that recruitment processes are only one of several elements to be considered when studying nominations (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). The study concentrates on the two most studied dimensions of selection processes (Hazan and Rahat, 2010): the selectorate – that is, the party actors or organs in charge of selection – and the territorial level at which selection is conducted within the party. In terms of time frame, the analysis covers the last round of selection processes having occurred ahead of the 2014 European elections, a single time point allowing to maximize comparability.
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Most clearly, it contributes to the literature on party organizations. If practices do not concord with rules, this has implications for power distribution within parties as ‘the locus of effective control ranges accordingly’ (Gallagher, 1988: 4). By contrast, if informal practices corroborate the rules, this would essentially mean that reading the rules is sufficient. At the same time, this article modestly adds to the understanding of how parties organize in multilevel settings (for a framework, see: Deschouwer, 2003). After 60 years of European integration, little is still known about how parties have adapted to the complex EU institutional system – that they have, willingly or not, become part of. In that regard, one important dimension to consider is undoubtedly how they have accommodated different types of elections and electoral processes.
This article proceeds as follows. The first section stresses the importance of understanding informality in candidate selection, deriving expectations on the occurrence of informality and the format that rules-in-use may undertake. The second part expounds the data and methods. The third section presents the results, suggesting that, despite divergences between rules and practices – most notably in terms of inclusiveness of the processes – formal processes can often be used as a reliable predictor.
Theoretical considerations
Informal rules (hereafter designated as ‘practices’) are usually defined as unwritten (Helmke and Levitsly, 2004; Lipson, 1991: 498), non-codified, and non-enforceable publicly (Christiansen et al., 2003: 6). Bailey (1969: 3637) argues that any political structure should be analysed by first ascertaining what the rules are, but then by completing the analysis by examining how they are applied and adjusted to respond to modified circumstances. The occurrence of informality in the functioning of political parties has largely been recognized (Appleton, 1994; Offerlé, 1987). As a crucial and much-studied aspect of intra-party life (Ranney, 1981; Schattschneider, 1942), the selection of candidates to stand at elections is a privileged field for studying informality in parties. In the title of what is often considered the first account of selection processes, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) referred to these processes as a ‘secret garden’, clearly referring to their alleged informal nature. Since then, the need to look beyond formal selection rules has been largely acknowledged (Bille, 2001; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Shomer, 2014). Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008: 5), for instance, note that ‘we must carefully distinguish between the written rules of the game […] and the actual process by which candidates are designated’.
Despite this recognition, and by contrast with the burgeoning literature dealing with informality in the implementation of selection criteria, few studies have explored the difference between rules and practices in selection processes. The call to consider the ‘real story’ of nominations (Bille, 2001: 369) remains largely unanswered – with most exceptions being case studies and small N comparisons (see, for instance, Gherghina and Spáč, 2015). Researching informal processes of candidate selection is indeed sprinkled with methodological and empirical caveats, not least in terms of accessibility (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).
At the EU level, the way nominations are carried out has unequalled consequences on the behaviour of representatives. National political parties are often said to control their MEPs thanks to their quasi-monopoly in the selection of candidates through which they can reward or punish MEPs seeking re-(s)election (Frech, 2016; Hix, 2002). Deputies in the EP have hence a major incentive to vote according to their national party’s positions over others (their EP party group’s positions, their constituents’ interests) (Faas, 2003). This is all the more true when party-centred electoral systems and centralized candidate selection processes are used (Hix, 2004). In the past, this mechanism of ‘stick and carrot’ has largely been tempered by the limited interest of national parties in EU affairs (and the sheer absence of party positions on many of the issues discussed in the EP). Increased contacts between MEPs and their parties as well as the growing importance of EU matters for national parties are game changers in this regard (Raunio, 2000).
Studies of candidate selection procedures usually concentrate on two dimensions of these processes: the level of intra-party decision-making (the ‘decentralization’ dimension) and the inclusiveness of the selectorate (‘who’ selects) (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). To examine these two main dimensions, the most widely used typology is the one developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001). Selectorates are ranged from the most inclusive – that is, when all voters are eligible to take part in the selection of candidates (e.g. as in open primaries) – to the most exclusive – that is, when one single person (generally the party leader) selects candidates. Between these two extremes, decisions on selection within parties may be in the hands of various types of party actors. The second dimension of the analytical framework, decentralization, is most often considered through its territorial component. To complicate the picture further, selectorates and levels are often mixed, with several bodies intervening, while processes can be multistages.
Why informality should ‘rule’ candidate selection for European elections
It is generally assumed that party elites are in charge of designing and reforming candidate selection processes. In most countries, only very few constrains are imposed upon party organizations as to the format of their selection method, conferring much leeway to the elite at the time of choosing the party’s procedures (Serra, 2011). The central question of this study is hence whether and why would political parties come back on their initial intention.
There are theoretically several reasons why political parties can be expected to bend or ignore their selection rules, all the more those rules guiding nominations to European elections. 2
A first set of explanations derived from the rational choice institutionalist perspective contends that rules change when there is an alternative institutional arrangement which is seen as more efficient. Within parties, defects in rules often lead to the development of informal practices (Appleton, 1994: 49). As stated by Faucher-King (2007:116), ‘reforming formal rules is used to find solutions to insufficiencies of the organization’. Assuming that parties have unequalled discretion over candidate selection procedures, Krook notes that these procedures can ‘occasionally be revised when they serve the interests of the party’ (Krook, 2010: 161). Within rules, political actors have a certain latitude regarding what they can do to fulfil their goals and realize their interests (Erdmann, 2002: 329–330). Looking at the European electoral process, informality in recruitment might be a way to cope with party rules improperly matching the specificity of the EP elections. On the one hand, EP elections still represent a disturbing event for national political parties (differences in the electoral system used, unfavourable electoral results for otherwise larger parties, etc.) (Lord, 2002), which often cannot use rules devised for other elections and have to reconsider their goals. On the other hand, the still dominant idea that there is ‘less at stake’ during these contests (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) is largely acknowledged to lead parties to devote less time, effort and energy into them (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Lord, 2002). If that is the case, selection rules are likely to have been simplistically drafted in the first place and may need to be reinterpreted.
In the same line of thoughts, party goals having prevailed at the time of the elaboration of the rules may significantly differ from those prevailing at the time of the selection. Party theory has for long recognized that party change (including towards informality) may be triggered by external shocks that impact on party goals. The EU level in general is often seen as disturbing for national parties insofar as it forces them to engage in issues that are remote from their core business. But it is above all EP elections that are disruptive of domestic political forces’ state-centric ways of doing things. Elections to the EP introduce an additional ‘general election’ – at least in the sense of everyone voting at the same time in a given member state – requiring adequate organizational means from parties. These contests have been shown to lead to tensions in coalitions and even to party splits (Lord, 2002). And as already mentioned, they are based on an often unfamiliar electoral system to which parties have to adapt, while inducing electoral results that quite radically differ from those of national elections. As such, EP elections and the processes surrounding them constitute external stimuli, and such ‘shocks’ are likely to impact on party goals and organization (Harmel and Janda, 1994).
Second, actors may also resort to informal procedures to overcome the dysfunctions imposed by conformity to the rationalized myths of the environment in which they operate. To a large extent, parties have been forced to adapt to a ‘democratization imperative’, with at best uncertain effects on the outcomes (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015), especially in terms of party cohesion (Serra, 2011). Ambivalent or even costly outcomes may lead them to turn away from this alternative in fine. In addition, party actors feel under less scrutiny when acting at the EU level – as voters and media alike are recognized to devote less attention to these processes (de Vreese, 2003; de Vreese et al., 2006; Reif and Schmitt, 1980) – and may hence more freely set aside normative considerations.
Third, informality may be used as a reaction to dysfunctions caused by diverging interests. Barnea and Rahat (2007) see the implementation of selection processes’ reforms as driven by intra-party struggles, with politicians trying to defend their status in the party hierarchy or to promote their view of the party’s collective interest. Offerlé had also noted that: Statutes are constraints accepted by those who have managed to institutionalize a certain balance of forces inside the party, and are resources that can be used against certain adversaries. […] Far from regulating everything, statutes give way to a game that allows the emergence of groups and structures. (Offerlé, 1987: 57)
This does not mean, however, that practices implemented within parties should always be expected to set aside the rules. There are contradictory evidence. The scarce existing attempts at examining informal processes of selection have in fact come to the conclusion that the ‘real story’ is not that different from the official story (Bille, 2001). A similar conclusion is reached by Holland (1986) regarding the selection of UK candidates to the first direct EP elections; he evidences that most parties had respected their rules. In Poland, Radecki and Gherghina (2015) show that parties display leadership selection practices largely matching the ‘formal story’. Why may party nevertheless abide by their own rules? First, rules undeniably constitute a safeguard for parties. A given party statute ensures internal governance and legitimizes the political behaviour and decisions taken in the party’s name (Gherghina, 2014). Additionally, parties may legally have only limited authority in adopting practices insofar as some countries have adopted state regulations constraining the party organization in its internal affairs. A well-known case is the United States where state law regulates most aspects of candidate selection, but rather strong regulations also exist in some European countries such as Germany where regional and local party conventions are to nominate parliamentary candidates. Finally, the argument of an EU-level exceptionalism in recruitment patterns has probably lost relevance; the need to adapt to a new politico-institutional setting that has been underlined after the introduction of direct elections (Hix and Lord, 1997: 2) may not be entirely relevant anymore. Almost all parties – with the exception of newly created and Croatian ones – have been interacting with ‘Europe’ for at least a decade, so that short-term adjustments involving informality should remain numerically marginal. Quite the opposite, given the minimal importance granted to these processes (in line with the ‘less at stake’ assumption), parties may have less incentive to deviate from the formal rules.
If these insights moderate expectations of radical divergence between rules and practices, the vast majority of previous works concord on the idea that the alleged democratization of candidate selection processes in European political parties is likely to be only a ‘façade’, allowing for a strategic use of the rules by the party actors. If parties turn away from their rules, whatever the extent at which they do, this is likely to be evidenced by a different set of party actors (and levels) taking control.
How may selection practices differ from rules?
There might be, on the part of party elites or executives in charge of designing the rules and implementing the intra-party processes, two main kinds of motivations explaining the ways in which informal practices may diverge from formal rules. On the one hand, unexpected circumstances around the time of implementation of the selection processes (but after the enactment of the rules) may lead parties to set aside the rules. On the other hand, party elites may have devised rules with, from the beginning, the intention to circumvent them. To be sure, this research does not start from the assumption that formal selection processes for European elections are very inclusive, but it argues that diverging practices are likely to run against a ‘democratization’ of the processes. Clearly, the above-mentioned ‘democratization’ imperative or trend has put pressures on the parties to devise rules that look grass-roots-oriented, but which may be in contradiction with parties’ strategies and short-term constraints. Most often, this has been evidenced with party elites ultimately regaining control. 3 Power reappropriation by the party leadership even occurs where it is less expected: in the ‘mass party’. This observation is even at the heart of what is often acknowledged to be one of the very first theories of party organizations; Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (1915). In the words of Katz (2001), if intra-party democracy was the democratic ideal of the mass party, ‘in reality, of course, it was often the party in central office, theoretically the agent of the party on the ground but more often its creator and master, that dominated’ (Katz, 2001: 284). The ‘cartel party’ thesis from the outset assumed that the opening-up of party procedures which gives power to party members or even supporters is above all a strategy of party elites to short-circuit the middle-rank activists and in fine be more autonomous – that is, keep power for themselves (Katz and Mair, 1995). Applying the model to explain candidate selection, Katz states that if leaders democratize candidate selection in form, they subsequently will want to limit the constraints imposed upon them. One way to do so is by regaining control in practice thanks to the disorganization of the party on the ground to which the nomination power was formally conferred. As such, the ‘expansion of the selectorate can be an elite strategy to defang the base’ (Katz, 2001: 293). Wuhs (2006) shows how in Mexico the trend towards more open selection procedures has been matched with party leaders’ preserving their influence and activists being given side compensations. In a different theoretical perspective and despite scarce evidences, the literature on the ‘Europeanization’ of political parties underlines that the integration process has led to shifts of power within the party organizations, of which political elites are thought to be the main beneficiaries (Poguntke et al., 2007). If such is the case, it should primarily be given to see in European-level processes as, as Bawn et al. (2012) argue, a lack of voter interest upholds the positions of groups that were already in favourable positions in nominations.
In line with the ‘second-order’ theory, the reduced interest of parties in European elections should also lead them to turn to more exclusive processes for practical reasons: They are simply willing to invest less time and means in these contests. Clearly, organizing open or even closed primaries is more costly in terms of money, personnel and time than holding a meeting of a more restricted circle of persons.
At the same time, regarding decentralization, previous literature has suggested that by entrusting and confining local and secondary issues to the decentralized party branches, autonomy of the central elite at the national level is ensured (Eldersveld, 1964; Katz, 2001). Conferring selection for an election that the leadership cares little about to decentralized party organs is a way to appease claims on their part without being too costly to the central party. Holland (1986: 186–187), for instance, evidences that the selection process for Labour candidates prior to the 1979 EP elections in the United Kingdom was in fine conferred to decentralized party bodies despites rules providing otherwise, which he sees as a marker of the disinterest of the party in these contests.
For Helmke and Levitsky (2004), shifts towards informality may either alter the spirit of the rules, their letter or both. Alteration in the implementation of selection processes for European elections, however, is likely to alter the rules’ spirit, for two main reasons. First, parties have been found to open their selection methods to regain legitimacy through a renewed public image, and to retain voters and members. The lack of scrutiny of EP elections by the media and the voters makes the achievement of these objectives unlikely and is likely to hinder ‘democratization’. Second, holding open nominations is generally thought to encourage intra-party competition (Rahat et al., 2008). Yet, at the EU level, there is on the part of the parties a need to accommodate left over politicians from other electoral contests, and an unequalled opportunity to choose representatives beholden, and hence loyal, to the party. Undoubtedly, both of these contradict the democratization ideal, and are more easily achieved if selection is made behind closed doors, whatever the rules dictated.
Data and methods
This article focuses on the 2014 European elections and examines the selection processes of major political parties having participated in these contests. It aims to assess how candidate selection processes really work. National political parties constitute the unit of analysis insofar as they are the main gatekeepers to elected office. This is particularly true of EP elections: Although member states have opted for quite different voting systems under the proportional representation rule, 4 most of these can be considered as ‘party-centred’ systems using fixed lists and/or large constituencies (Bowler and Farrell, 1993). 5 Partly as a result, very few candidates running as independent are elected to the Strasbourg assembly (only 3 of 751 in 2014). Additionally, in some EU countries, only political parties or political organizations are allowed to submit nominations – such is the case e.g. in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, and Sweden.
This study builds on a new and unique data set recording the formal and informal candidate selection processes used in the political parties of the 28 member states in view of the 2014 European Parliament elections. Because of the meso-level at which the study is conducted, selection was made on the highest number of cases possible, based on availability and comparability of the data. Parties not represented in the eighth EP were excluded; not only does the PR system ensures that the main parties are represented in the European assembly, but the often temporary and unstable nature of the groups of actors involved in the building of more marginal lists also makes their actions difficult to trace.
Formal rules were collected in the statutes and documents of the parties through an experts’ questionnaire. 6 Practices having prevailed were gathered through MEPs semi-structured interviews conducted between January and April 2014, and an MEPs’ survey realized between January and October 2015. Clearly, those are data sources of a very different nature. Yet, all questionnaires have been designed as part of an integrated project and aimed at comparability from the very beginning, increasing the reliability of the data thus collected. On the one hand, sample selection for interviews 7 was based on the countries’ size (with all countries with 50 MEPs or more being included), geographical balance (North-South, East-West) and variation in terms of party system characteristics. 8 Interviewed MEPs were asked to describe the process they went through and to point out the most influential organ(s) within these processes. Since the interviews took place before the elections were held, only interviews with MEPs from parties which then gained representation in the eighth EP and which displayed clear written selection rules (hence allowing comparison with the rules recorded by the experts) were retained for inclusion in this study – in total, 31. On the other hand, the survey included, among others, questions on the process of selection MEPs underwent in 2013–2014, as well as on the most influential organ(s) in their nomination. 9 It was administered online, in two of the EU’s working languages (the MEPs could choose to fill in a French or an English questionnaire). The email inviting the MEPs to complete the survey was accompanied by a message from their respective EP group coordinator in the Constitutional Affairs Committee. All MEPs (except those elected as independents) were contacted to take part in the survey. Yet, only 61 of them did take part, amounting to a response rate of 8.2%. After a careful examination of the answers and after dismissing the MEPs whose parties did not have clear formal rules, 38 were retained for the analysis. It should be noted that representatives are just one possible category of relevant actors to be asked about informal selection (see, for instance, Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016). Focusing on the MEPs has, however, proved particularly fruitful in terms of accessibility, and interviewed MEPs have also proved particularly unrestrained in their answers and inclined to share their experience. Overlaps between survey and interview data (several MEPs from the same national party taking part in the survey and/or the interviews) reduced the sample to 51 parties. Such overlaps, which happened in 11 cases, indeed proved useful to cross-check the information provided. In this regard, confidence in the measure is increased by the fact that when more than one representative per party answered, responses given displayed remarkable similarities. 10 In the few cases of divergence, however, the organs and levels cited by all respondents were considered as the baseline answer. After all, the literature has largely anticipated that different candidates may face different selectorates (see, in particular, Hazan and Rahat, 2010). In total, 69 MEPs from 51 parties in 18 countries were retained. 11 The relatively small number of MEPs from each party and country included in the study undoubtedly raises concerns as to the representativeness of the sample. Calculating the (Duncan) index of dissimilarity, 12 however, shows that the sample is reasonably representative of the EP population in terms of both country (index score of 0.333) and EP party group (0.202).
In the next section, the information collected in the rules and practices is systematically compared. To do so, first, the party organs and level cited in the formal rules (those present in the party statutes and documents’ provisions on candidate selection for European elections) as well as those mentioned by the MEPs were coded using the above-mentioned typology of Rahat and Hazan. To do so, I make use of two measures of inclusiveness and one measure of decentralization in the following manner: The (party) actors present in both formal and informal processes were given an inclusiveness score as indicated in Figure 1.
13
The overall selectorate score for each party was subsequently calculated as the arithmetic mean of the scores of all actors present
14
within a party’s process.
15
Another assessment of the difference in terms of selectorate’s inclusiveness between rules and practices is made through a direct comparison of actors present in both processes, in order to determine whether informal practices are more exclusive (or inclusive).
16
The same direct comparison was done for decentralization,
17
based on Figure 2. For each party, the party level(s) at which selection should take place is compared with those at which it eventually did.
The inclusiveness of candidate selection methods.
The decentralization of candidate selection methods.
Second, I make use of the typology put forward by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) to highlight the ways in which practices differ from rules using a more qualitative assessment. The authors have identified four main alternatives through which informality may develop in organizations, depending on whether the practices implemented set aside the letter and/or the spirit of the formal rules.
Lastly, MEPs were asked in the survey and interviews to cite the party actor(s) that they viewed as most influential among the organs having intervened in the selection process of their party. 18 Although this is not part of the comparison between rules and practices per se – since rules generally assign their respective role to a set of actors, without clear indication of their respective power 19 – this measure is used as an indicator of where informality may lie.
Results
The divergence between rules and practices is first examined by means of a direct comparison between the inclusiveness score obtained by each party’s selectorate in the formal and informal processes (see Figure 3). It shows that formal rules are in general more exclusive than their informal counterparts. The mean for overall selectorate scores on the scale is of 3.26 for formal rules and only 3.09 for informal practices. A typical case is, for instance, that of EELV (France), where the formal rules only provided for delegates and members’ intervention. Informally, however, an electoral commission (‘Commission Permanente électorale’, CPE) also played a role in the elaboration of the lists in 2014, a practical modality greatly reducing the inclusiveness score. A more extreme divergence is to be found in Syriza (Greece), where rather undeveloped rules simply provided for party primaries (i.e. involving all members), while the surveyed MEP retraced his selection to a number of much more exclusive actors: the national executive, a body at the regional or local level, and an electoral committee. A number of cases, however, display an inverted pattern, such as the Irish parties, the Spanish PNV or the Finnish Vasemmistoliitto (Left Alliance). Overall, it should be noted the correlation between formal and informal overall selectorate scores is significant (at the level of p < 0.01), suggesting that informal rules are closely linked to formal ones. Practices do not develop in a vacuum. This seems to lend some support to the assumption that practices are largely built on pre-existing rules.
Formal and informal inclusiveness scores of candidate selection processes for European elections (N = 51).
Indeed, a careful examination of ‘who’ selects leads to acknowledge that the difference between rules and practices is rather minimal. The most striking feature of the direct comparison between formal and informal processes is perhaps the high number of cases where similar scores are obtained for both (as is, e.g., the case for most of the British parties, the two Polish parties represented in the sample, the Spanish party Podemos, etc.).
Looking at the sheer presence or absence of different levels and selectorates in the various processes, practices appear overall as more exclusive, but more decentralized, than rules (see: Figures 4 and 5). Yet again, it is above all the high level of concordance that is noteworthy, especially regarding the party levels in charge of conducting the nominations. For this decentralization dimension, one possible explanation of the predominant stability between rules and practices is that these processes overwhelmingly take place at the national level only. This phenomenon is probably partly attributable to the size of the constituencies prevailing for EP elections, which are either state-wide or not corresponding to any national constituency, and thus unmatched by party structures, as for example, in France.
The inclusiveness of informal practices versus formal rules (N = 51).
The decentralization of informal practices versus formal rules (N = 51).
Examining more in depth the passage from rules to practices, the different types of alterations to the rules were classified according to the above-mentioned Helmke and Levitsky’s typology. Results are displayed in Table 1.
Types of alterations to candidate selection rules.
It should be noted that one scenario, namely the absence of change, was not entirely foreseen by the initial typology – which aimed at examining change. In over one-fifth of the cases, the MEPs cited in their description of informal practices the exact same actors that were foreseen in party rules. This exact similitude occurs notably for the UK parties, which all had very detailed selection rules, hence arguably more difficult to bypass. Besides, in more than half of the cases, the informal processes do not clearly contradict or set aside the rules (complementary and substitutive informal practices). Total contradiction (competing informal practices), where actors and levels totally diverge between formal rules and informal ones, is nonetheless still to be found in one-fifth of the parties under scrutiny. The Nuovo Centrodestra (Italy) is a case in point; while primaries are foreseen by the party rules for each selection process, they simply never took place for European list-making in 2014, largely contradicting the spirit and letter of the rules. In total, three quarters of the parties under scrutiny did respect the letter of their rules when implementing them, and over half of the parties even abode by the rules’ spirit.
After their depiction of the processes they underwent, MEPs were further asked in the survey and interviews to cite the party actor(s) that they viewed as most influential among the actors they previously cited as having taken part in the actual process.
The results depicted in Figure 6 suggest that most inclusive party actors – that is, party elites – are de facto in charge of candidate selection for European elections and that members are also conferred some power, while middle-level party activists (delegates) are largely underrepresented. Party upper layers keep a firm hand on selection processes. If one would agree that candidate selection echoes power distribution within parties (Schattschneider, 1942), then my findings seems in line with the ‘cartel party’ thesis which posits that party central executive organs have managed to short-circuit middle-level activists. More generally, this also tends to corroborate instrumental approaches which see reforms as primarily beneficial to those who launch them. Party elites were expected to try to foster or defend their status in the intra-party hierarchy, and to do so primarily through change of the rules of the game (Barnea and Rahat, 2007), which they seemingly did. Indeed, bivariate correlations display a positive and significant relationship (p < 0.05) between, on the one hand, the difference of selectorate scores between rules and practices and, on the other hand, the selectorate score of formal rules. The more a selectorate is formally exclusive (involving party elites such as leader or the executive committee), the less practices will differ from rules. In mirror, the more a selectorate is inclusive in the rules, the more the practices will actually diverge. This confirms that dominant party actors have indeed adopted practices that allow them to remain or become in charge.
Most influential actor(s) in informal selection processes (number of citations of each party organ).
Conclusion
Informality often constitutes a major focal point for scholars who want to study the functioning of political parties. Recent studies have stressed the importance of studying informal practices in political nominations, largely based on the understudied assumption that formal procedures are not applied and thus provide an imperfect proxy for explaining how selection works within parties. Yet, another – somewhat contradictory – widespread postulate is that practices are best understood in their interplay with rules. This article has delved into these assumptions by examining whether parties do what they say they are doing when selecting their candidates for European elections. Results have shed light on both convergence and divergence between rules and practices. Parties put in place rules and neglect them in favour of practices, but not to the extent sometimes expected. Two key findings have been that practices rarely frontally oppose the written rules, but that when they do, practices are more exclusive than rules – thereby confirming a de facto power of party elites.
On the one hand, it has been evidenced that informality embraces various modalities and is inclined towards more exclusiveness but similar or even higher levels of decentralization. Most clearly, the careful – though only descriptive – examination of the formal party rules and its systematic comparison with insights from informal practices has confirmed that attempts at broadening selection processes – that is, conferring selection power to a larger pool of people – undergo many limitations in practice, the details of which would certainly deserve further investigation. Although a general trend towards more open candidate selection procedures is often acknowledged in the literature, informality may largely operate against these democratization patterns. On the other hand, the other main finding of this article is that all in all, informal processes of selection do not differ that much from formal rules, a finding in sharp contrast with that of Meserve et al. (2017). Although a majority of parties did not do exactly in practice what they had laid down in their rules, only a minority of them have implemented fully diverging processes; rules are more bent than breached. A number of processes even simply involve the same party actors as foreseen in the rules, while many others have implemented only minor changes. In the case of nominations for European elections, the formal rules can hence be used as a relatively reliable predictor of party actual behaviours. Future research avenues will have to turn to the question of why such (limited) divergences occur, and especially establish the role of party attitudes towards the EU therein. After all, parties are still largely expected to behave differently in that arena (Blomgren, 2015), which would argue against a generalization of the findings, and call for more comparisons to be made for other selection processes.
To repeat the core argument of this article, both formal rules and informal practices may matter in recruitment processes. It is therefore necessary to systematically decompose the processes, distinguishing both aspects, but considering them in their interaction. If parties were repeatedly found to respect their selection rules, this would question the emphasis often put on informality, and significantly ease the work of researchers on political parties. Of course, before such conclusions are drawn, other candidate selection processes and intra-party processes need to be examined. Recruitment studies also ought to be put in the balance with research on candidates (Daniel, 2015; Holland, 1986; Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). Informality is probably most pervasive in the social and political screening of candidates, an issue that has gone beyond the scope of this article.
Supplemental material
Supplemental Material, pp-2017-0204-supplementary_material - ‘I bend, indeed, but never break’: Formal rules and informal processes of candidate selection for European elections
Supplemental Material, pp-2017-0204-supplementary_material for ‘I bend, indeed, but never break’: Formal rules and informal processes of candidate selection for European elections by Gabriela Borz, Kenneth Janda and Camille Kelbel in Party Politics
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Karina Kosiara-Pedersen, Caroline Close, Simon Willocq and Emilie van Haute for comments on previous drafts of this work. Special thanks also go to the participants of the 2016 IPSA World Congress panel entitled ‘Contemporary Trends in Party Organization’, especially Gabriela Börz (convenor).
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Supplemental material
Supplementary material for this article is available online.
Notes
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
