Nation branding through the lens of soccer: Using a sports nation branding framework to explore the case of China

Abstract

Soccer is seen as an extended instrument to brand China in the post-Beijing Olympic period. This article explores how the brand of China is expressed and negotiated through the lens of soccer by adopting the content analysis method to deconstruct the media texts specific to sports mega-events. The findings show the creation of a number of media frames accompanied by a new tradition in the representation of Chinese national identity, featuring the rhetoric of a ‘powerful’ nation and social prosperity attributed to the projected common goal of elevating China to be a world soccer superpower by 2050. These media frames provide insights into the underlying personalities of the country’s brand, including humiliation, world hegemony, trust and superiority. We argue that the merit of nation branding in China is more engaged with the inwardly oriented political exercise aiming at restructuring national identity for the purpose of consolidating the state’s legitimacy and social cohesion. The proposed sports nation branding framework expands the scope of critical research on nation branding within the context of identity politics in relation to sports. It underlines the significance of strengthening the personality traits of a nation’s brand through developing a thriving soccer culture. Due to the growing importance of soccer in East Asia, this article has both domestic and regional significance.

Keywords

China framing nation branding place branding soccer sports nation branding framework

Introduction

Nation branding is understood as the practice of governments collaborating with public relations firms and corporate business to foster a country’s image and/or reputation for the purpose of advancing its global competitive advantage and international influence through the reliance on economic and political means. This conceptualization demonstrating strong instrumental research orientations is labeled as a form of technical-economic and political approach in nation branding (Kaneva, 2011). Accounting for the linkage between nation branding and nation building in the construction of national identity (Polese et al., 2020), Kaneva (2011: 127) points to the importance of evoking a new wave of critical cultural scholarship on nation branding, which seeks to capture the implication of nation branding for ‘national identity, culture, and governance’. The above perspectives give rise to the notion that nation branding initiatives led by governments adhere to the dual aims of building a nation’s tangible (e.g. the growth of a country’s global competitive advantage) and intangible (e.g. international influence and nation building) assets by targeting international as well as domestic publics (Kania-Lundholm, 2016; Li, 2020; Valaskivi, 2016). Following this line, sports being regarded as an integral part of culture acts as a vehicle to boost a nation’s brand in the service of reaching these aims through successful performance of a nation’s team in international sports events in addition to the nation’s opportunity to champion the events (Freeman, 2012; Li, 2017).

In the case of China, soccer functions as one form of sports bolstering national identity and global influence, and success in soccer symbolizes the country’s substantial influence in the world (Li, 2020). However, for the fourth tournament in succession, the Chinese national men’s soccer team did not qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and the Chinese youth national men’s soccer team has failed to qualify for the FIFA U-20 World Cup for the past seven tournaments since 2005. The position of the national women’s soccer team on the FIFA’s ranking slipped from the 5th in 2003 to the 16th in 2019. The succession of disappointing outcomes doesn’t sit well with China’s emerging superpower status and the vision of becoming a world soccer superpower by 2050 (Li, 2020). It reveals Chinese insecurity of being an ‘inferior power’ (Wan, cited in Connell, 2018: 9) and provokes feelings of historical humiliation in Chinese society (Delgado and Villar, 2020). In a broader context, sports are more political in Asia than in Europe and America. Japan is using soccer to reclaim its position in Asia in the current century (Kelly, 2013), while South and North Korea played two soccer matches in 2018 and 2019 with the intention of breaking the ice in their mutual relationship. Given the underdeveloped state, soccer in Asia is expected to have a promising future (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2016). Strong state intervention characterizes the rise of soccer in this region, which is forged as a national project being interwoven with nationalist ambitions and domestic policies (Weinberg, 2015).

The media are ‘both the canvas for and instruments’ in nation branding (Bolin and Miazhevich, 2018: 530) and governments bear the main responsibility for management of a country’s reputation (Kaneva, 2018). In China, the central government requires the media to guide the public to have a good understanding of the country’s soccer status quo and establish reasonable expectations on competition results (General Office of the State Council, 2015). Due to Beijing’s commitment to brand the country via sports and the rising status of soccer in East Asia, the aim of this article is to investigate how the brand of China is expressed and negotiated to acquire political, cultural and social goals through soccer-related mega-events. Drawing upon the critical tradition of nation branding scholarship (Kaneva, 2011; Volcic and Andrejevic, 2016), the research questions (RQs) concern the intersection of nation branding and soccer in the representation and (re)construction of national identity. These look into the following:

RQ1. How did the Chinese state-owned media brand the country during soccer-related mega-events?

RQ2. Did this branding approach contribute to the reputation of the country while serving the aims of nation branding?

RQ3. What is the implication of this sports nation branding approach for branding China and broader international actors?

Under the premise that original meanings of a brand are mediated by brand receivers in a dynamic ecosystem, an interpretation discrepancy between desired brand and registered brand is likely to exist. In comparison to the former concept, referring to what brand creators desire to communicate, the latter is identified as perceptions of that brand in the minds of brand receivers (Anttiroiko, 2016). Given that this article aims to examine the ways Chinese state actors utilize sports in the promotion of the country’s brand from the desired brand perspective, investigation into how foreign media outlets portray China from the registered brand perspective is beyond the scope of this study. Thereby, we sourced the reports produced by China Daily (CD) e-paper (International edition) between 1 June and 16 July in 2018 via the ProQuest Central database to form the corpus, adopting the keywords ‘World Cup’.¹

Our analytical approach is informed by framing theory using the content analysis method. To frame refers to the communication process of selecting ‘some aspects of a perceived reality’ and make them more prominent than the remaining aspects of this perceived reality (Entman, 1993: 52). Journalists and media organizations apply framing (un)consciously to present ‘facts’ to societies, which influences public attitudes toward social issues (Curran and Gibson, 2020). Thus, all the data were structured by the coders into the different dimensions in the sports nation branding framework proposed in this study, via assessing the main theme of each report.² We then closely examined the texts to identify (1) which media frames were formulated, addressing RQ1, and (2) how they were crafted based upon the subtheme, the tone and the news style (e.g. hard or soft news) of that report, responding to RQ2. As the deconstruction of frames needs to be placed within context (Miazhevich, 2018: 579), our interpretation of the media frames concerned the broader context of Chinese identity politics and soccer policies. This offers the response to RQ3.

This article starts by reviewing the concept and the underlying reasons for the government’s motivation in nation branding by discussing different research strands. This leads to the point that to probe nation branding from a critical vantage point would comprehensively explain the interplay of power and identity instilled in the process of branding a nation, which involves the personality traits (PTs) of the nation’s brand. The second section puts forward a sports nation branding framework aligning with the discussion about the prominence of sports in nation branding and the contextualization of critical research on this research area. Following that, this proposed framework is adopted as a guide to tracing the rationales behind soccer development in China. The fourth section presents the findings, and in the last section, this article moves beyond that to explore the implication of this nation branding practice by situating it within the broader historical context.

The main contribution of this study is to unpack the ways that soccer performs as a vehicle to mobilize national identity resources and influence nation building in attempts to ensure the twin functions of nation branding. Capitalizing upon the three-dimensional essence of commercial branding and integrating sports with nation branding, the conceptual development of the sports nation branding framework reiterates the significance of undertaking critical approaches in nation branding research. It empirically expands critical research scope on this topic through the lens of sports regarding identity politics, underlining the value of strengthening the PTs of a nation’s brand. The research outcomes shed light on the state of China’s nation branding and offer a lens to understand how governments in the eastern subregion of Asia leverage sports activities to brand the countries.

Reconceptualizing the three dimensions of nation branding

Nation branding involves the deployment of strategies to identify, communicate and manage national image and reputation with regard to a nation’s economic, political and cultural strength. The different strands of research about this phenomenon show that engagement with various disciplines determines the purposes of nation branding. Kaneva (2011) classifies the strands as the ‘technical-economic, political, and cultural approaches’. The first perspective defines nation branding as a strategic tool for the enhancement of a nation’s global competitiveness, having a strong background in the fields of marketing, management and tourism (Kaneva, 2011). Within this stream, countries must attract investment, talent and tourists in order to stand out from a crowd of competitors in the global marketplace (Anholt, 2007). Domestically, the goal of building a strong national brand is to boost sales and exports, raise settlement, and create jobs for local residents (Fan, 2006).

The political strand conceptualizes nation branding as a means to improve the international status and influence of a nation in accordance with the disciplines of international relations, public relations and international communication (Kaneva, 2011). Research adopting this tradition is characterized by elaboration on the intersection between nation branding, public diplomacy and soft power (Aronczyk, 2013). The coupling of the first and the second stream notes an instrumental focus on advancing a nation’s strength in the economic and the political sphere. The cultural tradition builds upon the fields of media and cultural studies, and critically decodes narratives and the practice of nation branding (Kaneva, 2011). It features a domestic orientation examining the reliance on nation branding initiatives to foster a sense of nationhood in the service of securing power politics in conjunction with economic agendas (Browning, 2015). Other critical studies (e.g. Miazhevich, 2018; Pamment and Cassinger, 2018) examine the roles of the media as one of the active agencies in perpetuating ‘nation branding ideas, images, ideologies, discourses and practices’ through the institutional, commercial, technological and symbolic nexus (Bolin and Miazhevich, 2018: 528).

The three research streams indicate that the different facets of values are interweaved in the process of nation branding, including economic (a nation’s global competitiveness), political (international influence) and cultural (national identity, culture and governance). Externally, a strong global competitive advantage enables a given nation to grow its power and amplify its influence in the world. Internally, nation branding contributes to national unity through boosting national esteem, expressing national pride and strengthening the ‘us’ feeling (Szondi, 2007). The success of nation branding campaigns is conductive to shaping a favorable perception of the nation among international and domestic publics, potentially benefiting the country in a way that ensures the double aims of nation branding.

However, the technical-economic strand, having an outward-directed and business-driven focus, overlooks the impact of domestic implications. For instance, the consolidation of domestic power politics functions by marketing economic policies and promising economic prosperity in exchange for the citizens’ understanding and support for domestic political legitimization (Desatova, 2018). The influence of ‘market-based rationalities’ on identity politics creates the danger that the meanings of a nation’s brand lack differentiation (Browning, 2015: 203). National identity is tailored to satisfy commercial interests in the global environment within ahistorical, decontextualized and depoliticalized contexts (Kaneva and Popescu, 2011). The concern points to the relationship with nationalism, encompassing whether nation branding is ‘a benign form of nationalism’ similar to patriotism or ‘a malign form of nationalism’ that can cause ‘international or civil conflict’ (Woods and Dickson, 2017: 170) or ‘a commercial form of nationalism’ – using nationalism to acquire commercial interests and public sectors applying business strategies to drive nationalism and national agendas (Volcic and Andrejevic, 2016: 2). Nationalism is engaged with projecting an imagery of a safe place for the citizens in the hope of easing their anxiety in an increasingly complicated and globalized world (Kinnvall, 2004). Likewise, nation branding serves as the mechanism to enable state actors to search for a sense of ontological security and (self-) esteem for the nation and their citizens (Browning, 2015). This common attempt to seek reassurance about a sense of identity and certainty is of utmost importance for the construction of national identity (Browning, 2015). Thus, the critical reading of nation branding conceives this practice as a powerful instrument for proactive nation building (Browning, 2015; Daniel, 2010; Polese et al., 2020).³

In comparison with the obvious-but-oblique political value, the economic value of nation branding is concrete. It can be evaluated by the national brand hexagon model based upon financial performance of the six sectors of a nation (e.g. the people, tourism, exports, governance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage) (Anholt, 2006). From this angle, the brand of a nation bears a strong resemblance to that of a corporation (Rasmussen and Merkelsen, 2012). Capturing the essence of commercial branding, the brand of a nation is constituted by three dimensions, including physical attributes (PAs), functional attributes (FAs) and PT (Li, 2017). The PA of a nation’s brand refers to ‘actions, investments, policies and communications’ happening within the six sectors of a nation (Anholt, cited in Li, 2017: 253–254) in addition to the brand’s recognizable features (e.g. name, sign and symbol). FA involves what the actions, investments, policies and communications mean to the referred international actors, such as benefits or costs. PT illustrates the intangible meaning of a nation’s brand that ideally can build the connection with the personal beliefs of target publics (Li, 2017). The combination of these attributes determines the value of a nation’s brand.

The discussion above notes that nation branding is a highly politicized and ideological exercise driven by states to engender changes in their citizens’ attitudes and behaviors (Desatova, 2018). The foundation of that starts with the cultivation of a sense of national identity with the purpose of consolidating social cohesion and generating social support for the legitimacy of internal political institutions. This identity-shaping effort is interspersed with given political, economic and social agendas situated within a dynamic social system. The instrumental research perspectives allow for investigation of the PA and the FA of a nation’s brand, while the cultural realm is conductive to uncovering this brand’s PT. Hence, using critical cultural approaches to examining nation branding would produce an insight into how power and identity penetrate the profit-driven process of branding a nation, and contribute to a comprehensive understanding of nation branding practice directed by the instrumental strands.

Sports nation branding framework

Sports have a great capacity to grow the three-dimensional essence of a nation’s brand. Being transformed from ‘amateur-based playful activities’, sports have become ‘a multi-billion-dollar global business and established industry’ (Gratton et al., 2012: 12). The result of commercializing sports develops the first two dimensions of a nation’s brand – PA and FA. Furthermore, sports have an impact on shaping a country’s global reputation and promoting a sense of national unity among domestic publics. To win international sports competitions, national teams are required to comply with globally unified rules and standards, which affects the message that a nation wants to claim to the world and may generate a positive global image (Haut et al., 2017). Politicians rely on acquiring world sports championships to legitimize a nation’s political system (Allison, cited in Murray and Pigman, 2013). This is because ‘cheering on athletes and teams clad in the colors of one’s flag generates emotions of joy or anger among countrymen’ (Cha, 2016: 141). It conveys ‘nationalistic symbolism’ to the domestic people (Paasi, cited in Koch, 2012: 42) and becomes a catalyst for national pride. From this aspect, achievements in international sports competitions help to enhance the PT of a nation’s brand.

The dynamics of sports in nation branding are exemplified via hosting sports mega-events. Potential economic rewards are one of the motivators for governments to bid for events. The host is inclined to initiate urban development upgrades featuring sustainability, technologies and lifestyles to meet the criteria of staging mega-events (Thomson et al., 2017). The influx of foreign tourists to experience sports events in the host country invigorates the growth of the leisure consumption and tourism industries (Cornelissen et al., 2011). On the negative side, the large number of tourists might impose a heavy burden on the environment, thus raising governance cost (Cornelissen et al., 2011). In addition, the host country has a high chance of being exposed to global media scrutiny of critical domestic affairs (e.g. corruption, human rights violations and environmental deterioration) (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015). The above benefits and downsides transform certain aspects of the PA and the FA of a nation’s brand. It affects how the country is perceived at home and worldwide, and creates differences in the PT dimension of the host’s brand. Integrating with the different research streams in exploring a nation’s brand, this study puts forth a sports nation branding framework. It identifies what ways sports impact the three-dimensional essence of a nation’s brand and which research approaches are suitable to generate insights into how the aims of nation branding are served (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Proposed sports nation branding framework.

This framework places an emphasis on enhancing the PT of a nation’s brand despite the fact that the three dimensions of PA, FA and PT are interdependent. When the PT of a nation’s brand becomes appealing, it encourages international publics to ‘buy the products of brand states, that is, their foreign policies’ (Van Ham, 2008: 128), and this tends to elicit a favorable relationship between the brand and its target publics (Li, 2017). Within the context of sports, raising local pride and a strong sense of nationhood becomes a powerful means to tie the brand of a nation with the domestic people, and demonstrating the alignment of the nation’s sporting culture with international accepted standards allows for the forging of a productive relationship between this brand and the international community. Along these lines, this framework is termed as a value-driven rather than a profit-driven branding mode. It helps to uncover the mechanism of sports for elevating the PA, FA and especially the PT of a nation’s brand in specific relation to the interplay of power and identity.

Branding China through soccer

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), sports in China have retained the role of serving propaganda and diplomatic purposes. In recent years, this prominence has been reinforced as part of the Belt and Road Initiative with the focus on initiating sports exchanges and providing support to Belt and Road member countries when they launch a bid to stage a major international sports event (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). Between the 1980s and the early part of the 21st century, Beijing promoted competitive sports with the aim of receiving international recognition and national unity, featuring the pursuit of Olympic Glory – to win the maximum amount number of Olympic medals (Liu et al., 2017). However, this strategy faces challenges due to the country’s established superpower status, rigid sport administration system, the rising cost of competing at the Olympics and the surging demand for public participation in sports (Li, 2017).

Soccer is seen as an extended sporting means to brand China in the post-Olympic period (Li, 2020). It derives from the potential for contributing to international relations, national identity and the Chinese society (Li, 2020), and allows the country to reach a far wider field of world sports competitions through citizen engagement and vast publicity (Pamment and Cassinger, 2018). In 2015, the Chinese government stated that advancement of soccer is of great significance to the country’s global influence and national pride as well as to the Chinese people’s psyche, cultural life, patriotism, sporting culture and sports industry (General Office of the State Council, 2015). Since then, it has started transforming the country from ‘a major sports country’ into ‘a world soccer power’ by 2050 (Tan et al., 2016).

One of the strategies to lift China’s soccer fortunes is to prioritize growing campus soccer. This means children commencing soccer education at the schools and kindergartens nominated by the Ministry of Education (MOE) (Tan et al., 2016). The responsibility for developing on-campus soccer shifted from the Chinese Football Association (CFA) to the MOE. Relying on lottery profits of 5.6 million yuan per year, the CFA has encountered a funding shortage (Tan et al., 2016). Furthermore, the stereotype associating homegrown soccer players with low academic performance and poor career options impedes the growth of youth soccer players (Liu et al., 2019). Under the leadership of the MOE, soccer training is merged with school education to cultivate soccer talents with academic success (Chen, 2017), which helps to ease the stereotype. Importantly, soccer is seen as ‘an educational tool’ and ‘a mechanism for social transformation’ (Delgado and Villar, 2020: 226). Hence, the MOE having adequate resources to regulate the country’s educational system is in a better position to ensure that this soccer promotion strategy is implemented via school education in the hope of achieving social unity via social classes.

Although it may take half a generation or more for the plans to bear fruit, China’s soccer reform has produced limited achievement at the international level. The heavy investment in physical infrastructure and campus soccer in addition to the acquisition of foreign soccer talents and clubs are regarded as creating hurdles in nurturing indigenous players, individual creativity and teamwork (Connell, 2018). The absence of interconnectedness between soccer and society does not help with the quest for a soccer superpower status (Delgado and Villar, 2020). Regarding potential value to the PT of a nation’s brand, soccer is accepted as one of the contributors to nationalism, ethnicity, community identity and cultural specificity (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2017). Hosting or winning at sports mega-events signifies a validation of the country’s search for recognition being recognized by the world community and of overcoming a ‘century of humiliation and shame’ (Xu, 2009: 6). Nevertheless, the national men’s soccer team has rarely been a source of Chinese pride.

The ‘Century of Humiliation’ commemorates the period starting from China’s defeat in the Opium War in 1839 to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese civil war in 1949 (Kaufman, 2010). The state actors dwell on this national trauma as a rhetorical instrument in the service of nation building and international relations. This involves the promotion of Chinese nationalism to obtain support for the CCP regime, which is depicted as the crucial force to beat Western colonial powers and Japanese imperialists in modern history, as well as being a model of how China should interact with the international system (Kaufman, 2010). However, Chinese national identity is interspersed not only with the weakness linked to national humiliation but also the strength deriving from Chinese civilization (Liao, 2013). The second component constitutes the source of the Chinese pride (Gries, 2006). This ‘dualistic’ national identity enables the state to accomplish inward goals by ‘connecting the normative structures of domestic conventions’ and outward goals by laying out ‘a vision for the state’s course of action’ on the international stage (Liao, 2013: 148). This point in connection to the previous discussion unveils the role of Chinese identity politics in intermingling with the three-dimensional essence of a nation’s brand to serve the outer and the inner plans of the Chinese state within the context of soccer.

Analysis

In response to RQ1, the findings showed that the PA and the FA dimension obtained the higher level of media presence, accounting for 41.4 and 33.2 percent of the reports, while the coverage dealing with PT was minimal (25.4%). The reports involving FA and PT were covered positively (62.5% and 58.1%), and the majority of the stories relating to PA were presented in a neutral light (90%). This implied that CD highlighted the material rewards of the country’s participation in the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Besides that, the following media frames were created to promote the country, consisting of the self-reflection frame, the soccer contribution frame, the responsible governance frame, and the local pride and nationalism frame.

Regarding RQ2, the analysis showed that each of the media frames revealed different aspects of the personalities of the China brand, including humiliation, world hegemony, trust and superiority. In accordance with the sports nation branding framework, strong brand resonance is built upon the appealing PT of a nation’s brand. Due to the low visibility of the PT and the silence of media coverage relating to soccer values, which is essential to engage domestic and international publics, this study holds that this branding approach does not enable the long-term growth of the country’s reputation. It instead concentrates on serving the inner-directed aim of nation branding – the construction of national identity. See the discussion below.

Self-reflection frame and humiliation

This frame presented an overview of Beijing’s self-reflection on the challenges of the path toward reaching the top ranks of soccer, while revealing the attempt to use the history of national humiliation in shaping national identity. It first sought the training and investment in young soccer players through schools and youth clubs as the fundamental solution (20 June; 14 July). This frame then reflected on the widening gap with the countries like Iceland, Japan and Russia on the soccer pitch. Comparing with Iceland, the smallest country by population entering the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification, one of the reports questioned why despite being blessed with a large population of over 1.3 billion, the world’s top paid players and a climate ideal for playing soccer, China develops this form of sport slowly (20 June). In the report Much still to be done to achieve goal of improving national soccer team (28 June a), the juxtaposition between China and Japan, the key rival in East Asia (Yahuda, 2014), urged Beijing to surpass Japan in the battle for soccer supremacy, stating that

China started its professional soccer league in 1994, one year after the J League was established in Japan. But China’s ranking in the world has fallen from around 50th to 90th since then, while Japan has risen from about 60th to 40th. (28 June a)

The comparison was then expanded to Russia, the key hegemonic competitor of China in the Asian-Pacific regions (Hsu and Soong, 2014). Restoring the historical scene of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the report Russia soccer success as example (6 July a) highlighted the breakthrough of the Russian soccer team in qualifying for the quarter finals in the 2018 World Cup – ‘. . . Russia’s success this summer should serve to inspire the Chinese team’ (6 July a).

Considering the Century of Humiliation narrative, the power disparity between Iceland and China in addition to the complex Sino-Russian strategic partnership, these reports were tainted with the ongoing sense of Chinese inferiority and insecurity. In light of Oh’s work (Oh, 2013), it can be argued that the construction of national identity is dependent on the commonalities among group members and the differentiation from the ‘Other’. Drawing on the contrasts with the performance of the three countries on the international soccer field, CD attempted to leverage this tournament to unite the Chinese to work toward the goal of transforming the country into a regional and ultimately global soccer power. This goal-setting exercise helps to sustain the common features among the ingroup members, and the achievement of that allows the reassertion of the Chinese state and the non-state actors in the world.

Soccer contribution frame and hegemony

Being loaded with the hegemonic discourses, this frame embraced Beijing’s active involvement in Russia 2018 as a contribution to local and global actors. A significant amount of the reports framed this global sporting extravaganza as a tremendous opportunity for both the established and the low-profile Chinese brands to increase their global exposure (8 June; 13 June a; 13 June b; 22 June a; 28 June b; 2 July; 5 July a; 13 July a). The coverage included information about how local (e.g. Incom Recycle and BGG Recycle) as well as global businesses (e.g. TerraCycle) thrived on revenue generated through high-tech waste management at this World Cup (22 June b; 5 July b).

The Chinese community was engaged by CD to promote the brand of China, including Chinese soccer fans, Chinese Internet celebrities and Chinese veteran businessmen. One of the reports Chinese fans ready for World Cup festivities (12 June a) described the Chinese soccer fans as the second highest spenders in ticket packages and hospitality services, producing a $65 million reward for Russia. Domestically, tens of thousands of Chinese livestreaming hosts – as represented by Internet celebrity Li Jin – made an enormous fortune by predicting the winners of this World Cup and recommending sports products to viewers (5 July a). Another 42-year-old male entrepreneur, Hu Hao, manufactured and exported flags to 196 countries for global soccer events (13 June b). These feature stories positively associated the country’s ambition to ascend to soccer superpower status with the opportunity to gain individual wealth.

This frame elaborated on the global vision of the Chinese tech giant Alibaba – to become a global leader in e-commerce, sports content production and sports entertainment consumption (12 June a; 13 June c; 14 June a; 4 July; 5 July a). A group of reporting further highlighted the country’s contribution to the global environment as a world leader in renewable energy production (22 June b; 5 July b; 5 July c). Beyond that, Beijing’s massive investment in the digital TV project in rural Kenya encouraged the African community to perceive the Chinese nation in a favorable light (16 July). Descriptions, such as ‘power shift’ (22 June a), ‘leading the world’ (22 June b), ‘rewriting the rules’ (5 July a), ‘overtake the United States’ (28 June b) and ‘surpassed . . . Russia’ (13 July a), characterized the reporting. The attempt to distinguish China from the two superpowers, the United States and Russia, was exemplified by the following comment on this event sponsorship:

The amount (of the Chinese sponsorship) is $400 million more than the second-biggest spender, the United States, and easily exceeds that of host country Russia. . . . (22 June a)

As noted by Delgado and Villar (2020: 227), hegemony involves ‘. . . presenting the issue as a matter of general interest’ and the hegemon nation acting as a role model for other countries to follow. The scholars posit that sports can facilitate hegemonic actions by inducing consent and social practices. Through describing the distinctive roles of the Chinese businesses in this tournament as business partners, sponsors and supporters, CD grappled with the combination of these stories to exhibit the country’s economic might, in addition to portraying the country’s ambition for international soccer success as a global project beneficial to local and global communities.

The coverage of China’s strong engagement with Russia 2018 from the perspectives of business and the people created the impression that Beijing’s soccer dream was in support of ‘FIFA’s vision to increase soccer participation to 60 percent of the global population by 2026’ (22 June a). Consequently, this frame served to divert public attention away from the national team’s failure to qualify for this soccer tournament to instead focus on the country’s emerging superpower status. It did not show any traces of China’s victim mentality but rather underpinned the aim of earning the support for the plans for acquiring hegemonic intentions through partnering with domestic and international counterparts. This observation was reinforced by the invisibility of the coverage involving negative public sentiments toward the failure of the Chinese national men’s team in this tournament.

Responsible governance frame and trust

This frame intended to promote the credibility of the state government by formulating the theme of responsible governance from the aspects of intellectual property rights (IPR), environment and public safety. Reportedly, the General Administration of Customs embarked on a national campaign to crack down on IPR infringement during Russia 2018 (15 June a; 28 June c). The report IP Scene (21 June a) exclusively illustrated China’s strides in anti-infringement and anti-counterfeiting, noting that ‘. . . the composite index of China’s IP has risen by 9 percent year-on-year, bringing the country to a rank of 29th worldwide’. Referring to the Global Innovation Index 2018 as ‘a “tool for action” for decision-making’, this item reinforced Beijing’s plan for raising social awareness of IP and seeking sustainable innovation-driven policy strategies that conform to international norms.

Outside China, the country’s IPR protection is seen as ‘inadequate’ and the infringement as ‘rampant’ (Huang, 2017: 47). When bidding for the 2008 Summer Olympics, the state government and the Chinese Olympic Committee promised that it would secure legislation protecting Olympic-related IPR (Mendel and Yijin, 2003). It recast the negative reputation by showing its enforcement and protection of IPRs during the 2008 Olympic Games (Mey, 2009). Considering this historical context, CD grabbed Russia 2018 as another opportunity to regain global attention on the country’s commitment to complying with the global provisions of the actions relating to IPR.

In response to one of the missions that FIFA and the Russian Local Organizing Committee attempted to achieve – to be greener and more sustainable – a total of four episodes documented China’s innovative solutions for waste and recycling management at home and abroad (21 June b; 22 June b; 5 July b; 5 July c). The coverage positioned the government favorably, which provided substantial support to grow the recycling sector by introducing tax and fiscal incentives, as well as stimulating innovation, sustainability and collaboration with international companies (5 July b; 22 June b). Tom Szaky, founder and CEO of TerraCycle, offered praise that ‘The government has been very supportive as well in terms of green and sustainable business’ (22 June b). This quote in favor of the state government given by a foreign CEO was likely to add value to the international perception of Beijing.

Internally, Chinese government institutions were described as responsive in resolving citizens’ concerns about public safety in drunk-driving, flu vaccines, food, registration services (e.g. real estate) and cyber-telecom crimes (19 June). The coverage of the Chinese police succeeding in combating illegal online gambling groups that colluded with overseas networks (30 June; 9 July a; 11 July; 12 July; 13 July b) and demonstrated the capability of the Chinese authority to handle cross-border crimes in the promotion of a healthy soccer culture.

By projecting the image of being a responsible and capable global actor, the above signaled the purpose of this frame – to build a sense of trust in the Chinese government at a national and a world level. It coincided with the claim that the states in East Asia ‘rely on the global appeal of soccer to . . . express authority, and win trust on the world stage’ (Manzenreiter, cited in Li, 2020: 109). Nevertheless, this outcome could be diluted by downplaying the episodes relating to violent behaviors (e.g. verbal insult, hooliganism, vandalism) (15 June b; 21 June c; 22 June c; 25 June d; 9 July b) at this World Cup and gender equality in soccer (28 June d). Compared with the feature stories narrating the government’s achievements, these were hard news reports without insights. Moreover, there was an absence of reporting on the universal values in soccer, including transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice and democracy (FIFA, 2019). The difference between these framing approaches implied the possible gap between Beijing’s and the global belief in soccer values.

Local pride and nationalism frame and superiority

This frame conveyed the message that soccer in China aimed to build bridges to connect the citizens with the nation as well as with the people within and outside that geographical barrier, evident in the attempt to raise local pride and benign nationalism. For instance, both fans and athletes around the world were proud of the engagement of their national soccer teams and themselves with the 2018 FIFA World Cup (29 June; 3 July; 5 July d; 5 July e). Conversely, ultranationalism needed to be discouraged (28 June e; 14 June b; 15 June b). One of them criticized German fans’ fierce attack on two Turkish-born German soccer players presenting the Turkish president with a Manchester City shirt with a logo saying ‘to my president’ (15 June b).

Within China, the feature story Express rail to Europe relies on dedicated workers all the way (10 July) emphasized in a positive tone the railway workers’ dedication to delivering excellent China–Europe Railway Express services, especially at this World Cup. A train driver, Jiang Tong, expressed that ‘The express . . . needs all of us’. Furthermore, ‘the Chinese soccer fans are happy to see Japan’s performance on and off the soccer field in the World Cup . . .’ (6 July b). As noted by Woods and Dickson (2017), a benign form of nationalism can build a common identity and create cohesion within society. In this vein, CD attempted to frame citizen participation in this tournament as a driver for social unity, and the creation of an inclusive soccer culture to motivate local athletes and fans to accept foreign players as fertile ground for the growth of soccer.

Another feature story World Cup highlights two sides of Japan (6 July b) intended to strengthen national identity through boosting self-esteem and acquiring international recognition. Reportedly, Japan’s 2–3 loss to Belgium at Russia 2018 sparked two sets of Chinese reaction on social media. One stream spoke highly of Japanese civic and hygienic practices, and the other condemned Japan’s refusal to admit its invasion and occupation of China. Responding to these opposite extremes, this item directed the readers’ attention to the collective narrative of the Century of Humiliation and the national pride of Chinese civilization, by commenting that

The other prominent debate issue is the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation of China which lasted until Japan’s surrender in World War II in 1945, and the successive Japanese governments’ reluctance to admit the country’s wartime past and the atrocities it committed on the people of China and other Asian countries. (6 July b)

Recapturing the people-to-people and the economic exchange activities between the two countries, the report maintained that the majority of the Chinese ‘. . . now judge Japan more objectively . . .’ (6 July b). However, the comparative rhetoric with Japan was seeded with the country’s sense of superiority – the strong side of Chinese identity. This was evident in the following discourse that highlighted the contribution of Chinese civilization to the success of modern Japan:

It is ironic, though, that Japan’s source of inspiration in these fields (craftsmanship and professionalism, citizens’ duties, social governance and organization, and energy saving and environmental protection) was China during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), and Japan seamlessly transplanted those ideas and practices into workable reforms that suited its national conditions during Meiji Restoration in the 1860s. (6 July b)

According to Woods and Dickson (2017: 170), there are two forms of Chinese nationalism deriving from the national humiliation: one refers to pride in the motherland, known as ‘patriotism’, which can be attributed to ‘positive material life experiences’, and the other is identified as anti-foreign resentment often addressed to Japan. Foreign governments are increasingly wary of the rise of Chinese nationalism and the implications for international security (Johnston, 2017). Balancing pro-Japan and anti-Japan attitudes, as well as differentiating anti-foreign sentiments from patriotic displays triggered by this soccer game, this reporting exemplified Beijing’s capacity to manage the complex expression of Chinese nationalism, while serving to ease the concern about Chinese ultra-nationalists. Therefore, this frame aimed to create social unity by utilizing the superiority aspect of national identity to resonate with domestic audiences.

Discussion and conclusion

In keeping with the critical tradition in nation branding, this study unmasked the ways that the aims of nation branding were served through the lens of sports, using the case of China. It probed how the brand of China can be amplified or destroyed via the rise and decline of Chinese soccer by analyzing the branding texts surrounding the 2018 FIFA World Cup. As guided by the sports nation branding framework, the research outcomes revealed that CD concentrated on branding the country through the dimensions of PA and FA with less attention given to that of the PT, featuring the creation of the self-reflection frame, the soccer contribution frame, the responsible governance frame, and the local pride and nationalism frame. These frames revealed multiple aspects of the personalities of the brand of China, comprising humiliation, world hegemony, trust and superiority. It demonstrated CD’s deliberate attempt to frame the country’s vision for rising to become a world soccer power by 2050 as a common goal shared between the state and non-state actors with the purpose of enhancing ingroup commonalities. Furthermore, a new tradition in the representation of Chinese identity has emerged, which builds upon the rhetoric of a ‘powerful’ nation and social prosperity attributed to the country’s aspirations toward the global soccer scene. Hence, this article argues that the merit of nation branding via sports in China is more engaged with the inwardly oriented political exercises, aiming at restructuring national identity for the purpose of strengthening the state’s legitimacy and social cohesion. The trend of Beijing seeking the soccer dream to develop a government-led participatory approach to promote the social consensus on the state-defined national identity has been brought to the forefront.

The focus on the domestic implications of nation branding taps into the need to reduce the enduring sense of uneasiness associated with the Century of Humiliation. Viewed from a historical perspective, China’s failure to win the war with Japan in 1895 triggered the consensus that triumphs acquired via winning international sports events allow the country to replace the historical ‘sick man’ image with a great-power image on the international stage (Xu, 2009). Contemporarily, the revitalization of Chinese soccer can accelerate the great rejuvenation of the nation based upon enhancing social cohesion and national pride (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016).⁴ Furthermore, the education system in China has the convention of the victimization narrative and the patriotic sentiment seeping into the textbooks (Woods and Dickson, 2017). The interdependence between the above points out that the political and cultural implication of sports has been inherited and converted to the purposive usage of soccer to revitalize the nation through implementing the campus soccer scheme. In this respect, the Chinese leadership’s obsession with this soccer nation branding approach embodies a strong strategic focus to legitimate internal governance and enhance social solidarity, and the boom in soccer helps to (re)construct, manifest and earn recognition for the paradoxical Chinese identity in domestic and international settings. The inward-looking purpose – nation building – lays out the foundation for China’s nation branding practice.

Responding to this inwardly oriented nation branding mode, the newly invented tradition displays the characteristic of crafting the image of a ‘powerful’ nation and utilizing social prosperity to seed national prestige. On one hand, CD was devoted to displaying Beijing’s intention of elevating the nation to the role of a global rule setter and regaining recognition of Chinese civilization through creating the soccer contribution frame and the local pride and nationalism frame. Linking the country’s accomplishments and transition to compliance with international standards, with its search for international leadership in soccer and global hegemony, this media outlet indicated the hegemonic aspirations are achievable. As noted by Liao (2013: 148), the pursuit of a powerful modern state on the world stage is useful to remove the past-victim ‘self’ and affirm the identity of the ‘ideal’ China. Therefore, this new tradition succeeded in heightening the message of the country as being ‘powerful’, while overshadowing the self-reflection frame that rested on a humiliating tone.

On the other hand, the country’s endeavor to acquire world soccer success is envisioned in multifarious aspects. CD utilized the power of positive storytelling from the accomplished grassroots individuals, private businesses and corporate giants to speak for the brand of China. The engagement of non-state actors with the political life of a state makes a contribution to the ‘informal loci of identity building’ (Polese et al., 2020: 27), and greater prosperity may shore up popular support for the CCP’s regime (Woods and Dickson, 2017). Viewed in this light, these non-state groups play the role of the brand ambassadors of China, and the materialistic opportunities promised to them allow the soccer vision to be internalized within the Chinese population. The outcome of that tends to strike a new wave of benign nationalism. Nevertheless, nationalism is ‘a double-edged sword’ and ‘can turn against the government, if the state appears weak or willing to compromise with foreign countries’ (Woods and Dickson, 2017: 171). Thus, the concentration on communicating a ‘powerful’ nation becomes more salient than being ‘responsible’ in nurturing a sense of national identity and securing the CCP’s governance. However, the avoidance of overplaying this nationalism card is essential, as it can lead to a malign form of nationalism.

Despite the emerging tradition penetrated by the hegemonic discourse, the victimization narrative has not vanished from the branding discourse of China. Nation branding requires the deployment of a country’s historical and cultural heritage to forge an emotional tie with domestic citizens (Jansen, 2008: 133). It forms the basis of the components to shape the commonalities in the construction of national identity (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1998). CD’s constant contrast with Japan, Russia and the United States reveals the historical roots of the Century of Humiliation, which is treated as ‘a historically informed and culturally sensitive component of the Chinese identity politics’, and has evolved as the social practice of the country’s striving for national rejuvenation (Liao, 2013: 156). This meaning-making process based upon reviving the public memory of national trauma to distinguish China from the ‘Other’ in conjunction with the projected common goal of boosting the world soccer ranking continues to play a vital role in enlivening Chinese nationalism through a myriad of soccer activities.

Furthermore, this sports nation branding approach points to the importance of developing the PT, while enriching the PA and the FA dimension of a nation’s brand. The multiplicity of government-led soccer programs enact the measurable objectives in developing physical and human infrastructure (PA) and in enhancing local people’s lifestyle (FA).⁵ In contrast, the cultivation of Chinese soccer culture is defined as the promotion of Chinese civilization, accompanied by healthy lifestyle, happiness, the spirit of fighting and endurance, solidity, accountability, collective glory, national pride, and dedication (National Development and Reform Commission, 2016). The core values for the game of international soccer as discussed need more exploration. Moreover, soccer in schools is viewed as a government-driven campaign, leading to ‘formalism’ and not having ‘a world beating sports ethos’ (Zuo, 2019). This implies the difficulty of this brand’s PT being sustainable and explains the obscure nature of the brand meaning, which is being responsible.

In China’s case, to forge a thriving soccer culture retaining some degree of indigenous uniqueness while adopting a key set of international soccer codes becomes critical. The advantage of that allows this brand to bond with the global community, easing international uncertainties about the emergence of Chinese soccer. It enables the consistency of brand meaning to be maintained with the reliance on the Olympics in exhibiting the country’s adherence to international values (e.g. Olympic Spirit, innovation and international cooperation) (Li, 2017). This value-shaping process can add credit to the ‘responsible’ attribute that can be translated into Beijing’s soft power capacity. In this sense, interaction rather than tension between the dual aims of nation branding is able to occur. The above discussion presents the response to RQ3.

Through critical examination of the ways Beijing brands itself via the use of soccer at a time when soccer in East Asia is growing in importance, this study sheds light on the overall government-led nation branding mode in this region. National identity makers are composed by ‘actors other than the state’ (Polese et al., 2020: 27), and the success of nation branding relies on the collaboration among government and non-governmental actors, including ‘the people of a nation’ (Kahraman, 2016: 98). Therefore, how to engage non-governmental actors in nation branding practice, especially through soccer culture, is one of the main research areas employing critical approaches. Future empirical research in the use of this sports nation branding framework from the perspective of registered brands would present a comprehensive view of nation branding and the implication for geographical economy, politics and culture.

Research Data

sj-docx-1-ecs-10.1177_13675494211011179 – Nation branding through the lens of soccer: Using a sports nation branding framework to explore the case of China

sj-docx-1-ecs-10.1177_13675494211011179 for Nation branding through the lens of soccer: Using a sports nation branding framework to explore the case of China by Xiufang (Leah) Li and Juan Feng in European Journal of Cultural Studies

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Xiufang (Leah) Li

Juan Feng

Notes

Biographical notes

Xiufang (Leah) Li is a lecturer and former program manager in the School of Media and Communication at RMIT University in Australia. Prior to her current position, Leah worked at different universities in Australia and China, including Macquarie University and as an Associate Professor at Guangzhou University. She teaches, undertakes research, and supervises PhD students in the areas of public relations, digital communication, branding, journalism, and media. Leah holds a PhD degree in International Communication and Media awarded at Macquarie University.

Juan Feng is a Ph.D. candidate studying at the School of Media and Communication, RMIT University. Her research interests include nation branding, place branding, sports communication, tourism and public relations.

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