Exploring “knowings” in human movement

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore and develop ways to describe what there is to know, from the perspective of the one who knows, when knowing how to carry out a complex movement. The paper will challenge the distinction between mental and physical skills, drawing on theories of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1969), knowing how (Ryle, 1949) and knowing-in-action (Schön, 1991), together with empirical data from the context of elite sport. One assumption is that exploring knowing in movement, in this context, can contribute to developing students’ movement education in physical education (PE). Pole-vaulting provides examples of what there is to know, in terms of embodied capabilities possible to explicate and develop as an educational objective in PE, irrespective of the context of competitive sports. Explicating the knowing (or capabilities) involved in the “capability to move,” as exemplified in this study, could emphasize an educational aim concerning practical knowledge, such as knowing in movement, and not necessarily specific skills related to competitive sport activities.

Keywords

Knowing movement physical education pole vault practical knowledge sport theory

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore and develop ways to describe what there is to know, from the perspective of the knower, when knowing how to carry out a complex movement; in other words, to describe the practical knowledge of the knower. The paper thereby challenges the distinction between mental and physical skills. The paper also discusses an approach to teaching and learning movements, based on what specific ways of knowing are possible to develop when learning movements. Thus, the central issue is what there is to learn, rather than how a movement is learned. In pursuing this task, the paper draws on theories of tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1969, 2002), knowing how (Ryle, 1949) and knowing-in-action (Schön, 1991), together with empirical data from the context of elite sport. One assumption is that exploring knowing in moving in this context can contribute to developing students’ capability to move in physical education (PE).

Practical knowledge in education

One issue that is often debated in the context of professional craft (Marchand, 2008), dance (Ginot, 2010; Parvianien, 2002) and physical education (Carr, 1997; McNamee, 1998; Parry, 1998; Reid, 1996a; 1996b), as well as in arts-related subjects (Hetland, 2007) and art (Dormer, 1994) is whether practical skills can be discussed in terms of knowledge. Also, in the context of education, it seems to be problematic to conceive of practical skills as being of educational value. There is, for example, an emphasis on theoretical knowledge in sport science, as well as in physical education (Green, 2010; Hay, 2006; McNamee, 1998: 78, 2005: 5; Tinning, 2010), which may also be related to difficulties in understanding and explaining practical knowledge, such as knowing how to move in different ways (Polanyi, 1954: 385). In discussing the educational value of PE, Reid (1996b, 1997) for example, argues in favor of conceiving the practical dimension in PE as knowledge worth recognizing, although he emphasizes the difficulties in describing it: “…practical knowledge, unlike simple physical ability, calls for the exercise of our rational powers. The question is, how is this exercise of rationality described?” (Reid, 1996b: 98). This kind of practical knowledge was, and still is, an issue for discussion among philosophers of epistemology and educationalists (Arnold, 1988; Carlgren et al., 2009; Gustavsson, 2000; Janik, 1996; Liedman, 2002; Molander, 1996; Parviainen, 2002; Polanyi, 1969; Ryle, 1949; Schön, 1991; Shusterman, 2004). One central issue in this discussion is how to conceive of and describe knowledge, as well as different forms, types or aspects of knowledge.

Human movement and knowledge

Research on motor learning, motor control and biomechanics provides a substantial base for the theoretical knowledge of human movement. Research on motor control provides knowledge of the neuromuscular functions involved when performing movements; and learning how to perform movements has been an issue for research in the field known as motor learning (Magill, 2011). Research shows the benefits of observational practice combined with physical practice, instructions inducing external attention (the outcome/effect of the movement), feedback related to success and a high degree of self-controlled practice (Wulf et al., 2010). Additionally, using culturally-appropriate analogies (Poolton et al., 2007) and movement variability with a non-linear pedagogic approach seems to be useful when teaching and learning movements (Renshaw et al., 2010). There is also a comprehensive base of knowledge concerning how certain movements should be performed effectively, from the perspective of biomechanics (Hughes and Franks, 2008). There are, however, difficulties in applying the base of knowledge produced in these fields of research, due to the fact that it originates in the highly controlled contexts of laboratories, not easily transferred to the practice of PE teachers and coaches (Hughes and Franks, 2008; Tinning, 2010: 80). Additionally, what it means to know a movement, from the perspective of the knower, has not been elaborated as a central issue in these fields of research. There is no doubt that biomechanics can tell us, for example, an efficient way to perform the takeoff in pole-vaulting:

You must take off with as much forward speed as possible but your body must be as extended as possible so that the pole is as near to vertical as can be. Both arms should be straight, the right directly above the head. As the takeoff foot extends, just before leaving the ground, the pole should hit the back and bottom of the box. According to Houvion (1985) the position of the takeoff point in relation to the top hand is the one element which can determine the success or otherwise of the vault. The consensus between coaches is that the takeoff foot should be located directly beneath the top hand (Figure 1). (Sports Coach Web Site (2012)

Figure 1

The take-off position. Source: http://www.brianmac.co.uk/polevault/2011-02-15.

This description gives a picture of what to do, but also raises questions concerning knowing how to do it or expressed otherwise: What do you need to know in order to master what is described? Knowing how to master this requires another kind of knowledge. As a result of this, this paper is concerned with what capabilities, henceforth also called knowings, need to be developed by the person who is expected to master a movement, in this case for pole-vaulting.

Physical and mental skills

Research on motor learning and motor control distinguishes between physical and mental skills; as Magill (2011) puts it:

Motor skills are activities or tasks that require voluntary head, body, and/or limb movements to achieve a specific purpose or goal. Motor skills are commonly distinguished from cognitive skills, which are activities or tasks that require mental (i.e. cognitive) activity, such as decision making, problem solving, remembering, and the like. People may use a motor skill to perform a cognitive skill (e.g. using a calculator to solve an addition problem), and they may use a cognitive skill to perform a motor skill (e.g. reading music while playing the piano). (Magill, 2011: 19)

Research on learning games and motor skills also separates mental operations from motor skills. For example, Wallian and Chang (2006) stress the mental operations developed when learning motor skills. Kirk and McPhail (2002), when analyzing the concept of “teaching games for understanding,” relate to the knowledge that it is possible to develop when learning games: declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, strategic knowledge, and technique or movement execution. In these examples, physical skills are separated from the concept of knowledge (at least in terms of linguistic usage), which, in an implicit, taken-for-granted way, implies mental or cognitive processes. Accordingly, emphasizing a distinction between mental and physical skills also reproduces the mind-body¹ as well as the theory-practice dualism. Discussing practical and theoretical knowledge, Liedman (2002: 83, 86), Gustavsson (2000) and Molander (1996: 9) emphasize, in line with the pragmatic tradition, the problems involved in this distinction, separating theory and practice. They question this taken-for-granted distinction, and like Janik (1996: 22), they question the “glorifying” of theory in our modern Western society and underscore the significance of practical knowledge as preceding all knowledge. Polanyi (1969) proposed the use of the concept of “knowing” instead of knowledge, to overcome the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. He described knowledge as an activity, a process of knowing (Polanyi, 1969: 132). Accepting a blurred distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge, one could instead discuss a distinction between habitual and intelligent action (Ryle, 2009), educational and non-educational knowledge (Carr, 1997: 201), simple and complex knowledge (Reid, 1996b: 97) or, as will be emphasized in this paper, knowing how or knowing-in-action. There is a need, not the least in the context of human movement, to find ways to describe the knowing ‘in the artistic, intuitive process which some practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict’ (Schön, 1991: 49).

Theoretical framework

Knowing how

Conceiving of voluntary human movement as intelligent actions, the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (2009) argues that “the intellectual legend” is false, and that when we describe a performance as intelligent, this does not entail the double operation of considering and executing:

The cleverness of a clown may be exhibited in his tripping and tumbling. He trips and tumbles just as clumsy people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose, and after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and [sic] where the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself. The spectators applaud his skill at seeming clumsy, but what they applaud is not some extra hidden performance executed “in his head.” It is his visible performance that they admire, but they admire it not for being an effect of any hidden internal causes but for being an exercise of a skill. (Ryle, 2009: 21)

The Cartesian dualism, which Ryle calls “the intellectualist legend,” inherits the belief in “considering” or “thinking,” as a coordinating superior regiment (Ryle, 2009: 26). In contrast to this, Ryle argues that thinking is a practice which itself could be performed intelligently or not (Ryle 2009: 26). The above example of the clown, executing his skills, could be any movement performed on purpose and illustrates an example of including physical skills in the concept of knowledge. According to Ryle, the skills of the clown are expressions of “knowing how” (Ryle, 2009) and an example of intelligent performance comprising, one might say, mental and physical processes interwoven. Taking this standpoint, we can conceive of moving in different ways as expressions of knowing, or rather, the plural form knowings, in order to underline a multifaceted concept of knowing.

Tacit knowing and knowing-in-action

Pursuing the task of exploring and describing a person’s knowings in human movement raises the question of whether this is possible; however, since knowing how to move is generally considered difficult to articulate. How does one explain what there is to know when riding a bike, swimming or carrying out a somersault? Drawing on Polanyi’s (2002) elaboration of tacit knowing, these kinds of knowings have a bearing on experience and are therefore personal. Personal knowledge includes a tacit component that is not easily articulated. Discussing the tacit component, in contrast to explicit or propositional knowledge, Polanyi (1969) gives the example of bike riding: We cannot learn to keep our balance on bicycle by taking to heart that in order to compensate for a given angle of imbalance a, we must take a curve on the side of the imbalance: “ $r ~ \frac{v^{2}}{a}$ . Such knowledge is ineffectual, unless known tacitly.” (Polanyi, 1969: 144)

Tacit knowledge can, in the example above, be seen as opposed to explicit knowledge, although Polanyi argues that there is no sharply-defined border between them:

While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence, all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable. (Polanyi, 1969: 144)

The tacit component evolves in the relation between two kinds of awareness, the subsidiary and the focal. By integrating “clues” perceived within the subsidiary awareness (for example, when using a tool like: a pole, a stick or a language), we can comprehend something else which we attend to, our focal awareness (Polanyi, 2002: 61). In executing a complex movement, the focal awareness could, for example, be directed towards keeping one’s back in a straight position, when dancing, clearing the bar in high-jumping, or where to place one’s feet when climbing down a ladder. The “knowing” could be regarded as a triadic process of which the knower (the human being), the subsidiary and the focal awareness are foundations (Mitchell, 2006: 78). The triad is dynamic and changeable. Whenever focal awareness (for example, clearing the bar in high-jump) changes direction towards something which otherwise would be part of subsidiary awareness (e.g. keeping one’s balance and tenseness throughout the movement), focal awareness and parts of the subsidiary awareness switch places in the triad.

The process of awareness in action has also been elaborated by Schön (1991), in theorizing practitioners’ practical professional knowledge. When practitioners display their knowing in action, they are, Schön (1991) argues, displaying reflection-in-action. Reflection-in-action is similar to the kind of awareness discussed by Polanyi. According to Schön (1991), a practitioner’s reflection-in-action is displayed when the action (for example jazz musicians’ improvising together) is proceeding successfully, as well as when something surprising occurs (Schön, 1991: 55, 56); however, when the latter occurs, one could say the degree and cogency of reflection-in-action will become enhanced. Practitioners also conduct intellectual operations before or after performing an action, something Schön calls reflection-on-action (Schön, 1991: 55).

Method

Methodological approach

One main methodological issue to be considered is how to understand someone’s knowing in moving, when this knowing for the most part is personal, tacit and not easily articulated, not even by the practitioners themselves. To answer the question of what knowings could be developed or aimed to be developed, from the perspective of the knower, an interpretative, qualitative approach was chosen, partly inspired by research on professional studies. Janik (1996), who studied tacit knowing in the exercising of professions, stresses the need for enticing the knowing out of the practitioners:

In order to reconstruct the practitioners’ experience, their feelings about this experience have to be drawn back to cognitive points of departure. They need to understand that in the core of their practice, there exists something that justly can be defined as knowledge, that is to say, they know a great deal of which they cannot articulate in lucid propositions. Then they have to find a way to articulate what they have learnt through experience. (Janik, 1996: 123)

Observing and communicating with practitioners exercising complex forms of human movement was then considered to provide the possibility to understand what they know, when they know how to move in specific ways, in order to manage a task.

Selection

We decided that informants of the study should be part of a practice where a tradition of learning movements is well-established, making athletics a suitable choice. The assumption was that experienced athletes and coaches, through their actions and communication with each other, would provide comprehensive data for the study. We chose two athletes, whom could be presumed to have reached the level that Dreyfus (Janik, 1996: 52) calls “expert.” Because the distinguishing feature of an expert is that she/he is also an expert on the related learning process (Janik, 1996) and, according to studies on movement experts versus novices, also demonstrates an enhanced capability to explicate what she/he is doing when performing movements (Magill, 2011: 229), it was assumed that such experts could be aware of and at least partly articulate their knowing, within their current practice. Accordingly, we also chose a coach as an expert, being both a former athlete and a coach for many years after PE teacher training at a university.

Data collection

Because the character of the performances in athletics is of rapidly performed movements, video recordings were conducted. The benefits of using video recording are emphasized by Heath and Hindmarsh (2007: 8), who say that it provides the “access to fine details of conduct, both talk and bodily comportment”, which is considered necessary in order to explore the practitioners’ knowings, tacit as well as explicit.

The strategy chosen was to follow two athletes (in this study, named Jon and Kalle) and their coach iteratively; and thus, four coaching sessions, each lasting 2–3 hours, were video-recorded. This procedure provided a learning process for the researcher, in which it was possible to learn what issues would be relevant to consider when encouraging the practitioners to communicate and articulate their knowing. We conducted this process partly using stimulated recall (SR), a method for enhancing reflection by recalling situations through audiotapes or video-recordings, in order to understand a phenomenon in a specific context (Vesterinen et al., 2010: 185). The method has been used in educational research since 1952 and gained popularity in the 1970s and early 1980s (Stough, 2001: 2). The methods used to stimulate the process of recalling situations vary, though “the general pattern employed is a series of structured, but relatively open-ended questions, posed to the subject as soon as possible after, or during, viewing of the videotape” (Lyle, 2003: 863).

In this study, stimulated recall was conducted during practice. Because the coach video-recorded the athletes’ performances, SR interviews were carried out while the athletes and the coach watched the video-recordings. Also, other parts of the practice were video-recorded, including every time the athletes and the coach were in communication, when the athletes practiced the takeoff or a complete pole-vault, and when they communicated with the researcher. Because the coach and the researcher mostly sat beside each other, their communication was also recorded, using the audio function of the video camera. We transcribed these audio/video recordings, including the SR interviews, conversations and speech; recorded together with gestures, noises and the athletes’ performances.

Analyzing data

Two main questions when analyzing the data were: “What kinds of actions seem to be of importance when practicing pole-vaulting?” and “What do they know, when they know how to do it?” or, in other words, “What capabilities did the athletes seem to have developed in order to master a pole-vault?” That is, although the observed context certainly involved an intense process of learning, the question was not how they learn, but rather what they learn, in order to master a pole-vault. Accordingly, another issue was how to categorize and describe their knowings (or capabilities).

The results of the first stage of the analysis showed that the qualities of the athletes’ performances in the different parts of the pole-vaulting process were important; for example, the last two steps before the takeoff, the position when inserting the pole, the position at takeoff, the “pendulum movement” preceding the upside-down position, and so on. The next stage was analyzing how these performances were communicated, and from this, what seemed to be important “to know,” to get it right. For example, one obvious object of attention was the last two steps before the takeoff. The coach said it is important not to “sink,” i.e. shorten the steps or lose speed. The interpretation, in this case, was that the desirable performance is the opposite: keeping an upright position while running, maintaining the length of the steps, as well as maintaining speed. The coach had more to say, though: “It’s like attacking…keeping the speed and keeping everything else (twists his arms in front of himself, probably to indicate running)…not to use as much power you are able to…rather to work out of the movement (twists his arms again).”

The coach was expressing that something more is needed: you have to “attack…keep everything else…not to use as much power you are able to” and “work out of the movement.” Statements like these were regarded as expressing something to know. When statements or topics of communication were found that indicated similar knowings to be developed, they were placed in the same category. During this process, possible meanings of these categories were outlined and designated as knowings important for the athletes to develop, in order to master pole-vaulting. Since the takeoff seemed to be of considerable importance during the observed practice, the data and the analysis focused particularly on what to know, in order to master the takeoff. Trying to elaborate categories of knowings and at the same time describing them was a mutual process.

What to know to get the takeoff right

In the following section, the result of the analysis concerning the takeoff in pole-vaulting will be presented in terms of specific ways of knowing; hence, these knowings seem to be of considerable importance in order to master the takeoff.

Finding alternative ways of moving

Consistently, the coach discussed the athletes’ performances together with them (Kalle and Jon), while looking at the video-recordings. Quite often, the topic of their conversation was analyzing a sort of problem. Sometimes there is consensus about the problem, like the position of arms, the position of the raised knee or the speed while inserting the pole; however, sometimes it was not clear what the problem was; it was something that must be solved and it must be solved during the very moment of conducting a movement, even if the athletes and their coach, when reflecting on the problem before, as well as afterwards, seem to have a solution.

Kalle obviously had a problem to solve and this time, he wants to find a solution based on his current performance. He and the coach watched, in slow motion, Kalle’s takeoff when he is hanging on the pole, bent to its maximum: Kalle:

That…it must be possible to do SOMETHING from that…shoulders back and like…SCHMACK!

Coach:

There…no raising of your hip in that sequence…ever…

Kalle:

No…

Coach:

THERE…Something starts to happen (he probably means raising the hip).

Kalle:

Could it be…pulling down my shoulders…or…?

Coach:

Well…maybe you could, but…(probably answering Kalle’s first statement)

(The sequence is now repeated on the screen)

Kalle:

Could I maybe start more grouped there…or…you have to try…to make SOMETHING out of this.

Coach:

Aa…

Kalle:

More gathered…then just…SCHMACK!

The desirable knowing is apparently how to find alternative ways of executing parts of the takeoff. When reflecting on his current problem, having time to do this, Kalle suggested a solution: starting the flight phase more “tucked in” (body gathered) which can probably help him increase the speed of rotation (see figure 2); and hence, enhance the raising of his hip, in order to reach the upside-down position. Knowing how to find alternative ways of executing certain movements seems to be a pre-requisite for conducting a pole-vault. Almost every time Kalle and Jon perform a pole-vault that was judged by the coach or by themselves as “good enough,” there is at least one remark on some part of the movement that was not performed as desired. Jon solved, for example, the problem he had in keeping himself in an upright position when raising the pole just before its insertion: Coach:

Now that was something! …it’s like…when you run faster…you get this position (he demonstrates a “bowing” movement)…you should keep height…

Jon:

Yeah…

Coach:

It gets sort of…OOU…much more down…

Jon:

Yeah, okay…but the rest of the jump felt anyway…

Coach:

Yes…the jumping got nevertheless better ‘cause you…ATTACKED more.

Figure 2

Kalle’s suggestion of adjusting his way of moving (Author's Figure).

That is, he managed to solve the problem at that very moment, even if he did not reflect on a possible solution prior to his performance. In this case, Jon did not get the desired upright position at the takeoff moment; and therefore, adjusted other parts of his performance as expressed by the coach, “attacking more,” which could mean more speed, or more force, or both. The adjustments required, in Kalle’s case, for increasing the speed of rotation upwards; or in Jon’s case, producing more speed or force, having to be “bodily decided” and executed in a very short moment, irrespective of any reflections on it before starting the movement.

Keeping ways of moving invariant, while varying others

A pre-requisite for succeeding with the takeoff is a certain degree of speed preceding it. The athletes must then, of course, know how to run fast enough; but they also have to manage the pole. At the end of the run-up, they have to prepare for the takeoff position, which means raising the pole above the head, while still running. This desirable knowing becomes obvious when Jon fails (see figure 3). The coach explained in detail what his problem was: Coach:

…then he gets here…and OOPS… now I have to insert the pole…then he brakes at the second last step…then he goes here instead (raising his arms above his head and dragging them backwards)…yes…instead of keeping the running and getting this position (straightens his arms and moves them in a direction in front of his head)…that’s a big difference…if he starts to get low already during the running (bending his knees and hip) and being more like a…well, I usually call him a tournament player (holds his arms in line with his hip), then he gets in here (shows the same position) and then obstructs the position (probably meaning the desired takeoff position).

Figure 3

Jon fails to keep an upright position invariant (Author's Figure).

Jon has to learn to keep the position, as well as the frequency and length of his steps invariant, while he varies the position of his arms. This knowing is probably a pre-requisite for conducting more sequences of the pole-vault. For example, when the athlete has started to raise his whole body, trying to reach the upside-down position, this movement must be kept invariant, while he must also twist himself, in order to pass the highest level rotated 180 degrees (see figure 4). Knowing how to keep some ways of moving invariant, while varying something else was; however, more prominent when the athletes and the coach focused on the run-up.

Figure 4

Invariant: rotation upwards; variance: rotating 180 degrees (Author's Figure).

Discerning one’s way of moving

The coach encouraged Kalle and Jon to be aware of, and to a certain extent, articulate their different ways of executing their movements, but he also indicated that the ability to “sense” (experience and discern) and express this depended on a learning process: “…but those young athletes at secondary high school level, and those even younger, they haven’t started reflecting yet…If you say, ‘what did you sense,’ the answer is: ‘no, what do you think’, they say.”

Jon and Kalle seem to be capable of discerning their different ways of moving when, together with their coach, they watch video-recordings of their takeoff trials: Coach:

Mm let’s see how the pendulum movement was (asks to see the video again). THERE. …and good…mm…(Jon and his coach study Jon’s take-off and his leg’s pendulum movement in slow motion, when trying to get into the upside-down position)

Jon:

THERE. I sort of lose my hip. (inaudible)…sort of twisting.

Also, without looking at a video-recording, Kalle expresses his way of performing the takeoff somewhat differently, since he uses more gestures instead of words, and he also makes noises in order to communicate: Kalle:

…but I feel it. When I’m about to twist (twisting his wrist). It’s frozen. It gets (makes a movement like holding and twisting a steering wheel) like this, PRJHH.

Coach:

(wipes his chin with his hand) Another pole?

Kalle:

…it’s…feeling unsure (twists and shakes his hands), there. Like fumbling.

Coach:

(chuckles)

Kalle:

…it’s like, when you try to put it right, then it goes. CHOP!

When describing his performance, Kalle is not watching himself on a video screen. He shows, nevertheless, an awareness of his way of initiating the turn right after the takeoff; his movement is “frozen” and he shows with his hands, how he experiences this. He frequently uses gestures, instead of words (see figure 5). Discerning different ways of executing movements is in this case, a kind of knowing developed through practicing athletics, and this is also the case with the coach. He has his own experience from practicing athletics, which he partly showed when using movements and gestures, together with articulating the practitioner’s performances actually carried out as well as those desired. Jon and Kalle are able to articulate their knowing, at least to some extent, even though they also use gestures and noises. Altogether, their talk, gestures, noises and metaphors give a picture of their knowing, although it is, in this case, expressed after execution. They are reflecting on their action, but this does not mean that the action of reflecting, through gestures and words, is a necessary part of their performances, either before or afterwards.

Figure 5

Kalle expresses his way of moving (Author's Figure).

Navigating awareness

The coach, as well as the athletes, frequently discusseed what is important to “think of” or “focus on” at the current moment. Sometimes the athletes ask the coach: Jon:

What shall I think of now? The insertion or the run-up, or…

Coach:

No (he points at the run-up track and makes a sweeping movement with his arm). The run-up, then…the insertion.

Jon:

(Looks at the coach, apparently considering something) Okay.

Coach:

(Sweeping his arm once more)

Jon:

Okay. Then I leave off, like. (sweeping his arm upwards, probably indicating the flight phase)

At other times, the coach asks the athletes: Coach:

Wow, that was really something. The best knee in your life! (He is referring to Jon’s position of the knee at the takeoff. Jon obviously succeeded in directing his power upwards, where the position of the knee is a major issue). What did you think of?

Jon:

Kicking the ground, or, kicking the ground with one leg.

Coach:

Well, yes. It got much better.

Jon:

Actually, I thought of (inserts one foot at the ground and makes a fast pendulum movement with the other leg), like this…

Jon has learned how to manage the direction of his force, partly by navigating his awareness towards “kicking the ground.” He uses the expression “think of,” as the coach also does. “Thinking of” something, in this context, does not mean reflecting on the performance, either before or afterwards. Rather, it is more like being aware of something momentarily. At the end of the conversation, Jon seemed to highlight this, when saying, “actually, I thought of” and then showed it (see figure 6). It seems also to be of crucial importance that the athletes must know, themselves, what to be aware of, as well as knowing how to navigate their awareness in the very moment it is necessary. “Kicking the ground” could in this case have been described as Jon’s focal awareness, because he cannot be completely unaware of everything else. If he was, then he would probably have failed.

Figure 6

Kalle illustrates his awareness of ‘kicking the ground’ (Author's Figure).

Knowing how and knowing-in-action

The knowings required to get the takeoff right, could be conceptualized in relation to knowing how, using Ryle’s argument that mental processes are not separable from physical processes:

Since doing is often an overt muscular affair it is written of as a merely physical process. On the assumption of the antithesis between “physical” and “mental,” it follows that muscular doing cannot itself be a mental operation. To earn the title “skillful,” “cunning,” or “humorous,” it must therefore get it by transfer from another counterpart act occurring not “in the machine” but “in the ghost”; for “skillful,” “cunning” and “humorous” are certainly mental predicates. (Ryle, 2009: 21)

When practicing pole-vaulting, Jon and Kalle show a comprehensive knowing, which includes the mental as well as physical predicates that Ryle describes as intelligent action. Thus, Jon and Kalle’s “physical skills” cannot be conceptualized as “mere physical skills,” (as perhaps no physical skills can be), because at this moment of initiating the flight phase, they have to find alternative ways of moving, in order to solve problems, keep certain ways of moving invariant while varying others, discern their way of moving and simultaneously, navigate their awareness in order to master the takeoff in pole-vaulting. They are using their extensive experience achieved throughout many hundreds of hours practicing this movement: trying, talking and thinking of various ways of executing it. Whenever they conduct a pole-vault, they perform an intelligent action, or in other words, they act attentively. They have been reflecting on their actions, together with their coach, and they are constantly reflecting in action. That is, they are, as Schön (1991) would put it, reflective practitioners. Jon, for example, is navigating his awareness to the direction of the force, by concentrating on how to swing his left leg, in order to be like “the rocket thrusting further upwards.” He uses the words “I thought of” together with a bodily illustration (places one foot on the ground and makes a fast pendulum movement with the other leg). In this context, Jon is explaining his momentary awareness, afterwards. Although at the takeoff moment, it is interwoven with his action, doing one thing and not two; however, when directing the force, Jon displays two kinds of reflection, reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action (Schön, 1991). After his trial, he discusses with his coach what he had been doing. Jon explains his reflection-in-action and by doing this, he reflects (encouraged by the coach) on his action, as well. Yet he cannot find words to describe it, so he tries to illustrate it. The ability to articulate one’s experience is encouraged by the coach, particularly when it comes to discerning one’s way of moving. Listening to the coach talking about encouraging the (younger) athletes to express what they’ve experienced: “… if you say ‘what did you feel’ …the answer is ‘no, what do you think…they say,” one could say the coach at the same time encourages their reflection-in-action, that is, to be aware of their bodily sensations during action.

What is explicitly required by the coach here is the ability to articulate your way of moving, in order to communicate and reflect on your actions, together with the coach. But the ability to do this is another type of skill, which has to be developed through practicing it; hence, learning how to express in words one’s bodily experience. Arnold (1988) distinguishes between practical knowledge in the “weak sense” and practical knowledge in the “strong sense.” He means that being able to express and explain one’s action represents a strong sense of practical knowledge, whereas knowing how to act, yet not knowing how the action was conducted, is a weak sense of practical knowledge. Tanney (2009) develops the case of skills in cooking, skills in following recipes and skills in writing recipes as different from each other. Skill in cooking does not necessarily mean that you are also skilled in writing or following recipes, because doing this requires that you can read or write. Writing or following recipes is related to the following of rules and “rules cannot tell you how to follow them” (Tanney, 2009: xlviii). Writing a recipe is comparable with describing the technique in pole-vaulting, as presented earlier in this paper. The capability of writing a recipe, as well as describing the technique in pole-vaulting, is rooted in tacit knowing in cooking and pole-vaulting. Experiencing and discerning different ways of moving is a knowing that was developed while practicing it, and therefore depends on personal experience, irrespective of any capability to articulate it or not. At the very moment of performing the takeoff, Kalle is aware of his way of moving, but he is not expressing this in clear propositions. Instead, he uses body language and onomatopoetic expressions. He is expressing a “strong sense” of practical knowledge, though he is not able to “write the recipe” in propositions.

Kalle shows, by communicating through words and gestures, that he was aware of his way of moving. Similar to Schön’s description of musicians improvising together, he was reflecting in action, although not “in the medium of words” (Schön, 1991: 56). Accordingly, he starts to reflect on his action and together with the coach, he tries to solve his problem. Kalle’s reflection-in-action is; however, a prerequisite for reflecting on his action, which needs in this situation, to be communicated with the coach.

In Ryle’s (2009: 20) terms, through their articulated reflections (through words and body language), the athletes give a picture of knowing-in-action, comprising “special procedures or manner, not special antecedents.” That is, their actions are what Ryle (2009: 19) calls “intelligent,” not due to any covert mental operations controlling their actions; but rather, according to Ryle’s argument that it is possible to perform intelligently without being able to “consider any propositions enjoining how they should be performed.” However, practicing pole-vaulting together with their coach requires, as well as enhances, a capability to reflect on their actions and also to consider, in propositions, how their actions should be performed. During practicing and reflecting on their movement execution, Jon and Kalle are ready to detect and correct lapses; constantly learning, trying to improve upon successes as well as failures, which is also an example of knowledge as an activity, a process of knowing, as Polanyi (1969: 132) describes it.

Discussion and conclusion

In this study, knowing how to master a complex movement, such as the takeoff in pole-vaulting, was explored and described from the perspective of the knowers. Mastering a pole-vault, as well as performing well at competitions (clearing the bar as high as possible) is the underlying agreed-upon goal; however, during these 9 hours of practicing pole-vaulting, neither the coach nor the athletes ever mentioned the height of their jumps, which also seems to characterize practices in other competitive sports (Andersson et al., 2010: 28). The bar is there, but seems to serve mainly as a reference point for the athletes. What seems to be important during practice, was rather the developing and nurturing of specific ways of knowing in moving. Hence, the practicing of pole-vaulting provideed examples of what there is to know, in terms of embodied capabilities, possible to develop when knowing a specific movement, irrespective of the context of competitive sports. I argue that PE teachers have something to learn here from the context of competitive sports, since learning movements is a significant educational objective in this bodily practice. The analysis showed that this practice enhances possibilities for the athletes to develop capabilities in terms of knowings. The professional object of teachers (perhaps also the professional object of coaches) is to provide possibilities to develop capabilities (Carlgren and Marton, 2000). Knowing how to adjust and find alternative ways of moving and discerning one’s way of moving, for example, is possible to explicate as an educational objective in PE in school (even if the content offered to reach this goal involves a range of different specific movements); however, the planning of teaching and learning must take into consideration how to provide possibilities for pupils to experience the discernment of one’s ways of moving as well as finding alternative ways of moving. Teaching and learning needs to focus on these capabilities, as well as discussing and reflecting on them. Doing this could contribute to, as Evans (2004: 94) put it: “the body’s intelligent capacities for movement and expression in physical culture.” Explicating the knowing (or capabilities) involved in “the capability to move,” as exemplified in this study, could emphasize an educational aim concerning practical knowledge, such as knowing in moving (and not necessarily specific skills related to specific sport activities). Research on the content and aims of school PE suggests that physical activity as content is regarded “either as an instrument for performing well in sports” or “an instrument for fulfilling the demands or the contemporary health-discourse” (Nyberg and Larsson, 2012). This approach can be looked upon as a way of draining the PE subject’s possibilities to contribute to learning and bodily experiences; and hence, regarding the subject as a matter of education (Ekberg, 2009: 251; Evans, 2004: 95; Gard, 2006: 234). This also raises questions about whether PE in school should mainly “produce” healthy bodies or offer possibilities to develop capabilities (Evans and Davies, 2004; Gard, 2006; Hunter, 2004; Larsson et al., 2005; Öhman, 2008; Quennerstedt, 2006; Redelius et al., 2009; Wright and Burrows, 2006).

My point is not that learning moving is to be equated with learning competitive sports, but rather with learning and developing specific ways of knowing how to move in specific ways, regardless of context; however, being aware that these knowings are only examples of what there is to know, when knowing movements/how to move, further research is required.

Footnotes

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