Rationalising the burden of establishing defences at criminal law in Singapore: Reconsidering Jayasena,in the wake of Eu Lim Hoklai

The reversal of the burden of proof and the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain offences have left the Singapore criminal justice system the subject of much rights-based criticism. Case law hints that there exists a very real possibility of wrongful conviction, should the courts apply s. 107 of the Evidence Act (‘EA’) in its literal sense and shift the legal burden to the accused, irrespective of the defence he seeks to invoke. The Singapore courts have acknowledged that the ‘evidential burden’ of proof as a distinct legal concept on numerous occasions but have not reconciled it with Lord Devlin’s interpretation of s. 3(3) EA in Jayasena, which limits proof to the ‘legal burden’. This article argues that the time has come for the Singapore courts to expressly banish the Jayasena ghost. The fairer approach would be to examine whether the defence falls within the categories of (a) mental condition defences, namely insanity, insane automatism, diminished responsibility and intoxication causing abnormality of mind, and (b) other general defences. Reliance on a defence within the former category will cause the accused to bear the legal burden of proof; he should only bear the evidential burden for the latter.