Coloniality of corporate social responsibility

Abstract

The objective of this article is to make the case horizontally that the intertwined legal compliance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) abet enduring coloniality in settler colonial states. The focus is on Indigenous nations and settler colonial states in the Americas. There are three key contributions. First, the jurisprudential, managerial, philosophical and political foundations of CSR are of Occidental extraction therefore making CSR susceptible to being a tool of coloniality directed against Indigenous nations. Second, CSR is constrained by compliance with Occidental jurisprudence. Third, firms’ compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions can be best safeguarded by legal pluralism-based compliance as this entails court-imposed coercive enforcement. CSR is not part of the solution; CSR is part of the problem.

Keywords

Ethics indigenous nations legal compliance settler colonial states societal power structures

Introduction

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received extensive favourable attention in the business literature and business ethics literature. In this article, the opposite view is taken – and this gap in the literature is addressed. CSR is consequently considered unethical. Because CSR comprises compliance with Occidental jurisprudence in settler colonial states, CSR may be illegal – and unethical – on the foundation of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions and a tool in continued jurisprudential coloniality. As positive law in the sense of Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre and legal theory associated with Modernity is not the only source of jurisprudence in the Occident, jurisprudential coloniality is not inescapable in the settler colonial states. The emphasis in this article is on the Civil Law family that incorporates, for example, Roman law and the scholastic jurisprudence of the School of Salamanca. The geographical focus of this article is on the Americas spanning from the Islas Tule del Sur to Inuit Qeqertaat. The objective of this article is to make the case horizontally that the intertwined legal compliance and CSR abet enduring coloniality in settler colonial states.

It is warranted to emphasize the difference between decolonization – the formal legal recognition of the sovereignty of former colonies – and decoloniality – the cessation of the dominance of the knowledge, societal power structures and territorial divisions introduced by the former colonial powers. The term Occident refers in this article to the cultural sphere rooted in the Greco-Roman Heritage and Occidental Christianity – Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.

Coloniality is violence. In the colonial and settler colonial contexts, Occidental knowledge can be considered a form of violence (Palermo, 2010). Coloniality negates the validity of otherness in discourses (Pinto Yépez, 2009). The focus of Aníbal Quijano’s scholarship has been the coloniality of societal power structures, including Eurocentrism, Occidental epistemology and Occidental social science (Germana, 2010; Grosfoguel, 2013; Mignolo, 2000; Quijano, 2006; Richards, 2014). Eurocentrism is an epistemic issue instead of a geographical one (Mignolo, 2011).

In settler colonial states, coloniality is ethically and morally troubling. Racism is fundamental to coloniality in societal power structures (Grosfoguel, 2012; Martínez Salazar, 2012; Mignolo, 2000; Quijano, 2008). Coloniality does not require settler colonialism: Because of the Occidental education of the Indigenous colonial elites (Droz, 2006), decolonization has not equated with decoloniality. Coloniality means that the colonial societal power structures have remained intact in spite of formal decolonization (Martínez Salazar, 2012; Morales, 2016; Quijano, 2003) – these societal power structures are responsible for the disenfranchisement and dispossession of Indigenous nations in the Americas. In addition to Aníbal Quijano’s focus on ethnicity-based societal power controlling knowledge, territory and work, there is a conceptualization of coloniality – biocoloniality – associated with the control of Nature (Cajigas Rotundo, 2007; Toro Pérez, 2009).

In keeping with Borboa Álvarez and Delhumeau Rivera (2018), CSR is understood to be a comprehensive, dynamic and inclusive concept that focuses on the collaboration of stakeholders on economic, environmental, ethical and human rights concerns in addition to legal compliance and the societal impacts in firms’ operations in this article. This description of CSR raises two major issues. First, because Occidental jurisprudence has been used to legalize the disenfranchisement and dispossession of Indigenous nations, compliance with Occidental jurisprudence de facto renders CSR a tool of coloniality that is incompatible with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions. Second, when CSR goes beyond compliance with Occidental jurisprudence, additional sources may introduce coloniality, for example, the understanding of the place of humans in Nature differs between the Occident on the one hand, and Sumak Kawsay (Avila Santamaría, 2019) and Indigenous nations in northern Québec (Laugrand, 2015) on the other hand.

As long as Occidental firms were able to operate within the confines of Occidental law – consisting of the Civil Law family and the Common law family – enforced by colonialism and coloniality, safeguarding jurisprudential compliance was relatively straightforward. Since then, the world has moved on. Nowadays, the world is increasingly characterized by legal pluralism (Ferrazzo and Lixa, 2017; Prieto Montt, 2012). There has been a blindness for Indigenous nations’ laws in legal history (Duve, 2012), but Indigenous nations’ autonomy in several Latin American jurisdictions in addition to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has transformed and will likely continue to transform the situation. Fundamental and irreconcilable differences in jurisprudence may therefore render jurisprudential compliance a growing challenge for firms.

Ignoring legal history and legal theory negates ethics (Engelen, 2007) – such a negation thus subverts any ethical or moral pretence of CSR. A key takeaway from legal history and legal theory is that positive law has been a tool in the disenfranchement, dispossession and genocide of Indigenous nations as epitomized by the partial abrogation of the Leyes Nuevas (1542) by the Castilian Crown in 1545 – in what was to become the Civil Law family – and the US Indian Removal Act (1830) – in the Common Law family.

In the wake of law becoming a tool of oppression by the extant societal power structures, a duty to disobey law emerges (Almonacid Sierra, 2018). In the context of coloniality, this is something very different than CSR exceeding compliance with positive law, because CSR supplements legal compliance. This is not about Occidental ethics and morals overriding positive law. This is about the mandatory compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions; a mandatory compliance flowing from Occidental scholasticism and Roman law.

In the context of legal compliance, firms are confronted with two problems related to CSR. First, an absolute submission to law may favour disenfranchisement, dispossession and genocide of Indigenous nations as discussed by, for example, Oscar Mejía Quintana (Almonacid Sierra, 2018). Second, contradictions in Occidental ethics and morals render them problematic for ethical and moral judgements (Cáceres Nieto, 2001). Moreover, biases in Occidental science need to be addressed when CSR goes beyond legal compliance.

A CSR-related coloniality argument is developed in three sections in this article. In the first section, key sources of bias contributing to coloniality in CSR are presented. In the second section, the impossibility of overcoming coloniality in the current Occidental conceptualization of CSR is addressed from a jurisprudential perspective. In the third section, after an assessment of firms’ rationales for adopting CSR, it is concluded that a mandatory compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions needs to be adopted and enforced to address coloniality.

Bias in CSR

Jurisprudence, the human rights discourse, policy and management of Occidental extraction contribute to the bias in CSR. It must therefore be questioned whether granting legal status to CSR would effectively stabilize extant coloniality.

The origins of CSR are opaque, but the roots of CSR in the Common Law family with its form of legal positivism are apparent (Acquier and Aggeri, 2015). The origins have been traced back to the United States in the 19th century (Gond and Igalens, 2008), to the work of Edwin Merrick Dodd in the United States in the 1930s (Rojas-Vargas and Madero-Gómez, 2018), and to the work of Howard Bowen in the United States in 1953 (Lépineux et al., 2016). CSR was thus borne out of the perception that the courts paid inadequate attention to ethics and morals in the Common Law family. Alternatively, such a perception may have arisen from a view that the other pillar of the legal system, Equity associated with Chancery Law, did not fulfil its ethical and moral control function any longer.

In the Civil Law family, the intermingling of Roman law, Greco-Roman philosophical ethics and Christian morals has been pronounced as exemplified by the interdisciplinary scholarship of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Francisco Suárez and Immanuel Kant. Later, a separation of law from ethics and morals took place in the Civil Law family, particularly with Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre in the early 20th century. A need for CSR in the Civil Law family had thus emerged.

In spite of many attempts, there is no universally accepted definition of CSR in the business literature and business ethics literature (Aßländer, 2012; Hajduk and Quandt, 2011). Terminological ambiguousness renders the CSR concept problematic from a jurisprudential perspective in at least the Civil Law family. This terminological ambiguousness is epitomized by the occasionally interchangeable use of the terms corporate citizenship, CSR and sustainable development (Aßländer, 2010), and the not always consistent use of the term CSR across different areas of law – labour law provides an example of a divergent use (Morales Saldaña, 2005). It is therefore requisite to hone in on CSR.

Bias and jurisprudence

It seems to be accepted in the business ethics literature that legal compliance supersedes CSR (Hajduk and Quandt, 2011). There is a nexus between identity and jurisprudence: Legal history is a part of identity (Duve, 2012). The connection between business ethics, identity and jurisprudence engenders the mechanism that allows the combination of jurisprudential compliance and CSR to become coloniality, see also Fryzel and Seppala (2016). The combination of CSR and positive law in the Civil Law family is problematic from the standpoint of coloniality. As CSR cannot supersede settler colonial jurisprudence, CSR may be considered to camouflage and even legitimize extant jurisprudential coloniality thus cementing it. Seeing that firms need to safeguard legal compliance in the face of its enforcement by settler colonial states, CSR cannot change settler colonial jurisprudence. CSR can, however, expand on settler colonial jurisprudence by dealing with perceived omissions in legal institutions.

The interests of the owners of firms hold primacy over other considerations – a primacy that predates the emergence of economics as a discipline as a result of the work of, for example, Pierre le Pesant and François Quesnay in the late 17th century and in the 18th century. Except for instrumental CSR – that is, CSR improves desired business outcomes with the help of improved ethical and moral outcomes – CSR violates corporate law. The solution would be a jurisprudential mandate to adopt non-instrumental CSR, but this would only add another layer of jurisprudentially mandated requirements without necessarily changing anything in existing regulation in areas of law, for example, criminal law, environmental law and human rights law.

Because of the lack of reappropriation and self-determination in Occidental anthropological research methodology (Jérôme, 2008), significant gaps exist in the understanding of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions. Settler colonial states may therefore inadvertently erect administrative and processual obstacles to the effective and efficient functioning of the jurisprudence of Indigenous nations (Benavides Ascuntar, 2011). Under such circumstances, the combination of jurisprudential compliance and CSR supports extant jurisprudential coloniality.

Bias and human rights

Attempts to address coloniality within the realm of the jurisprudential human rights discourse are fundamentally misguided. It is not much of an exaggeration to maintain that current human rights law is by and for former colonial powers and present settler colonial states – hardly a constellation providing a solid foundation for decoloniality. Even if human rights law were decolonial, there is a real-life enforcement problem: The enforcement of legal institutions against discrimination and racism is haphazard (Ardito Vega, 2010).

The coloniality in the jurisprudential human rights discourse extends to CSR rendering the latter problematic. As the human rights in, for example, Kirchschläger (2015), are of Occidental extraction, CSR spreads and stabilizes extant coloniality, see also León Untiveros (2010) and Sierra Camargo (2017). One example of the coloniality of the human rights discourse can be found in the fundamentally incompatible views of the place of humans in the universe espoused by the U’wa Indigenous nation and the settler colonial state (Gómez Pardo, 2006). For the U’wa, a violation of the rights of the universe is inevitably a violation of human rights; this is different in current mainstream Occidental thinking.

One form of bias against the Indigenous nations in human rights law stems from the multitude of protected categories. For example, it must be questioned whether the focus on gender in CSR (Dion et al., 2009) is effectively an attempt to cement extant coloniality to the detriment of Indigenous nations.

Human rights law can also be used by firms striving to defend and extend coloniality. For example, firms have coopted human rights law to claim protection for themselves even against the backdrop of legal history not being necessarily clear that legal persons are covered by human rights law at all (Groß, 2019). If such claims result in decisions incompatible with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions, then human rights law protects coloniality.

Bias and policy

On occasion, CSR is considered from an explicitly political perspective involving a contested terrain (Ungericht and Hirt, 2010), this can take place on the foundation of, for example, Corporate Political Strategy (Kolleck, 2012; Ungericht and Hirt, 2010), Issue Framing Approach (Eyestone, 1978) and Social Movement Theory (Smith, 1991). Nonetheless, in the settler colonial context it is possible, even likely, that coloniality is not adequately addressed, if at all, as a result of cultural hegemony (Argounès, 2014).

A neo-institutional economics-based notion of CSR suggests behavioural determinism (Travaillé and Naro, 2014) – and therefore a cementing of Eurocentric and settler colonial power structures to which Occidental economics belongs. The view that CSR deals with the economic aspects of regulation (Bettache, 2015) overlooks the detrimental impact an economic focus on regulation has had on law (corrosion of law). A further problem is that, for example, the Inuit do not have societal power structures (Hervé, 2015).

CSR has been considered a development tool in settler colonial states (Kröker, 2011). If the development is incompatible with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions, or if CSR is used to camouflage such an incompatibility, then settler colonial firms and states endeavour to legitimize coloniality with CSR. It is not like firms partaking in the disenfranchisement and dispossession of Indigenous nations in, for example, Guatemala, the Amazon and the United States would not publish CSR reports.

Explicitly or implicitly, there has been an understanding in the business ethics literature that firms’ CSR activities are apolitical (Ungericht and Hirt, 2010), an understanding that is questionable on two counts. First, firms’ activities are limited by laws enacted by states’ political institutions and enforced by administrative and jurisprudential institutions established and financed by political institutions all the while as firms attempt to influence these institutions by different forms of lobbying activities. Second, firms exist as the result of political choices made by society thus making firms political creations ipso facto. To the degree that settler colonial states’ political choices are incompatible with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions, CSR cannot be apolitical.

Bias and management

Attempts to consider CSR an interactive and iterative process within multinational enterprises (Pestre, 2013) is woefully inadequate, because it overlooks the mandatory compliance with settler colonial jurisprudence to the detriment of compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions. In the case of multinational enterprises, CSR may worsen extant coloniality by introducing foreign coloniality to domestic coloniality in the case of, for example, the Latin American settler colonial states.

From the standpoint of legal history and legal theory, CSR exhibits two fundamental shortcomings. First, CSR is immaterial in the Civil Law family. If a firm is considered a social agent in society (Gómez Nieto and Martínez Domínguez, 2016), then the identity of a society particularly in settler colonial states needs to be considered. CSR has its roots in the Common Law family – the concerns included in CSR were already taken into account in the Civil Law family in Continental Europe (Aßländer, 2010). Business schools and transnational firms have been instrumental in spreading CSR into Colombia (Pulido and Ramiro, 2010) – something that is prone to support intra-Occidental coloniality. It is moreover dubious that CSR is valid in, for example, the Mesoamerican cultural sphere.

It has been shown that an astute management of CSR-related factors favourably impacts the performance of firms (Günther et al., 2015). Natheless, firms’ CSR-based attempts to influence their supply chain partners may be unsuccessful as the result of the firms’ limited weight in the interactions, and firms may abandon such attempts for cost-related reasons (Hansen et al., 2011). The only viable way to overcome these issues can be found in the realm of legal compliance. However, firms have engaged in a form of forum shopping in their capital investment and localization decisions (Kneip, 2011) – via competition between jurisdictions this may be detrimental to compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions.

The criticism that CSR lacks links to business theory (Hoßfeld and Schmiel, 2015) is questionable on the count that CSR attempts to close the gap between ethical and moral behaviour on the one hand, and legal compliance on the other hand – a gap that has emerged as a result of legal positivism. As firms are products of legal norms, and legal compliance is in the self-interest of firms, any business theory neglecting legal compliance – and by extension compliance with ethical and moral norms – is fundamentally flawed and hence invalid.

A development of CSR is the corporate social innovation concept in proactively seeking stakeholder involvement to minimize environmental and social concerns (Aspíllaga Alayza, 2010; Maines da Silva, 2017). If such an involvement is to be meaningful, then the rejection of a project under consideration has to be a realistic outcome. A warning example is the TMX project in Canada. The TMX project consists of a pipeline that is designed to transport diluted bitumen across the Rocky Mountains from Edmonton to Burnaby. The TMX project was acquired by the Canadian government in 2018. Before the first permit that was quashed by the Federal Court of Appeal in 2018, and before the second permit were issued by the Canadian government in 2019, the Canadian prime minister publicly stated that the TMX pipeline would be built. When a firm or its owner preclude a rejection as a potential outcome, then CSR is a charade.

It is noteworthy that alternative foundations for CSR have received scant attention in the business ethics literature. One alternative would be the embrace of Indigenous nations’ way to consider development holistically on the foundation of collectivity, equilibrium, reciprocity and solidarity in Mexico (Barrera Rosales, 2018) – sustainable development is hardly compatible with being in equilibrium with Nature.

Granting legal status to CSR?

Granting legal status to CSR – an issue assessed by Acevedo-Guerrero et al. (2013), and Ibarra Padilla (2014) – by settler colonial states does not necessarily address coloniality. Quite the contrary. The existing coloniality found in jurisprudence would be amplified by any ideological, philosophical or scientific coloniality found in CSR. This amplified coloniality would then find its way back into jurisprudence.

An innate problem with granting legal status to CSR in the Civil Law family derives from the fundamental jurisprudential dissimilarities between the Civil Law family and the Common Law family. For two reasons, CSR cannot be self-regulation in the Civil Law family jurisdictions contrary to the view expressed in Karmasin and Litschka (2010). First, the idea of optional legal compliance is incompatible with the legal history and theory in the Civil Law family. Second, firms’ self-regulating CSR would introduce intra-Occidental coloniality into the Civil Law family (Merino Acuña, 2014; Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2014). Simultaneously, it must be questioned whether business ethics – and CSR – can be limited to legal compliance as discussed in Mack (2010). It has been maintained that CSR does not equate legal compliance (Campuzano, 2010). If the raison d’être of CSR were limited to legal compliance, then anything beyond a comprehensive reference to existing law can be interpreted as an attempt to corrupt existing law to the benefit of firms. Limiting CSR to compliance with settler colonial legal institutions would moreover be an attempt to circumvent compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions.

A move beyond legal compliance in CSR requires an assessment of the coloniality-related issues primarily relating to business ethics. If ethics and legality are considered to coexist in CSR (Gómez Nieto and Martínez Domínguez, 2016), then the ethics of ethics and the ethics of jurisprudence need to be considered. It has been posited that the Kantian morals of an individual of good will and self-sacrifice associated with duty has given way to an ethics that maintains that behaviours are directed by norms that result in a desired outcome irrespective of the good or bad will of individuals (Cortina, 1996). In the aftermath of the economic and jurisprudential turbulences in 2008 and 2009, a renewed interest in a duty-based ethics has resurfaced (Hahn, 2014). There is therefore no consensus as to the substance of Occidental ethics – something rendering its application in jurisprudence factually impossible.

Coloniality-related business ethical assessments are made more challenging by globalization. CSR has been associated with globalization (Restrepo Salazar, 2008). A globalization of CSR – a prospect raised in Ermida Uriarte (2010) – opens the door for additional coloniality. It has been claimed that the cultural, political and societal situations in the countries where a firm operates influences CSR (Lizcano-Prada and Lombana, 2018) – this creates two ethical challenges. First, an existing cultural, political and societal situation may be an expression of coloniality and an associated disregard for Indigenous nations’ sovereignty. In settler colonies, assuming that the extant societal power structures are ethical and legal may be questionable at best. Second, the relativism discussed in Lizcano-Prada and Lombana (2018) does not offer guarantees that possibly even fundamentally different Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions are adopted in CSR on the Indigenous nations’ own terms.

CSR is a weak successor of previously failed attempts to reconcile ethics and business (Postel and Rousseau, 2009). Attempts to institute universally applicable CSR may superficially look successful, but their illegitimacy in a society may result in their effective failure (Schoeneborn et al., 2011). In the settler colonial context, CSR may also serve as a way to provide legitimization of continued jurisprudential coloniality to the detriment of Indigenous nations and their cosmovisions.

Impossibility of overcoming coloniality in compliance and CSR

Overcoming coloniality in CSR faces several challenges as the result of Modernity and legal positivism. It must be asked whether it is necessary to reinvent CSR as a consequence.

There are numerous ethical and moral systems (Smaele, 1968), and this pluralism undermines any attempt to develop universal business ethics. Analogously, John Rawls has noted that what is considered just is usually a matter of contention (Brink, 2010) – and it is doubtful that he even considered the divergent views of the Indigenous nations and the settler colonial states on this topic. Legal positivism can be seen as an attempt to overcome this dilemma, but this happens at the cost of legalizing state violence against, for example, Indigenous nations.

It is noteworthy that the three rationalizations for CSR presented in Pestre (2013) – that is, ethics and morals, neoclassical economics and the stakeholder concept – lack unambiguous jurisprudential foundations. Calling for a broader vision of governance as done in Pérez (2012) requires at the very least that it is compatible with applicable jurisprudence. From the standpoint of coloniality, the issue is: Which economics, ethics, jurisprudence, morals and stakeholders?

Overcoming coloniality in jurisprudential compliance and CSR is effectively unachievable, because the differences between the Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions, and the Occidental understanding of ethics, jurisprudence and morals are often incompatible and prodigious.

Ethics versus law

The incompatibility and prodigiousness are not only a matter of contemporary ethics. In reality, they are a matter of the DNA of Occidental ethics. Several continuities can be found, for example, (i) the continuity from Greek philosophical ethics (e.g. Plato) via Roman rhetoric (e.g. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus) to Christian theology (e.g. Origen of Alexandria), with the notable exception of Saint Augustine of Hippo (Sarr, 2010), in Antiquity; (ii) the continuity can be discerned in the influence of Aristotle on the theological scholarship of Saint Thomas Aquinas; and (iii) the continuity from stoicism to Saint Francis de Sales’ theological writing (Jagu, 1964). The Enlightenment and Modernity did not change the continuity. In spite of the anticlerical sentiment among Enlightenment philosophers exemplified by Voltaire (Ory, 1978), the Greek philosophy that had been intermingled with Christian theology for centuries strongly impacted the Enlightenment philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Montesquieu (Raskolnikoff, 1984; Santozki, 2004). The great influence of Immanuel Kant on present-day ethics and business ethics (Baumanns, 2006; Nagler, 1991; Sautter, 2017; Summer, 1998), and his reliance on philosophical sources from Antiquity, establishes a significant continuity in Occidental ethical thinking.

A key facet in the ascendancy of business ethics and CSR has been the separation of ethics and morals on the one hand, and law on the other hand with the rise of legal positivism. As exemplified by Schöttl and Ranisch (2015), two issues are not fully appreciated in the literature, that is, the role of legal positivism and the situation outside of the Occidental cultural sphere.

Legal pluralism

One way to counteract the intertwined coloniality in CSR and jurisprudence entails the adoption of legal pluralism. A key challenge in the term legal pluralism derives from the use of Occidental categorizations – the Occidental category law does not necessarily exist in the Indigenous nations in spite of the existence of the societal phenomenon (Greenhouse, 2003). Griffith (1986, p. 38) has described legal pluralism thus: ‘Legal pluralism refers to the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous social fields, which, it may be added, is a dynamic condition’.

There are two fundamental challenges in legal pluralism. First, as a result of the great number of Indigenous nations around the world, there are literally hundreds of cosmovisions. The search of a modus vivendi between the Indigenous nations and the settler colonial states needs to respect the diversity among the cosmovisions on the Indigenous nations’ terms. Given this diversity, it may prove factually impossible to formulate universally valid CSR. This impossibility in no way limits the need for compliance with the cosmovisions.

Second, the fundamental tenets of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions and settler colonial jurisprudence may be inherently incompatible. For example, an inherent compatibility can be found in the cosmovision of the U’wa Indigenous nation and the environmental law of settler colonial Colombia. The U’wa consider oil to represent the blood of Mother Earth, and the extraction of oil is therefore an act of murder of Mother Earth and everything associated with Mother Earth, including humans (Gómez Pardo, 2006). From the standpoint of compliance with the U’wa cosmovision, permits for oil extraction cannot be issued.

Eliminating jurisprudential coloniality requires a strict adherence to Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions in addition to legal compliance vis-à-vis settler colonial jurisprudence. At a minimum, an elimination of jurisprudential coloniality requires that settler colonial states and firms recognize the simultaneous and comprehensive sovereignty of the Indigenous nations over all the territories the latter had prior to colonialization.

The development of the concept of legal pluralism has coincided with the stateization (étatisation) of law since the 16th century (Belley, 1986). In Occidental legal sociology, legal pluralism was considered an alternative to mainstream legal theory until 1940, thereafter legal pluralism was viewed as an extension of mainstream legal theory until 1980, and finally legal pluralism has been associated with empiricism (Belley, 1986). Legal pluralism has been difficult for what is today called the Civil Law family, because its development in the 18th and 19th centuries was closely related to jurisprudential centralization and integration after the fall of l’Ancien Régime in France (Rouland, 1994) – highlighted by the Code Civil (1804) – and after the unification of Germany – epitomized by the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900).

Lajoie et al. (1998) have identified two forms of legal pluralism, that is, legal pluralism occurs as the result of a parallel existence of separate social norms and state norms with the former possessing the coercive mechanisms (moderate form), or legal pluralism emerges as the result of a choice of the state to have more than one legal system simultaneously (radical form). Neither the moderate nor the radical form fully grasps the situation of the legal pluralism emerging from the coexistence of Indigenous nations and settler colonial states, because both Indigenous nations and settler colonial states exhibit the characteristics of states, and postulating that the Indigenous nations and settler colonial states have chosen legal pluralism is historically problematic.

It is troubling that the idiosyncrasies of the numerous different legal families are not meaningfully assessed in studies spanning more than one legal family as evidenced in, for example, Arthaud-Day (2005), Barthe (2007) and Hawn and Ioannou (2016). Even when legal pluralism is recognized (Ferrazzo and Lixa, 2017; Lythreatis et al., 2019; Miska et al., 2016; Prieto Montt, 2012), a primacy of Occidental jurisprudence can be inferred. Ergo, the differences have not been satisfactorily assessed to identify their implications for CSR.

Dynamism within one legal system may impact the gap between different legal systems and hence the extent of legal pluralism (Lajoie et al., 1998). There have been attempts to seek similarities between Indigenous and Occidental legal systems (Lajoie et al., 1998), but such attempts are problematic by forcing Indigenous concepts into an Occidental mould (Éthier, 2016).

Legal positivism

In the legal positivism associated with the Civil Law family, the validity of a law requires that it has been enacted according to the provisions in the Grundnorm – effectively the constitution or its equivalent – in addition to containing sanctions in cases of non-compliance and its effectivity in society (Thevenaz, 1986). On the basis of Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm – a key foundation of legal positivism in the Civil Law family – and Kurt Gödel’s Unvollständigkeitssatz, it has been argued that the demise of a legal norm can result from a conquest associated with military aggression (Thevenaz, 1986). From the standpoint of legal positivism, this would be the case of Indigenous nations after their subjugation by settler colonial states. However, the basis of the validity of the Grundnorm remains nebulous, and this renders any argument founded on it speculative.

Legal positivism has also been studied by, for example, H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls in Common Law jurisdictions, but contrary to, for example, Bernatchez (2015), it must be doubted that such studies – in spite of potential references to Civil Law family-associated legal philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Hans Kelsen – accurately reflect the legal positivism in the Civil Law family. Incidentally, Dworkin explicitly argues within the Common Law family in his criticism of Hart’s conceptualization of legal positivism (Dworkin, 1985). Although Common Law has approached the Civil Law family in the wake of the work of Jeremy Bentham and the reforms commenced in the 19th century, fundamental processual and substantial differences remain (Blondeel, 1951; Glenn, 1993; Leckey, 2010).

Settler colonialism

Unsurprisingly, the phenomenon of settler colonialism in the Americas has its jurisprudential roots in Roman law. Because the Senate of the Roman Republic had to recognize that there was a shortage of potential colonists to be settled in Italy (Seston, 1980), the adoption of Roman law by communities throughout Italy became the key way to safeguard Roman power (Chastagnol, 1990). This state of affairs entailed jurisprudential coloniality. Although there were a handful of earlier Roman settlements outside of Italy, the rule of Gaius Iulius Caesar meant a conscious and fundamental change in safeguarding of Roman power with the combination of jurisprudential coloniality and the establishment of coloniae with Roman settlers exemplified by Arelate, Carthage and Hispalis (Chastagnol, 1990). Such a combination of settlers establishing and maintaining jurisprudential coloniality in jurisprudentially foreign territories is problematic from the standpoint of Indigenous nations when CSR is contingent on the compliance with Occidental jurisprudence.

Although the Americas are characterized by settler colonialism today, the intent of establishing settler colonies varied among European states and over time. This fluidity can be best seen in the case of the Castilian Crown as the original intent seems to have been commerce while avoiding the Arabs’ stranglehold on the traditional African and Asian trade routes in addition to finding allies against the Arabs. After the conquests in the Americas, the Castilian Crown seems to have followed a path broadly modelled on the policies of the Roman Empire, and simultaneously outlawing some of the worst abuses against the Indigenous nations in the Leyes de Burgos (1512), the Leyes Nuevas (1542) and the Ordenanzas de descubrimiento (1573). Two divergent developments resulted in the strengthening of settler colonialism as the mestizos started to behave like settler colonists instead of Indigenous Americans in, for example, Mexico, and large-scale emigration from Europe to, for example, Argentina and Uruguay.

The French Crown openly strove to establish settler colonies with the desire to convert the Indigenous Americans into Roman Catholic subjects in what became Nouvelle-France from the onset (Blain, 1968). From the start, the British Crown also strove to establish settler colonies in North America (Buckner, 1993). Prior to the rebellion in the Thirteen Colonies, the British Crown attempted to safeguard the rights of the Indigenous nations with the Royal Proclamation (1763) and to a lesser degree also with the Québec Act (1774). After the British Crown was defeated by the French Crown with the help of the rebels, the safeguards against settler colonialism effectively fell – the Confederation Congress Proclamation (1783) and other legislation passed by the United States have been frivolous from the standpoint of Indigenous nations – this led to genocidal consequences as a result of massive immigration from Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Indigenous nations

A privatization of matters usually considered legal (Daugareilh, 2013) raises the prospect of increased non-compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions as privatization would supersede them as well. For example, although private landownership complies with Roman law, private landownership is not compatible with numerous legal systems of Indigenous nations (Merino Acuña, 2014). The implications of this difference are sweeping, because firms’ ownership claims in the context of extractivism are null and void from the standpoint of Indigenous nations.

In legal anthropology, legal pluralism has been considered as a way to question states’ claim that they have the sole authority to enact law (Éthier, 2016). Legal compliance may be complex as a result of competing claims of sovereignty. The spatial dimension of legal norms – an issue studied by Lorini and Loddo (2017) – is of particular interest in settler colonial states. If the conclusion is accepted that the holder of imperium (sovereignty) has dominion (ownership) over subterranean natural resources on the basis of Roman law (Adame Goddard, 2017), then in natural resource extraction, the question arises whether the Indigenous nations or the settler colonial states hold imperium.

A key jurisprudential issue in the interrelationship between Indigenous nations and the settler colonial states relates to extractivism (García, 2010). The criticism of economic growth in Mattauch et al. (2019) does not fully recognize the growth-related issues in the context of extractivism in settler colonial states. Because the capital intensity of mining operations in addition to the finite life of them, new operations need to be projected and expanded to provide well-paying jobs and business profits – thus further violating Indigenous nations’ rights.

The sovereignty issue is of decisive importance even outside of international public law and constitutional law. There has been a tendency to broaden the state sovereignty-based concept of law to other forms of law and territoriality in legal theory (Berman, 2012; Humfress, 2013). Such a broadening is a two-edged sword from the standpoint of coloniality. On the one hand, it may provide an opportunity for the enforcement and normativity of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions in settler colonial states and international law. On the other hand, it may be a Trojan horse that further strengthens coloniality at the expense of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions in settler colonial states and beyond via, for example, CSR.

Analogously with internalized racism (Ardito Vega, 2010), Indigenous nations may engage in coloniality against themselves. The Occidental worldview contained in CSR may therefore serve as a basis for furthering internalized coloniality among Indigenous nations. The result of internalized coloniality may entail the adoption of settler colonial CSR and jurisprudence, and an abandonment of Indigenous cosmovisions.

Remarks on the common law family

The reliance on precedent – see stare decisis – in the Common Law family represents an obstacle to addressing jurisprudential coloniality directed against Indigenous nations in, for example, Canada and the United States. Stare decisis may limit the abuse of power within the Occidental society, but it also cements extant systemic coloniality by significantly limiting the effect of external sources – among them Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions – in the Common Law family.

The Civil Law family is more adaptable because of its diverse ‘DNA’, including the scholastic law of the School of Salamanca and Roman law with their (limited) receptiveness of jurisprudential pluralism. Regardless, the only reliable application and interpretation of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions must be undertaken by themselves.

Impossibility

The dilemma of ethical and legal non-commensurability on the one hand versus the need for their mixing on the other hand as the result of globalization described in (Bibeau, 2000) does not necessarily exist for two reasons. First, such a dilemma does not exist as long as the current Occidental dominance prevails. Second, such a dilemma does not need to exist in the future, if viable paths forward for both Indigenous nations and settler colonial states are identified, enacted and enforced.

Demonstrating the shortcomings of CSR in the settler colonial context prompts the question of what it may be replaced with. Responding to this question in this article is inappropriate for four reasons. First, the existential nexus between legal compliance and CSR would make it necessary to force Indigenous thinking into Occidental categorizations – this would be coloniality ipso facto. Second, there are hundreds of Indigenous cultures in the Americas rendering an attempt to answer the question illusory – a universal CSR translates into coloniality. Third, only the Indigenous nations without interference from the Occident can answer this question – anything else would perpetuate coloniality. Fourth, expressing Indigenous thinking accurately in an Occidental language is next to impossible as a result of supra-subjectivity preceding intersubjectivity according to Edmund Husserl (Bouckaert, 2001) – Sumak Kawsay (Avila Santamaría, 2019; Ortiz Viveros, 2015; Sauvé, 2014) has been described in Occidental languages, but the accuracy hereof is debatable.

Rationales for CSR adoption

Legal compliance ranging across a wide spectre of areas of law is a key concern for firms. The argument that CSR goes beyond legal compliance (Borboa Álvarez and Delhumeau Rivera 2018; Pestre, 2013) is problematic, because it raises the issue of an intrinsic incompatibility of ethical and moral considerations with legal compliance.

The key rationale for a firm to resort to CSR is legal compliance – board members do not want to go to prison or face capital punishment, or to see the firm slapped with serious fines and other legal repercussions. These rationales are certainly more egocentric than those found in the business and business ethics literature. Cited rationales include ethical values or psychology as surmised in, for example, Petrenko et al. (2016), Tang et al. (2018), Shen and Zhang (2019) and Wang et al. (2019); a prevailing ideology in firms as argued in, for example, Chin et al. (2013) and Gupta et al. (2017); firms’ financial benefit as proposed in, for example, El Ghoul et al. (2017) and Kaul and Luo (2018); firms’ reputation as claimed in, for example, Gosselt et al. (2019), Kim (2019), Kuokkanen and Sun (2019) and Saxton et al. (2019); and ethical and moral considerations as suggested in, for example, Sendlhofer (2019). Egocentric rationales may moreover constitute a part of a legal defence in case board members and/or firms are prosecuted or sued, because CSR can be used to frame legal issues in an attempt to circumvent legal compliance (Restrepo Amariles et al., 2017).

Particularly in settler colonial states, legal compliance and some purportedly ethical criteria used in CSR may actually be illegal and unethical. A focus on legal compliance as done in Aggerholm and Trapp (2014) overlooks that law can be a tool of coloniality and oppression – as exemplified by the partial abrogation of the Leyes Nuevas (1542) in 1545 and the US Indian Removal Act (1830). Forbye, the need for compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions is usually disregarded in a sign of coloniality.

Assertions that actions cannot be restrained by law (Asmussen and Fosfuri, 2019) and that law has become an insufficient guide in the postmodern world (Pasquero, 2007) must be dismissed. Such claims would be understandable in the context of legal positivism in the Civil Law family allowing societal power structures to defend their position with the help of the enactment of statutory law, but they overlook that the same societal power structures can influence the foundations of CSR via legitimacy – an endeavour facilitated by the multifaceted and sometimes contradictory substance of Occidental ethics. Any insufficiency is an insufficiency of the societal power structures enacting positive law, and not an insufficiency of jurisprudence largo sensu – including Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions, scholastic jurisprudence and Roman law.

Conclusion

The objective of this article is to make the case horizontally that the intertwined legal compliance and CSR abet enduring coloniality in settler colonial states. CSR is preceded and superseded by legal compliance. Two sources of coloniality are therefore contained in CSR. First, the ethical and moral norms underpinning CSR are of Occidental extraction. Second, the legal compliance is demarkated to the Civil Law family and Common Law family thus disregarding the need to comply with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions.

This article contains three key contributions. First, the jurisprudential, managerial, philosophical and political foundations of CSR are of Occidental extraction therefore making CSR susceptible to being a tool of coloniality directed against Indigenous nations. Second, CSR is constrained by compliance with Occidental jurisprudence – a poorly defined entity. Apart from the fundamental differences between the Common Law and Civil Law families, there are multiple complementary and competing facets in the Civil Law family. The legal positivism used to legalize the disenfranchisement and dispossession of the Indigenous nations besides coloniality is therefore not obligatory in the settler colonial states. Alternatives include Roman law and the scholastic jurisprudence of the School of Salamanca. Third, firms’ compliance with Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions can be best safeguarded by legal pluralism-based compliance as this entails court-imposed coercive enforcement.

Additional and complementary research is needed regarding three issues. First, the corrosive influence of CSR on Indigenous nations provides empirical study opportunities. Second, the implications of the use of scholastic jurisprudence of the School of Salamanca – particularly Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez – present the prospect of Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions superseding Occidental law in the Americas thus raising jurisprudential research questions. Third, further research into the numerous Indigenous nations’ cosmovisions is warranted – on their own terms.

CSR in its current iteration is not a solution to the problems associated with coloniality in settler colonial states. CSR is indeed part of the problem. CSR needs to be comprehensively reinvented.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jurgen Poesche

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