Culture as display revisited

Abstract

In this article, I revisit Raymond Williams’ idea of culture as display, which he developed to describe a particular moment in culture–state relations: the use of culture and the arts in celebration, embellishment and strengthening of the economic and political power of the state. Jim McGuigan applied this concept to contemporary national cultural policy, emphasizing the significance of display under global capitalism. Besides this notable attempt, Williams’ idea of culture as ‘display’ has never received the attention it deserves. The main purpose of this article is to advance the understanding of ‘display’ by considering its place within the context of urban cultural policy. A critical inquiry into the roles of arts and film festivals helps to dissect different instrumental layers of urban display practices and to capture the ‘symbolic power’ of display. This, in turn, contributes to a more comprehensive conceptualization of globalized urban festivals.

Keywords

arts festivals festival circuit film festivals instrumentalization symbolic power urban cultural policy urban festivals

Introduction

More than three decades ago, Raymond Williams (1984: 3) made a compelling argument regarding the roles allocated to culture¹ by the state, noting that culture and the arts tend to be used as display of ‘a particular social order’. According to Williams, the nation-state uses culture and the arts to promote, embellish and, ultimately, to make this ‘particular social order’ more effective.

In the early 2000s, Jim McGuigan (2004) adopted Williams’ idea of ‘display’ to explain the transformations occurring within contemporary cultural policy under global capitalism. Besides this notable contribution, during all the many years since there have been very few attempts to revisit Williams’ argument, let alone to extend it beyond the realm of national cultural policy. In an attempt to further our understanding of culture as ‘display’, this article explores the meaning of display within the context of urban cultural policy, wherein the use of various display-oriented initiatives has increased significantly over the last three decades following the so-called ‘cultural turn’ (Zukin, 1995) in urban development.

An upsurge in the number of publicly funded international cultural events and festivals exemplifies the growing significance of display in cities. It has become common practice for cities, particularly large ones, to host their own ‘world-class’ film, arts and fringe festivals, design weeks, and arts biennales. As Peranson (2008: 23) accurately notes, nowadays ‘festivals are popping up like Starbucks franchises, in terms of numbers – every major city now has one’. The tendency to adopt ‘imported’ formats of large-scale cultural events largely reflects the increasing economic instrumentalization of urban cultural policy. In this sense, the events are used as a display practice of an ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Harvey, 1989), an urban spectacle set to promote the city as a site of attraction for tourists, investors and the so-called ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002). However, large-scale cultural events can also be aimed at making a political statement of some kind. For instance, they have been used to enhance global recognition of the state (Ma, 2012), (re)establish social order (Lilley, 1998), build collective identity (Quinn, 2005), and to articulate social inclusion (Laing and Mair, 2015). In this context, ‘display’ unfolds as a useful yet complex and multi-layered construct that needs further conceptual refinement and scrutiny.

This article contributes to this task through a critical inquiry into the roles attached to international arts and film festivals. By exploring the ways in which the meanings and functions of arts and film festivals in Europe and East Asia have changed over the past few decades, it exposes these urban practices of display not only as marketable political and economic tools, but also as generators of a particular kind of ‘hidden’ power, termed ‘symbolic power’ by Bourdieu (1977). This type of power is accumulated through recognition and reflects on one’s ability to exert a degree of influence over others.

Due to their relatively small scale and ‘local’ scope, arts and film festivals are often overlooked in the literature as sources of symbolic power. Their ability to generate symbolic power can only be observed when one reads these festivals not as isolated occurrences, but rather as nodes comprising the global network of festivals. A large number of studies have addressed cultural events as part of a broader neoliberal discourse, thus recognizing them as both increasingly entrepreneurial in focus and increasingly global in scale. Nevertheless, to date there have been only a few attempts to interrogate cultural events as global ‘circulating capital’ (Yeoh, 2005: 945). I argue that, as such, these festivals become key reference points for understanding a full spectrum of roles attached to display within the context of urban cultural policy.

This article is divided into three core parts. The first part draws attention to contributions and limitations of the previous work on culture as ‘display’. In the second part, I explore the relevance of display to culture–city relations through various instrumental and symbolic functions attached to display in cities. A brief critical inquiry into the roles of international arts and film festivals in Europe and East Asia, carried out in the third part of this article, helps to convey the complexity and significance of display in the context of urban cultural policy.

Understanding culture as display

While every state has its own ways of ‘dealing with’ culture, there are three interrelated roles or functions that most countries generally assume with regards to culture and the arts: regulatory, protectionist and promotional (Bell and Oakley, 2015). It is this third – promotional – role that most accurately resonates with Williams’ (1984) understanding of display.

In his short three-page essay entitled ‘State culture and beyond’, Williams (1984: 3) convincingly argues that the state ‘is not only the central organ of power, but of display’ (original emphasis). For every state, the display of its power, or as Williams (1984: 3) puts it, ‘the public pomp of a particular social order’, is as important as maintaining this power and/or order.

In his article, Williams seems to distinguish between two major types of display.² The first type is centred on ‘the actual display of certain aspects of state power’ (Williams, 1984: 3, emphasis added). During royal weddings, coronation ceremonies, and presidential inauguration days we are presented with a number of cultural practices and rituals that manifest the majesty of the state. This ultimately helps to garner a greater level of respect and recognition for the state from the international community and/or local public. All these ‘great ceremonial events’ (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 9) encapsulate what Williams (1984: 3) calls ‘a stately sense of cultural policy’ (original emphasis). The stately sense of cultural policy reflects the inherent role of cultural policy in the manifestation of power. Ironically this role often goes unnoticed. While all the above-mentioned events contain a number of cultural and artistic elements, we often fail to recognize them as cultural policy initiatives. According to Williams (1984), this happens because the use of culture and the arts in the display of state power is too deeply ingrained to even be noticed (see also Mirza, 2012).

Besides the stately sense, Williams (1984) identified another type of cultural policy as display, which can be broadly defined as instrumental sense of display. Whereas the stately sense reflects on a somewhat intuitive attachment of culture to public display of power, the instrumental sense encapsulates a systematic and strategic use of cultural initiatives within a vast number of different areas of public policy. For instance, some display practices such as public festivals and other cultural events can be employed to strengthen the sense of social cohesion and to forge the ‘new’ identity of the place (see Leong, 1989; Reverté and Izard, 2011). Meanwhile, others, such as various cultural exchange programmes, can be used as ‘soft power’ tools (see Nye, 2004).

At the same time, the instrumental sense also reflects on the decreasing role of a monopoly state and the growth of an ‘economic “instrumentalization” of culture’ (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 127). Already at the time of Williams’ writing, the UK was experiencing the emergence of a so-called ‘enterprise culture’ (Hewison, 1997). Williams (1984) captured this moment by noting a broadening scope of national interests and objectives. He described a ‘contemporary public power’ as ‘that of a nation-state, which has business and tourism, which has commercial interests, which has international interests in exchanges of visits with other nation-states and their representatives’ (Williams, 1984: 3).

Needless to say, over the past three decades, national governments have become even more entangled in the complex webs of international alliances and trade agreements. Their dependence on global market fluctuations and competition for capital and labour has also increased. In this context, culture-as-display practices emerge primarily as strategic tools for place promotion and marketing, ‘organised spectacles’ (Harvey, 1990) set up to attract foreign investment, skilled labour, and tourists. Evans (2003) refers to this use of culture as a form of ‘hard branding’, where the major role attached to artistic practices is to promote various commercial activities, provide entertainment, and facilitate consumption.

Jim McGuigan made the most significant contribution in addressing the growing role of culture as display in this neoliberal age. In his work, McGuigan (1998, 2004) applies Williams’ idea of display to explain the transformations that have taken place in the domain of national cultural policy under global capitalism. According to McGuigan (2004), cultural policy can be divided into two broad categories – cultural policy proper and cultural policy as display.³ In McGuigan’s (2004) view, cultural policy ‘proper’ addresses public patronage of the arts, media regulation and construction of cultural identity. In many ways this corresponds with the regulatory and protectionist roles that the state has traditionally assumed in relation to culture (see Bell and Oakley, 2015).

Cultural policy ‘proper’ rests on the idea of culture as intrinsically valuable. However, today this reason alone is not sufficient to ensure a consistent flow of funds for culture and the arts. As a result, according to McGuigan (2004: 65), cultural policy ‘proper’ is now increasingly undermined by that of ‘display’:

[T]here is endemic uncertainty about the value of cultural policy ‘proper’ everywhere. Hence, much effort is put into mapping its contours and, also, in evaluating its usefulness to interested parties. This in itself is frequently an exercise in cultural policy as display, demonstrating symbolically that something worthwhile is actually happening.

Indeed, various display practices, including mega-events and signature constructions, render culture more tangible, which, in effect, makes it appear more ‘useful’. In times of ‘evidence-based’ (Belfiore, 2004) policymaking, this makes it easier for policymakers to justify their support of the arts.

Initially, McGuigan (1998: 70) adopted Williams’ concept of display to demonstrate how culture is used in what he referred to as ‘the symbolic politics of government’. Through critical examination of such display practices as the funeral of Princess Diana, the national Cool Britannia rebranding campaign, and the Millennium Dome project, McGuigan (1998) showed how New Labour in the UK employed culture as a marketing and promotional tool for itself and Britain more generally. In this context, the role of display has been discussed in relation to explicitly political goals of the state. McGuigan (1998) refers to such use of display practices as ‘national aggrandisement’. Several years later, he added another sub-category of display, which he calls ‘economic reductionism’ (McGuigan, 2004).

According to McGuigan (2004: 62–3), some aggrandising national projects and events are not necessarily, or not only, focused on ‘the ritual symbolisation of nationhood and state power’ – they can also be seen as ‘business propositions of one kind or another’. His study of a highly controversial flagship construction – the Millennium Dome project – is particularly revealing in terms of understanding the ways in which national and corporate interests, working either together or separately, steer and exploit culture-as-display practices (see McGuigan, 2004).

However, McGuigan’s division of cultural policy as display into two sub-categories of national aggrandisement and economic reductionism is problematic. For one, it overlooks the role of display practices in identity politics and community representation.⁴ It is important to acknowledge that cultural policy as display should never be prescribed a solely outward-centred role. For instance, such mega-events as Olympics or World Fairs are designed not only to promote the host nation to the world but are also aimed at strengthening the sense of belonging and pride among the local populace (Quinn, 2010; Roche, 2000). Likewise, the Cool Britannia campaign was targeted not only at enhancing the national image of the United Kingdom in the world, but also at providing a sense of empowerment for the British people (Bell and Oakley, 2015).

Another problem with McGuigan’s categorization of cultural policy as display is that it does not accurately reflect Williams’ understanding of display. While McGuigan ascribes national aggrandisement to Williams’ stately sense of cultural policy as display, his arguments and examples seem to align more closely with the instrumental sense of display. As noted earlier, the stately sense captures the inherent function of culture to manifest the power of the state. The scope of all display practices that McGuigan (1998, 2003, 2004) explores as contemporary examples of ‘national aggrandisement’, including the Millennium Dome project, the Cool Britannia campaign and World Fairs, by far exceeds this inherited use of display practices. They are also seen as important tools for economic revitalization, city branding and identity building. These secondary uses of culture as display point towards an instrumental sense of display.

Another subtle but important characteristic of Williams’ stately sense of display lies in its obliviousness towards instrumentalization of culture. The intrinsic relationship between the display of culture and the display of power goes back so far and runs so deep that the use of culture in the display of power is generally accepted as a habit, norm or ritual – anything but a matter of cultural policy. Under the instrumental sense of display, cultural policy initiatives are recognized and deliberately used as important tools for dealing with various economic, social and political matters across different realms of public policy. Most contemporary aggrandisement projects are closely attached to the domain of cultural policy and often recognized as part of that domain. For instance, the Millennium Dome project has been extensively discussed within the context of cultural policy (see McGuigan, 2003; see also Gray, 2003; Hewison, 2014).

For Williams, the stately sense of culture seemed to embody a strictly state-centred and state-driven approach to culture as display. The fact that corporate interests and economic considerations play an important role in all these projects also indicates a different form of display from that Williams described as ‘stately’. While the inherent function of World Fairs or Olympics may seem to be a display of power through the promotion of the state, for the host nation and the host city these events also present a great opportunity to facilitate tourism and other service industries, to strengthen the local economy and to attract foreign investors and businesses (Cunningham, 2012; Dicks, 2004; see also Roche, 2000). This obvious overlap between national aggrandisement and economic reductionism demonstrates that both practices are part of the organized spectacle; they are both assigned their own instrumental roles and thus they both represent the instrumental sense of cultural policy as display.

While McGuigan’s view of display is undoubtedly more accurate in terms of reflecting on the current state of culture–state relations, this does not mean that Williams’ stately sense of display has no relevance to contemporary cultural policy. It is important in terms of acknowledging the inherent role of all display practices in the display of power. This intrinsic, though often overlooked, connection between the two hints at the potentially overlooked ability of culture to assist the state in exerting a degree of power over other entities on the basis of recognition and respect acquired through various instrumental practices of culture as display. Bourdieu (1977, 1989, 1994) refers to this kind of ability as ‘symbolic power’. According to Bourdieu (1989: 23), symbolic power is ‘the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition’. Unlike other forms of power, it can be exerted only if it is ‘misrecognized as arbitrary’ (Bourdieu, 1994: 170). As Bourdieu (1994: 164) further explains, symbolic power is ‘that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it’.

Although Bourdieu coined this term to conceptualize social class relations in the ‘social world’, Harvey (1990) observes that the application of the concept in the ‘built environments’ of that ‘social world’ can be equally instructive. Nation-states (and cities) are integral elements of the social world: by interacting, competing and engaging in power struggles with each other they function as ‘social institutions’ (Taylor, 2013: 56). Subsequently they all seek to obtain a greater level of recognition and respect from both the international community and the local public. If, as a result of this increased recognition, the state and/or the city finds itself in a position to exert a certain degree of influence over other nations, cities, and members of the public, then (and only then) can the tools that helped them to achieve this ‘hidden’ power be labelled as sources of ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1989).⁵ All policies and policy programmes that are emulated and adopted across the globe as ‘best practices’ can be considered as sources of symbolic capital for the nation-state. Take, for instance, creative industries policy in the UK. While the initial launch and display of creative industries discourse was guided primarily by economic objectives, the degree of popularity that this policy initiative received outside the UK, and the subsequent impact it had on the formation of cultural policies in many parts of the world, generated an unforeseen symbolic power for the state (see Prince, 2010).

Considering the inherent connection between the display of power and the display of culture, it could be argued that the pursuit of symbolic power lies at the core of culture as display, because symbolic power grants an ability to influence, rather than just an ability to be noted. This power can be generated – at times unintentionally – through a deliberate use of display practices to pursue other economic, social and/or political objectives. These objectives comprise different instrumental layers of display, which will be further dissected in the context of culture–city relations.

Considering display within the context of urban cultural policy

Both Williams and McGuigan considered display only within the context of culture–state relations. Other authors who applied this concept in their research also addressed display primarily in relation to the domain of national cultural policy (see Ahearne, 2009; Lee, 2004; Leong, 1989). This article considers display within the context of urban cultural policy, arguing that it is in cities where culture and the arts are used first and foremost (if not solely) as a means of display.

Today cities are recognized as primary drivers of economic growth, and in the case of large cities, as key nodes of global control (see Sassen, 1991; Taylor, 2013). Consequently, most cities are forced to compete with each other for investment, a skilled workforce, tourists, and other means of capital accumulation. David Harvey (1989: 9) critically addressed this trend as ‘entrepreneurial’, arguing that inter-urban competition is pushing cities ‘to appear as [. . .] innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place[s] to live or to visit, to play and consume in’ (emphasis added).

Culture as display appeals to urban policymakers because it is in line with their market-driven policy objectives. In entrepreneurial cities where a central focus is placed on capital accumulation and consumption, cultural policies are seen as first and foremost policies of attraction (Grodach and Silver, 2013). Consequently, various flagship constructions and events are now widely recognized as indispensable display tools for embellishing the image of the city (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2006). Their value is often measured by their ability to create the perfect ‘Instagram-worthy’ moment – the more shares and views that moment receives, the more visitors the city is expected to attract. More visitors means more revenue for the local businesses and the city. In this context, it becomes very difficult to detect any instances of culture ‘proper’, which suggests a significant, if not absolute, dominance of the display-centred approach to urban cultural policy.

While it might be tempting to conclude that display practices in cities have been guided primarily by entrepreneurial intentions (i.e. ‘economic reductionism’), the true picture is far more complex. The concern about the good image of the city is also closely linked with efforts to enhance its international recognition. As Urry (2007: 134) explains:

It seems that ‘spectacle-isation’ is necessary in order for places [. . .] to somehow be ‘recognised’ as places to enter the ‘global stage’. Such cities can only be taken seriously in the new world dis/order if they are partly at least places of distinct spectacle, through events, museums, ancient remains, festivals, galleries, meetings, sport events, [and] new and refurbished iconic buildings.

While in part, ‘spectacle-isation’ captures ‘market desire to acquire symbolic capital’ (Harvey, 1990: 264; see also Zukin, 1991), it also represents the city’s ambition to raise its influence on the global stage and, in some instances, the pursuit of national policy interests. It has been widely acknowledged that in many East Asian cities, various urban display practices, including large-scale cultural events and signature constructions, are closely linked with a nation’s image building, national ambitions for international recognition, identity politics, and the pursuit of cultural superiority (Karvelyte, 2018; Kong, 2007; Lee, 2004; Yeoh, 2005). As Ong (2011: 209) observes,

[U]rban spectacles in Asia today play an aesthetic role in promoting future values and new political orientations. [. . .] The skyscraper megalomania of Asian cities is never only about attracting foreign investments, but fundamentally also about an intense political desire for world recognition.

A wide variety of roles attached to display practices indicates at least three overlapping layers of the instrumental display. The first layer – entrepreneurial display – points out a common use of culture and the arts for attraction of investors, businesses, skilled workers and visitors to the city. The ultimate goal attached to urban display practices here is not only to promote the city, but also to make more effective those public policies that support the neoliberal ideology of an entrepreneurial city. While the entrepreneurial layer of display largely corresponds with McGuigan’s (2004) ‘economic reductionism’, the second layer, which I call reputational display, echoes his ‘national aggrandisement’ category. The reputational layer of display reflects efforts to increase the image and reputation of the city (and the state) both at local and transnational levels. In this context, display practices are aimed at strengthening bilateral ties, increasing international cooperation, and enhancing global recognition, while also boosting the internal image of the state and/or the city among the locals. The last layer of display, which can be referred to as togetherness display, indicates the role of display in identity politics and community (re)development. As noted earlier, display practices are commonly used to enhance the sense of belonging and pride within the local populace. In some cases, they can also be used to restore social order and political stability. For instance, following the social unrest of the 1960s, the colonial government in Hong Kong hosted a number of cultural activities and events to divert people’s attention from sensitive issues and ‘to placate the population’ (Ku and Tsui, 2008: 348).

The role of symbolic power should also be considered in the context of urban cultural policy as display. Whereas the instrumental layers are focused primarily on putting the city on a map and outlining the brand of the city for the purpose of tourism, investment or political gains – the generation of symbolic power reflects on the degree of influence generated in return. This includes not only external, but also internal influence, provided the city government is capable of earning the trust and support of the majority of local citizens. In Taipei, capital city of Taiwan, the city’s symbolic power was generated through many years of consistent support and promotion of culture, particularly traditional Chinese culture. In effect, the city has accumulated a symbolic cultural superiority in the Chinese-speaking world and is now considered to serve as an exemplar city in the region, an ‘educator’ (as opposed to an ‘emulator’) in the field of culture and the arts (see Karvelyte, 2018).

A brief critical inquiry into the major roles attached to international arts and film festivals in different cities and at different times not only provides a more accurate illustration of the ways in which different instrumental layers of display play out in the context of urban cultural policy, but also lays out some specific examples of symbolic power yielded by urban display practices.

Conceptualizing urban practices of display: arts and film festivals

Urban festivals are probably one of the most recognizable practices of display in cities. However, to date urban festivals have not been addressed in the context of culture as ‘display’. Due to the state-centred approach adopted in previous work on display, the majority of cultural initiatives that have been recognized as ‘display practices’ fall within the purview of national cultural policy. Specifically, this has included national celebrations (Williams, 1984), traditional cultural practices (Leong, 1989), religion (Ahearne, 2009), flagship constructions (Lee, 2004; McGuigan, 2003), and mega-events such as Olympics or World Fairs (McGuigan, 2003, 2004).

‘Urban festivals’ is an umbrella term for all urban ‘temporary public displays’ (Belghazi, 2006: 98) ranging from beauty pageants to international sporting events. Among urban festivals, international arts and film festivals emerge as one of the largest, the oldest, and the most wide-reaching urban practices of display. Also, importantly, they function as tools of both inward and outward display, because they are often intended for multiple audiences such as members of the public, media, international participants and tourists.

Today the value of most large-scale urban festivals seems to be measured predominantly through entrepreneurial lenses. In recent decades, the literature on events has discussed cultural events and festivals within the context of other policy programmes that are integral to urban entrepreneurialism, such as the development of cultural and creative industries, urban regeneration, tourism, and the general economic growth of the city (see García, 2004; Quinn, 2005; Waitt, 2008; Waterman, 1998). This is a stark difference from mega-events, such as the Olympics, World Cup and World Expo, which tend to be addressed as a means of national aggrandisement or identity building (Dicks, 2004; McGuigan, 2004; Roche, 2000). The existing division between mega-events and large-scale urban festivals is not helpful, because it obscures the multi-layered functions of display practices.

As systematic and ‘rigorously planned’ (Belghazi, 2006: 108) display practices, arts and film festivals first started to emerge after the First World War. At that time, urban entrepreneurialism played little, if any, role in the decision to launch these events. Instead these kinds of festivals were seen and used primarily as practices of reputational and togetherness displays. For instance, the major goal behind the first regular film festival launched in 1932 in Venice was to promote fascist ideology and to disseminate propaganda for Mussolini’s government (de Valck, 2007). Meanwhile in Taiwan, the central Kuomintang government launched the Golden Horse Film Festival (1962) as part of the island’s re-sinicization campaign (Chun, 1994).

After the Second World War, in the years of massive reconstruction and growth, Europe saw an upsurge in large-scale arts and film festivals (de Valck, 2007; Harvie, 2003; Prentice and Andersen, 2003). The unveiling of the Cannes Film Festival in 1946 was followed by the launch of the Edinburgh International Festival (1947), the Edinburgh Festival Fringe (1947), and the Berlin International Film Festival (1951). While the primary objectives behind these festivals were still overwhelmingly driven by national interests, gradually their host cities were also recognized as potential beneficiaries. The major role ascribed to arts and film festivals at that time was to display and articulate the unity of Europe and to re-build its cultural identity (Harvie, 2003; Quinn, 2005). At the same time, they started to be seen as contributors to economic growth because of the financial capital that they brought to their cities (Waterman, 1998).

The rise of cities as important economic actors on both national and global stages in the 1960s further shifted the focus of arts and film festivals towards the needs and interests of their host cities. Cities started to use them to boost tourism, to promote local arts, and to advance community engagement and inclusion. While the actual contribution of arts and film festivals to local communities has been questioned (Quinn, 2010), the fact that all of these goals were set out by the cities themselves marked a significant transition of arts and film festivals from state-centred to city-centred display practices.

As such, they have become increasingly incorporated into a broader neoliberal discourse of urban development. From the late 1980s onwards, following the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies in Europe and North America, festivals and events have been viewed as primarily ‘marketable economic resources’ (Waitt, 2008), turning effectively into ‘an industry of very sizeable proportions’ (Quinn, 2010: 267). For cities that have been transformed into the ‘landscapes of consumption’ (Zukin, 1991), they offer a chance to be noted and talked about.

However, it is worth acknowledging that arts and film festivals are not merely ‘marketable economic resources’ – they are also marketable policy devices. As noted earlier, many arts and film festivals in the post-war era were used in national image building and ‘the celebration of national identity’ (Hewison, 1997: 60). While today most urban festivals in Europe are rarely ascribed these roles, it is not the case in most East Asian cities, where urban cultural policies are still largely guided by the interests of the nation-state (Kim, 2017; Kong, 2007). The state-led development model of these cities means that their display practices are shaped primarily by national interests such as international recognition and ‘world-aspirations of the state’ (Ong, 2011: 224). Market-driven aspirations in this context play only a secondary role. This is how the former Minister of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, Sun Jiazheng, described the major goal of the China Shanghai International Arts Festival:

By hosting the festival, we seek to absorb the excellent culture of the world, to promote cultural exchange, to broaden the dissemination and influence of Chinese arts in the world, and to establish a good image of China’s culture and the arts. (trans. from Chinese, cited in People’s Daily, 1999).

It should also be noted that contrary to most places in Europe, the process of building ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2006) in many East Asian countries is still under way. Consequently, whereas in Europe arts and film festivals are now rarely addressed in relation to nation building and identity politics, in East Asia these particular goals remain at the core of arts and film festivals (see Cheung, 2016; Kong, 2007; Ma, 2012).

The discussion up to this point has focused primarily on the different instrumental layers of urban display practices. In the remaining part of this section, I will show how symbolic power of urban display unfolds through arts and film festivals. To do this, it is first important to acknowledge that today arts and film festivals are interconnected through their own global networks, or, borrowing from Stringer (2001: 138), through ‘festival circuits’ that operate ‘through the transfer of value between and within distinct geographic localities’. The term ‘festival circuit’, in this respect, represents not simply a network of interrelated festivals, but also a socially produced space of mediation, ‘a unique cultural arena that acts as a contact zone for the working-through of unevenly differentiated power relationships’ (Stringer, 2001: 138). In this context, it is the most prestigious and reputable events – ‘best practices’ – that are setting the agenda for the other events and cities that adopt them.

In other words, it could be argued that ‘hierarchical tendencies’ (Taylor, 2013) that have been observed in the context of the global city network also exist within the global networks of arts and film festivals. However, in this case, rather than being guided by the integration of cities with the global economy, these hierarchical tendencies are set by the industry professionals working for the festivals and their relationship with other professionals and experts in the field. Provided the event is successful and well received by professionals, media and public, it can then generate a symbolic power for the city within this ‘festival circuit’ and possibly beyond.

Take, for instance, Hong Kong, which was one of the first cities in East Asia to launch its own film and arts festivals. Over more than four decades of existence, both the Hong Kong International Film Festival (HKIFF) and the Hong Kong Arts Festival (HKAF) earned a deep respect and admiration within the international community of industry professionals (see Lilley, 1998; Wong, 2011). With growing respect and experience, influence has followed. As Wong (2011: 221) explains in reference to the HKIFF:

As the HKIFF gained an international reputation and became integrated into an international festival circuit, it also gained more power to attract films and even take a stance with regard to thematic screenings, including Chinese non-official films. [. . .] Meanwhile, the very success of this event made the festival an event to be imitated in other cities across the region.

This trend of copying and imitating reflects ‘a damning indictment of the neoliberal project’ (Peck, 2011: 790) as it points to the constant urge and pressure among the cities (as well as their events) to outperform each other. Nevertheless, we can also recognize the symbolic power that the HKIFF gains, because in this particular case the intensity and frequency of competition has, in fact, generated a positive result.

For a host city, particularly a city that feels marginalized or excluded from the global arena, the mere access to the ‘festival circuit’ could already be considered a source of symbolic capital. Even if the festival does not appear to be as prominent and successful as other festivals in the same network, the sense of belonging created by merely being a part of the network is already a significant step towards its international endorsement and recognition, as well as towards a greater degree of influence in the local matters of culture (see Karvelyte, 2018; Yeoh, 2005).

Arts and film festivals act as symbolic display practices not only in terms of their global interconnectivity, but also in terms of what they represent as a whole. If we are to consider these festivals as a singular set rather than as isolated individual occurrences within one city they then come to represent the general advancement of the city. As Cunningham (2012: 117) suggests, the events and festivals are place-marking activities that cities hold to announce ‘their status as culturally savvy’. The fact that the city is capable of hosting a series of large-scale cultural events on a regular basis not only suggests a degree of the city’s cultural ‘savviness’, but also points to its economic and political advancement, positioning the city as a ‘repository [. . .] of stability, continuity, uniqueness and harmony’ (Urry, 2000: 151). Previous studies on the Edinburgh International Festival clearly exemplify this point. This festival – as with other large-scale urban festivals in post-war Europe – served as an important signifier of growing prosperity and stability in the region (Harvie, 2003; Prentice and Andersen, 2003). Similar roles are now assumed by arts and film festivals in many East Asian cities, where they have become symbols of modernism, advancement and stability (Lim, 2012; Ma, 2012). This resonates with Williams’ stately sense of display, but in this case it is about the inherited use of culture in ‘the actual display’ of the growing influence and power of the city and not the state.

Conclusion

This article was guided by two major objectives. First, it sought to advance our understanding of Williams’ culture as ‘display’ by considering the relevance and significance of display in the urban context. Another objective of this article was to conceptualize urban practices of display by adopting a broader and more inclusive approach to globalized urban festivals.

As argued, earlier work on culture as display has largely overlooked the role of display in cities. However, I argue that it is through urban display practices that a full spectrum of roles attached to display can be unveiled, because urban cultural policy is essentially a policy of display.

Drawing on Williams (1984), McGuigan (2004) and Bourdieu (1977), I suggest reading urban cultural policy as a combination of different instrumental layers of display that represent the deliberate use of culture geared towards the achievement of specific economic and political goals. In the urban context, I distinguish between three interwoven strands of display including entrepreneurial, reputational and togetherness displays. Culture and the arts are used as practices of entrepreneurial display to promote, embellish and make more effective those public policies that support the neoliberal ideology of the so-called ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Harvey, 1989). Reputational display refers to the efforts to increase the image, reputation and recognition of the city (and the state) both at local and global levels. Finally, togetherness display represents the practice of using culture and the arts as a means to build, celebrate and manifest national identity, and to boost the sense of belonging among local citizens.

International arts and film festivals encapsulate all different layers of instrumental display. Notably, this article was not concerned with arts and film festivals as separate individual occurrences, but rather as globalized practices of urban display or a ‘circulating capital’ (Yeoh, 2005). As such, these festivals become key reference points for dissecting the role of display within the context of urban cultural policy.

Originally launched as instrumental display practices for the state, arts and film festivals have been gradually transformed and reworked into display practices for cities. Nowadays most cities in Europe use arts and film festivals for entrepreneurial display – to attract tourists, a ‘creative class’, and foreign direct investment more generally. However, as argued in this article, it is important to recognize that in other parts of the world instrumental roles attached to these festivals with regard to display might extend beyond city marketing and economic development. For instance, in East Asia, arts and film festivals are also seen as marketable policy devices and means of national identity building.

Most previous attempts to conceptualize large-scale cultural events have also overlooked the ‘hidden’ symbolic power of globalized urban festivals, which is manifested mainly through their belonging to hierarchical networks. It is through these networks that arts and film festivals unfold as sources of symbolic power, particularly if they are recognized as ‘best practices’ in their circuit. I argue that the pursuit of symbolic power lies at the core of culture as display, because it grants an ability to influence, rather than just an ability to be noted or recognized. However, as display continues to shape the urban policies of tomorrow, more empirical research is needed to expand our knowledge of the ways in which globalized festivals generate symbolic capital for their cities.

Footnotes

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author biography

Kristina Karvelyte holds a PhD from the School of Media and Communication, University of Leeds, UK. She is currently an Assisting Professor at the Department of Urban Planning and Disaster Management, Ming Chuan University, Taiwan. Kristina’s research interests revolve around Chinese cities, urban cultural policy, creative labour, culture-led urban development, and policy transfer.

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