Abstract
Based on the classical sociological study by C. Wright Mills from 1956, the authors of The New Power Elite aim to follow the critical spirit of their predecessor from the start. They point out that the questions which need to be asked about today’s elite are not complicated in as much as they are concerned with clearly observable situations – to whit that a group of the very wealthy in the finance industry managed to convince governments to use public funds to prop them up following the financial crisis of 2008 at a level which is unheard of within public services and that this enabled this ‘1 per cent’ to accrue further wealth and capital under conditions which would previously have led to their downfall, or at least to the downfall of significant numbers of them. Furthermore, these selfsame financial elites garnered voter and public support in the face of apparent desires from electorates that such skewing of wealth, and power, not be tolerated in democratic and meritocratic systems such as were believed to be in place in the United States, Europe and Asia.
The questions then are easy to ask, as the authors say, however, they are not easy to answer. The authors attempt to generate explanations and answers through new analyses of empirical data concerned with the accrual and distributions of economic and political views set in the context of the mechanisms by which various elites not only position their societal connections but also bring into play various class fractions as a means of stabilizing their place in economies and societal structures. To this end, the authors argue that they offer new and internationally applicable ideas on the importance of friction within the elite in sparking and steering wider social change; the shifting relationship between power and money within elites; the alternative ways in which elite fractions enrol ‘middle’- and ‘working’-class elements in their power struggles; and the typical developmental consequences of elites alternately forming and breaking up distributional class coalitions. (p. IX) In order to work through this complexity with relevant attention to detail, the authors structure their approach in a scholarly clear and interesting way in eight chapters, which logically, because they are systematically and historically oriented, take as their starting point the title ‘Elites under Siege’ and the claim that: ‘We know whom to blame for our bad situation –…’. (p. 1)
At heart, the success of the elites is based on – in modern terms – ‘networks’ and networking; in other words, what used to be called ‘connections’, ‘gangs’ and nepotism. In the main, this is therefore about structures and agencies as well as the ability to forge and maintain alliances in the interests of the ruling class. Class coalitions play a hugely important role here, especially under the conditions of internal competition – as is evident in the case of Trump who on the one hand embodies ‘the elite’ and on the other is fought by other elite fractions.
Therefore Chapter 5 is called ‘Politics and Money’, since this is the question of the instrumentalization of politics – this needs to be formulated in its ‘class’ meaning and with reference to Marx’s distinction between the governing class and ruling class. As the authors say, for the new conditions this means: ‘These who have attained political power in today’s societies tend to be rich. Increasingly personal wealth – or sponsorship from personal or corporate wealth – appears a prerequisite for those who aspire to be powerful’ (p. 124). Nonetheless, with regard to analyses of the influence of ‘money’ on ‘politics’ and their interpretation of research results, the following applies to the authors’ own narrative: ‘But the actual process of converting wealth into policy remains tantalizingly unclear’ (p. 125). They do attempt to offer some clarity through a perspective which engages with the discourses on ‘oligarchy’ and the purchase of influence (pp. 126–136), which in my opinion promise the most insights and (highest yield!) in terms of analytic returns.
The consequences at a fundamental level are dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7 under the headings ‘Inequality: Causes and Consequences’ and ‘Elites and Democracy’. These two chapters integrate questions of ‘political stability’, ‘social change’ and empirical findings on the victims of inequality (‘Squeezing the Lower Middle and the Base’, pp. 142–145), and deal with explanations and clarifications of social and political developments in which the – awkward – reactions of ‘the ruled’ cited at the beginning of this text are questioned. The central problem is already present before the financial crisis and collapse: Yet the runaway top end need not be socially damaging, or spark political protest, if the ultra-rich are sufficiently elevated from the rest of society to be regarded as a curiosity, another species, or even a form of exotic entertainment…Runciman (1966) documented and popularized the view that people feel disadvantaged only in relation to their immediate peers – being buoyed by outperforming their former classmates, colleagues and neighbours, and undeterred by the soaraway success of other with whom they never felt any rivalry. (p. 172) Drawing the same conclusion across the Atlantic and a century later, Joan Williams (2017) observed a white working class that envies and resents its immediate superiors – the middle managers and professionals – while admiring the immensely rich bosses and bankers who dwell and deal far above them – and adhering to the new politics advanced by this elite. (pp. 172–173)
To keep a longer story short, it is enough to quote the alarming finding on the topic of ‘Democracy and Elites’: ‘Elites can afford to concede democracy once they have reinforced their rule through a particular arrangement of constitutional rules and economic incentives; and that they prefer to democratize at this point, rather than continuing autocratic or plutocratic rule, because democracy makes the system more stable and efficient. Democracy thus emerges as a consolidation that strengthens the ascendancy of elites, rather than a concession that erodes their power in order to avoid its total loss’ (p. 195); a recognition which, when fascist power relations were established in Germany, the ‘alliance of the elites’, as Fritz Fischer called it, had forgotten – not only to its own disadvantage, but with the consequence of the downfall of all.
The last chapter ‘Giveaways and Greed’, which already indicates its direction in the choice of words, also belongs to this socially stabilizing context of the former analyses: The role of philanthropists is emphasized against the greedy fractions!
Against the background of competing interests and fractions of so-called elite milieus, the authors conclude by stressing the likelihood that elites (re)unite when faced with the danger of losing power: In the end, elites close ranks and rediscover the need for solidarity, not least because their appeal for support from groups below then tends to set off a much wider protest movement, threatening their own personal fortunes and the political bedrock they intend to leave intact.…An elite afflicted by greed, for money beyond what it needs or power beyond what it can handle, often struggles to suppress its appetite and regain the support of those beneath the banqueting table.…Elites invariably settle the conflicts that break out below their coalition-building battles. Right now, they have unleashed too many to be sure where the cards will fall. (p. 224)