The joint impact of collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation on group creativity

Abstract

Which antecedents and group processes are beneficial to creativity in groups? Taking a component-based approach of individualism–collectivism (I-C), we proposed that the combination of collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation of group members enhances group creativity. In an interactive group brainstorming experiment (N = 68 triads), we manipulated group members’ value orientation and their self-representation via priming methods and examined group creativity using both a consensual and an objective measure of idea originality. Results indicated that groups generated ideas that are more original when members combined a collectivistic value orientation with independent self-representation than with interdependent self-representation. In contrast, differences in self-representation did not have a significant effect when an individualistic value orientation was activated. We also identified specific group processes characteristic of the predicted combinatorial effect: In creative groups, there was more open communication. Implications of these findings for research on group creativity and future directions are discussed.

Keywords

group creativity individualism–collectivism self-representation value orientation

The ability of group members to generate creative ideas is critical for the effective functioning of task groups (see Amabile, 1996; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Thompson & Choi, 2006). In this paper, we examine group creativity from a cultural standpoint. Arguably, cultural values and beliefs shared among group members play an important role in how they behave at work (see Earley & Gibson, 1998; Sanchez-Burks, 2007; Wagner, 1995; Yuki & Brewer, 2014). Moreover, creativity is inextricably related to cultural processes (Chiu & Kwan, 2010; Goncalo & Staw, 2006), and many antecedent factors of group creativity, such as a strong focus on common goals, psychological safety, constructive disputes, diversity and minority influence (see Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009; Paulus, Larey, & Dzindolet, 2001; West, 2002) are a manifestation of group culture. In this regard, research on the link between culture and collective creativity can contribute to the development of a culture-based theory as well as organizational practices designed to promote the creative potential of workgroups (Li, Kwan, Liou, & Chiu, 2014; Mumford, 2012).

Despite the apparent link between culture and group creativity, there remains a dearth of research on how group members’ cultural orientation affects their collective creativity. Even in the few available studies, findings are mixed, and the link between culture and group creativity remains elusive. Previous research on the culture–group creativity link relied on individualism and collectivism (I-C hereafter) as a conceptual tool, under the assumption that I-C has a unilateral relationship with collective creativity (see De Dreu, 2010; Li et al., 2014). In this paper, we argue that researchers need to go beyond the simplistic view of culture in studying the link between I-C and group creativity. Specifically, we acknowledge that I-C represents a multidimensional construct (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995), and that at the individual level component elements of I-C are conceptually distinct (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Kağitçibaşi, 1997, 2005; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Wagner, 2002). Therefore, to comprehensively capture how individuals’ cultural orientation affects their collective creativity in task groups, we take a more refined approach and differentiate between group members’ value orientation and their self-representation.

Preliminary data suggest that the combination of collectivistic values and independent self-representation promotes group creativity (Bechtoldt, Choi, & Nijstad, 2012). Following up on this finding, the present paper analyzes why this is the case. We argue that the combination of collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation of group members (collectivistic independence) promotes group creativity because independent self-representation sets the ground for creative performance on the individual level and collectivistic values establish functional group processes for integrating individuals’ contributions. Thus, this paper contributes to extant research by illuminating the mediational effects of collectivistic independence on group creativity. In what follows, we begin with a brief discussion of I-C along with the recent conceptual development that calls for a more fine-grained approach to I-C. We then discuss the joint impact of collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation on group creativity and present an interactive group experiment that tested our hypothesis.

Individualism–Collectivism: Core Features and Conceptual Refinements

Individualism and collectivism reflect two contrasting worldviews regarding the nature of the relationship between the individual and the group (Oyserman et al., 2002). Generally speaking, individualism promotes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in the direction of separating oneself from the group and other members, whereas collectivism promotes thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in the direction of connecting with others and one’s own group (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012). In much of the previous work, I-C has been considered as a set of stable characteristics that differentiate between large entities such as nations and societies (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). This sort of comparative approach raised a number of issues at both the conceptual and the methodological levels (see Bond, 2002; Cohen, 2007; Fiske, 2002; Voronov & Singer, 2002). Most notably, research has shown that people in a given society possess both individualism and collectivism in their knowledge structure and value system, and I-C can be activated differentially by cues that exist in a given situation (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Hong, Wan, No, & Chiu, 2007). Relatedly, there is a growing appreciation that I-C is not a trait-like construct but needs to be viewed as situated cognition (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2007).

Directly relevant to the present paper, many scholars urged research on the role of specific components of I-C in guiding social behavior (see Fiske, 2002; Ho & Chiu, 1994; Owe et al., 2013; Oyserman et al., 2002; Wagner, 2002). Along these lines, Kağitçibaşi (1997, 2005) has shown that the key components of I-C are not antithetical to each other and called for research on the effects of specific combinations of the component elements. Drawing on Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985), Wagner (2002) distinguished between utilitarian (i.e., individual vs. collective goals) and ontological (i.e., individual vs. collective self-concept) dimensions of I-C and provided evidence that at the individual level the two dimensions are conceptually distinct (Wagner, Humphrey, Meyer, & Hollenbeck, 2012). In a similar vein, Brewer and Chen (2007) provided evidence that individuals’ self-representation, values, and agency beliefs (corresponding to self-concept, motivation, and cognition, respectively) constitute I-C. Further, they argued that at the individual level the key elements of I-C are conceptually independent and that research is needed to explore new concepts involving a particular combination of the I-C subcomponents at different levels of analysis (see also Brewer & Yuki, 2014). Extending these analyses to group creativity, we examine one specific case of such combinatorial effects involving collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation.

Value Orientation and Self-Representation

Previous research on I-C can be classified into two broad conceptual categories (Kağitçibaşi, 2005; Wagner, 2002). The values approach (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1994) focuses on individuals’ beliefs regarding the primacy of personal versus collective goals, whereas the self-concept approach (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) focuses on individuals’ self-construal involving separateness versus social embeddedness. Traditionally, value orientation has been treated as a motivational construct because it involves goal-directed behaviors rooted in people’s beliefs about a normative behavior in a given social setting (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Triandis, 1994; for reviews, see Bardi, Calogero, & Mullen, 2008; Maio, 2010).¹ Consistent with this view, researchers have induced collectivistic versus individualistic value orientation via group-based versus individual-based incentives respectively (e.g., Bechtoldt et al., 2012), instructions that encourage cooperation versus competition (e.g., Tjosvold, 1998), making attitudes supporting collectivistic versus individualistic values salient (e.g., Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998), and priming collectivistic versus individualistic cultural schemas (e.g., Hong et al., 2000). Individuals’ value orientation has also been measured via proxy variables, such as prosocial versus proself motivation (e.g., Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, & Choi, 2010; Probst, Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999), trait agreeableness (e.g., Realo, Allik, & Vadi, 1997), and conservation versus autonomy (e.g., Schwartz, 1994).

By contrast, self-representation refers to the person’s understanding of himself/herself in relation to others (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Kashima et al., 1995). Previous research involving this construct has focused on the difference between independent versus interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), the former primarily consisting of individual self-representations and the latter of collective self-representations (Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 2013). Research has shown that different aspects of individuals’ self-concept can be made salient by activating different reference measures via priming methods. Further, research indicates that once activated, different types of self-construal foster different kinds of cognitive, affective, and behavioral experiences (see Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Self-construal has also been measured to capture chronic differences among individuals using a scale developed by Singelis (1994), with a caveat that this scale also contains several items measuring individuals’ value orientation (see Wagner, 2002; Wagner et al., 2012).

In light of the growing recognition that key components of I-C are conceptually distinct and empirical findings that support this proposition (Bechtoldt et al., 2012; Owe et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2012), we treat group members’ value orientation and self-representation as separate constructs on the individual level. We assume that value orientation represents a motivational end-state (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Triandis, 1994), whereas self-representation guides the process by which individuals define themselves with respect to others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Also consistent with previous research, we assume that individuals’ values (cf. Bardi & Goodwin, 2011) and their self-representation (cf. Cross et al., 2011) can be primed by contextual parameters. As such, we take a situated view of culture (Oyserman, 2011) and follow the assumption that various group contexts constitute situational cues that activate cultural knowledge and specific actions deemed appropriate in a given group context (Brewer & Yuki, 2014). Based on this, we define collectivistic independence in groups as a psychological state which springs from a collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation. The combination of the two subcomponents is particularly relevant to group creativity, because as we discuss in what follows, group creativity requires high levels of collective striving and unique contribution from individual members.

Collectivistic Independence and Group Creativity

Previous research relied on the assumption that group creativity requires members to stand out and make original contributions (Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Nemeth & Staw, 1989). From this view, collectivism is detrimental to creativity because it encourages harmony and conformity, whereas individualism promotes group creativity by facilitating uniqueness and differentiation. Findings from several studies are in line with this assumption. For example, group creativity was higher after groups engaged in a competitive negotiation than a more cooperative one (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005). More directly relevant to the present paper, Goncalo and Staw (2006) used a self-description task to induce I-C and found that brainstorming groups generated more original ideas when members were primed with individualistic self rather than collectivistic self. Similarly, Goncalo and Kim (2010) reported that groups generated a greater number of ideas when members were primed with independent self and worked under an equity norm rather than an equality norm. When group members were primed with interdependent self, no significant effects emerged.

These results were often interpreted as support for the conclusion that “collectivistic values extinguish the spark necessary for creativity in groups” (Goncalo & Staw, 2006, p. 107). Unlike this conclusion, however, Taggar (2002) reported that teams were more creative when members collaborated closely with a strong commitment to the collective goal than when they did not. Bechtoldt et al. (2010) also showed that, as long as members were epistemically motivated, groups with prosocial motivation were more creative than were groups with proself motivation. Cooperation, strong commitment to group goals, and prosocial motivation are key characteristics of collectivistic values (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Triandis, 1995). Thus these findings suggest that collectivism is beneficial for group creativity.

Though informative, we view that the few previous studies are limited because they treated I-C as a unitary concept and simply examined the overall impact of I-C on group creativity. In this paper, we eschew the conclusion that I-C has a simple main effect on group creativity (see also Morris & Leung, 2010; Westwood & Low, 2003). Instead, we propose that, to be creative as a performing unit, group members must have a collectivistic value orientation while maintaining independence in their self-views. Our arguments advocating such a combinatorial effect are based on specific assumptions driven from research on I-C.

As for self-representation, research has shown that activating independent self-construal leads to thought processes associated with differentiation and contrast, whereas activating interdependent self-construal leads to connectedness and assimilation (Hannover, Pöhlmann, Springer, & Roeder, 2005; Kühnen & Hannover, 2000; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009). Thus, when independent self-construal is made salient people are more likely to strive for uniqueness and adopt a more autonomous mindset as compared to when interdependent self-construal is made salient (Wiekens & Stapel, 2008; see also Cross et al., 2011). Priming independent self-construal as compared to interdependent self-construal also leads to better performance on tasks that require context-independent thinking (Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001). To the extent that strong focus on uniqueness, differentiation, and context-independent thinking promote group creativity (Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Smith, 2003), group members should be more likely to think divergently and generate creative ideas when independent rather than interdependent self is made salient.

In regard to collectivistic versus individualistic value orientation, there is ample evidence that people with collectivistic values put priority on achieving common goals and work cooperatively, whereas those with individualistic values put priority on maximizing personal interests and work competitively (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Triandis, 1995; Wagner, 2002). As such, collectivistic values provide a fertile ground for group functioning, whereas individualistic values often stifle collaborative achievement (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998; Driskell & Salas, 1992). To the extent that strong commitment to a common goal leads to high levels of collective striving in groups (Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Karau & Williams, 1993), collectivistic values as opposed to individualistic values should promote group members’ coordinated efforts towards the common task. Thus, contrary to the notion that collectivistic values produce blind conformity, it is under individualistic values where members avoid open communication and withdraw from common tasks (Chatman et al., 1998; Tjosvold, 1997; Wagner, 1995).

Our previous analysis suggests that collectivistic values as compared to individualistic values can foster group processes conducive to group creativity. If so, it is plausible to assume that benefits of independent self-representation for group creativity are more likely to emerge when group members adopt a collectivistic rather than an individualistic value orientation. In contrast, when a collectivistic value orientation is combined with interdependent self-representation, members are less likely to encourage diverse opinions and original ideas due to high concern for conformity and uniformity. Indeed, research indicates that priming interdependent self accentuates the influence of majority views in decision-making, whereas priming independent self attenuates it (Torelli, 2006).

We also reasoned that when group members adopt an individualistic value orientation, the positive effects of independent self-representation are not likely to be augmented, because in such situations members are less likely to have a strong commitment to the collective task in the first place and less likely to adopt a cooperative orientation needed for accomplishing a common goal (Eby & Dobbins, 1997; Wagner et al., 2012; Wagner & Moch, 1986). Thus, we expect that groups would generate more creative ideas when a collectivistic value orientation is combined with independent self-representation than when it is combined with interdependent self-representation. In contrast, we expect that self-representation would not have a significant effect when group members adopt an individualistic value orientation.

The Current Study

Consistent with previous research, we adopted a group brainstorming paradigm to investigate group creativity (see Stroebe, Nijstad, & Rietzschel, 2010). In a first attempt to integrate the role of values and self-representation in group creativity, Bechtoldt et al. (2012) showed that the combination of a group-based incentive and independent self-construal promotes ideational creativity of brainstorming groups. In the current research, we attempt to extend the previous study in several important ways. Research indicates that members feel more committed to their group and to the group task when they adopt collectivistic values than when they adopt individualistic values (see Earley & Gibson, 1998; Karau & Williams, 1993; Triandis, 1995). Following this, we reasoned that the positive effects of collectivistic values in task groups would be manifested in high levels of cohesion and enjoyment of the common task. Further, we sought to identify specific task behaviors characteristic of collectivistic independence in the context of group creativity using video records. We posited in our model that the hallmark of collectivistic independence is group members’ strong commitment to accomplishing the common task without succumbing to the perilous forces of conformity. We reasoned that this sort of psychological state would facilitate open communication among group members, which is one of the most important preconditions for group creativity (Hülsheger et al., 2009; Nemeth & Staw, 1989; Paulus et al., 2001; West, 2002). Thus, we analyzed the ways individual members argue and advance their ideas and opinions during group brainstorming and explored the mediating role of these process variables.

Second, we enriched our dependent measures by including two indices of ideational creativity in brainstorming groups. Specifically, we included a consensual measure of originality at the idea level (Bechtoldt et al., 2012; Bechtoldt et al., 2010; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2007) and an objective measure of novelty which reflects the statistical rarity of the conceptual categories represented in ideas (Kohn & Smith, 2011; Smith, 2003). Thus, idea novelty integrates both flexibility (heterogeneity of categories; see Baer, 2011; Runco, 2006; Silvia et al., 2008; Snyder, Mitchell, Bossomaier, & Pallier, 2004) and fluency (overall productivity; see Runco, 2006; Runco, Noble, Reiter-Palmon, Acar, & Ritchie, 2011).

Third, to obtain converging evidence for the predicted combinatorial effect, we attempted a conceptual replication of the previous study (Bechtoldt et al., 2012) that used financial incentives to induce different value orientations. Research has shown that individuals’ values can be examined via abstract concepts, value-based attitudes and beliefs, and important goals (see Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Research also indicates that goal priority and cooperation/competition are at the core of individuals’ cultural values (Dierdorff, Bell, & Belohlav, 2011; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995; Wagner, 2002), and that values can be induced via priming procedures (see Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Consistent with this, we manipulated group members’ value orientation by directly priming a knowledge structure pertaining to either collectivistic or individualistic values (cf. Hong et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2007). Also consistent with previous research, we induced different aspects of self-representation by priming individualistic versus collectivistic self (cf. Cross et al., 2011). Priming has become an established technique in cultural psychology, reflecting the dynamic constructionist approach to culture (Hong et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2007) and the more recent culture-as-situated cognition approach (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman et al., 2009). Both perspectives have gained substantial support (for reviews, see Briley, Wyer, & Li, 2014; Cross et al., 2011; Hong et al., 2000; Oyserman, 2011) showing that cultural effects are malleable, and I-C can be better understood in terms of the effects of salient cultural mindsets in a given situation (see also Brannon, Markus, & Taylor, 2015; Briley & Wyer, 2001; Hong & Khei, 2014).

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred and four undergraduate students at a large university in Korea participated in the study for course credit. They were randomly assembled into 68 three-person groups (105 males, 99 females) that were randomly assigned to the conditions in a 2 (value orientation: individualistic vs. collectivistic) x 2 (self-representation: independent vs. interdependent) between-groups design (n = 17). Sample size is comparable to previous work directly relevant to the current study (Bechtoldt et al., 2012; Goncalo & Kim, 2010; Goncalo & Staw, 2006).

Procedure

Participants were informed that they would be participating in two unrelated studies. Upon arrival, three individuals were ushered into individual cubicles and performed an ostensibly first study which was introduced as an experiment on perception and memory. This task was included to manipulate the two independent variables (see following lines). Upon completion of the allegedly first study, the experimenter delivered instructions for the group brainstorming task. Participants were asked to generate ideas about how to improve the quality of teaching at their university. Previous research (Bechtoldt et al., 2012; Bechtoldt et al., 2010) has established that this topic is suitable for student samples because it is not only involving to students but students themselves are the subject matter experts. In the experiment reported, we counterbalanced the order of manipulation and used mixed-gender groups. Neither the manipulation order, nor the gender composition affected our results. Participants performed the task for 15 minutes, and one person within each group was randomly chosen as a scribe. We recorded group interaction using a video camera. Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

Manipulation of value orientation and self-representation

Participants were given a booklet divided into two parts under the pretext of studying perception (order counterbalanced). In the first part, they were given four pictures and asked to describe the pictures in writing according to whatever came to mind (cf. Hong et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2007). We arranged the booklet such that the pictures contain images indicative of either collectivistic values or individualistic values. Participants in the collectivistic value prime responded to four images portraying collective goal-striving and cooperation (e.g., Korean farmers working together on a rice farm). Those in the individualistic value prime responded to four images portraying personal goal-striving and competition (e.g., two females trying to win at arm-wrestling).

We activated independent versus interdependent self-representation under the pretext of studying memory. We used a procedure by Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai (2010) which activates either independent or interdependent self (cf. Cross et al., 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). Participants in the independent self condition were first asked to think about themselves. They were then instructed to write down three sentences that best described their own personality and to provide three recent incidents or examples of behavior that they thought best represented their personality. The same procedure was used in the interdependent self condition except that participants responded to the questions for one of their family members.

Measures

Two graduate researchers blind to the experimental conditions independently classified nonrepetitive ideas. We computed the degree of agreement after the two coders had assessed 229 (23%) of the overall 985 ideas and found that the coders agreed on 96.64% of the cases. Thus, the remaining ideas were assessed by the first coder. A total of 41 repetitive ideas were excluded, leaving a total of 944 ideas in the data.

Two graduate researchers blind to the experimental conditions assessed idea originality (1 = not original at all, 5 = highly original). The coders were trained on portions of the data before proceeding to independently classify the ideas. Following previous research (Bechtoldt et al., 2012; Rietzschel et al., 2007), the coders were trained on a detailed description of each scale point with sample items. Unoriginal ideas were defined as “mentioned very often, well-known complaints about teaching, ideas that concern measures that have already been taken, or ideas that involve only a minor change of the existing situation.” Highly original ideas were described as “rare, unusual or even radical ideas that refer to innovative applications of existing technology, or even to nonexisting technology.” We computed intraclass correlation after the coders had judged 194 ideas (20%) and found ICC(3, 2) = .74 (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Differences between the coders were resolved via discussion, and the first coder continued to assess the remaining ideas. We averaged originality ratings across ideas for each group.²

By contrast, idea novelty reflects the degree to which generated ideas represent conceptual categories that are statistically rare, and this measure has been used to assess the idea conformity effect in interactive brainstorming (Kohn & Smith, 2011; Smith, 2003). An independent pair of graduate researchers analyzed the ideas and ascertained 16 mutually exclusive idea categories (e.g., teaching methods, grading system, curriculum, evaluation of lecturers). Using these categories, the two coders independently coded 30% (20 groups, 290 ideas out of 944) and counted the total number of idea categories represented in the ideas for each group. Agreement between the coders was high (Cohen’s k = .93), and thus the first coder continued to classify the remaining ideas. Each idea category was assigned a score following Kohn and Smith (2011).³ On this measure, the less frequent the category was used by the participants in the sample, the higher the novelty. We averaged the novelty scores for each group.

In the questionnaire, we measured cohesion and task enjoyment using items from previous research (Barry & Stewart, 1997). Cohesion was measured using eight items (e.g., “I trusted the members of this team,” “There was a feeling of unity in this team”), and we computed an aggregated score for each group by taking the average (Cronbach’s α = .94). Task enjoyment was assessed using a single item: “I enjoyed working on the team task.” All items were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much).

Finally, using the video records we measured task behaviors indicative of open communication by assessing the overall degree of (a) clarity, (b) confidence, and (c) strength of the arguments exchanged among group members during the group task (cf. Barry & Stewart, 1997; Tjosvold, 1997; West, 2002): “Overall, members of this group advanced their arguments clearly,” “Overall, group members argued their opinions confidently,” “Overall, group members expressed their opinions strongly” (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). Two graduate researchers blind to the experimental conditions independently analyzed videotapes of 20 groups (29%). Interrater agreement on all three items was high, ICC(3, 2) = .77 ~ .92, and thus the first coder continued to evaluate the remaining tapes. We aggregated the scores by taking the average of the three items (Cronbach’s α = .87, a single-factor solution with 73.93% of the variance accounted for).

Results

Manipulation checks

Following guidelines by Keppel and Zedeck (1989), we evaluated the effectiveness of our manipulation in an independent pilot testing prior to the main study (N = 57). The experimental procedure was identical to the main study except that the participants did not perform the group brainstorming task. To examine the effectiveness of the value manipulation, we analyzed participants’ written descriptions of the images. A total of 114 sentences were obtained, and two graduate researchers blind to the research hypothesis content analyzed 40% of the descriptions to count the total number of expressions semantically associated with individualistic values (e.g., “getting ahead of others,” “competition”) or collectivistic values (e.g., “achieving a common goal together,” “cooperation”). Correlation between the two coders was high for both conditions (r = .84 ~ .96, ps < .01). Thus, the first coder continued to analyze the remaining descriptions. We conducted two-way ANOVAs and found that the number of words related to personal goal-striving and competition was higher in the individualistic values condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.64) than in the collectivistic values condition (M = 0.57, SD = 1.00), F(1, 53) = 30.79, p < .001, η_p² = .367. In contrast, the number of words related to collective goal-striving and cooperation was higher in the collectivistic values condition (M = 2.79, SD = 2.11) than in the individualistic values condition (M = 0.76, SD = 0.99), F(1, 53) = 46.90, p < .001, η_p² = .469. No other effects emerged.

As for the manipulation of independent versus interdependent self, we asked our participants to choose five of 10 sentences from Exner’s (1973) Self-Focus Sentence Completion Scale immediately after they had completed the alleged memory task. Of the 10 sentences, five sentences were likely to lead to self-focused responses (e.g., “I ____,” “My life ____”), whereas another five sentences were likely to lead to responses involving family (e.g., “My family _____,” “My family frequently ______”). Thus, participants’ choice in this task reflects the degree to which either independent self or interdependent self was made salient (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010). The order of the sentences was randomized, and participants simply chose five sentences that they felt like answering. For each participant, we counted the total number of sentences that made reference to either himself/herself or the family. We conducted a two-way ANOVA on the number of familial items and found that participants who had thought about a family member chose more familial sentences (M = 2.26, SD = 1.10) than did those who had thought about their own personality (M = 1.70, SD = 0.79), F(1, 53) = 4.70, p = .035, η_p² = .081. No other effects were found.

Group creativity

Descriptive statistics of the variables under study are presented in Table 1. The total number of generated ideas did not vary as a function of the experimental conditions, all ps > .15. We conducted two-way between-participants ANOVAs on the two indices of group creativity. The two indices were not correlated (r = .07), reflecting the fact that originality was calculated at the idea level whereas novelty involved rarity weightings at the idea category level.

Table 1.

Dependent variables as a function of value orientation and self-representation.

Dependent variables	Individualistic value orientation				Collectivistic value orientation
	Independent self-representation		Interdependent self-representation		Independent self-representation		Interdependent self-representation
	(n = 17)		(n = 17)		(n = 17)		(n = 17)
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Novelty	6.24	7.48	6.79	6.04	9.12	6.87	3.32	3.80
Originality	2.08	0.49	2.04	0.43	2.55	0.36	2.14	0.17
Total number of ideas	13.88	3.20	12.35	4.43	15.29	3.74	14.00	5.73
Cohesion	4.99	0.67	4.77	0.85	5.28	0.74	5.14	0.49
Task enjoyment	5.20	0.70	4.98	1.11	5.45	0.72	5.51	0.43
Open communication	3.12	1.02	3.31	1.27	3.73	0.97	2.67	1.19

A two-way ANOVA on average originality scores revealed that groups generated more original ideas when collectivistic values were primed (M = 2.34, SD = 0.35) than when individualistic values were primed (M = 2.06, SD = 0.45), F(1, 64) = 9.13, p = .004, η_p² = .125. Originality was also higher when independent self was made salient (M = 2.31, SD = 0.49) than when interdependent self was made salient (M = 2.09, SD = 0.32), F(1, 64) = 5.86, p = .018, η_p² = .084. More importantly, we found the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 64) = 4.09, p = .047, η_p² = .060 (Figure 1). As expected, groups primed with collectivistic values generated more original ideas when independent self was made salient (M = 2.55, SD = 0.36) than when interdependent self was made salient (M = 2.14, SD = 0.17), F(1, 64) = 9.87, p = .003, η_p² = .134. In contrast, no significant effects emerged when groups were primed with individualistic values, F < 1. As for average novelty, we found as expected a significant interaction effect, F(1, 64) = 4.43, p = .039, η_p² = .065 (Figure 2). Simple effect analysis revealed that groups generated more conceptually rare ideas when collectivistic values were combined with independent self-representation (M = 9.12, SD = 6.87) than with interdependent self-representation (M = 3.32, SD = 3.80), F(1, 64) = 7.40, p = .008, η_p² = .104. By contrast, the self-representation manipulation did not have a significant effect when individualistic values were activated, F < 1.

Figure 1.

Mean originality as a function of value orientation and self-representation.

Figure 2.

Mean novelty as a function of value orientation and self-representation.

Questionnaire data and video records

We analyzed the questionnaire data using a series of two-way ANOVAs. Results indicated that participants in the collectivistic value orientation condition reported higher levels of cohesion (M = 5.21, SD = 0.62) than did those in the individualistic value orientation condition (M = 4.88, SD = 0.76), F(1, 64) = 3.78, p = .056, η_p² = .056. We also found that participants in the collectivistic value orientation condition reported higher levels of task enjoyment (M = 5.48, SD = 0.58) than did those in the individualistic value orientation condition (M = 5.09, SD = 0.92), F(1, 64) = 4.34, p = .041, η_p² = .063.

We analyzed group interaction using the composite index of open communication obtained from the video records. We conducted a two-way ANOVA and found a significant interaction effect, F(1, 64) = 5.35, p = .024, η_p² = .077. Simple effect analyses showed that the degree of open communication was higher when collectivistic values were combined with independent self-representation (M = 3.73, SD = 0.97) than with interdependent self-representation (M = 2.67, SD = 1.19), F(1, 64) = 7.61, p = .008, η_p² = .106. In contrast, no significant effect of self-representation was found when individualistic values were activated (M = 3.12, SD = 1.02 and M = 3.32, SD = 1.27 for independent self-representation and interdependent self-representation, respectively), F < 1.

To further illuminate the role of open communication in our study, we conducted a mediational analysis following MacKinnon (2008; collectivistic values and independent self-representation = 1, individualistic values and interdependent self = 0). We found that the interaction term predicted the overall level of open communication during group brainstorming, β = 0.47, t(64) = 2.31, p = .024. When the interaction effect and the mediator were entered into the equation simultaneously, open communication predicted idea originality, β = 0.25, t(63) = 2.20, p = .031, whereas the interaction effect was not significant, β = 0.27, t(63) = 1.39, p > .17 (Figure 3). We also conducted a test of the indirect effect using bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 5,000 bootstrap resamples. We found that the indirect effect was significant as the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap CIs did not include zero [0.01, 0.33].

Figure 3.

Mediation model.

Parallel analyses on the novelty scores did not yield significant effects. This is somewhat understandable given that originality and novelty in our sample were measured at different levels and not correlated. To explore how collectivistic value orientation led to higher levels of novelty when it was combined with independent rather than interdependent self-representation, we analyzed the total number of idea categories explored within each experimental group (Kohn & Smith, 2011). This measure was moderately correlated with novelty (r = .43), and we found that groups that combined collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation surveyed more conceptual categories (M = 8.06) than did those that combined collectivistic value orientation and interdependent self-representation (M = 6.59), t(32) = 2.24, p = .032. Though exploratory, this suggests that the higher level of novelty in the former than in the latter condition might have come by via a wider search of conceptual categories during brainstorming.

Discussion

Collectivism allegedly stifles creativity (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; Goncalo & Staw, 2006). The current study relativizes this take-home message of previous research: Collectivistic value orientation steers groups toward producing more original and diverse ideas provided that group members adopt an independent self-representation. This is because collectivistic values foster a positive group climate by promoting solidarity among group members, while at the same time independent self-representation induces the cognitive set for creative thinking. In the current study, groups reached the highest level of originality and novelty when collectivistic value orientation was combined with independent self-representation. Moreover, there was no indication that an individualistic value orientation led to higher levels of creativity than did a collectivistic value orientation.

Unlike the significant interaction effect on novelty and originality, there was no significant effect on fluency. If one treats fluency as an index of task effort in brainstorming groups, one might infer that fluency would be largely a function of collectivistic values (cf. Karau & Williams, 1993). This was not the case in the current study, and it is possible that the sheer number of ideas may not be sensitive to the joint effect of the two components in the current paradigm. It is worth noting that, though widely used in brainstorming research, there has been an increasing awareness that the overall productivity of brainstorming (i.e., fluency) may not be an appropriate measure of ideational creativity. Scholars have argued that originality is a vital component of ideational creativity, but fluency is not (Runco, 2006; Runco et al., 2011). Moreover, fluency can be sometimes misleading because it is often a characteristic of not truly creative people (Eysenck, 1997). Thus, unlike the early conceptualization, the more recent work in creativity research emphasizes that fluency must be weighted by other measures necessary for estimating the creative potential of individuals and groups (e.g., the volume of conceptual categories represented in ideas; see Baer, 2011; Runco, 2006; Silvia et al., 2008; Snyder et al., 2004).

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The group process that mediated the effects of collectivistic independence on idea originality speaks to one of the cornerstones of brainstorming research, namely, the blocking effect (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987): Brainstorming groups are known to perform worse than individuals because group interactions block individual creativity. While the present study does not speak against the blocking effect in groups because it did not compare groups to individuals, the implications of our findings are nonetheless telling: Not only do group interactions impair individual creativity, they may also leverage it. In our study, groups were more creative when there was a positive group climate encouraging group members to speak, suggesting that communication quality moderated the blocking effect. Thus, when groups embark on creativity projects, they need to be aware that group interactions may be both boon and bane. While the bane may be stronger at times, the present study points out the potential for boon.

Our findings dovetail with the notion that cultural effects are dynamic and context-dependent (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Hong et al., 2000; Oyserman, 2011), and that behavior in groups is not simply a function of the culture of the larger society that is fixed and context-free (Hornsey, Jetten, McAuliffe, & Hogg, 2006). Focusing on collective creativity, the current study provides evidence that the two key components of I-C can be activated differently depending on contextual parameters. Further, our study indicates that a particular combination of the two components produces specific effects in terms of thinking processes and task behavior in groups. Our culture-based approach to group creativity can offer an overarching framework which allows us to examine collective creativity with a parsimonious set of principles. This is important, because research on group creativity often focused on a host of antecedent variables without a unifying theoretical framework (Bechtoldt et al., 2010). Moreover, empirical findings in the group literature are inconclusive in terms of the overall impact of I-C on group functioning (see Oyserman et al., 2002). In this regard, taking a combinatorial approach can offer new insights that could be profitably integrated into research on groups in general, and group creativity in particular.

For one thing, one can compare specific ways each of the key elements of I-C is related to cognition and behavior of individuals within and between groups. We do acknowledge that this sort of component-based approach rooted in a “culture-as-entity” perspective may neglect the system-level effects of culture (see Kitayama, 2002). At the same time, however, a component-based, domain-specific approach is needed as it can offer insights into some of the equivocal findings in the group literature involving the overall indices of I-C. It is also worth noting that our arguments advocating collectivistic independence are in line with Asch’s (1951, 1956) notion of connected independence. In his analysis on Asch’s legacy, Levine (1999) summarized that Asch conceptualized connected independence as independence in actions that originates from cooperative motives and a genuine concern for the correctness of one’s own group. Ultimately, connected independence fosters open mindedness and mutual influence in groups, whereas competitive independence leads to closed mindedness and lack of communication among group members. Findings from the current studies not only lend support for this perspective but extend the previous conceptualization. Obviously, we focus on the very goal of work groups (i.e., objective performance), not just “soft” variables such as climate and communication. Further, our model predicts a critical function that most workgroups must serve (i.e., collective creativity) and allows causal analysis. Finally, the current study examined group performance, not individual behavior within groups.

On the surface, our arguments regarding the proposed combinatorial effects resemble several other conceptions. Most notably, Wagner et al. (2012) have shown that a heterogeneous combination of I-C can have positive effects on individuals’ performance in teams where the task is both individualized and shared among members. Though our arguments are rooted in the notion that I-C subcomponents are conceptually distinct and empirically separable (Wagner, 2002), our studies focused not on individual performance but on group performance and showed a synergistic gain from the combination of specific advantages each associated with collectivistic value orientation and independent self-representation.

Another potentially relevant concept is the vertical versus horizontal dimension of I-C (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). In the sense that the horizontal form of collectivism combines collectivistic values with equality-based self-views (i.e., horizontal self), it may seem somewhat similar to our notion of collectivistic independence. Importantly, however, what is at the core of horizontal collectivism is that people in this type of culture view themselves as similar to others within the framework of egalitarianism. Moreover, it is not known whether this form of collectivism taps into the specific effects associated with the combination of collectivistic values and independent self-construal in the context of collective creativity. In a related vein, a series of studies on biculturals (see Hong et al., 2000; Hong et al., 2007) indicate that people who have been exposed to multiple cultures possess diverse cultural schemas and think like either individualists or collectivists depending on social context. We share the idea that cultural influence upon individuals is not monolithic but dynamic. Importantly, however, this work is largely about the relative preponderance of either individualism or collectivism, and focus is given on cognitive processes of biculturals. By contrast, our focus is on the synergistic benefits in task groups associated with the combination of the two I-C subcomponents. Recently, the notion of multicultural identity has been extended in studies that showed multicultural experience enhances creativity of individuals (e.g., Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008) and teams (Tadmor, Satterstrom, Jang, & Polzer, 2012). Though intriguing, the underlying mechanism of this effect is still not clear, and this work is focused on the overall degree of multicultural experiences reflected in the amount of time living in foreign countries.

As for the practical implications, the current study offers new insights into how to shape the culture of groups to enhance their creative potential. Nevertheless, one may wonder how likely it is in real work settings. We believe it depends on many factors including selection and training of team members, socialization practices, design of group task, and the overall team management strategy. Given that both value orientation and self-representation are sensitive to situational cues, teams can create an environment so that collectivistic independence is encouraged and executed. Further, research indicates that I-C can take effect as descriptive norms (Fischer, 2009). Thus, once established, collectivistic independence may go beyond the minds of individual members and exert normative influence in groups. In this regard our approach is not descriptive but prescriptive, and findings of the current study bear importance to the creation and maintenance of a healthy work culture in task groups.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Although our arguments were focused on workgroups, we used student groups in our experiment. It has been documented that findings obtained from ad hoc groups and groups in the real world are comparable (Mullen & Copper, 1994), and thus this issue may not merit much concern (Levine & Moreland, 1998). A related issue concerns the fact that our research was focused on the novelty and originality of generated ideas in group brainstorming. Given that generating novel and original ideas is the first step toward creative outcomes in groups (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Paulus et al., 2001), this approach may also be justified. Nevertheless, the current study does not speak for the proposed combinatorial effect over the course of a creative production in organizational teams. In addition, creativity in real teams does not only require novelty and originality, but usefulness (Amabile, 1996; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Thus, future studies need to examine various aspects of collective creativity at different phases (cf. Harvey, 2013; Li et al., 2014) under different norms of creativity (cf. Morris & Leung, 2010). Relatedly, we observed as expected the interaction effect on open communication but in situations where group members are involved in a common task for their personal achievement, individualistic values might facilitate ironically communication in groups. In addition, research is needed to further unpack the observed interaction effect by examining the semantic content of communication.

A more difficult issue to resolve at this point is the possibility that we observed supportive evidence for the combinatorial effect because the study was conducted in a collectivistic society. Based on their meta-analysis, Oyserman et al. (2002) argued that the impact of each cultural orientation in groups varies according to its relative prominence in the larger society. From this point of view, our study may have amplified the effects of collectivistic values. By the same logic, however, our study may have attenuated the impact of independent self-representation, and yet we found support for our hypothesis. Moreover, research indicates that student samples in Korea no longer match the conventional view that Koreans are highly collectivistic (Han & Shin, 1999). Thus, whether or not we should view this as a boundary condition for our findings is an open question. It is worth noting that previous findings favoring individualism for group creativity have been reported in the Western culture, and thus one might also suspect that these findings may reflect effects specific to the Western culture. In this regard, future studies need to examine the moderating effects of the nature of the larger cultural context. On a related note, our findings also have important implications for the effective management of multicultural work teams. Research (Swann, Kwan, Polzer, & Milton, 2003) has shown that especially in culturally diverse teams, embracing individual identities rather than depersonalizing them is a more effective way to promote creative performance. Thus, examining the joint impact of cultural values and self-representation in highly diverse versus homogenous teams would be an interesting avenue for future research.⁴

Conclusion

In previous research, the link between I-C and group creativity has not been fully captured because existing conceptualizations placed a much greater emphasis on the benefits of individualism for creativity. This state of affairs is unfortunate as it neglects the positive effects of collectivistic values in task groups, thereby missing the opportunity to discover the synergistic gains that might occur when they are combined with independent self-views. In a sense, our arguments resemble the authentic form of communalism often discussed in the Confucian literature characterized as a dialectical state in which individuals strive for harmony while maintaining their uniqueness out of concern for the community (Tu, 1985). A long time ago, Confucius said “Exemplary persons seek harmony but do not seek sameness.” The current study points us to the benefits of adopting this sort of psychological orientation when working in groups to achieve creative outcomes.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This paper was supported by Samsung Research Fund, Sungkyunkwan University, 2012.

Notes

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