Close ever,distant never? Integrating protest event and social network approaches into the transformation of the Hungarian far right

Abstract

In this article, we extend our understanding of fringe politics to include relational and thematic elements, namely, the relationship of far-right collective actors with their broader network and the claims made within it. Locating our analysis at the intersection of protest event and social network analysis, we focus on the far-right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) which, since late 2013, has committed to moderation. Analysing the protest events in which Jobbik took part and the types of claims upon which it mobilized between 2009 and 2017, we examine whether there has been a corresponding distancing from extremist groups and radical claims – a finding that would indeed validate the substantive transformation of Jobbik. By focusing on often neglected relational and thematic aspects, the study provides new ways to analyse fringe collective actors, the relationship with their environment and the evolution of such a relationship over time.

Keywords

far right Jobbik party change protest event analysis social network analysis

Introduction

Throughout the first two decades after the end of communist rule, Hungary attained a high degree of party system consolidation. Hungarian party politics swiftly gained a bipolar configuration and the two principal poles – the conservative and the socialist – remained practically intact until the late 2000s (Enyedi and Tóka, 2007). From 1998 onwards, the Hungarian party system was one of the most institutionalized in the region, due to voters’ orientation towards two main party preferences, that is, the national-conservative Fidesz and the Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP; Hungarian Socialist Party) (Casal Bértoa, 2014; Gherghina, 2014). Moreover, Fidesz’s consolidation as the driving force of the right contributed to the quick marginalization of the far-right Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP; Hungarian Justice and Life Party), making the country immune to far-right inroads for over a decade.¹

Immediately after the 2006 elections, the credibility of the MSZP started to wane amid political scandals and the implementation of draconian austerity measures (e.g. Enyedi, 2015). The 2010 general elections hence brought seismic changes, which helped reconfigure the status quo described so far. The landslide victory of Fidesz² and the entry to parliament of the far-right Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik; Movement for a Better Hungary) have set in motion a large-scale process of mobilization reconcilable with an enduring shift in the country’s electoral regime (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010; Pirro, 2019).³ Right-wing domination has been uncontested ever since, with steady support from over two-thirds of the electorate who have voted for either of the two parties through three consecutive national elections (2010, 2014 and 2018).⁴

Such regime oscillation has entailed a major process of adjustment to political contingencies by both parties. On the one hand, Fidesz has attempted to outflank Jobbik and woo its voters by turning into a fully fledged nativist actor (on nativism; Mudde, 2007: Ch. 1). In this regard, Fidesz’s emulation and co-optation of Jobbik policy proposals throughout the 2010–2014 term is certainly suggestive (Pirro, 2015, 2017). On the other, the leadership of Jobbik embarked on a path of moderation around late 2013, which was aimed at transforming the organization into a centrist people’s party (Bíró-Nagy and Boros, 2016). A move, we contend, dictated in equal measure by the government aspirations of the former leader Gábor Vona (2006–2018) and an increasing crowding on the right side of the left-right ideological spectrum.

These shifts resonate with the emerging literature on fringe politics that seeks to depict the discourse of mostly right-wing movements and parties and their fluctuating interaction with mainstream or core actors (Gherghina and Fagan, 2021). We use the attribute ‘fringe’ spatially, relationally and thematically to refer to forms of political activism (parties and movements) located at the ideological extremes of the predominant political cleavage (Arzheimer, 2011; Wodak, 2015).

Focusing on the Hungarian case highlights how the attribute of marginality is problematic in a context where the interaction between the ‘mainstream’ Fidesz and the ‘fringe’ Jobbik is hard to disentangle, and where radical stances are no longer marginal, either in spatial or electoral terms. We essentially note a growing pervasiveness of far-right politics in Hungary. It has been argued that the far-right Jobbik has at least in part instigated Fidesz’s radicalization since 2010 (Pirro, 2015). Given ongoing reshuffles within the right-wing camp, it seems compelling to investigate Jobbik’s dynamics of change along the lines of (asserted) deradicalization. The article thus calls for a refined understanding of the fringe quality and looks at the networks where material and symbolic resources are mobilized and circulated within a specific field of action.

We argue that distinguishing between fringe and mainstream political actors should be based on relational as well as thematic elements. In this sense, the so-called fringe actors – in our case, Jobbik – may still qualify as such on the basis of their links with grassroots far-right actors (the relational element) and the types of claims made (the thematic element) across mobilizations occurring within these networks. For more substantive reasons, we are interested in evaluating Jobbik’s self-proclaimed moderation and rebranding since late 2013 by considering its relationships with actors belonging to the extremist milieu as well as the elaboration of contentious issues in the protest arena. In essence, we would associate a distancing from contentious politics, appraised as reduced coordination capacity as well as radical claim-making, with a move away from fringe politics.

The article is the first study to assess the transformation of the far right looking at developments in the protest arena, combining research techniques such as protest event analysis (PEA) and social network analysis. In order to ascertain whether Jobbik qualified as a fringe actor ahead of the 2018 general elections, we set out to map and explore the more or less radical network of actors around it and the claims made at protest events. The analysis relies on a unique dataset on the protest events and social network surrounding Jobbik, spanning a total of 9 years (2009–2017). In the following section, we lay out the theoretical starting points and a justification for focusing on the Hungarian case. Next, we elaborate on the data and methods used in our study before shifting our attention to the results of our analysis. In the concluding section, we discuss the findings of our article and relate them to the study of the far right and fringe politics at large.

Integrating relational and thematic elements into fringe politics

Within the existing literature, ‘fringe’ tends to be used to capture those forms of political activism (parties and movements) that sit at the extremes of the predominant political cleavage (Arzheimer, 2011; Wodak, 2015). This is seen to be ‘due either to their ideological position or to their smaller size’, including those parties that campaign for a single issue (Daniel, 2016: 807). The term is generally used pejoratively to describe those deemed to hold extremist views, often interchangeably with labels such as ‘niche’, ‘populist’, ‘protest’, ‘single-issue’, ‘radical’, ‘flash’ and ‘extremist’ (Daniel, 2016: 807). Within the European context, fringe parties are usually characterized as being Eurosceptic and are routinely studied from this perspective (Jolly, 2007). Such a broad definition is particularly problematic in Central and Eastern Europe where party and electoral systems lead to the persistence of a number of minor parties, not all of which are extremist or single-issue, hovering at the edges of mainstream parties and coalitions (Bakke and Sitter, 2013).

Given the need for greater clarity in identifying the ‘fringe’ element, our specific focus is what might be termed the ideological fringe, that is, far-right activism, rather than parties and movements that specifically represent an ethnonational minority or religious constituency, or that are simply small parties on the edge of governing or opposition coalitions. However, emphasizing ideological distance does not entirely circumvent contention and deliver conceptual clarity. Manifestations of fringe activism can be defined according to spatial metaphors, which have become the lingua franca of theorists of party competition (Laver and Hunt, 1992: 7). We have learned to reason in terms of distance, movement and direction in describing parties and the configuration of party systems (Benoit and Laver, 2006). Different arguments have been advanced to understand the impact and/or electoral performance of nativist fringe actors on the basis of their location along political or policy dimensions (Carter, 2005; Harmel and Svåsand, 1997; Pirro, 2015; Van Spanje, 2010). Our use of the term ‘fringe’ is both spatial and relational in the sense that we refer to the dynamic interaction between the fringe and the mainstream (i.e. our point of departure) as well as within the fringe sector itself (i.e. the focus of our analysis).

We note two problems when translating the fringe attribute, defined along spatial lines, to post-communist contexts not conventionally, or necessarily, characterized by the presence of relevant and self-standing Green/left-libertarian, far-left, far-right, ethno-regionalist and/or confessional parties; and where competition dynamics structured along ‘government vs. opposition’ or ‘mainstream vs. challenger’ patterns are less entrenched (Meguid, 2005). The first problem pertains to the intrinsic variance of fringe politics across contexts. Indeed, what happens when the major locus of party competition is the periphery of political spaces? Or when these stances no longer qualify as marginal in any strict electoral sense? The second problem relates to the separation between fringe movements and parties, and the neglect of one or the other in the assessment of politics at the margins. The neat partition of work between the scholarship on social movements and political parties is often grounded in the perception that these actors operate in different arenas and are motivated by different goals – the far right being a fitting case in point (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro, 2018; Pirro, 2019; Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018; Rydgren, 2007).

The ‘radicalisation of the mainstream’ witnessed across Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg, 2013, 2015) and, more precisely, the normalization of nativist and authoritarian politics, complicates the juxtaposition between ‘fringe’ and ‘mainstream’, but does not inherently strip fringe politics of its heuristic value. We enhance spatial elements subtending this concept with relational and thematic aspects. In other words, it may be possible to identify fringe actors through their links with more extremist actors operating at the grassroots level and their mobilization around contentious issues. In addition to their spatial location at the margins of political spaces (in our case, the far-right end of the ideological left-right continuum), we contend that fringe collective actors can sustain links with extremist actors and articulate a specific set of radical claims within these networks. Therefore, the more collective actors are embedded in networks of relations with fringe actors, the more they occupy central and strategic positions within them, and the more these networks become vehicles for radical claims, the more confident we could be about their fringe quality. There are of course a number of aspects pertaining to the ties and the size of networks, or the type of claims that need to be taken into consideration when analysing the fringe attribute of cases under investigation. In this respect, we believe that a thorough examination of networks that are developed by actors as well as of the themes that are raised and discussed within them can help us address the question of fringe politics in Hungary.

Hungary serves as a crucial case study to disentangle the coil of mainstream and fringe politics, especially in light of the influence ostensibly exerted by the far-right Jobbik on Fidesz’s ‘illiberal turn’ and the ensuing attempt by the first to transform into a moderate actor (Bíró-Nagy and Boros, 2016; Pirro, 2015). Indeed, the Hungarian case helps understand the underlying practices of fringe actors striving to become mainstream; it casts light on the foothold and links of these actors with the grassroots subaltern operating outside of the mainstream and institutional spheres; and finally, it is illustrative of the inherent fluidity between fringe and mainstream. Political competition between the ruling mainstream party (Fidesz) and the main opposition party (Jobbik) has progressively converged towards the terrain of the far right (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Positions of right-wing actors on the Hungarian ideological spectrum, 2002–2017.

This has occurred, though, without affecting their electoral performances. Over the past three general elections, the two parties have steadily captured over two-thirds of the vote. This seems an essential requisite to delve into the fringe quality of Jobbik. The Movement for a Better Hungary was formed as a party in 2003, drawing on a pre-existing network of Christian right-wing students. Ideologically located at the ‘right’ end of the ideological spectrum and organizationally at the intersection of movement and party forms (Pirro, 2014a; Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018), Jobbik has maintained a fringe profile throughout most of its political lifespan. Under the leadership of Gábor Vona (2006–2018), Jobbik was ostensibly set on a moderation track (from late 2013) with the intention of transforming the party into a centrist people’s party and, thereby, a respectable governing force.⁵

Irrespective of the criticism and defections prompted by this move, we feel that such commitment to moderation requires interrogation. What we are interested to ascertain is whether the ‘de-demonization’ strategy undertaken since late 2013 bore any substance, or has simply been a cosmetic exercise. We explore this by looking at Jobbik’s activity in the protest arena and specifically at its extra-parliamentary mobilizations, the social network sustaining them and their claims. Hence, our purpose is not to explain why such shifts have or have not occurred. Rather, our objective is to unveil ‘what goes on at the fringe’.

Extra-parliamentary mobilizations are deep-seated in Jobbik’s own history. Jobbik was thrust into the limelight following the 2006 anti-government riots and, most notably, through the activities of the paramilitary-like Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard)⁶ – contentious activities substantiating a pronounced interaction with the movement sector (Pirro, 2019). In 2009, moreover, Jobbik signed a formal cooperation agreement with the Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom (HVIM; Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement),⁷ Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws) and Magyar Gárda – organizations standing at the extremist fringe of the Hungarian far-right network. Jobbik has essentially granted continuity to pre-existing far-right groups and given consistency to a nativist milieu traditionally limited by poor organization (Pirro and Róna, 2018).

Sustaining links with such actors can be at least reconciled with our relational understanding of fringe politics. In a context where Jobbik is striving to deliver a moderate self-image, we would expect similar pre-existing links to be discontinued and involvement in contentious politics to diminish. Their relationships with the broader grassroots sector and their mobilizations in the protest arena would also resonate with their ‘movement party’ nature (Kitschelt, 2006). For a collective actor like Jobbik, which is seemingly transitioning from movement to party (Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018), conveying decreasing ties to the movement sector and coming across as increasingly less geared towards contentious politics would, in all probability, indicate its gradual institutionalization and, inter alia, the abandonment of ‘movement-party clothes’. On the whole, we wish to illustrate that the interaction between mainstream and fringe politics is not one-directional; a moderation strategy may not necessarily entail changing networks, tactics or claims.

Analysing this phenomenon beyond the electoral arena resonates with social movement studies, which have placed significant emphasis on the relational component subtending contentious politics (Diani and McAdam, 2003; Tilly, 2005). We value this starting point and call for a network-analytical approach combining insights from the analysis of protest events and networks in a dynamic fashion (Diani and Kousis, 2014). By placing our focus on networks and protest, we essentially emphasize ‘relations among actors and the shared understandings they entail’ (Tilly, 1995: 22). Similar persuasions have only seldom informed the study of the far right. With this study, we set out to reveal interplays among far-right collective actors and ascertain their durable relations or contingent interactions (Diani and Mische, 2015). The actors and relations subtending far-right networks are therefore seen as interdependent, rather than independent, and such interplays meant to satisfy organizational and symbolic functions (Diani, 2003).

Research design and data

This study seeks to ascertain whether, and to what extent, Jobbik has moved away from fringe politics after 2013. We understand ‘moving away’ from fringe politics as a process of distancing – relationally and thematically – from far-right politics in terms of collective actors and contentious issues. We particularly seek to answer the research question above starting from the analysis of protest events, which will allow us to (a) reconstruct/map the (more or less radical) network of actors around Jobbik and (b) chart the types of claims, suggesting that their radicalness can be assessed on the basis of the themes’ substantive contents. The underlying assumption is that distancing from more extremist actors and radical claims would entail becoming more marginal within far-right networks, at the same time using these network ties to make less radical claims.

Our basic unit of analysis is the protest event. Protest events fall under the umbrella of ‘unconventional’ political participation (Teorell et al., 2007) and largely reflect those ‘repertoires of contention’ presented by Charles Tilly in his work (e.g. Tilly, 2008). Protest events are privileged over other types of events (e.g. meetings and direct-democratic actions), for they are indeed more likely to include extremist actors. In this sense, we do not require a minimum number of participants for such events, nor limit our enquiry to specific issue fields; instead, we rely on a detailed list of specific action forms (Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kriesi et al., 1995). A codebook was created ad hoc, providing guidelines for the codification of protest events retrieved through multiple online sources: the Jobbik official website (www.jobbik.hu) and two major/quality Hungarian news portals (www.index.hu and www.hvg.hu). Our analysis predominantly focuses on Jobbik; all data collected refer to events in which Jobbik has partaken, in one way or another. In this regard, we treat Jobbik’s organization of/participation in events in the same manner since there is a clear and public recognition of its involvement in partisan and non-partisan media sources. Nonetheless, information about the involvement of HVIM, the different/successive incarnations of the Magyar Gárda and Betyársereg – formally part of Jobbik’s network following the abovementioned agreement – has been also gathered separately through the analysis of respective organizations’ websites.⁸ Additional searches were predisposed to also account for those events recurring on an annual basis: 1848 Revolution celebration (15 March), Jobbik May Day celebration (1 May), Day of National Unity (from 2010, in remembrance of the Treaty of Trianon; 4 June), Magyar Sziget Festival (organized by HVIM; July–August), St. Stephen’s Day (20 August) and 1956 Revolution celebration (23 October).⁹

We are aware of potential problems relating to selection bias, that is, sources and media selectively reporting on protest events (Andretta and Pavan, 2018; Davenport, 2009). While not aiming at unearthing the entire universe of events in which Jobbik has partaken, we believe that the systematic and unrestrained collection of data through multiple (partisan as well as non-partisan) sources between 2009 and 2017 goes a long way to reduce these problems. Our multiple event recognition strategy represents a significant advantage compared to the standing sampling practices in PEA, which restrict collection efforts to circumscribed coverage periods (Hutter, 2014). Regarding the time span covered by our analysis, we deem 2014 as a critical watershed in Jobbik’s ‘mainstream turn’. We indeed argue that, after publicly elaborating on the opportunity to deliver a more moderate self-image, the effects of this strategy were mostly visible through the 2014 electoral campaign (Bíró-Nagy and Boros, 2016). In order to account for developments occurring prior to and after this point, we cover a total of 9 years from Jobbik’s year of entry to the European Parliament (i.e. 2009) to 2017. Data collection ultimately returned 201 events, from which we extrapolated and coded information about the types of event, actors involved, claims made and frames used.¹⁰

Data collected in this way were organized and analysed following a twofold approach. On the one hand, in order to characterize protest events in which Jobbik participated, we adopted a typical PEA approach (Hutter, 2014). More precisely, events collected from the above-mentioned sources were coded with particular respect to the moment in time in which they occurred, the main type of protest repertoire adopted, the organizations participating alongside Jobbik and the claims made in these occasions. Our analysis concentrated not only on the number of events in which Jobbik has partaken but also on the type of protest activities it undertook in these circumstances, under the conviction that a progressive distancing from fringe politics would correspond to a lower number of direct collaborations with extremist actors as well as to a sustained preference for non-violent protest techniques.

Starting from the list of collective actors participating at each event, we reconstructed Jobbik’s ego network in the two periods. An ego network is a particular network centring on a specific actor (ego) and involving the nodes it connects to (alters) and the ties among all these actors (Borgatti et al., 2013). By comparing the structural characteristics of Jobbik’s ego network, particularly in terms of composition and cohesion, and by examining the mediation role it played for other far-right actors, we could assess its involvement and relevance for the far-right milieu across the two periods.

At the same time, we also integrate our analysis with a more in-depth study of the claims made during protest events and, thus, endorsed by Jobbik and its partners. Previous studies of protest campaigns have underlined the relevance of claims as true ‘connectors’ among protest events occurring at different timepoints and places (Diani and Kousis, 2014). Therefore, even in presence of a shift towards less violent and/or disruptive protest techniques, the elaboration of radical claims might still entail activity within fringe political boundaries. In the coding process, we relied on an exhaustive pool of 27 issue themes; 25 issue themes were eventually addressed at protest events.

Results

Protest events and protest repertoires

On the basis of the self-proclaimed moderation trajectory taken by Jobbik, our analysis distinguished between (allegedly) ‘radical’ (2009–2013) and ‘non-radical’ (2014–2017) phases, returning 147 and 54 events, respectively.

By looking at Jobbik’s involvement in protest activities during the two phases, as well as at the type of protests it enacted, our results seem to suggest a retrenchment from the protest arena and a progressive distancing from the fringe. Indeed, events retrieved and reported upon for 2014–2017 amount to approximately 37% of those of the previous period (Table 1). Moreover, the repertoire of events changed rather substantially. In the first phase, a variety of protest techniques was adopted, ranging from demonstrative and non-violent ones – such as legal and non-violent marches – to more disruptive acts of symbolic violence (e.g. burning of flags) or physical violence against people. Conversely, in the second phase, protest activities were mainly carried out through public assemblies and legal, non-violent demonstrations. Common to the two periods is the organization and participation in festivals – events that have traditionally functioned and generally continue to serve as summoning events for a number of far-right collective actors.

Table 1.

Types of protest events, per cent.

	P1	P2
Public assembly	39.5	53.7
March/demonstration (legal, non-violent)	49.7	38.9
Vigil/picket	1.4	0.0
Illegal demonstration	0.7	0.0
Boycott	0.7	1.9
Blockade	0.0	1.9
Symbolic violence	1.4	0.0
Limited destruction of property	1.4	0.0
Physical violence against people	1.4	0.0
Festival	4.1	3.7
Total (N)	100.00 (147)	100.00 (54)

Note: Phase 1 (P1): 2009–2013; Phase 2 (P2): 2014–2017.

Although Jobbik’s protest repertoire did not highlight violent or disruptive techniques, its progressive simplification from the first to the second period shows an increased tendency to ‘meet and discuss’. In the second period, confrontational types of protest, such as boycotts or blockades, became truly exceptional. Notably, violent protest repertoires completely disappeared from its tactics and public assemblies turned into the preferred type of action, even outnumbering marches and demonstrations.

Jobbik’s ego network: Composition and internal dynamics

Similar considerations can be made with regard to the network of actors around Jobbik in the two phases. As shown in Table 2, following the reduction of protest events, we can also observe a slimming down of its network of partners. During the second phase, the actors involved halved compared to the previous period (23 as opposed to 46), with a decreasing involvement of sport and music groups (see Table 2; Figures 2 and 3) and a consequent reshuffling of the network around three main types of collective actors: political parties; social movement and civil society organizations; and militia groups. Especially with reference to the political party category, it is worth noting that in the second phase Jobbik also partnered with liberal non-far-right parties such as Lehet Más a Politika (LMP; Politics Can Be Different), Együtt (Together) and Momentum. The occasion was offered by the 15 December 2017 demonstration against the State Audit Office decision to fine Jobbik (HVG, 2017). In this occasion, the above-mentioned parties decided to join Jobbik and stand up against what had been perceived as an arbitrary decision instigated by the Orbán government against its main political competitor – that is, a politically motivated act.

Table 2.

Type of actors in Jobbik’s ego network by phase, proportion.

	P1	P2
Political party	0.15	0.22
Social movement/civil society organization	0.28	0.26
Militia	0.35	0.43
Sport	0.11	0.00
Music	0.11	0.04
Other	0.00	0.04
Ego network size	46	23

Figure 2.

Jobbik’s ego network, 2009–2013.

Figure 3.

Jobbik’s ego network, 2014–2017.

Although the network around Jobbik has shrunk in size, also opening towards moderate political parties, representative actors of the extreme right have remained part of it also after 2014. Over time, Jobbik upheld links with actors such as HVIM and Betyársereg. The first is probably the oldest and one of the most significant irredentist far-right movements in Hungary. Its founder and honorary president, László Toroczkai, is a prominent figure within the Hungarian far right; he has served as mayor of Ásotthalom since 2013 as well as Jobbik vice president between 2016 and 2018. He lost a chairmanship bid to Tamás Sneider after the 2018 elections and was stripped of his Jobbik membership after challenging the party leadership on programmatic grounds. He eventually formed the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Home Movement) – of which HVIM now represents the youth wing – with other outgoing Jobbik members, in order to pursue a more radical nationalist platform. Betyársereg also figured as a militant extremist actor with a xenophobic and homophobic agenda. As far as our analysis stretches out, the group has taken part to Jobbik events until 2016.

Notwithstanding the lower number of events during the second phase, Jobbik’s engagement with social movement and civil society organizations such as HVIM remained substantially unaltered, while partnership with militia groups (e.g. Új Magyar Gárda, Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom, etc.¹¹) became more frequent. The reasons to engage with militia groups could range from substantial cooperation in the organization of events to an instrumental involvement to ensure security at events – a typical function exerted by these types of groups. Even so, the increased tendency to share common spaces with these groups would at least in part contradict Jobbik’s construction of a more moderate self-image. Within this context, we could also make sense of Pax Hungarica’s participation to three events across the two periods. Pax Hungarica qualified as an extreme-right actor in light of its militant neo-Nazi profile; the group, disbanded in 2017, appeared at commemorations organized by Jobbik in 2012 and 2015 (i.e. two Trianon Treaty commemorations and one 1956 Revolution celebration). We are however hesitant about Pax Hungarica being invited to join these events as Jobbik has repeatedly denied links with the group (Index, 2015).

A closer view at the structural characteristics of Jobbik’s ego network in the two phases sheds light on the different roles that Jobbik has played for the far-right milieu across the two phases. Table 3 shows that the partnership network of Jobbik slimmed down over time, while also becoming more cohesive. The density parameter, indicating the extent to which ego partners also tend to be partners among themselves (Borgatti et al., 2013: 274), shows that in the second phase, a greater proportion of actors in Jobbik’s network tended to participate in the same events. Differently put, in a context in which the number of protest events was lower, chances for far-right actors to cross paths at assemblies or demonstrations had become higher. Consistently, Jobbik’s capacity to broker relations between unconnected far-right actors did somewhat decrease – as shown by the lower brokerage coefficient in the second phase, which indicates how much potential an ego has to bridge disconnected alters (Gould and Fernandez, 1989: 91–93), but also by the lowering of the betweenness score (Freeman, 2002 [1979]), which indicates how often Jobbik mediated relations between far-right actors that did not take part in the same events.

Table 3.

Egonet features by phase.

	P1	P2
Size	46	23
Ties	220	94
Density	10.63	18.58
N components*	8.70	13.04
Brokerage*	0.89	0.81
Betweenness*	67.38	57.77

*Value normalized on ego network size.

Nonetheless, Jobbik continued to play a rather crucial role for the far-right milieu. Albeit slightly reduced, its brokerage capacity remained quite high, meaning that Jobbik continued to be a true weaver in the field regardless of the fact that far-right actors mobilizing alongside it tended to converge more at the same events compared to the past. This is further corroborated by the number of components that make up Jobbik’s ego network – that is, the number of subgroups that would be disconnected in its absence. During the 2014–2017 period, the absence of Jobbik would have generated more disconnection than in the past, when other actors – particularly, the Új Magyar Gárda and HVIM – also played a non-negligible brokering function.

An in-depth examination of Jobbik’s brokerage function discloses further details on the evolution of its weaving role in connection with – and, perhaps, in spite of – the assumed distancing from the fringes. In order to capture this, a useful metric had been examining the different brokerage roles that Jobbik played within its network. Typically, brokerage roles are assessed through a combined evaluation of the structural position of actors inside a network and their membership within specific subgroups, which is understood as affecting the type of intermediation that can be played. Five brokerage roles are typically identified (Gould and Fernandez, 1989; see Table 4). When all nodes belong to the same group, a broker plays a coordinator function. When two nodes belong to the same group and the third to another one, a broker can be either a gatekeeper or a representative depending on whether it is mediating the access to or carrying a message from its own group. When the broker belongs to a different group than that of the other two nodes, it acts as a consultant. Finally, when all nodes belong to different groups, a broker plays a liaison role.

Table 4.

Jobbik’s brokerage roles, per cent.

Brokerage role	Graphic representation	P1	P2
Coordinator	A → A → A	1.4	4.5
Gatekeeper	B → A → A	16.9	23.3
Representative	A → A → B	16.9	23.3
Consultant	B → A → B	14.3	14.7
Liaison	B → A → C	50.5	34.2
Total (N)		100 (1395)	100 (292)

Table 4 shows the extent to which Jobbik plays different brokerage functions in relation to different groups of actors partaking in the events we mapped. Jobbik has worked constantly and mainly as a liaison between different groups, particularly to connect movement and civil society organizations with militia groups. While not renouncing this liaison function, in the second phase, it conveyed more efforts to mediate on behalf of, and in connection to, political parties, that is, the group it belongs to and that has committed more explicitly to. Interestingly, Jobbik surged to representative of, and a gatekeeper for, the political party category, particularly with reference to militia actors. Nonetheless, its coordination role for political parties remained marginal across phases. Instead, Jobbik focused on mediating relationships between other types of actors as well acting as a consultant. While in the first phase Jobbik essentially mediated to connect and coordinate social movement and civil society organizations, in the second phase, this consultancy function related mostly to militia groups, thus functioning as a connector for this specific category.

In sum, Jobbik’s role has not changed substantially over time. Besides retrenching from the protest arena, Jobbik has consistently served as liaison for different far-right actors in Hungary. However, as it entered the second phase, it started playing additional roles in a more systematic fashion, particularly as a representative of the far-right political party category and as a connector for militia groups.

Issue themes and claims

The starting premise of our investigation moved from a strategic course change by and large steered by chairman Vona. As the leadership has repeatedly made clear, this change did not alter Jobbik’s substantive policies but aimed at ‘repackaging’ its brand (Financial Times, 2015). Therefore, it is possible to argue that, even if the moderation strategy simply boiled down to a cosmetic change, this should at least reveal at the discursive level. In other words, the claim-making domain should be the most affected by Jobbik’s moderation strategy. As it turned out, a substantial variation was ascertained in the issue themes and claims made across the two periods (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Issue themes at protest events by phase, per cent.

The Roma question, usually framed in terms of ‘Gypsy criminality’ or ‘Gypsy terror’, had been Jobbik’s trademark issue on its way to parliament (Pirro, 2014b) and remained the most prominent issue throughout the first phase analysed in our study. Thirty-five (13.8%) of the 147 events retrieved during the 2009–2013 period referred to Roma – unsurprisingly, the most salient issue during this phase. The Roma issue was closely followed by the related questions of ‘security, order and law enforcement’ (11%). Protest events addressing ‘Jews, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism’ mounted to 10.2%. Other claims concerning national minorities abroad and irredentism as well as home defence returned 8.7% of the time.

In the second phase, anti-Roma claims disappeared almost completely. Only one event referred to ‘Gypsy-Hungarian coexistence’ (Index, 2017) among those retrieved as part of this study – that is, the 2017 May Day celebration. Most notably, ‘law and order’ claims, usually linked to the issue, were not detected during this period. Discursive priorities had in fact changed for Jobbik and its surrounding network. Between 2014 and 2017, the issue of immigration by far outweighed all other issues, with 17.2% of claims made at protest events. The timing and framing of claims are clearly in line with the politicization of the issue orchestrated by Viktor Orbán after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015, whereby the Prime Minister started investing in a long and costly campaign against refugees. At this point, it is possible to argue that Jobbik had been outflanked by Fidesz vis-à-vis radical nativist discourse, and the far-right movement party was compelled to adapt its rhetoric to the changing political scenario.

The issue of immigration tellingly appeared alongside claims on ‘Europe’ and ‘home defence’, indicating that, within the far-right network, immigration had been mainly framed as a matter of security for the country, the responsibility for which mainly rested on the European Union. Subject to a relative increase, the second most salient issue is ‘national minorities abroad and irredentism’, which was addressed at 10 of the 54 events (i.e. 11.5% of the time). Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism had been also on the wane, mounting to just 4.6% of claims. On a final note, it is worth mentioning that racist claims were singled out only in two occasions, both taking place during Summer 2015. The first event was an anti-immigration demonstration organized by HVIM centring on the protection of a ‘white and Christian Hungary’ from immigration where only selected Jobbik affiliates took part (HVG, 2015a). The second occasion was at St. Stephen’s Day celebrations in 2015, where former Jobbik vice president Előd Novák spoke of immigration in terms of ‘a threat of extinction for the white man’ (HVG, 2015b). Novák, one of the most radical figures within Jobbik’s upper echelons, was forced to resign from his position as a member of parliament in 2016 and has been a member of Toroczkai’s Mi Hazánk since its establishment in 2018.

Over time, Jobbik ostensibly shied away from the more radical claim-making that characterized its phase of electoral breakthrough. In the last phase surveyed in our study, Jobbik virtually dropped the contentious anti-Roma and anti-Semitic claims from its rhetorical palette and started focusing on the more salient issue of immigration. On the whole, while discursive moderation might have occurred, the relational aspect subtending similar strategic choices cannot be understated. Jobbik has veered towards different (and arguably less radical) discursive territories in response to Fidesz’s radicalization. There are elements suggesting that the governing party has set the political agenda (and its tone) during the 2014–2018 mandate, in turn influencing Jobbik’s discursive strategy. Therefore, no matter Jobbik’s attempts at delivering a more moderate self-image, radicalness should be also understood in relation to developments unfolding with Fidesz. In other words, if Fidesz surged to agenda-setter from a radical standpoint, any attempt by Jobbik to respond to his mainstream rival would necessarily involve adapting to Fidesz and, thus, the radicalness of its discourse.

Discussion and conclusions

Since late 2013, Jobbik has publicly committed to moderation in order to transform into a centrist people’s party. This move was essentially dictated by Fidesz’s nativist makeover and by a related crowding of the ‘right’ end of the political spectrum. With our study, we tackled the essence of Jobbik’s transformation by looking at developments occurring at the relational and thematic levels, hence offering a more nuanced understanding of (distancing from) fringe politics. In order to do so, we integrated protest event and social network approaches, assuming that Jobbik’s moderation trajectory would be consistent with a distancing from extremist actors within the far-right network and a moderate turn in its claim-making. The article therefore offered a novel and refined approach to study fringe politics in general, and the transformation of far-right collective actors in particular, combining research techniques geared towards mobilizations in the protest arena.

While a number of changes occurred between the years 2009 and 2017, they do not necessarily contradict Jobbik’s initial qualification as a fringe collective actor. Our analysis substantially provided a nuanced picture of Jobbik’s involvement at the grassroots level, its role within the far-right field of action and the evolution of its discourse. First, Jobbik has significantly reduced its levels of street mobilization. Differences ascertained between the ‘radical’ (2009–2013) and ‘non-radical’ (2014–2017) phases indicate a substantial retrenchment from the protest arena. These changes resonate with the lifecycle of a ‘movement party’ in transition from the movement to the party form that – though decreasingly so – still resorts to extra-parliamentary forms of mobilization on top of more conventional politicking within institutional arenas (Pirro and Castelli Gattinara, 2018). Within this changed scenario, Jobbik has notably enhanced its involvement in public assemblies – especially over marches and demonstrations – while giving up on violent forms of protest.

Second, while the far-right network surrounding Jobbik has thinned over time, the movement party’s role within it has possibly become more strategic. Jobbik has preserved its brokerage role as liaison between different types of actors and has been even more critical in linking militia actors to the rest of the far-right milieu over time. The movement party has substantially upheld relationships with HVIM throughout the period analysed, also becoming a crucial player for the whole post-disbandment Magyar Gárda galaxy, though we should also be aware that continued links with militia actors might often respond to security purposes at Jobbik events. As of late 2018, most relations with the HVIM and other extremist groups had been discontinued and Jobbik has also teamed up with liberal non-far-right parties against Fidesz – a prospect that has become more frequent since Orbán’s re-election (e.g. Reuters, 2018). This evidently suggests that the composition of the network around Jobbik may be further subject to change.

Third, by accounting for the claim-making embedded in protest events (Diani and Kousis, 2014), we tackled changes occurring in the discourse of Jobbik and its surrounding network. Critically, the Hungarian movement party has shifted its attention from ‘Roma criminality’ to anti-immigration, though not exclusively. This is hardly surprising, given the salience of the issue since 2015. At the same time, Jobbik has effectively toned down a good portion of its rhetoric and tried to reframe its claims along less radical lines. Hence, we could argue that the Hungarian movement party did not essentially turn into a centrist actor, nor did it alter its nativist backbone, but invested in keeping contentious claims and vocal members at bay.

The scholarship on fringe politics and the far right emphasize spatial interpretations of politics, which are overall only partially able to convey information about far-right organizations operating at the intersection of the protest and electoral arenas. Our findings on the Hungarian case resonate with such an assertion insofar as that, in order to appreciate the essence of changes within the far-right camp, more attention needs to be paid to what happens at the extra-parliamentary level. This is particularly so regarding any claims of deradicalization of fringe actors, which must be interrogated both relationally and thematically.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068819863624 - Close ever, distant never? Integrating protest event and social network approaches into the transformation of the Hungarian far right

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068819863624 for Close ever, distant never? Integrating protest event and social network approaches into the transformation of the Hungarian far right by Andrea LP Pirro, Elena Pavan, Adam Fagan and David Gazsi in Party Politics

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Andrea LP Pirro

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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