Abstract
The Iranian state is the state of redistribution of oil and gas resources by a wide bureaucracy. Inequitable redistribution of resources and bureaucratic corruption have caused drastic movements in Iran over the past decade and raised the issue of public attitudes toward state funding and spending. Although previous studies in the literature have extensively addressed the rentier Iranian government, the issue of the public attitudes toward redistribution has been largely neglected. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the attitudes of two generations of students toward state financing and expenditure practices in Iran. The data were collected by conducting two surveys in 2003 and 2016. The findings demonstrated that from the perspective of Iranian students, economic corruption is the most important factor leading to economic crisis.
Introduction
The constitutional revolution of Iran in the second half of the 19th century was accompanied by the advent of a modern world in the country, the consequence of mutual cooperation among intellectuals, state reformers, marketers, traders (economic activists), clergymen, and educated individuals. The constitutional revolution and the foundation of the first legislation parliament were concurrent with the First World War and the pressure imposed by the colonial states of England, Russia, and France as well as their infliction of unequal commercial relations and transparent interventions in the internal affairs of the country. Within this period, the impact of the state on economy was very insignificant, and the annual state budget on average accounted for 2% of the gross national income. In addition, the state did not play a constructive role in making investments and providing social services (Nili et al., 2008: 110). In other words, in the 19th century, the politicians failed to ensure public accountability and relieve the pains that were afflicting the people (Isavi, 1989).
After the constitutional revolution, the economic and social state of the society did not improve. Insecurity, acute shortage of goods, chronic poverty, and deficit were prevalent in the society. About 90% of the workforce did farming and were involved in rural industry (Katouzian, 1995: 112). In the first period of the 20th century, oil revenues gained a prominent status in the economy of Iran though the required technologies for oil exploitation did not exist. Therefore, numerous privileges were given to developed countries such as England. Meanwhile, other countries controlled the two economic sides, that is, banking and oil. The increase in oil revenues gave more authority to the central state. This changed the relationship among the state, economy, and society. Using oil revenues, the state took widespread economic actions, directly founded companies, and built railways. The economy was heavily dependent on state funding. Accordingly, oil revenues played a key role in economic-political (including positive and negative) transformations (Katouzian, 1995: 36).
The dual role of oil in the economy of Iran from the mid-20th century is transparent. From 1944 onwards, due to the occupation of the country by the allied forces, Iran was stricken by massive recession, inflation, insecurity, and crippling economic problems for a decade. In this period, oil revenues facilitated the country’s administrative affairs (Nili et al., 2008: 119). From 1970 onwards, the increase in oil revenue that led to the expansion of the state turned into a practical agent for its distribution and corruption. This ended up in one of the important challenges, that is, the state independence from the society. In the last century, oil revenues have gained an important status in the economy and politics of the country. This led to the dependence of the state structure and economy on oil (Zamanzadeh and Alhoseini, 2012: 152). The dominance of the state is due to oil revenues (Ferasatkhah, 2017: 185).
In the economic system of the country based on restricted competitions, the exclusive power in the hands of an inefficient state emerges in different forms: (1) reinforcement of corruption processes, (2) financial independence of the state forming the internal economy (market and civil society), (3) illusion of development-oriented state, (4) increase in state expenses, (5) ineffective allocation of corruption based on oil revenues, (6) enfeebling democracy, (7) and considerable fluctuation and instability (Zamanzadeh and Alhoseini, 2012: 131–136). In state, the distributor of the resources formed a new social class called bureaucrats causing inequality in distribution (Nee, 1989). In addition, in Iran, due to its financial independence, the state has continually attempted to devalue and weaken civil institutions (Hady Zonooz, 2008: 295).
In the Western developed countries, the state intervention is made against market system inequalities, and in socialist states, redistribution is directly transferred from producers to other social groups (Nee, 1989). However, in Iran, the state has exclusive access to oil revenues redistributed by bureaucratic mechanism. The Iranian state was reluctant to expand the democratic mechanisms to the lower classes except for religious affairs, parliament elections, and presidential elections. Fligstein (1996) believes that since the state is the largest distributor of oil revenue benefits, a growing number of sectors in the society interact with it to facilitate their trading, market development, control of local product market, and finance making. The leading classes in the society interact mutually with bureaucratic state to gain advantage. However, the salaried and lower-level classes of the society protest in their call for equality in the distribution of the resources.
Over the last two decades, several movements have been made in Iran, majority of which were reactions to the state performance in economic and social areas. The workers’ protest to the privatization of the state companies as well as the teachers and retired individuals’ protest to the method of resource distribution and low income are parts of these movements. The state allocates the budget to different organizations that are not accountable for their performance to the state and society. In recent years, different social groups have called for transparency in state expenses. The protest of the poor and low-income families in more than 100 cities in Iran in 2017 is a case in point. The state policies in expending oil revenues have been increasingly questioned (Hadi Zonooz, 2008: 246). Accordingly, the analysis of different social groups’ views about the mechanisms of the state incomes and expenses are important from different perspectives. First, it is the significant share of the state expenses in economy and dependence on oil revenues. Second, it is social inequality of the distribution of oil resources.
In this study, investigating the Iranian university students’ attitude toward the financial provision and expense in the state becomes important from different perspectives. First, the state expenses play pivotal roles in policymaking, and it is important to explore the attitudes of university students, as the intellectual members in the society, toward the priority of the state involvement in economy. Second, there is an opportunity to investigate the difference in the attitude of two generations of the students toward state expenses.
In case of any contrast between the economic attitude of different social groups, and state strategies and policymaking practices, several economic disorders are witnessed. This being the case, university students as the intellectuals in the society show their negative attitudes and feel the inequality. Therefore, the possibilities such as immigration, unusual economic and even illegal enterprises, disappointment at reforming economic structure, and diminishment of the culture of hard work are not far-fetched. After graduation, the university students follow their career path in the labor market, take responsibilities in both public and private sectors, and make effective economic decisions in the society. Consequently, it could be claimed that university students having the potential for turning into experts, scholars, and elite people function as social revolution factors. Therefore, it is important both operationally and practically for the policymakers, society administrators, and researchers in different areas of human sciences to be informed about the mental and behavioral attitudes of the university students. This research study aims to identify the Iranian university students’ attitudes toward macroeconomic issues in the society that could be considered significant from scientific, cognitive, and policymaking perspectives because social and economic policymakers require the findings of scientific research studies more than anything else.
The following research questions were proposed:
What are the students’ attitudes toward financing the state?
What are the students’ preferences for the state budget spending?
What is the root of economic issues from the Iranian students’ views?
What changes have been made in the university students’ attitudes toward the economic issues (the state revenues and expenses) from early 2000s (1380s) to early 2010s (1390s)?
Literature
The role and the importance of the state in different disciplines including sociology, economics, and political science are discussed in several stable, fiscal, and coercive categories (Block and Evans, 2005; Campbell, 1993; Davis et al., 1994; Dobbin, 1993; Evans, 1995; Evans et al., 1985; Skocpol, 1985; Fligstein, 1990; Roe, 1994; Tilly, 1990). Fligstein (1996: 660) argues that the firms are trying to limit the competition and create stable markets. In other words, the state is stabilizing markets by regulating them for large companies and the state’s inability to stabilize is possible. It takes a major crisis, such as a war, depression, or the collapse of the state to change them. Dobbin (1993) believes that states operate on a cultural basis. For example, in France, the state should guide the railroad industry and protect it from the anarchy of the market. According to Evans (1995), the main question about the economic and financial roles is not ‘how much’ a state is involved in the economy, but ‘what kind’ of involvement it has. Evans further specified that the criterion of state involvement in the economy of the developing countries is divided into three categories: ‘developmental states, predatory states, and intermediary states’.
One of the important concerns in economic sociology is fiscal sociology. Finance is a renewed topic in sociology, and most research studies have focused on public opinion regarding taxes (Campbell, 2009), the institutional foundation of financial markets (Dobbin, 2005; Swedberg, 2003), banking and financial markets (Brewster Stearns and Mizruchi, 2005), and the sociology of money and consumption (Zelizer, 2005 [1994]). Swedberg (2003: 174) argues that ‘the expenditures of the state can be used for different purposes – for war, welfare, and so on – and this will obviously have important effects’. Recently, Carruthers and Chul Kim (2011) acknowledged that financial issues involve particular clusters of actors, activities, contexts, and rules. Studies on how the state generates economic expenditure (economic sociology) and how the state generates and spends its resources (fiscal sociology) are expanding in sociology. State financial policies have effects on various groups of society.
However, the attitude of different social groups toward the role of the state in the economy as well as the financial and budgetary priorities of the state is an important issue on which little research has been done. The attitude of different groups toward these issues can influence the state decision-making by lending support to specific social policies. Although there are different attitudes toward how state interacts with the economy, most people want to have the state’s support, which should inevitably be reduced from state spending (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; German Marshall Fund, 2013). More research studies focused on the attitude of individuals toward the role of state in the economy and the financial issues of the state, mostly on the welfare state (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Guo and Gilbert, 2014; Jacoby, 1994; Lipset, 1996; Svallfors, 1997, 2008). The empirical literature demonstrates that there is a difference among countries regarding their people’s attitudes toward the state intervention’s in the economy.
Table 1 represents two important issues. The first one shows that the emphasis in this type of study has typically been on the redistribution of economic resources via the state, while less attention has been paid to the way the income of the state is generated and the relationship between the welfare of the state and the business community (Swedberg, 2000: 171). The second point is the tendency of the American ideology to portray the state as having a negative influence on the economy (Block, 1996).
Attitudes toward various forms of government activity in some OECD countries (Lipset, 1996).
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Some researchers demonstrated that the public attitude toward the state expenses differ across the world (Shapiro, Patterson and Russell, 1987) or across the time (Shapiro, 1992). Sears and Citrin (1985) revealed that in the United States, people believe in shrinking the state. Overall, it is important to explore which methods of revenues and expenditures are approved by people.
Iranian scholars have called the Iranian state a rentier state due to high oil and gas revenues, where the state’s financial independence (rentier state) has consequences: lack of economic development (Mahdavy, 1970), increased short-term mentality and self-interest (Sharifzadegan and Ghanouni, 2018), increased inequality (Movassaghi and Ghanimifard, 2012), increased corruption (Bokharaei and Gharibi, 2015), bad governance (Mirebaigi, 2016), lack of civil society independence (Hajiyoseffi, 1999), and lack of entrepreneurship groups (Byselami, 2007). However, the analysis of the attitudes of various social groups, especially Iranian students, toward state financing and spending has been neglected. Therefore, the analysis of people’s attitude toward the financial plans of the Iranian state differentiates this research from the other studies.
Analytic framework
Classical sociologists, such as Max Weber (1981: 254–266, 279–280) and Georg Simmel (1978), analyzed financial issues. ‘While Weber did not use the term “fiscal sociology,” he was strongly interested in how the ruling political organizations have been financed in different ways throughout the history and what effect this has had on both economy and society’ (Sewdberg, 2003: 176). In economics and society, Weber believes that the state’s financing method affects the structure of the economy. The way in which the state provides its own needs has a significant impact on the structure of the economic activity. If state’s financing is based on monetary tax, and if the tax is at its discretion, the best opportunity for developing the institution of capitalism is given to the market. Therefore, the way the state finances determines the economic activity. Weber provides a typology for the three main methods by which the states have been financed by reliance on their own productive units, liturgies, and taxation. The state, based on the way it finances, has important implications for the private economic activity (Weber, 1981: 199).
Following Weber, O’Connor (1973) attempted to expand the field of fiscal sociology from two different perspectives. Over the past two decades, Campbell (1993, 1996) has provided more complementary theoretical concepts in empirical research studies. He believes that the two major issues in modern fiscal sociology are the factors determining the state’s tax policy and the factors affecting the state’s tax policies. In Campbell’s view (1993), fiscal sociology focuses on the variety of noneconomic factors affecting financial policies, where the state’s fiscal policy has a variety of effects on different social groups. Thus, studying the determinants of tax policy can provide new insights into the relationship between the state and various social groups. Campbell’s (1993) article consists of two parts: First, it addresses the determinants of tax policy in advanced capitalist societies, which include geopolitical conflict, macroeconomic condition, fiscal crisis, classes and interest groups, state structure, and ideology. Second, it concentrates on the consequences of taxation, which include political rebellion and revolution, state building, economic organization, labor force participation, and philanthropy.
Fiscal sociology and public opinion
Although taxation constitutes one of the main linkages between citizens and the state, the study of public opinion and taxes has generally taken a backseat to the accounts of the elite politics of tax policy. Since the ordinary citizens rarely pay much attention to public affairs, and often know little about complex policy issues, such as taxation, this customary emphasis on elites is understandable (Campbell, 2009). Research demonstrates that in economic and fiscal sociology, not many studies have been done on public opinion and the fiscal state finances. There are three groups of sociologists known on the basis of their approaches to public opinion. Some sociologists do not consider public opinion to be an independent and important factor, and scrolling is merely the summing up of an inexplicable idea of how people think. Accordingly, public opinion is influenced by several factors, such as media and elites. The proponents of rational choice theory believe that a public opinion is an independent form, and individuals act on a personal basis so that the views of individuals represent personal gain. Some thinkers play important roles in public opinion (see Manza and Brooks, 2012).
In this study, public opinion is considered as a significant factor in social and economic life. At the outset, any discussion of public opinion includes the inevitable challenge of providing a concise definition of the concept. As with other controversial concepts, public opinion has been understood in a wide variety of ways by social theorists and empirical researchers. A simplistic definition of public opinion is related to those attitudes measured by opinion polls and surveys. Whether the public can be represented by the aggregation of individual responses to survey questions remains a vexing issue (Manza and Brooks, 2012). Opinion surveys may have their limits. However, alternatives to the opinion survey are often fraught with equal (if not greater) amounts of uncertainty and even bias. Standardization, reliability, and representativeness endow surveys with well-known strengths and properties that complement and extend research based on in-depth interviews, archival research, focus groups, and/or participant observations (Manza and Brooks, 2012). Public opinion can affect the wide variety of contexts. The state in advanced capitalist countries will try to take advantage of those elements of public attitudes that support their case in presenting demands or making policy proposals.
Individual’s attitudes are shaped by personal characteristics and experiences that are also influenced by the social contexts in which they are formed, an instance of which is how growing up in a religious community can influence one’s attitude toward marriage and family life (Guo and Gilbert, 2014). When it comes to people’s attitudes, factors, such as age, gender, ethnicity, educational level, and income gain significance. In other words, there is a relationship between the attitude of individuals toward the redistribution of income by the state and the individual affairs (Gelissen, 2000; Pfeifer, 2009). For analyzing public opinion about the state, besides the individuals’ different characteristics, the experience of individuals about the performance of state agencies influences their positive or negative attitude. People’s attitudes toward welfare state refer to issues, such as unemployment, health, and redistribution (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Svallfors, 1997). In conclusion, the literature reveals that the public attitudes toward the welfare state show the importance of the individual characteristics and the institutional context in determining the positive and negative attitudes of individuals toward the welfare state.
We have mentioned that according to Dobbin’s view, one must refer to the political culture of each country to understand economic developments. Oil revenues have created a different political culture in Iran. The implicit agreement between the state and the society on low taxation led to the formation of a tax evasion spirit, large and corrupt bureaucracy, and de-productive economy.
Weber’s financial sociology framework is crucial. The type of financing each state forms a different economic structure. Unlike developed countries, state financing in Iran over the past hundred years has consisted of two first-stage oil and gas outlets and taxation in the latter, where high state revenues from oil and gas sales, tax breaks for companies and organizations, and large tax evasion gain prominence. Campbell, 1993 and Nee (1989) also showed how state structure and tax policies are linked to influential groups. The structure of state in Iran is based on the redistribution of oil and gas revenues and a powerful class of bureaucratic employees and managers who distribute income. Most research focuses on elite attitudes toward state financing and spending. However, addressing the attitudes of other groups in society, such as women, ethnicities, and students, is less studied. Moreover, much of the research has been on welfare states and has neglected the analysis of oil-based states. Accordingly,
State oil revenue in Iran has shaped a different state structure and political culture, where different social groups prefer to finance the state from selling more oil, not raising taxes.
Different social groups, including students, believe that the state will provide more social services such as housing, education, and health.
The State of Iran can be called the rent-redistributive state of oil sales, where the corruption of rent-distributing bureaucracy is probably the root cause of economic issues from the perspectives of various social groups, especially students.
Iranian experience
The two common approaches to understanding Iranian society and its changes, which have influenced most Iranian scholars and researchers are as follows: (1) ‘less state more market’ and (2) Iranian despotism. In ‘less state more market’ approach, most of the studies have focused on this question ‘which is better, more state or more market?’ Implicit in that question is the assumption that the state and economy are separate analytic spheres that can function autonomously (Ghaninejad, 2007, 2017; Nili et al., 2008). The most important principle of the new world is the separation of these two areas and the result of freedom and prosperity. ‘Less state more market’ is a general and universal principle for the development of all countries without any alternative (Ghaninejad, 2017). The approach of ‘less state more market’ considers two main areas in society: the political area (state), which should be less, and the nonpolitical area (civil society), which is based on the market and free exchange between individuals which should be more. According to the researchers following this approach, the problems of contemporary societies have a common root, that is, a large government and a small market. Therefore, only a free market can create freedom and prosperity. According to the free market approach, the most desirable society is the one in which state power is limited to the minimum possible and as necessary, and the political sphere is completely separated from the economic sphere.
Researchers such as Ghaninejad and Nili see the separation of government and economy (market) as the foundation of the new world. According to Hayek (1944), socialist intellectuals have had the greatest influence on public opinion and politics in the last hundred years. Ghaninejad (2007, 2017) has followed the same idea about understanding Iranian society. In his opinion, the familiarity of Iranian intellectuals with socialist ideas was the beginning of our misunderstanding of modern society and the beginning of the wrong path in Iran’s development. Ghaninejad considers the socialist and nationalist ideas of Mossadegh, Khalil Maleki, and the leaders of the Tudeh Party as the main causes of Iran’s underdevelopment (Ghaninejad, 2007). In his view, these thoughts have affected not only the public opinion but also politicians. Ghaninejad believes that economic policies before and after the Islamic Revolution were influenced by the socialist and nationalist ideas of Iranian intellectuals after World War II. Accordingly, the policies and beliefs of social groups are influenced by socialist and nationalist ideas. According to this approach, Iranian students have been influenced by the collectivist ideas of intellectuals and have not gained a proper understanding of the free market, which results in more state and less market.
Another approach that has been considered by researchers to understand Iranian society is Iranian despotism (Abrahamian, 1997; Ashraf, 1980; Katouzian, 1995, 2012, 2013). The Iranian despotism approach created a model that has been constantly reconstructed and used to analyze the situation in the Iranian society. Accordingly, the daily routines, moral characteristics, and beliefs of the Iranians can be explained on the basis of despotism. According to this approach, the signs of Iranian despotism can be observed in the culture and attitude of the Iranians in today’s modern life. Iranian despotism (by H. Katouzian) has more academic credibility than other theories. In his study, Katouzian (1995: 13) puts emphasis on the absence of contract (lack of right and ownership) and tyranny (absence of law) as important causes of underdevelopment in Iran.
According to this view, despotism is constantly reproduced and formed in the new society based on oil and bureaucracy. Oil revenues have allowed the state to operate independently of society (Katouzian, 1995). In contrast, civil society has reacted to the unequal distribution of oil resources by the government. Therefore, the behaviors and attitudes of people in society can be explained based on despotism, especially its quasi-modern type (oil despotism; Ferasatkhah, 2017: 123). According to this approach, the views and beliefs of different social groups have been influenced by the domination of despotism. Social movements have been formed, especially the student movement against despotism. Student movements have demanded freedom and equality due to the domination of despotism. In case of equality, how resources are distributed to students is important.
Researchers of the first approach believe that the beliefs and opinions of different social groups in the field of economics are influenced by collectivist ideas (nationalist and socialist), which results in the governmentalization of the economy. In contrast, scholars of the Iranian despotism approach are of the view that student movements seek justice and freedom because of the dominance of modern despotism. In the first approach, the economic attitudes of Iranians are state-centered, and in the second approach, beliefs against despotism are formed in the direction of democracy and equality. The student movement in Iran has always struggled against despotism from the beginning. In this context, the gap between the government and the university has been one of the most important issues in Iran since 1945 (Sajjadi, 2015). The collective critical behaviors of students aim to bring about changes in the structure of state (Sajjadi, 2015).
The student movement, like other social movements, is a reaction to the current state of society and involves the collective effort of students to bring about change in society. The relationship between student movements and the government can be expressed on the basis of three points: (1) The structure and function of the state play an important role in the emergence, development, and change of the student movement; (2) The construction and functioning of authoritarian states is the most important factor in the emergence of a radical approach in student movements; and (3) The construction and functioning of democratic states is the most important factor and determinant of the reformist approach of student movements (Jalayipour, 2010). From the beginning, this movement has always been known as a motivating and leading force in the face of premodern relations. Student movements after the Islamic Revolution of Iran have had demands for freedom and equality (Jalayipour, 2010; Jomezadeh and Nejatpour, 2010). Over the last two decades, the globalization of communications and social democratic teaching practices, the structure of university, and civic education such as idealism, libertarianism, and justice, the presence of political parties and groups, and the dominance of political atmosphere after 2 June 2 1997 and the press have strongly affected the student movement (Sajjadi, 2015). Students’ demand for justice has been pursued more intensively since 1997, while the student movement has been in recession since the late 2000s (Jomezadeh and Nejatpour, 2010).
From 2003 to 2016, economic, social, and political changes in Iran were expected to affect the economic attitudes of individuals, especially students: (1) presidential elections in 2005 and the issue of distribution of oil resources among the people, (2) the issue of widespread economic corruption and its publicity since 2012, (3) the issue of economic sanctions due to nuclear activities and its economic effects, (4) rising Iranian oil revenues since 2006 and the challenge of unemployment and recession in the Iranian economy that has continued until now, and (5) increase in the number of universities and students since 2006. According to statistics, in 2003, the number of students was 1,945,631 and in 2016, this number reached 4,348,383. However, the direct effect of these changes on students’ attitudes based on two-survey data is not possible, but we could potentially examine the changes in the economic attitudes of the two generations of students.
Method
The participants of the study included the students studying in state-run universities that are under the direct supervision of Iran’s Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology. Two national surveys investigating the Iranian university students’ attitudes toward the state budget were done in two phases in 2003 and 2016 (Serajzadeh et al., 2003, 2016). In the first phase of the survey, the population consisted of the students studying in the academic year 2002-2003 at different levels of education in 57 universities (about 350,000 students), and in the second survey, they were the students studying in 86 universities (622,142 students) in the academic year 2015–2016.
Sample size
This study employed simple random sampling, where the sample size was calculated and the number 383 was obtained based on the Cochran formula. However, with this sample size, the size of the subsamples or clusters (sample sizes in different classes of students and universities) is less than acceptable, and in practice, the probability and reliability level of the results obtained for the subgroups (age groups, gender, income, discipline, educational level, urban–rural, etc.) cannot be practically possible. Therefore, for the feasibility of comparing subgroups, the sample size was considered to be 1500. In spite of this, in the second phase, due to the lack of cooperation of some of the sample universities, the sample size eventually reached 1286 people. Fortunately, this sample size was sufficient to compare the subgroups. For simple random selection, by using SPSS software, a list of students from each university was numbered, and random numbers were selected and adapted to the list. The respondents themselves completed the questionnaires.
Demographic characteristics of respondents
In the first phase, about 43% of the participants were female respondents and 57% of them were males. In the second phase, the percentage of women rose to 51% (Table 2).
Gender of respondents by year of implementation.
About 89% of the respondents in the first phase of the survey were single, and 11% of them were married. In the second phase, the percentage of the married people has increased by 17% (Table 3).
The respondent’s marital status by year of implementation.
Overall, 38% of respondents in the first phase and 20% of them in the second phase were within the age range of 17–20 years. About half of the respondents in both phases were within the age range of 21–24 years. The percentage of the respondents within the age range of 25 years and above that was 12% in the first phase increased to 32% in the second phase. The mean age of respondents in the first phase was 21.7 years and in the second phase, it was 23.6 years (Table 4).
Age of respondents by year of implementation.
Providing budget deficits
In developed countries and the ones that do not have huge oil and gas resources, states use taxes on income, wealth, inheritance, and other conventional methods to fund taxes, but this differs in countries with major oil and gas resources. In Iran, since the discovery of oil and gas, the state has provided a significant part of its budget through the sale of these reserves. Some oppose the sale of oil by presenting two lines of arguments: The first one is that the oil and gas resources are intergenerational. Although the state obtains its funds from selling oil, it is not held accountable for how it uses funds in practice. Others consider the oil and gas resources as the rights of the people, and believe that the state should not only avoid taxing people but also distribute revenue from the sale of resources among the people. Students’ attitudes toward this issue were measured in both scales (see Table 5).
Students’ attitudes toward oil sale and tax increase.
Table 5 shows that while students considered tax increases in 2003 to be more appropriate to offset budget deficits compared to oil sales, this attitude was weakening among the students in 2016, where more than 65% of the students considered selling oil as the more appropriate strategy. They knew the budget deficit. This change of attitude could be associated with factors, such as the unprecedented reduction of oil production and export to less than a million barrels per day, as the result of the sanctions imposed on the economy of Iran (see the ‘Ministry of Oil’ website), and the period of presidential election in 2003 and 2009 in which the candidates claimed that oil money is the right of people and the state is required to turn back the money of the oil to people. In other words, the students’ attitude in 2016 led to the conclusion that the state budget and the oil-dependent state of Iran remained a mono-product. Students in 2016 insisted that the state should pay off its oil budget deficit and not increase taxes (Table 5).
Gender: Female respondents (11% more than male respondents) viewed oil sales as a good way to cope with budget deficits.
Location: Students studying in cities other than the capital, Tehran (16% more than the students studying in the universities of the capital) believed in increasing oil sales to finance their budget deficits. In other words, students in Tehran (16% more than university students in other cities) considered tax increases to be a more appropriate solution to budget deficits.
Degree: Whereas the undergraduate students believed that oil sale is a better solution to budget deficits, graduate students (more than 6%) believed in raising taxes to finance budget deficits.
Relationship between variables of gender and ethnicity with priority of budget deficit financing 2016.
Priorities given to raising the budget
According to Table 7, students considered funding allocation to housing, education, and assistance to production and hygiene as a priority in 2003. In 2016, the students also believed that the state should prioritize budget allocations to health, housing, and aid for production and teaching. However, in post-war era, states have tried to reduce the provision of health services, education, and housing, transfer them to the private sector, increase the share of the patient in treatment, expand the non-state universities and tuition-paying students, and increase the number of private hospitals. In addition, the state refrains from having a serious partnership in providing housing for low-income groups. This represents the state’s ignorance of providing social services to people in post-war period.
Students’ attitudes toward budget increase priorities.
Students, however, agree to intervene in the economy and prioritize allocations to social sectors, such as health, education, housing, and other aids. In all cases, the students had serious criticisms to the performance of states in Iran. The students gave the least priority to allocating funds to Section 1, that is, development of religious facilities and activities, Section 2, that is, public transportation, Section 3, that is, development of recreational and sports facilities, Section 4, that is, subsidy, and Section 5, that is, defense and military forces in order.
Economic corruption in state agencies: The most important reason for economic crises
Why is the Iranian economy facing many problems, including unemployment, inflation, low economic growth, and unfair distribution of wealth? What is the root of all these problems? Do economic issues have economic roots? In other words, should economic issues be examined merely from an economic perspective? For example, does the root of unemployment lie in low investment and low economic growth? Or are social affairs effective as well? For sociologists, many economic issues have a noneconomic background. This being the case, the main questions are ‘What is the attitude of the students towards the factors affecting the emergence of economic problems?’ and ‘Do students have economic problems or non-economic problems?’
Table 8 presents the Iranian students’ attitudes toward the most important factors affecting the economic problems of the society in order.
Causes of economic crisis.
Table 8 shows that students studying in 2003 and 2016 considered economic corruption as the most important issue in Iran’s economy. About 72% of people in the former communist states believed that corruption was a major issue and the national state was corrupt. In 2000, 75% of Latin Americans believed that corruption had increased significantly (Bashiria, 2005: 168–172).
While Iranian students accepted the state’s intervention in the economy to a large extent, they simultaneously considered the state’s administrative and executive agencies to be responsible for the economic issues of the society. Iranian students in both 2003 and 2016 are hoping for state intervention in the economy though they are afraid of state intervention in the economy. Students did not consider economic disorders as having cultural basis. Instead, people’s hard work can be considered as a cultural proposition. In 2003, the students rated 11% of the root of economic issues as cultural (people’s hard work), and in 2016, students believed in this issue less than 10%. If we look at the students’ point of view, the solution to the economic problems in Iran lies in controlling corruption. In other words, economic issues have an internal root, and we must abandon the illusion of conspiracy in the emergence of economic issues.
From the students’ point of view, there is no hope for solving economic problems unless there is a serious intention to fight corruption. Accordingly, it can be said that, in the eyes of the students, the state must develop a set of effective strategies for combating economic corruption in order to regulate the economy in the first place.
Conclusion
Research on the role of the state and fiscal sociology focused on the capitalist countries that are based on taxes. Dealing with fiscal sociology in countries where state revenue is not just based on taxes is different. In these countries, the public opinion about state revenue and spending is different. Iran is among the countries in which most of the state’s revenue is based on the sale of oil, and the tax has a smaller share in state revenues. A lot of research studies have been done on the states that have independent income (rentier). These studies have focused more on how to finance the state. Two issues have been neglected, that is, the way resources are distributed in the society and the attitude of social groups toward the fiscal programs of these states. This study attempted to analyze the attitude of two generations of Iranian students toward financing and spending in Iran. Compared with other social groups, students are more responsive to state policy because state revenue and spending are important to them.
The Iranian state can be called the state of redistribution of oil and gas revenues (which are being redistributed through a vast bureaucracy). As Nee (1989) argues, the redistribution of resources by the bureaucracy creates corruption. Iranian students also consider corruption as the cause of economic problems in Iran. The structure of the state varies according to the type of financing (Weber) and creates a specific political culture (Dobbin) that influences the attitude of individuals. The findings show that from the perspective of the Iranian students, the state should be financed by selling more oil, not raising taxes. The economic crisis over the past few years has attracted the attention of various social groups to the budget and demonstrated how the incomes and expenditures of the state have been so far.
The Iranians tend to have more accurate information about the procedures for allocating the state budget. The concept of the state budget has attracted the attention of the fiscal sociologists, but not the public in Iran. The findings demonstrated that there was a significant difference between students’ attitudes and state performance in Iran as the state allocated less money to social services. Students also believed that the state should give priority to education, health, and housing in its budget-setting agenda, which is similar to the results of Lipset’s (1996) study on European countries. In other words, students supported the allocation of more funds to social service organizations and institutions. The findings indicated that the students were unhappy with the tax increase in 2016 and believed that the state would provide revenue through the sale of oil. However, in 2003, students considered tax increase as a better way of financing the budget.
According to the Iranian students, economic corruption is the most important factor leading to economic crisis, and the state must reduce economic corruption in the first place. The analysis of students’ attitudes shows that the state and economy cannot be regarded as two separate spheres, but as Block and Evans (2005) argue, the state and economy are not analytically autonomous realms though mutually constituting spheres of activity. The results also demonstrated that most students, namely 67% of the students in 2016 do not support any political group and consider themselves to be conservative or reformist. Therefore, the relationship between conservative and reformist attitudes and students’ economic beliefs cannot be analyzed. The analysis of changes in students’ attitudes toward state economic activities is the most important result of this research. The results show that there is a significant difference in the attitude of Iranian students toward economic issues.
The findings illustrated that from students’ point of view, the state plays a pivotal role in economic policymaking. Therefore, although the state predominantly affects the economic and political processes, it could turn into a factor destabilizing the economic condition. The state could define a specific efficient strategy, provided that it resolves issues of non-transparency and bureaucratic corruption, and enjoys a democratic nature. Accordingly, a responsive democratic state following transparent rules could guide the policymaking process for resolving economic issues and gaining legitimacy. The students’ attitudes significantly differ from ‘less state more market approach’ requiring the state to withhold economic activities and offer social services. Consequently, the findings revealed that neoliberal economic strategies are not compatible with the Iranian students’ attitudes. From the onset of 2000s, massive bureaucratic corruption and presidential candidates’ slogans about distribution-based state led to the students’ changing attitudes.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr Fatemeh Javaheri for providing him with the survey information.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.