Marketing the “radical”: Symbolic communication and persuasive technologies in jihadist websites

Introduction

The use of new media technologies for communication, mobilization of politics, and activism has received much scholarly attention. Since the attacks of 9/11 government and security agencies have been increasingly interested in how new media technologies can be exploited for radicalization and communication of extremist political ideologies. Cultural psychiatry has focussed on the role of religious beliefs and practices and cultural beliefs in the expression and management of mental distress. In so doing cultural psychiatry research has built up a range of concepts and methods, and research variables of importance in studies of radicalization. Specifically, these evolving research arenas have including violence and conflict; refugees, migration, and war; prejudice and discrimination; religious beliefs and coping and the impact of cultural change on individual identity. Therefore concepts of research from cultural psychiatry can make a valuable contribution to the emerging literature on radicalization and extremism, especially when combined with studies of communication, marketing, and Internet technologies as the vehicles of persuasion in the modern world.

The emergence of online political movements that call for a jihad (literally a struggle but applied as if meaning a justified holy war) and the development of al-Qaeda as a global brand through the exploitation of media (both old and new) have initiated various studies to understand how the Internet influences users, its consequences for identity formation and radicalization. The relevance of understanding computer-mediated communications (CMC) on identity issues, particularly on migrant Muslim communities as a research imperative, is related to the attacks of 9/11 (and other terrorist events). Following these events questions emerged on how diasporic Muslim communities in Western countries respond to terrorist and extremist ideologies online. This strand of research aims to comprehend how diasporic communities, especially young people, negotiated their identities through the Internet with unlimited access to extremist and radical literature which uses the sacred script of the Quran to build its ideologies and mobilize disparate groups of Muslim youth. The unanswered questions of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks revived the research agenda on how organizations such as al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations were using the Internet for radicalization and recruitment.

The term “radicalization” is associated with a local and global sociopolitical context in which the discourse is dominated by fear, apprehension, and risk. Horgan (2009, p. 186) defines violent radicalization as the “social and psychological process of increased and focussed radicalization through the involvement with a violent non-state movement.” In particular the term “violent radicalization” is entwined with the distinct discourses of terrorism and security issues as constructed by the Western nations since 9/11. According to Aziz Huq (2010) for the first 5 years after 9/11 there was very little public information about how North America and European states conceptualized the radicalization process. In the past few years however more policy documents and research papers have appeared on the topic. Huq (2010) notes that radicalization has become a new object of state scrutiny and epistemological investment. Drawing on Michel Foucault, Huq relates these discursive formations on radicalization to economies of power and governance emerging after 9/11 and as evident in the discourse of risk and security in the context of global geopolitics. The emergence of a body of work on radicalization subsequently identifies the concept with at least two stages. The first entails a change of mindset (i.e., adopting extreme views) and the second entails a small minority who has embraced radical views either participating in or aiding terrorist acts. ¹ The British government’s thinking about radicalization evolved between 2006 and 2008 through strategy papers which listed potential factors in radicalization including the exposure to radical ideas. The 2008 strategy paper treats “radicalization” as an individual process in which social exclusion and criminal networks enable personal crises to be resolved through conversion to radical ideas (Huq, 2010).

The issues of radicalization and identity formation are fused in complex ways vis-à-vis the Internet. Tufyal Choudhury (2007) in examining groups such as Al-Muhajirou and Hizb-ut-Yahrir observed that the path to radicalization often involves a search for identity in a moment of crisis. Choudhury argues that those who are attracted to radical groups cannot be deemed as religious and often they lack religious education and literacy. Besides exposure to radical literature, radicalization has also been linked with the social context of exclusion, displacement, and poverty. Brinkerhoff (2009) outlines the role of social exclusion which can lead to the polarization of group identities among migrant populations; thus migrant populations seek support from those with similar histories and identities as a form of social support and resource that is often called “bonding social capital.” However, bonding social capital alone can lead to isolated communities of “people like us.” Brinkerhoff asserts, it is bridging social capital, the connection with people “not like us,” that enables diaspora to connect, communicate, and redefine personal and globalized identities for successful and progressive citizenship and personal success. Young Muslims’ quest for identity and belonging in Western polities is a resonant factor that has been identified in various studies (Bunt, 2003; Carpenter, Jacobson, & Levitt, 2009; Mandeville, 2003). These discussions of new transnational Islamic identities directly implicate online media as important determinants of new identities.

The use of the Internet for politics particularly by transnational movements and organizations can be attributed to the fact that the Internet transcends geographical boundaries and can reach potential audiences beyond a defined territory. The use of mainstream and new media by al-Qaeda and the emergence of jihadist networks were inspired by the tactics of al-Qaeda with an online presence. According to Torres, Jordan, and Horsburgh (2006) global jihadist movements (GJM) include all those armed groups that appeal to the “tradition of armed jihad” and their reference group is the global community of believers (Ummah). David Kilcullen (2009) posits that this globalized jihad is best characterized as an insurgency comprising of grassroots networks which seek to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict, and terrorism.

Jihadi ideology is based on what is commonly termed as Salafism, a term that has been used to refer to numerous movements throughout history (Stemmann, 2006). Salaf in Arabic means “to precede” and with reference to Islamic history it refers to the companions of Prophet Mohammed. Salafis view any deviation from the original sources of Islam as a distortion of the religion and seek to eradicate such practices introduced during centuries of religious practice. In essence, Salafism is a quest for religious authenticity and a desire to practice Islam exactly as it was revealed by the prophet (Stemmann, 2006). The militant version of Salafism has become the core ideology of the global jihadism sponsored by al-Qaeda. As a revivalist movement Salafism is committed to restoring what it claims are the original precepts of the faith. The ability of the Internet to transcend geography and territorial boundaries corresponds to the mythical Ummah of Salafism, which specifically rejects nationalism and fosters the global Salafi jihad priority of fighting against the “far enemy” rather than the “near enemy” (Sageman, 2004, p. 16).

As mentioned, since the events of 9/11 there has been much academic enquiry on the growing use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by terrorist and radical organizations. Pickerill (2006) argues that radical politics have employed ICTs since their inception. In relation to this, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) highlight the concept of “netwar” as a mode of conflict that falls short of a traditional war. Small dispersed groups communicate and conduct their campaigns in an “internetted” manner and without a precise central command. Today all active terrorist groups have a net presence and they utilize many features on the Internet including email, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, and virtual message boards (Weimann, 2008). Besides recruitment the Internet has also proved to be a useful tool for fundraising, training, planning and attacking vulnerable computer systems and networked infrastructure belonging to perceived adversaries (Cilluffo, Cardash, & Whithead, 2007)

There is a double articulation with regard to the culture of the Internet. The use of Internet is mediated by the offline cultural context but it is capable of developing cultures and norms in the virtual environment in its own right (Hine, 2000). Weimann (2008) points out that terrorist organizations often subvert conventional broadcasting norms of mainstream broadcasters by posting uncensored footage of executions, beheadings, fatal snipers, and deadly bombings to frighten the enemy’s troops (for example as in al-Qaeda’s DVDs; see O’Shaughnessy & Baines, 2009). The audiences on the Internet compared with the mainstream broadcasting model cannot expect content to conform to any discernable standards of taste or decency. In effect the idea of gatekeeping has been reconfigured through the technical features of a web space and those who preside over content. The conventional ways in which organizations come to exist or apply membership codes, and forms of internal censorship or rules of publication are meaningless in virtual networks and collectives. Even when efforts to impose rules or regulations are seen, these are easily subverted given the flexibility and anonymity with which new sites and forms of media can be created.

In the virtual environment, individuals can be free of many constraints they face in real-world interactions, and in fact, can experiment with new perhaps risky ideas and expressions of self that would not readily emerge in the more threatening, adversarial, and perhaps legally challenging communications found in real-world encounters. Liminality as a concept is used to capture what happens at the formation and dissolution of structures and hierarchies. It has been defined as “in-between situations and conditions that are characterized by the dislocation of established structures, the reversal of hierarchies, and uncertainty regarding the continuity of tradition and future outcomes” (Horvath, Thomassen, & Wydra, 2009, p. 2). Drawing on notions of liminality, and by observing people using the Internet, it has been argued that Internet use, perhaps not unlike watching television or engaging in other forms of performance or theatre, lead to a liminal state in which some ideational constraints are suspended, whilst others are entertained and played with for the first time (Koning, 2008, after Victor Turner). Thus individuals in virtual space recreate their identities and engage in virtual interpersonal interaction which permits new self-states to emerge, evolve, take shape, and be consolidated. Although online relationships can be distinct from offline ones, there is clearly a dialectic between offline and online self-states, and the generation of new forms of identity. Castells (2001) propounds the notion of networked individualism to highlight the rising prominence of the individual in society where the individual is more important than the collective. With ICTs, the individual is able to build her networks on her interests, values, affinities, and projects (Pickerill, 2006).

Many young adults have been heavily influenced in their collective identity formation by various theological and political perspectives found online. Pan-Islamic movements with a presence on the web—ranging from those promoting peaceful coexistence to militant jihadism have become significant identity markers for a growing number of Muslim young people living in diaspora (Bunt, 2003; Drissel, 2007; Mandeville, 2003; Roy, 2004). The jihadist agenda is action-oriented as its claims to be religiously justified and appeals to the relatively young, action-oriented population (Jenkins, 2007). The higher number of young people engaging with new media has enabled radical websites to enmesh their ideologies (both religious and political) with the search for identity among youth and the displaced. The use of established techniques of propaganda, for example, the use of symbolism, rhetoric, and myth (discussed later; see O’Shaughnessy & Baines, 2009) as well as the use of interactive media such as forums and chat rooms and multimedia platforms, have allowed radical websites to experiment with new features and to establish a sustained presence in the virtual environment. These sites are reactive to world events and are updated with professional alacrity to reflect an organized presence. Indeed, some sites and even computer games associated with violent radicalization target particular age groups whilst others may simulate combat against a particular enemy to provide some emotional disengagement in preparation for killing enemies (Post, 2008).

Within the realm of radicalization there has been increasing focus on the notion of “lone wolf terrorism” as a variant form of self-radicalization. This form of self-radicalization involves violent acts designed to promote a cause or belief. Rodger Bates (2012) points out that lone wolf terrorism seems to have been resurrected in the later half of the 20th century by right-wing radical activists, Islamic jihadists, and others. In the digital age the proximity to secondary literature or direct links with interlopers is a significant factor to consider in the domain of self-radicalization. Lone wolves lack the support and resources and may not commit themselves to continuous membership or group involvement. Self-radicalization is through exposure to secondary sources such as books, writings, and manifestos. In recent years the Internet has played an important role by providing justification for causes and in aiding direction from a distance (Bates, 2012). A case in point is the Fort Hood massacre by Nidal Malik Hasan who killed 13 people and wounded 13 others at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009.

Bruce Hoffman (2010) notes that the nature of terrorism is changing in our contemporary landscape where terrorist organizations can motivate and empower individuals to commit such acts outside of any chain of command. The proliferation of material and its seamless dissemination on the Internet facilitate self-education of individuals with extremist interests and leanings and their mobilization through violent deeds. The Internet is seen as providing a ready forum for these lone wolves with their commitment to correct a perceived injustice and to become a hero through “propaganda by deed” leveraging on the performative act or spectacle. In the Ford Hood massacre, Hasan had online contact with Yemen-based radical mullah Anwar Al-Awaki. Investigations into the attack reveal that the radical mullah appropriated the role of a “virtual spiritual sanctioner” for Hasan (Lieberman, 2011). The Fort Hood massacre undoubtedly involves a complex interplay of several factors which led to the final tragedy but the role of the Internet in mediating constructions of self and spiritual justifications or the role of spiritual interlopers in influencing individual agency and actions through virtual platforms remain an important area of enquiry in the domain of radicalization research.

Persuasion and persuasive technologies

The term Web 2.0 conveys a form of transition from an earlier text-based and static computing environment to a more fluid space encompassing a set of nebulous Internet applications. In comparison to the earlier environment, Web 2.0 entails enhanced applications, increased utilization of applications by users, and the inclusion of content-generative technologies into everyday life. It is characterized by blogs, video sharing, social networking and podcasting where the activities of sharing and producing can be seamless (Anderson, 2007). The defining elements of Web 2.0 are interaction, community, and openness (Millard & Ross, 2006).

For users and organizations there are new ways to collaborate, network, create communities, and form collective intelligence. The newer services include social networking and professional networking, aggregation services, data “mash-ups,” tracking and filtering content, and collaborating (George & Scerri, 2007). By shifting the flow of information from the one-way broadcast model, these new applications allow information to flow in different ways. Content creation becomes dynamic where user participation can create metadata such as tagging. Beyond creating data, users can also classify content and induce hierarchies to content by indicating their preference for material that occurs online.

Today the Internet has offered new forms of communication and ways of disseminating information, which when considered in terms of reformations and shifts in thinking, is often compared with written texts and methods of intellectual persuasion. However, the Internet, through computer-mediated communications (CMC), offers different parameters for communications and differing thresholds for information becoming public. Anyone can set up messages and tailor the message to suit their intentions, without fear of editing or facing thresholds for publications, perhaps with no critique or feedback, or censorship except in extreme situations. However, the Internet in some ways is as democratic a form of media as is possible to achieve. Notwithstanding issues of digital divide, its use for persuasion, advertising, and marketing are well established. The domination of the Internet as a medium for marketing reflects its low cost, accessibility and diffusion, and because it transcends conventional boundaries and barriers.

Persuasion is an important mechanism for constructing and reconstructing social facts (Payne, 2001) and normative claims can become powerful and prevail by being persuasive (Finnemore, 1996). Persuasive messages do not exist in a vacuum and have to contest competing ideas and norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). While the concept of persuasion has always been linked to the use of language and rhetoric, restructuring communication media and technologies in a way that can be exploited for persuasion is a new area of research. For example, the use of social network sites, blogs, and online discussion fora offer new possibilities. Research is needed to discern how social cues can be embedded within a particular technology and medium, and how this is optimized to influence and persuade. Fogg (1999) conceives computers as persuasive technologies and as “social actors” in their own right; these social actors influence and motivate human behaviour through psychological cues within computer programmes.

Psychological cues from a computing product such as text messages or on-screen icons can lead people to infer that the product has emotions. Fogg’s (2003) research with engineers who were tech savvy found that one powerful persuasion principle is similarity. When people perceive themselves to be similar to another, this can motivate and persuade people more easily. Fogg asserts that even trivial types of similarity such as having the same hometown or rooting for the same sports teams can lead to persuasion. The Fogg study conducted in the mid-1990s had important implications for designers. It suggested that products may be more persuasive if they match the personality of target users or are similar in other ways. Computing technology can apply social dynamics to convey social presence and to persuade users by offering praise, via words, images, symbols, or sounds.

Fogg (1999) defines persuasive computing technology as a computing system, device, or application intentionally designed to change a person’s attitudes or behaviour in a predetermined way. Intentionality distinguishes between a technology’s side effect and its planned effect. Fogg conceives computers as a functional triad: as tools, as media, and as social actors. As a tool computers can enable humans to do things more easily. As a medium, computers can convey either symbolic content (i.e., text and icons) or sensory content (virtual worlds). As social actors computers can invoke social responses from users when they follow social dynamics such as turn taking or expressing greetings. As a functional triad computers are linked to persuasion by leveraging on social rules and dynamics and by providing people simulations and virtual environments. Fogg argues that the functional triad framework reveals how interactive technology persuades by increasing a person’s abilities, providing users with a novel and attractive experience, or by leveraging the power of social relationships. From a designer’s perspective, this functional triad helps people to produce interactive technologies to integrate persuasive strategies into their products.

Fogg’s notion of the medium being important in shaping social responses and stimuli concurs with Marshall McLuhan’s argument about the “medium is the message.” McLuhan drew attention to the medium rather than the content stressing that the medium shapes, controls, and constitutes any form of human association and action. A new innovation can introduce a “change of scale or pace or pattern” into human lives (McLuhan, 1964, p. 7). McLuhan does not refer to the use of new technology or content per se but the change technology brings to interpersonal dynamics that often goes unnoticed despite its presence or pervasiveness. For example, the introduction of the mobile phone, emails, social network sites, and now smartphones have revolutionized the way friendships and business transactions are managed in time and place. By describing the medium as an extension of our body (or sense or mind) McLuhan refers to anything from which a change emerges including innovations and inventions. McLuhan contends that in human history we are often blinded by the content of the medium rather than the character of the medium and the ways in which technology becomes potent because of our inability to recognize the changes and unanticipated consequences that creep up on us. McLuhan’s phrase “the medium is the message” cautions humanity to notice the change in our societal and cultural contexts induced by new innovations and technology.

Despite the vast amount of radicalization research that has emerged since 9/11, there is still a void in understanding how ICTs particularly mobile and multimedia interactive technologies function as persuasive technologies in shaping senses and patterns of thinking. The existing research emphasis on the content and propaganda potential of the Internet has not closely considered the shaping of the senses through interactive and mobile technologies which people especially youths experience in their everyday lives. The increasing ability to gather intelligence based on personal preferences can help to customize sites for the target audience; this can help tailor interactivity and content to create a sense of intimacy with the audience. Mass media and television cannot be so shaped by the users’ needs and expectations. Undoubtedly many governments today are using the online platforms and features to counter radicalization and to thwart mobilization of youths by radical organizations. However, more research is needed to understand the role that persuasive technologies play in the radicalization process; in changing the mindset of a targeted audience, and in mobilizing them to participate in their political or terrorist agenda.

Marketing religion and extremism online

The role of the Internet in religious movements has received much scrutiny particularly on how ICTs are used to recruit and radicalize segments of society. The way in which people explore their religion, and make use of the Internet is a subject in itself, but how the Internet has been used to influence violent radicalization has to be seen as a special instance or example, not necessarily unique in its processes but unique in terms of its consequences (if we accept that it does truly lead to terrorist actions).

A U.S. Institute of Peace special report (Weimann, 2004) concludes that CMCs are used in the service of terrorism by permitting: psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, sharing information, and planning and co-ordination. It is the first two items on this list that are particularly important when considering the role of the Internet in generating violent radicalization through recruitment and persuasion.

A relevant and important example is Internet initiated religious conversions, or forums in which religious belonging is negotiated through interpretations of religious texts and through negotiations of diverse diasporic religious practices. Many argue that Islamic thought is evolving by making use of the notion of Ummah (idealized global Muslim community), and that the Internet, and the possibility of constructing new communities and selves, has truly enabled this global but stateless religious movement, and associated networks and societies, to emerge without the constraints or boundaries of nation states (Sands, 2010). Islamic websites are used in many ways; some question or raise knowledge about Islam, as well as test ideas about how to live life; some list fatwas as propositions and some as commandments; some inform users of potential new marital partners, as well as provide up-to-date news of world events of relevance to the Ummah (Koning, 2008; Sands, 2010).

In the past, the success of messaging was determined by the number of readers and converts and followers, perhaps through personal contact and acquaintance and the social and economic costs associated with such contact, not to mention the desire for committed entry and exit strategies from any relationship involving marketing and persuasion. The Internet offers endless consumers, all willing to engage within fragments of communication, whether verbal, written, or visual. Consumers scan these fragments and select those of interest and discard or suspend judgement on those that are not congruent with expectations.

The best forms of persuasion and marketing seek to enlist the consumer in beliefs and actions that are complicit with the intentions of the provider of information; such that this leads to take up of messaging, interpreting the messages in the process. The Internet surfer then has potential to retain control, feel empowered, and avoid confrontation and challenges to his or her own discourse. Thus information is construed as remarkably consistent with their own latent ideas and expressions, irritations and frustrations. At the same time there is sufficient flexibility and freedom so that the individual can coauthor the way the information is integrated into their own worldview. In order to inform any future counterterrorism strategy, we must consider if this sort of knowledge about marketing and communications can be applied to the terrorist organization and related online marketing and propaganda.

Examining the techniques of persuasion

Weimann and Winn (1994) drawing on Jenkins (1975) adopted the “theatre of terror” metaphor to examine modern terrorism as an attempt to communicate messages through the use of orchestrated terror. Terrorism becomes a visual spectacle as it is not aimed at the actual victims but the people watching and is a form of symbolic communication and action (O’Shaughnessy & Baines, 2009; Weimann, 2008). Symbolic communication through terrorist events and the use of the Internet to communicate extremist and radical ideology often involve distance framing where local grievances are enmeshed with global issues of security.

In the media age, terror and terrorist organizations do not just exploit new media platforms but mainstream news organizations as well. The intertextuality between offline events as well as narratives in mainstream media is often bound with the communication of radical politics online. Castells reiterates this iterative relationship between the symbolic and new media technologies. According to Castells, “it is in the realm of symbolic politics and in the development of issue-oriented mobilizations by groups and individuals outside the mainstream political system that new electronic communications may have the most dramatic effects” (2001, p. 131). While the mainstream media is used for maximum publicity and visibility or in fully exploiting the “symbolic” by radical organizations, new media technologies have both symbolic and instrumental functions.

Pickerill (2007, p. 272) argues that the mediation of politics by radical groups can be seen as “symbolic crusades” which aim to persuade the public of the legitimacy of their goals by presenting political arguments from a distance. The communication of propaganda is an important mobilization strategy for global jihadist movements and the Internet is used as a preferred medium due to its low cost of production and dissemination (Torres et al., 2006). With increasing number of terrorist groups using the Internet, this needs to be acknowledged as a dynamic phenomenon with sites being updated all the time, and with media connections being used very actively, in synchronicity with global events; current and future supporters are the main audience but so is international public opinion and the views of the frightened enemies of terrorist groups.

The techniques of persuasion used by jihadist websites include conceiving their imagined audiences through the concept of Ummah and by dividing potential audiences into believers and infidels. This conception and dichotomization of believers and nonbelievers instantly adheres those who believe as potential audience even if they do not subscribe to radical ideologies and hence the discourses—bound through this polarization—place the onus on the Muslim audience to decide between the two categories. Websites targeting Muslims are replete with ritual expressions of Islam and numerous Quranic references regarding Allah and his prophet (Torres et al., 2006). The binding of propaganda to the sacred script is a device to legitimize the ideology of extremism by constantly moving between the holy script and extremist ideologies and reinterpreting the seminal Islamic concepts. The Islamic belief system is constantly juxtaposed with the conditions of modernity and contextualized as the struggle of the Ummah. The accumulation of religious content online does not necessarily mean that the Internet provides answers to difficult questions of struggle with modernity. For example, there can be a simplification of the religious content on Islamist websites adapted to a public living outside a Muslim community and equally the mass nature of the Internet communication encourages sound bites and reductionist answers to difficult questions (Roy 2004; Sageman, 2004).

The global jihad movement assumes all Muslims are vulnerable to arguments and highly symbolic and emotional content (Torres et al., 2006). The underlying extremist narrative offered by al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains strong and compelling for many Muslims. Al-Qaeda charges that the USA and the West are at war with Islam and that Muslim countries must unite to defeat this threat and reestablish the caliphate (a unified federal Islamic government ruled by Sharia law) with its caliph as spiritual head of Islam (Carpenter, Levitt, & Jacobson, 2009). The message from global jihad is aimed directly at the individual. It argues that the Islamic community faces assault from aggressive infidels and their apostate allies; it is threatened by military attack, cultural corruption, and social integration. The antidote to these threats is jihad, not as a spiritual quest, but posed as an armed defence which is proposed to be obligatory for all true believers (Jenkins, 2007). Bin Laden’s followers are constructed as holy warriors who gain a blessed eternal life through their “martyrdom” (Weimann, 2008). Fighting is presented as God’s mandate and a religious duty with paradise guaranteed to those who join jihad (Jenkins, 2007).

Jenkins (2007, p. 2) terms the jihadist campaign as a “missionary enterprise” that is designed to attract attention, demonstrate capacity, and harm the jihadist enemies but the ultimate aim is attracting recruits to the cause and creating a new mindset. Jihadist recruiting campaigns emphasize various themes such as honour, dignity, shame, guilt, solidarity and masculinity, etcetera (see O’Shaughnessy & Baines, 2009). Often their acts of violence contradict content on these websites which are replete with the rhetoric of nonviolence, messages of love of peace, and support for nonviolent solutions (Weimann, 2008).

An important aspect of the Internet is its ability to connect and link people and material. Terrorists inspired by, but with no direct ties to al-Qaeda, continue to perpetuate violence and justify their actions by reciting al-Qaeda’s global narrative (Carpenter et al., 2009). The jihadist movement expresses an explicit connection to the ideological principles and the general strategies of al-Qaeda that can encompass combatant ties with al-Qaeda or similar strategic objectives (Torres et al., 2006). Some of the characteristics of these sites include their ability to change addresses frequently. This means that while a radical follower may be aware of the frequent change, a casual observer may not be. The potential for dissemination is seen as a key feature in enabling a sustained presence online. Circulation and reproduction features within the Internet make a jihadist presence seem greater than it really is (Rogan, 2006). Secondly, it also allows for global intervention to transcend territorial boundaries at a faster pace. Without the Internet, Bin Laden still could have globalized his jihad as videotapes and compact discs were already in circulation. However, his message before Netscape would have been transmitted at a snail’s pace (Benjamin & Simon, 2005).

The Internet now serves as a marketing platform for jihadist movements in a number of ways. It has become a virtual library of jihadist material granting easy access to everything from political, ideological, and theological literature, via fatwas and khutbas, to videos of assaults and beheadings (Rogan, 2006). The accumulation of both literature and performance of rituals such as fatwas online means the Internet becomes a repository for both instrumental and symbolic communication through its multimedia platforms which can circulate powerful text, rhetoric, sound bites, and images that are synchronized. The thematic content of such websites include threat of new attacks, blackmail on the taking of hostages, commentary on current affairs, religious-political discourse, assassination of hostages, mobilization of new mujahideen, denial of responsibility for attacks and revindication of an attack. The wide array of material posted online, anything from inflammatory sermons to videos, requires the audience to make the connections and links between different materials (Drissel, 2007). Visitors to one extreme website are encouraged to visit other such websites (Cilluffo et al., 2007).

This lack of centrality in directing the gaze of the audience goes against the marketing and advertising logic of keeping audiences more narrowly focused, but the websites work on the wider dimension of propaganda where the worldview of the jihadist groups is reinforced in the widest array of material available online. Cilluffo et al. (2007) contend that rather than fostering free and open discussion, interactive formats such as chat rooms and Internet forums become echo chambers in which extremists find their ideas reinforced by others who hold equally aberrant views.

The marketing of violence or violent tactics online reveals a process of negating violence or justifying it through indirect means. Torres et al. (2006) in examining the propaganda techniques of websites which advocate jihad argue that violence in and of itself is never sufficient to achieve the ultimate aim of terrorism. Messages are often transmitted through symbolism used in communiqués or through the interpretations for the population that “read into” justifications for the attacks and the nature of the attacks themselves. The images of women and children hurt or dead are used to justify the need to avenge the enemy. A common propaganda and marketing tool in these websites is the “displacement of responsibility” rhetoric where violence is presented as the only means to deal with the antagonist. Jihadists frame their tactics as a form of self-defence against the persecution of the Muslim Ummah as means to demonize and delegitimize the enemy (Bandura, 2004). Violence is presented as a “no choice motive” through a rhetoric that combines images and arguments where the terrorists appear to be underdogs in a world which has turned against them (Bandura 2004; Weimann, 2008). Drawing on Albert Bandura’s theory of selective moral disengagement and social cognitive theory, Weimann (2008) argues that the rhetoric in radical websites seeks to distance themselves from their own use of violence and to shift the responsibility for their violence to their enemies. The aberrant behaviour is justified as some higher societal need in a manner that is not easy to cognitively challenge or revise.

Despite common perception, the Internet does not function as a “virtual training camp” organized from above, but rather as a resource bank maintained and accessed largely by self-radicalized sympathizers (Rogan & Stenersen, 2008). Many of the jihadist websites fully utilize all the multimedia functions on the Internet including the interactive features to establish contact and pursue communication in a number of formats including chat rooms, movies, and music and some even feature online stores where users can by t-shirts and CDs. Cilluffo et al. (2007) note that in examining online discussions, jihadists promote the videos as the most valuable tool for recruitment, and in many cases, the jihadist identify the videos as their own inspiration for joining the movement in the first place. By combining many of these technical features into their websites, these organizations often target youth who are literate with new media and proficient in negotiating the content online. The use and circulation of audiovisual formats means that organizations can upload footages from conflicts in different parts of the world such as Israel, Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kosovo and conceive and construct continuity to these different struggles. Beyond individual engagement, the Internet provides a platform for creating a community who share common causes and ideologies.

Visual media, emotions, and persuasion

The power of the visual to encode the symbolic elements of persuasion is a research area which requires more attention. O’Shaughnessy and Baines (2009) propose a “propaganda trinity”: symbol, rhetoric, and myth as the key ingredients of effective persuasion in the al-Qaeda videos. The visual media are particularly powerful to deliver symbols, and symbols can be rendered more powerful if they are accompanied by myths that provide greater meaning to the timing and location of atrocities. These devices are used to create hatred and motivate atrocities. O’Shaughnessy and Baines (2009) analysed al-Qaeda’s DVDs marketed on the Internet and applied semiotic analysis and Derrida’s deconstruction technique (1967) to explore “the deed of violence” as propaganda. They distinguish between the item, the symbolic representation of that item to produce an intended meaning, and the actual interpreted meaning, which may or may not approximate to the intended meaning. The culturally influenced interpretation of the symbols used in these DVDs leads to this variation of actual meaning and actions from intended meaning and actions. This is the niche in which cultural knowledge and expertise might be applied to anticipate and investigate how al-Qaeda’s DVDs actually influence people.

In addition to the complexity of visual imagery and symbolism on the Internet, more research is also required on how audiences are appropriating and adapting religious messages from jihadist propaganda to create their own identity or cultural signification and perhaps resistance to hegemonic discourses in the mainstream media. Drissel’s (2007) research examined how hip hop is often fused with other cultural discourses to produce distinctly new style formations. In particular his study examined the synthesis of Black-inflected rap music with pan-Islamic concerns. Drissel analysed young Muslims’ Myspace accounts and over half of these profiles included hip hop music and/or videos which incorporated both Islam and Black-inflected ghetto life. In these personal profiles jihad appeared as a hybridized term G-had which fused gangster culture with jihad. Several Myspace group sites include the word jihad in their title often mixed with hip hop slang and style or militant rap songs referring to “kuffars” which is a derogatory term for nonbelievers. Some of the profiles also included mock video games of bullets being fired at George W. Bush. Drissel found that it was a common tactic among many users to appropriate an existing political slogan or concept such as “Support for our troops” and to reframe it in new ways to resist existing regimes of power.

Sands (2010) has shown that Muslim websites are not all obviously terrorist in their inclinations, and that there are typologies of sites reflecting subtle engagement with other projects including critical debate about contested forms of Islam. Bhatt (2012) argues that given our lack of knowledge of the many forms of contested Islam and the cultural and diasporic influences, more conservative, and potentially dangerous forms of Islam are finding sanction by western democratic governments that cannot keep pace with the changes seen in the Muslim organizations in their respective countries or around the world. This strategy is high risk, but may seem to be the only way for governments to act, and to begin some form of concerted response by engaging with right-wing religious movements. It is difficult to make direct links between such movements and the Internet and terrorist actions. Yet study of these movements becomes important, alongside studies of movements that are more directly linked with the terrorist acts of 9/11 and 7/7. With this aspiration, studies of Al-Qaeda (AQ) can inform counterterrorism strategies.

Explaining individual variations

Any theory of violent radicalization faces the same dilemma as any behavioural theory, that of individual variation. What makes some people susceptible to radicalizing websites and influences? Some individuals may not engage in the first place or soon after engagement they sever ties with radicalizing influences. How can Internet-based marketing efforts be accommodated within such a reality? Al-Qaeda propaganda and associated rhetoric can of course influence people, but it is likely that some people are more vulnerable to such influences than others. Brinkerhoff (2009) emphasized the role of social isolation, and the lack of bridging social capital among diaspora who become involved in virtual communities of disaffection and hatred. For example, Major Hassan was an isolated psychiatrist in the U.S. forces and heard stories of veterans in Washington. He was about to be deployed to Iraq when he came under the influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki and was in regular email contact with him. He raised questions about the contradiction of a Muslim soldier helping other soldiers kill Muslims, and the advice was that killing of such soldiers was acceptable (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/06/nidal-malik-hasan-fort-hood-shooting1). He was attracted to the culture of radical Islam through new technology and this shaped his beliefs, identifications, and loyalties. Of course, the rhetoric of the enemy, the West, and of being under attack by the West were prominent influences, but perhaps his isolation, shyness, and inability to negotiate a new identity and the contradictions he encountered were instrumental in the path he chose. Was this just an accident? There is some evidence that radicalizers like Al-Awlaki were actively seeking out social network sites, seeking lonely, alienated, and isolated people who were in search of belonging and a greater cause. It is known that aggression and shyness are linked, although the exact contributions of biology and genetics and of environmental and social stressors or triggers remain the subject of much research (Ferguson & Beaver, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2002). Thus an interesting but as yet unproven hypothesis is that active radicalization is most likely to succeed in those that are vulnerable; and they are vulnerable because of their isolation, shyness, and potential for aggression, but these traits are only activated in the context of perceived discrimination, feelings of diasporic threat, and injustice. Chronic stress due to the strain in loyalty and cultural identity is resolved when exposed to radicalizing rhetoric as this offers a more potent, concrete, and unambiguous solution. This emphasizes the need for social and migration policies that foster greater engagement and social inclusion of migrant populations, and in fact of all racially, religiously, culturally or socially isolated individuals. Bridging social capital is essential and educational, immigration, social, and health policies that support such an outcome can reap social and health benefits, as well as benefits for security. Signs of chronic stress, shyness, a significant life event that acts to provide a cognitive opening, persistent isolation, and a lack of bridging social capital may in fact be the only individual markers for vulnerability.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the nature of the Internet, and how persuasion and marketing are part and parcel of the technology, software products, and the styles of interaction that individuals embrace. Computers and computer-mediated communications can be understood as social actors in their own right, and these interact with the personal biographical and psychological attributes of individual users to enable new forms of interactivity, self-state expression and modification, and therefore new forms of identity and community. The use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and extremist groups is receiving more research attention. This sort of research on the uses of the Internet is just as important for developing new forms of counterradicalization strategies as it has been for al-Qaeda in its campaigns. The use of the Internet to tackle radicalization has failed to make wider use of its potential as a social actor that can shape communities, identities, citizens and enhance social cohesion and social belonging.