Abstract
Does the belief that a face belongs to an individual with autism affect recognition of that face? To address this question, we used the inversion effect as a marker of face recognition. In Experiment 1, participants completed a recognition task involving upright and inverted faces labelled as either ‘regular’ or ‘autistic’. In reality, the faces presented in both conditions were identical. Results revealed a smaller inversion effect for faces labelled as autistic. Thus, simply labelling a face as ‘autistic’ disrupts recognition. Experiment 2 showed a larger inversion effect after the provision of humanizing versus dehumanizing information about faces labelled as ‘autistic’. We suggest changes in the inversion effect could be used as a measure to study stigma within the context of objectification and dehumanization.
Autism is one of the fastest growing and the most commonly diagnosed neurodevelopmental disorders (often associated with depression, obsessive compulsive and mood disorders). In 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released new data showing that in the United States 1 in 59 children is diagnosed with autism. Individuals with autism are often susceptible to stigmatization and its discriminatory consequences. For example, children with autism experience disproportionately high rates of bullying (Montes and Halterman, 2007) routinely struggle with loneliness, anxiety and depression and are under supported by academic institutions (Gelbar et al., 2014).
In a recent study, university students read a vignette describing a person with the symptoms of autism (without presenting the label) before completing a measure of openness towards that person. The majority of students stigmatized the target person by reporting a preference for having a distant relationship with them, rather than close engagement (Butler and Gillis, 2011; Gardiner and Iarocci, 2014).
Here, we investigated university students’ recognition of faces labelled as autistic. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the category label associated with a set of ‘regular’ faces presented to participants: one group was instructed to memorize, and later recognize, a set of faces labelled as ‘regular’, whereas another group was given the same instructions for faces labelled as belonging to individuals with ‘autism’.
We assessed the face inversion effect which refers to impaired performance when trying to recognize a face stimulus turned upside down. The explanation for this deficit is that inversion disrupts configural perceptual processing (i.e. spatial relationships among facial features). Critically, a significantly smaller inversion effect is found when stimuli are objects rather than faces, suggesting more featural perceptual processing for objects (see Maurer et al., 2002). This paradigm has been previously used as a cognitive marker of objectification/dehumanization of sexualized images of men and women (wearing under garments). Specifically, studies have shown the inversion effect to be smaller (i.e. more object-like featural processing) when participants are presented with sexualized images and objects (shoes) compared to non-sexualized images (people wearing a t-shirt and jeans). Furthermore, it has been shown that giving humanizing information about the sexualized images can reduce objectification by increasing the inversion effect (i.e. increased face-like configural processing; Bernard et al., 2012, 2015, 2018; Civile et al., 2016b; Civile and Obhi, 2016).
Here, we aimed to extend this paradigm to stigma and mental health. We specifically selected autism (future studies should examine other disorders) because of its increasing prevalence and the corresponding need to understand how people perceive individuals with autism. In Experiment 1, we engaged students in a recognition task involving upright and inverted face stimuli simply labelled as ‘autistic’. We anticipate a reduction of the inversion effect compared to the control group who were presented with the same stimuli labelled as ‘regular’. In Experiment 2, we tested an intervention providing humanizing versus dehumanizing information prior to exposure to the (autistic) faces in an attempt to determine whether top-down information would modulate the magnitude of the inversion effect.
Method
Participants
A total of 160 naïve participants took part in the two experiments (119 female, Mage = 18.62, SD = 1.51). Each experiment included 80 participants randomly assigned to either one of the two groups (40 in each group). All the participants were students from McMaster University. The experiment was approved by the research ethics committee at McMaster University. For Experiment 1, the sample size was determined from earlier studies that used the same face stimuli and behavioural paradigm (Civile et al., 2011, 2014, 2016a). At the end of the study, the participants in the autistic faces group were asked if they knew what autism was. All participants reported being familiar (some from direct experience and others from reading about it) with autism (for similar findings, see Tipton and Blacher (2014) who found that despite students, professors and university staff being knowledgeable about autism, misperceptions remain).
Materials
The study used 120 images of faces (60 males and 60 females) standardized in grey-scale format and cropped around the hairline (pics.stir.ac.uk).
Procedure
The old/new recognition task consisted of two parts: a ‘study phase’ and an ‘old/new recognition phase’ (Civile et al., 2011, 2014, 2016a). In the study phase, each participant was shown upright and inverted faces with 30 images for each type (60 images overall). Faces were presented one at a time in random order. In each trial, participants saw first a fixation cross in the centre of the screen presented for 1 s. After this, one of the faces was presented on screen for 3 s. The next trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross again. After the 60 faces had been presented, the programme displayed another set of instructions, explaining the recognition task. Hence, 60 novel faces split into the same stimulus types were added to the 60 faces seen in the study phase, and all 120 images were presented one at a time in random order. No face ever appeared in more than one condition during the experiment for the same participant. In the recognition task, participants were asked to press the ‘.’ key if they recognized the stimulus as having been shown in the study phase on any given trial or press ‘x’ if they did not (the keys were counterbalanced). The faces were shown for 3 s during which time participants had to respond (Figure 1, Panel a).

Panel a shows a schematic representation of the procedure adopted in the study. The experiment was implemented using SuperLab 4.5 installed on a PC. The dimensions of the stimuli were 6.95 cm × 5.80 cm. Panel b shows the results for the old/new recognition task in Experiment 1. Panel c shows the results for the old/new recognition task in Experiment 2. Error bars represent SEM.
The critical (and only) manipulation in both experiments was applied as part of the study phase instructions by providing category label information about the faces being presented.
In Experiment 1, participants assigned to the regular face condition read the following instruction: You will see a set of faces presented one at a time These are faces of REGULAR people Try to remember as many as you can
Critically, participants assigned to the autistic faces condition read the following instruction: You will see a set of faces presented one at a time These are faces of people diagnosed with AUTISM Try to remember as many as you can
In Experiment 2, participants assigned to the humanizing condition read the following instruction: You will see a set of faces presented one a time These are faces of individuals diagnosed with Autism Some of the traits of people diagnosed with Autism are: -Trustworthiness. Individuals with Autism don’t have hidden agendas. -High Integrity. The idea of trying to cheat on the job, or to slack in their work, does not occur to individuals with autism. They are conscientious, diligent workers. -Little/No prejudice. Because they know what it is like to be different, people with Autism tend to be more accepting of others. Try to remember as many faces as you can
In contrast, participants assigned to the dehumanizing condition read the following instruction: You will see a set of faces presented one at a time These are faces of individuals diagnosed with Autism Some of the traits of people diagnosed with Autism are: -Significant problems developing nonverbal communication skills, such as eye-to-eye gazing, facial expressions, and body posture. -Lack of interest in sharing enjoyment, interests, or achievements with other people. -Lack of empathy. People with autism may have difficulty understanding another person’s feelings, such as pain or sorrow. Try to remember as many faces as you can
Data analysis
Our primary measure was performance accuracy. The data from all the participants were used to extract d′ sensitivity in the recognition task where a d′ = 0.00 indicates chance-level performance (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). Each p value reported is two-tailed, and we also report the F or t value along with effect size
Experiment 1
We computed a 2 × 2 mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) using, as a within-subjects factor, Face Orientation (upright or inverted), and the between-subjects factor Face Label (autistic or regular). There was a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 78) = 5.87, p = 0.018 and
Experiment 2
The same statistical analysis was conducted for Experiment 2. The 2 × 2 ANOVA (Face Orientation × Face Label) revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 78) = 5.26, p = 0.025 and
General discussion
In Experiment 1, we investigated how being exposed to a set of faces labelled as ‘autistic’ can affect the way that university students recognize faces. Critically, the robust inversion effect typical of face recognition was significantly reduced for faces labelled as belonging to individuals with autism compared to (identical) faces labelled as belonging to ‘regular’ non-autistic individuals. This finding suggests that when people think they are presented with a face of someone with autism, they show poorer recognition performance. In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of humanizing versus dehumanizing information on recognition of the same set of autistic faces used in Experiment 1. Importantly, we found a larger inversion effect when humanizing versus dehumanizing information was presented.
Our results are reminiscent of previous studies that adopted the inversion effect paradigm as an index of ‘objectification’ (Bernard et al., 2012, 2015, 2018; Civile et al., 2016b; Civile and Obhi, 2016). This paradigm makes use of the consensus that faces are processed more configurally, whereas objects are processed more featurally (Maurer et al., 2002). In Experiment 1, we suggest that the autistic faces resulted in a smaller inversion effect because they were processed more featurally – in a manner more similar to processing of objects rather than faces.
Objectification is often linked to dehumanization – perceiving others as lacking core human characteristics such as a sense of agency and warmth (Cameron et al., 2016). Hugenberg et al. (2016, Experiment 1 and 2) provided direct evidence of how inversion disrupts activation and categorization of humanness in human faces compared to controls (machine or animal comparisons). Importantly, Fincher and Tetlock (2016) demonstrated that the inversion effect is attenuated when faces are paired with negative social information (e.g. faces of norm violators). Moreover, Bernard et al. (2015, Experiment 3) showed that inversion effect for sexualized images of women increased (i.e. more face-like processing vs object-like processing) after the provision of humanizing information about the women depicted in the images. The results from our Experiment 2 are consistent with these findings and provide some evidence in support of the de-stigmatization effects of pairing autism with humanizing information.
Future research exploring the cognitive bases of stigma could seek to further inform what responses are elicited when such a label (i.e. ‘autistic’) is presented. For instance, will participants feel pity or contempt when presented with the ‘autistic’ label, and how might individual difference factors influence these feelings? Does the provision of humanizing information about autism make participants more compassionate?
In sum, our research demonstrates that the mere labelling of faces as belonging to individuals with autism reduces the magnitude of the inversion effect that normally occurs for face stimuli (Experiment 1). We suggest that stigma-laden labelling induces a processing style akin to the typical processing deployed in object recognition. Crucially, this effect can then be modulated by providing humanizing versus dehumanizing information about autism (Experiment 2). We suggest that changes in the inversion effect may be a useful index of the objectification and dehumanization of individuals diagnosed with autism. Research investigating the cognitive bases of stigma could be instrumental as a first step towards eliminating it altogether. If we can better understand why and how individuals are stigmatized, perhaps, we can devise more efficient and effective solutions for combating stigma (e.g. providing humanizing information).
Individuals with a mental disorder experience two sets of problems – problems associated with the disorder itself and problems associated with the stigma – and this report has made strides towards better understanding the latter.
Supplemental Material
AUT807158__Lay_Abstract – Supplemental material for Labelling faces as ‘Autistic’ reduces the inversion effect
Supplemental material, AUT807158__Lay_Abstract for Labelling faces as ‘Autistic’ reduces the inversion effect by Ciro Civile, Eamon Colvin, Hasan Siddiqui and Sukhvinder S Obhi in Autism
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
S.S.O. is supported by a discovery grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research council of Canada. C.C. is supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie (grant agreement No. 743702) and by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) New Investigator Grant (Ref. ES/R005532).
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
References
Supplementary Material
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