Tony Blair’s gamble: The Middle East Peace Process and British participation in the Iraq 2003 campaign

Abstract

Tony Blair tried throughout the preparatory phase of the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 to influence US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. This article tries to understand how Blair fared in this endeavour. Using newly declassified documents, it examines the circumstances under which the US administration listened and engaged with British ideas and when and why it ignored British requests. The study shows that Blair was able to extract the greatest US concessions on the Middle East Peace Process in moments when Great Britain’s participation in the Iraq campaign was the most uncertain. The findings promote fresh thinking on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making.

Keywords

British foreign policy diplomacy international negotiations Iraq intervention special relationship US–UK relations

Much ink has been spilled on dissecting the motives former British Prime Minister Tony Blair pursued when deciding to intervene alongside the United States in Iraq in 2003 (see, for example, Bluth, 2004; Bratberg, 2011; Davidson, 2011; Dumbrell, 2006; Dyson, 2006; Jones, 2011; Kampfner, 2003; Press-Barnathan, 2006; Ralph, 2011; Sharp, 2003; Von Hlatky, 2013). Thus far, however, little is known about how negotiations over British participation in the Iraq intervention unfolded. Newly declassified documents reveal that some of Blair’s closest advisers ardently urged Blair to attach ‘conditions’ to British involvement in the Iraq War. Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff, for instance, advised Blair to get a ‘trade-off’ for British participation in the Iraq intervention (Manning, 2002). Similarly, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, pleaded with Blair that the United States had to understand that the United Kingdom was serious about ‘its conditions for UK involvement’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 34). Sir Christopher Meyer (2005: 48), the British Ambassador in Washington, DC, admonished Blair that the United Kingdom was getting ‘too little in return for [its] public support [of the Iraq War]’. Blair himself stated during the Iraq Inquiry that ‘trading this policy for that policy’ was not a strategy he pursued (Greene, 2013: 119). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a notion of ‘conditionality’ floated among the highest echelons of British decision-makers in the lead-up to the Iraq intervention.

The ‘conditions’ that were most frequently discussed included that the United Kingdom required (1) United Nations (UN) support for the intervention in Iraq and (2) that progress had to be made on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) before an invasion could be envisaged (see, for example, Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 479, 2016/3.3: 15; Meyer, 2005: 243). The second ‘condition’ is arguably the more intriguing one to study Blair’s influence on US decision-making – albeit thus far the less examined. Powerful US actors such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and military planners at US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Joint Staff equally pushed hard for UN support (see, for example, Baker, 2013: 208; Haass 2009:225; Recchia, 2011, 2015: 207–208; Thompson, 2009: 139–140). President George W. Bush (2011:238) recalls in his memoirs that Colin Powell had been ‘more passionate [on UN support for Iraq]’ than on any other issue during his administration. Consequently, it is very difficult to determine to what exact degree Blair influenced Bush’s decision to work through the UN in September 2002.¹ By contrast, British and American priorities distinctly diverged with regard to the MEPP. Blair was deeply attached to relaunching the peace process, while no US government actor shared his cause to a comparable degree.

The conventional wisdom on this subject suggests that Blair’s influence on the US administration was minimal if non-existent (see, for example, Azubuike, 2005: 133; Chilcot 2016/7: 621; McHugh 2010:466; Porter, 2010: 372; Sharp in Evangelista and Parsi, 2005: 133–135; Wheatcroft, 2003). This article, however, tries to nuance this assessment. Using hundreds of UK government documents that were recently declassified during the drafting process of the Chilcot Report,² I argue that during the incipient stage of US war planning, especially at the Crawford meeting in March 2002, Blair was quite successful in gaining US support for his Middle East peace plan. Nevertheless, his bargaining power almost completely vanished from May 2002 onwards. It only resurfaced in the last weeks and even days prior to the beginning of offensive military operations in Iraq in March 2003. I explain these ebbs and flows of British influence over US policy by highlighting US perceptions of how certain British participation in the Iraq War was. More precisely, I argue that during periods when US government officials doubted UK participation, British bargaining power rose. On the contrary, when the US government perceived British participation as guaranteed, Blair’s influence evaporated – even humiliatingly so.

These findings matter both empirically and theoretically. From a theoretical perspective, examining these negotiations adds to our knowledge on how, when and why the United Kingdom can influence US decision-making. We learn under what circumstances Great Britain can extract concessions from the United States. The article thus promotes fresh thinking on the ‘special relationship’ and yields new insights on how best to negotiate in situations of asymmetric power and preferences. Thus far, the linchpin of the ‘special relationship’ has been to provide unwavering public support to the US government and, in return, be granted special access and an ear in Washington, and punch above weight in the affairs of the world. Nevertheless, this article suggests that injecting on occasions some ambiguity and suspense into the ‘special relationship’ can yield surprising pay-offs. Empirically, US–UK negotiations over Iraq had important political repercussions in the Middle East. They changed the status quo in Israel and Palestine, notably with the de facto removal of Palestinian leader Arafat in early 2003 – to name just one example. This article sheds light on how and why these changes occurred.

UK–US bargaining dynamics: An overview

Conventional wisdom suggests that Prime Minister Winston Churchill conceived the ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom and America. In Churchill’s eyes, at the heart of the relationship were, of course, a shared history, common socio-cultural and linguistic ties, and convergent interests – notably the fight against fascism and communism (Azubuike, 2005: 129; Dunne, 2004: 898; Reynolds, 1988). Nevertheless, there was also a bargain (Reynolds, 1988: 65). Britain, the conventionally weaker ally, would offer steadfast public support of US policy, and in exchange, the United Kingdom would be given extensive access to US decision-making and opportunities to influence policy outcomes (Dunne, 2004: 893–909). Under ideal circumstances, Great Britain could thus ‘harness American power to British purposes’ (Porter, 2010: 358) and exercise ‘great power status vicariously through the United States’ (Richardson, 1996: 215). Ever since Churchill, generations of British Prime Ministers have adhered to this bargaining logic (Porter, 2010: 356). Tony Blair was certainly one of them. In 1999, he proclaimed in a speech in London that ‘if America was the new guardian of world order, Britain’s role was to align itself’ (Blair, 1999). In return, of course, Blair hoped that America would lend an ear to his ideas, opinions and suggestions.

Can conventional bargaining theories explain the logic that undergirds the ‘special relationship’ as conceived by Churchill? On what grounds can Churchill and his successors reason that unwavering attachment to the United States would grant Great Britain the greatest influence on US decision-making? Three possible causal mechanisms can be invoked. The first mechanism centres on information. Extensive social and diplomatic interactions open information channels (Hall and Yarhi-Milo, 2012: 562; Henke, 2017; Holmes, 2013; Sending et al., 2015: 223). Socially embedded actors learn about each other’s personalities, policy preferences, and cultural currencies (Cooley and Nexon, 2016; Hardt, 2014; Mérand et al., 2011; Pouliot, 2016:63) – information that is not readily available from public accounts (Neumann, 2012: 35). In the context of the ‘special relationship’, Great Britain can thus pick up what America really cares about; it gets a better sense of the available bargaining space and at times might be able to exploit asymmetries in preferences to reach a better deal with the United States (Moravcsik, 1998: 62; Odell, 2000: 62). The second causal mechanism focuses on sympathy and affection. Members of a dense social network often care about each other. They want the other to succeed (Das and Teng, 1998: 494; Leach and Sabatier, 2005: 92). By aligning closely with the United States, Great Britain may be able to exploit the fact that US government officials have grown fond of their trans-Atlantic ally. Finally, the third causal mechanism focuses on trust. Actors that frequently interact with one another often learn to trust each other. They start interacting in an environment which Rathbun (2014: 24) calls ‘value creating’. Such an environment entails that both parties honestly and openly reveal their preferences and concerns. Both parties can then think and act creatively and draw in issues through side-payments and/or issue-linkages to make a mutually beneficial package deal – irrespective of the power discrepancies between both states (see also De Dreu et al., 2000; Fearon, 1994; O’Connor and Carnevale, 1997).

However, is ‘unwavering’ attachment the only way to gain leverage in international negotiations? Of course not. Scores of scholars indeed claim that closeness carries equally as many risks as advantages. Most importantly, it can lead to the distortion of information, the misplacement of trust and related inflated feelings of obligation and friendship (see, for example, Burt, 2005; Cooley and Nexon, 2016; Henke, 2018; Uzzi, 1996). In tightly knit social groups, information often only passes among a select few, thus decreasing the quality and diversity of views and ideas: information provided from network participants is often uncritically accepted, while non-participants are trusted less easily (Burt, 1992; Henke, 2018; Janis, 1971). Finally, exaggerated reputational concerns can lead to deep-seated and sometimes irrational fears of ‘not to hurt a friend’ (Granovetter, 1992: 44). These accounts thus suggest that a bargaining actor gains leverage not necessarily by being close but by being cunning: effective bargaining requires the dissimulation of information, the use of threats and brinkmanship. To get a piece of the pie, states – especially ‘weaker’ ones – need to inflate their reservation price (that is the lowest possible outcome they are ready to accept; Rathbun, 2014: 15). They need to hold an issue of value to the other (but not necessarily to themselves) hostage, refusing to concede on it as to extract concessions on more important issues (De Dreu and Boles, 1998; McKibben, 2014; Odell, 2000; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975: 31). US President Donald J. Trump (in Trump and Schwartz 1987: 37), for instance, writes in the Art of the Deal:

The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. That makes the other guy smell blood, and then you’re dead. The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have. Leverage is having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, needs. Or best of all, simply can’t do without.

A frequently used technique to gain leverage in international negotiations is to ‘tie your hands’. It is based on a two-level games framework and proposes that the outcome of interstate bargaining favours the state whose negotiating autonomy is most domestically constrained (Putnam in Evans et al., 1993: 431–468).

To explain Blair’s failure to wrest any concessions from the US government in exchange for British participation in the Iraq campaign, several scholars point to the fact that Blair opted for a failing negotiating strategy. Some even call it ‘his greatest error in diplomacy’ (Seldon, 2004: 625). Rodric Braithwaite (2003), former British ambassador in Moscow and chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), suggests that the ‘special relationship’ robbed Blair of the ability to say no to the Americans and threaten, if necessary, to ‘walk away from the table’. McHugh (2010: 498), in turn, argues that Blair’s reluctance to openly disagree with the US President hampered his negotiation goals. Moreover, Blair’s single-minded focus on persuading the US President caused him to underestimate the influence of the hawks in the US administration. Other arguments, irrespective of negotiating strategy, have also been put forward. First, Blair was a weak negotiator because of his personal conviction to intervene in Iraq (Azubuike, 2005; Dyson, 2006; Porter, 2010: 360). Second, Blair had no power because the United Kingdom is weak. Negotiation is about power – not just in the negotiation context but overall (Fearon, 1998). In other words, the strong do as they will and the weak as they must (Baylis, 1984; Campbell, 1986; Clark, 1994; Dumbrell, 2001: 129).

The next section tries to assess which one of these explanations best explains US–UK bargaining dynamics over Iraq and, in particular, the MEPP. Instead of looking at the overall negotiation outcome, it looks at different negotiation episodes and tries to assess which factors influenced UK bargaining success or failure in each single instance. The hypotheses the analysis tries to test are as follows: Did the ‘special relationship’ grant power to Blair? In other words, did trust, sympathy and the full disclosure of information lead to bargaining success? Or rather, did the dissimulation of information, threats and uncertainty increase UK leverage? Moreover, how did Blair’s personal convictions and UK power influence the bargaining outcome and his handling of US government actors?

US–UK negotiations over Iraq and the MEPP

The United Kingdom was the second largest troop contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom after the United States. The United Kingdom committed 35,000 troops to the intervention – a quarter of its army (Kampfner, 2003: 258). The British engagement in Iraq, of course, did not start in 2003. Britain governed over Iraq from 1920 until 1932 and also maintained much political control of the subsequent British-imposed Hashemite monarchy until the so-called Free Officers’ Coup in 1958. During the first Gulf War, the United Kingdom stood ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ with the United States, contributing the second largest contingent to Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, in 1998, the United Kingdom also joined the United States in Operation Desert Fox – a 4-day bombing campaign aiming at weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production facilities in Iraq. The operation infuriated Saddam Hussein and led to his banning of all UN weapons inspectors from Iraq. To reengage Saddam, the United States and the United Kingdom collaborated intensely in the UN Security Council in 1999 to draft UN resolution 1284, which foresaw a loosening of UN sanctions (especially on oil) in exchange for Saddam’s approval to a new monitoring group (UNMOVIC) to oversee his WMD programme. UN resolution 1284, however, did not deliver the intended results. Saddam continued to obstruct UN inspections while selling oil illegally through Syria and Turkey (Kampfner, 2003: 155). The situation, therefore, required further attention, and one of Colin Powell’s first decisions as new US Secretary of State in the incoming George W. Bush administration in 2001 was to rethink Iraqi sanction policy. The British government was again eager to collaborate. And yet, at no point did it push for regime change. Rather, as one senior US government official recalls:

[The British] were horrified at all references to regime change. When we were negotiating [UN Resolution] 1284, the Brits were adamant this had nothing to do with regime change. I don’t remember so much as a whiff or a whisper from the Brits about using more force. (as quoted in Kampfner 2003: 155. See also Blair 2011: 395; Chilcot, 2016/3.1, 314; Coughlin, 2013: 123)³

This attitude of the British government changed by roughly mid-2002. By then, British officials, specifically British Prime Minister Tony Blair, publicly advocated for regime change in Iraq. UK officials had started to sense only weeks after 9/11 that the United States was turning its regard towards Iraq (Chilcot, 2016/3.1: 353). On 15 November 2001, Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff, wrote in a note to Blair that ‘[after Afghanistan] there is a real danger that we will part company with the Americans on what comes next. The right wing of the Republican Party wants to carry on by bombing Iraq and Somalia’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.1: 345). Jonathan Powell initially expressed great scepticism about these plans. Nevertheless, US determination to tackle Iraq grew very rapidly, and as a result, discussions among Blair’s inner circle quickly changed from trying to prevent US war plans to influencing US strategy instead. In late November, Jonathan Powell sent another note to Blair this time suggesting that the United Kingdom should engage with the US government over Iraq (Chilcot, 2016/3.1: 356–357). Nevertheless, Jonathan Powell also presented to Blair a set of ‘conditions’ that in his eyes had to be met before regime change in Iraq could go forward (Powell, 2001). These included (1) Saddam’s further isolation in the international community; (2) the need to secure support from Russia, France, the Middle East and Europe (via cooperation in the UN); and (3) ‘making progress on the MEPP’ (Powell, 2001). Powell indeed considered the last condition ‘absolutely essential … or [we] will be accused – correctly – of double standards’ (Powell, 2001).

Many of Blair’s advisers especially in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) concurred with Powell. Sir Derek Plumbly, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, for instance, suggested that:

[Great Britain] should not give the Americans a blank cheque … [T]he Americans need us on Iraq … we should promote the thought that a more balanced and determined US approach on Palestine would be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for moving forward on regime change. (Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 410)

The cabinet minutes of 7 March 2002 also state that ‘the right strategy is to engage closely with the US Government in order to be in a position to shape policy and its presentation’. Moreover, ‘it [is] critically important to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace Process’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 425).

Why the focus on the MEPP?

Preparing public opinion and securing international support via the UN were policies that had become a deep-seated tradition in UK intervention endeavours. The MEPP, however, was a different type of animal. Nobody in Blair’s inner circle ever described in a very clear and methodical way how the MEPP and Iraq were exactly connected. Rather, a number of interrelated themes emerge from Blair’s memoirs and various government documents. First, Blair and his advisers considered the conflict ‘a running sore’ – a tool that extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda were able to exploit for their own rethorical ends (Greene, 2013: 200; Levy, 2008: 196–197). A peace settlement in the Middle East would prove that their claims were untrue; that ‘coexistence’ of Jews, Christians and Muslims was possible; or as Blair put it, ‘A calm region, on a path to change, would not be an easy region for the likes of [Saddam Hussein] and his sons’ (Blair, 2011: 118). Second, Blair and his advisers were persuaded that if the Israeli–Palestinian issue was resolved, an invasion in Iraq would be ‘less upsetting’ for the Muslim world avoiding ‘a revolt on the Arab streets’. On the contrary, if the issue was not resolved, many Arab states would likely refuse cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom over Iraq. This attitude was widely shared among British government agencies such as the FCO, the JIC and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).Alan Goulty, the FCO Director for the Middle East and North Africa, commented, for instance, on 20 February 2002 that ‘[without] progress on the MEPP … Arab States would have the greatest difficulties in supporting an operation which is bound to be seen as serving Israeli interests’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 403). Similarly, the SIS opined in December 2001 that Egypt, which was ‘vital to UK interests in the Middle East’, was ‘vulnerable to Iraqi influence due to the failure of [the] MEPP’ and thus would likely refuse to cooperate with the United Kingdom on Iraq (Chilcot, 2016/3.1: 361). Jonathan Powell also wrote in a memo on 19 July 2002, ‘We need at least neutrality in the region before we can act … If we want to base our troops in the region this will mean a real effort on the MEPP’ (Powell, 2002).⁴ Third, and on a grander scale, Blair and his team believed that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict inhibited political reform in the region. Because of its all-encompassing nature, it drew ‘political energy’ from the ‘demand for change’. As a result, a peace settlement would be one step further on the path towards democratisation in the Middle East (Blair, 2011; Greene 2013:11).⁵

US initial reluctance to engage with Blair’s idea

Blair’s initial demarches to sell to the Americans the importance of the MEPP failed miserably. George W. Bush saw no reason to bring peace to the Middle East (Coughlin, 2013: 228; Greene, 2013: 73; Powell, 2010: 228). Sir David Manning reported in December 2001 after a meeting with Condoleezza Rice that the United States was on board with British policy ‘except on the MEPP’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.1: 370). President Bush considered the MEPP a risky business with much to lose and little to gain. Many Republican political strategists had blamed his father’s attempts at Middle East peace as one of the key factors contributing to his failure to be re-elected in 1992 (Kampfner, 2003: 179). Moreover, George W. Bush was also advised by people who were advocating for a neoconservative US foreign policy. Their key mantra was that the United States had to show strength, not weakness, in world politics. According to them, revisiting the issue of Middle East peace would ‘show weakness’. After all, if Islamic radicals were criticising America for being too close to Israel, would it not look like caving in to their demands if a new attempt at Middle East peace was explored (Quandt, 2005: 394; Zoughbie, 2014:14–15)? Moreover, for many neoconservatives it was impossible to envision a peace process while Saddam Hussein was still in power in Baghdad. They maintained that it was he ‘who was training, arming, rewarding the terrorists and the suicide bombers … you had to take out Iraq in order to get the peace process on the road’ (as quoted in Greene, 2013: 117). Once Saddam was gone, neoconservatives argued, peace would come to the Middle East quasi automatically (Mann, 2004: 322–324).

The 9/11 attacks were able to briefly shift this attitude. In the wake of 9/11, Colin Powell, a strong opponent of neoconservative ideology, made the pitch to George W. Bush (alongside Blair) that the War on Terror required the help of Arab and Muslim states and revisiting the MEPP would help in the coalition-building process. As a result, on 2 October 2001, Bush announced that he was prepared to back the creation of a Palestinian state. On the day of the announcement, however, Palestinian gunmen burst into a settlement in Gaza, shooting civilian residents and killing a young couple. Moreover, on 3 January 2002, the Israeli navy intercepted a ship in the Red Sea, the Karine A. The ship was part of a smuggling operation coordinated by the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, and Iran transporting weapons to Palestine. Both events led to a rapid abandonment of the US-led peace initiative (Kampfner, 2003: 181).

The Crawford meeting: Blair’s first negotiation victory

The meeting at Crawford is considered by many analysts to be a critical juncture of US–UK negotiations over Iraq. While Iraq had been a topic superficially discussed by Blair and Bush since late November 2001, both heads of state had never explicitly talked about the details of the invasion. All this changed when Bush invited Blair to his ranch in Crawford on 5 and 6 April 2002. As a result, for the purpose of this article, Blair’s visit to Crawford marks the beginning of Phase 1 of UK–US negotiations over the Iraq War.

Blair and his team were fully aware that the key reason why Bush invited Blair to Crawford was ‘to talk business’. Was Blair on board with Iraq, and if so, what could the United States expect from the United Kingdom with regard to an invasion (Manning, 2002)? In preparation of the visit, Blair solicited advice from many of his closest collaborators who all advocated for a very similar negotiation stance. Jonathan Powell, for instance, counselled Blair to ‘capitalize’ on his standing with Bush and push for sensible plans on both Iraq and the MEPP (Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 478). Powell urged Blair to make it clear to Bush that he should get a ‘trade-off’. We ‘need warm words from [Bush] on [the] MEPP in return for warm words from [Blair] on Iraq’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 479). Manning (2002), in turn, told Blair to relay to Bush the following message: if the US wanted company, it would have to take account of the concerns of its potential coalition partners. In particular: (1) the UN dimension … and (2) the ‘paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine’. Blair thus arrived in Crawford with a mission to clinch a deal. His bargaining strategy involved specifically two points: first, he wanted a UN resolution that would authorise any possible intervention, and, second, he wanted US support for an Israeli–Palestinian peace deal. Blair recalls in his memoirs: ‘[At Crawford] I made a major part of my pitch to George the issue of the Israel-Palestine peace process’ (Blair, 2011: 401; see also Chilcot, 2016/3.2: 490–494).

Bush’s immediate reaction to Blair’s proposal was tepid. Intellectually, he failed to understand why Blair was so attached to resolving the conflict in the Middle East (Powell, 2010: 279). Nevertheless, George W. Bush badly wanted Blair’s support for the Iraq War (Coughlin, 2013: 241; Kampfner, 2003: 168–241). More importantly, Blair’s support in April 2002 could not be taken for granted. The United Kingdom had not been involved in any concrete military planning with regard to the war thus far. No investments had been made, and the die was yet to be cast. Bush was also aware that many officials in Blair’s cabinet questioned the wisdom of an Iraq intervention. As a result, the UK–US negotiation context at Crawford was engulfed in uncertainty. Blair was able to hold his cards tight and dissimulate his reservation price, and Bush felt that he had to agree to some of Blair’s proposals. As an immediate response to Blair’s Crawford demands, Bush thus sent US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Israel and Palestine to immediately restart the MEPP negotiations (Meyer, 2005: 245). This move was a major victory for Blair. Without Blair, it is highly unlikely that Bush would have authorised such mission.

Britain loses cloud

On 17 May 2002, roughly a month after Powell’s visit to Israel and Palestine, Sir Christopher Meyer, the UK ambassador in Washington, DC, reported that Blair’s ‘conditions’ on Iraq were all but forgotten. President Bush had lost interest in the MEPP and once again sided with the neocons of his administration, who fiercely opposed any potential peace deal. In mid-May, thus, begins Phase 2 of US–UK negotiations. What exactly had happened?

By roughly mid-May 2002, CENTCOM had heard from British military sources that Blair was contemplating contributing an armoured division to the Iraq intervention (Chilcot 2016/3.3: 15). The US government read in this news that Blair had made up his mind: if he had already told the British military to prepare for a deployment, Blair was on board. From a US perspective, Blair thus lost much of his bargaining power. Why should his ‘demands’ with regard to Iraq be entertained if he already effectively committed troops to the intervention? This calculation led the US side to forget the ‘but’ in our ‘yes, but …’ as Meyer put it (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 15). ‘We were getting too little in return for our public support’, he recalls in his memoirs, ‘this was a lousy backdrop to taking part in any military action against Iraq’ (Meyer, 2005: 248). Peter Watkins, the private secretary to Secretary of Defence Geoff Hoon, saw the situation in similar ways: The more the British engaged in US cooperation, the less bargaining power they had and ‘the PM’s conditions [were] … simply sidelined’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 31).

To remedy the situation, Blair’s advisers pleaded with him to have a strong word with Bush. Blair had to prevent that Great Britain was taken for granted; he had to forestall the negative consequences of ‘hugging them close’ such as a distorted US perception of British loyalty and sense of obligation. Edward Chaplin, the Director of the Middle East Department at the FCO, wrote in a note on 12 July 2002:

There is no commitment yet to UK participation [sic] in military action … we need to re-emphasise at the highest [US] levels that the … conditions we have set are not just desirable in themselves for any action, but [are] essential for UK participation, on whatever scale. (as quoted in Chilcot 2016/3.3: 43)

Jack Straw also wrote in a note to Blair on 8 July 2002 that the United States had to understand the United Kingdom was serious about its conditions for UK involvement. At about the same time (19 July 2002), a cabinet paper was produced titled ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’. The paper also put in very stark terms what the United Kingdom should ask from the United States in exchange for its support. It stated:

When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April, he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met … We need now to reinforce this message. (Cabinet of and Blair, 2002)⁶

Closeness as best remedy

Blair listened attentively to his advisers and the cabinet. He agreed that conditions for UK participation were necessary, but he disagreed on the delivery (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 50). He refused to play cats and mouse with Bush. Instead, Blair’s intention was to signal to the United States British loyalty to an even more intense degree. Campbell records in this regard that Tony Blair felt ‘maximum closeness publicly was the way to maximize influence privately’ (Chilcot 2016/3.3: 62). To Matthew Rycroft, Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Blair suggested that ‘We should say we’ll be with you [USA]. Here’s how to make it happen successfully; not here are our conditions for being with you’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 23).

Blair thus clearly believed that the advantages of staying close would outweigh its risks: the information, trust and sympathy he could exploit by ‘hugging them close’ would outweigh the potential pitfalls. Blair’s plan on how to exert influence on the Bush administrated thus mirrored the traditional logic of the ‘special relationship’: unreserved attachment to the United States was the best way to influence US strategy. The United States would punish a wobbly British message. On the contrary, loyalty would be rewarded. It appears that Blair intended to create almost an emotional bond and a normatively laden negotiation environment with the objective that Bush could not reject Blair’s requests because it would be morally wrong to cast off a country that was so blatantly loyal and supportive. The US government would have a guilty conscience. No document indeed illustrates Blair’s negotiation strategy better than the note he sent to Bush on 28 July 2002. Instead of starting the letter expressing some British hesitancy with regard to UK involvement in Iraq, Blair flat out stated, ‘I will be with you, whatever’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 72). Only once this statement was made did he delve into what he thought needed to be done before the intervention could be launched. These conditions were, notably, (1) the MEPP had to be relaunched and (2) the UN had to get involved (Chilcot, 2016/3.3: 73).

Did the 28 June note have any impact on Bush? It possibly influenced Bush’s decision to seek a UN resolution for Iraq although it is unclear whether Blair was the tipping point or whether other people in the US administration such as Colin Powell had already done the heavy lifting (Bush, 2011: 238; Haass, 2009: 225; McHugh, 2010: 480; Recchia, 2015). Nevertheless, with regard to the MEPP, it did not budge the US government one inch. Bush simply ignored the topic. Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Washington, DC, reported on 15 August 2002 that ‘the arch hawks [Rumsfeld and Cheney] are undeterred by the possible effect on the already inflammable Middle East’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.4: 109). On 30 August, he followed up saying that ‘the hawks’ [argue] … that to postpone action [on Iraq] until Arab/Israel improves is to postpone it forever’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.4: 130). Roughly a week later, Sir Christopher Meyer (2002), concurred:

The President seems to have bought the neo-con notion that with the overthrow of Saddam, all will be sweetness and light in Iraq, with automatic benefits in the rest of the Middle East (which partly explains his inactivity on the latter).

The heat turns up

By the middle of January 2003, Downing Street was in a panic. London saw the biggest demonstrations in British history. Two million people were taking part in anti-war rallies (Nineham, 2013: 3). Opinion polls showed that only 2% of the British population felt that a war in Iraq would make the world a safer place (Campbell, 2007: 660). In all, 86% of the British public wanted additional time for weapons inspections, and only 25% believed that there was sufficient evidence to justify an intervention (Weitsman, 2014: 156). Internationally, a diplomatic storm was brewing. France, Russia and Germany were collaborating in a forceful anti-war alliance. In addition, Blair had to fend off fierce opposition in his own party. Blair (2011:412) himself recalls about this time: ‘My isolation within [the] Cabinet, let alone the [Labour party] and large parts of the media and public opinion was colossal’. It was around this time that the US Embassy in London informed the US State Department that Blair was in considerable danger of losing his premiership. When asked what the US government could do to help, Blair replied, ‘I need a second UN resolution and progress on the MEPP’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.7: 290).

Bush initially only agreed to attempt to get a second UN resolution. With regard to the MEPP, Bush argued that Palestinian President Arafat first had to leave office before anything else could happen.⁷ Blair did not agree with Bush’s assessment of Arafat (Blair, 2011: 405). However, Blair wanted to clinch a US deal over the MEPP. If Bush insisted on the removal of Arafat, a solution had to be found. Blair thus sent his special adviser Michael Levy on the morning of 23 January 2002 on a secret mission to the capital of the Palestinian Authority, Ramallah. Levy was instructed to negotiate a commitment from Arafat that he would step down and agree to the appointment of a new Palestinian Prime Minister – a request which entailed the de facto abdication of Arafat. Arafat needed some serious convincing – that is all that is currently known about this encounter. In the end, Levy obtained Arafat’s de facto resignation letter, flew back to London and handed it to Blair (Greene, 2013: 130; Kampfner, 2003: 262). Blair then immediately asked Bush for another meeting in Washington, DC and a summit was arranged for 31 January 2003. When Blair landed in Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer took him aside and said, ‘You are going to have to clinch the deal [now]’ (as quoted in Kampfner, 2003: 260). In Meyer’s eyes, this was Blair’s last chance. Blair indeed managed to gain a private promise from Bush that once the Iraq invasion was over, a Road Map detailing the path towards Middle East peace would be delineated with the assistance of the United States (Kampfner, 2003: 263). Publicly, however, Bush made no commitment. As a result, little changed in the public perception of British and US war aims.

The Road Map: Blair’s second victory

On 11 March 2003, the second UN resolution process ground to a halt. France declared that it would veto a new UN initiative (Recchia, 2015). The next day Blair phoned Bush. Blair was melodramatic. He told Bush that there was a real possibility that his government would fall. His cabinet was up in arms: several ministers wanted to resign (Chilcot, 2016/3.8: 472). The last option to save his government came in form of a vote in the House of Commons to approve the UK deployment to Iraq. The vote was scheduled for 19 March 2003. Blair told Bush that the likelihood that he would lose that vote and have to resign immediately after was immense. Blair then pleaded with Bush once more. He absolutely needed a public commitment to the Middle East Road Map. His future depended on it. The publication of such Road Map would appease some of his cabinet ministers. In addition, it would provide him with an important talking point that he could use to convince Labour MPs to vote in favour of the war resolution.⁸ The peace plan had converted from a (somewhat) lofty ideological idea to a domestic policy imperative (Rycroft, 2003). Campbell vividly recalls Blair’s phone call in his memoirs: ‘[Blair] spelled out [to Bush] the symbolism in the Road Map. Bush didn’t quite get it … But [Blair] pressed on him …’ (Chilcot 2016/3.8: 457).⁹ In parallel, David Manning also spoke to Condoleezza Rice. Manning told Rice that publishing the Road Map that weekend was ‘critical’ for the United Kingdom; it might be worth 50 votes which ‘could make all the difference’ in the parliamentary debate (Chilcot, 2016/3.8: 458). On 13 March 2003, Bush and Blair talked again. Blair continued to press Bush to publish the Road Map. Blair (consciously or unconsciously) became a master negotiator. He told Bush, his hands were tied. He needed the MEPP to convince rebellious MPs and intransigent cabinet members to support him (Chilcot, 2016/3.8:472, 482). Bush finally complied. Recounting the phone call, Campbell writes, ‘Bush said they could do the Road Map’ (Chilcot, 2016/3.8: 484).

On the afternoon of 14 March 2003, Bush stepped out on the lawn of the White House and announced his intention to produce a new Road Map for Middle East peace (Woodward, 2004: 347). Two days later, on 16 March 2003, Bush and Blair (alongside Spanish Prime Minister Aznar) met on the Azores Island. The communique that was issued that day also included a passage dedicated to the MEPP. It stated:

We affirm a vision of a Middle East peace in which two states, Israel and Palestine, will live side by side in peace, security, and freedom. We welcome the fact that the roadmap [sic] designed to implement this vision will soon be delivered to Palestinians and Israelis, upon the confirmation of an empowered Palestinian Prime Minister. (White House, 2003)

Blair (2011: 435) recalls in his memoirs about these events:

I had finally got George to commit to the Road Map, which was of enormous importance to the Middle East Peace Process … we got the U.S. signed up to it and we even got a specific commitment to it in the U.S. ultimatum to Saddam.

And, indeed, the final ultimatum given to Saddam on 17 March 2003 stated the following:

Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. … When the dictator has departed, [the Iraqi people] can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation. The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. (Bush, 2003)

The last sentence had been inserted by Blair. Blair had finally gotten the deal he had hoped for (Powell, 2010: 279). Bob Woodward (2004: 347) also acknowledges, ‘It was another concession to Blair, who had pressed [Bush] to not delay the peace plan until the Iraq issue was resolved’.

Blair used his bargaining success with Bush in his speech in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003 front and centre (Blair, 2003). Interestingly, he even scolded his European partners for not having followed the same strategy as he did. He said:

I tell you what Europe should have said last September to the U.S. With one voice it should have said: we understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and WMD and we will help meet it. We will mean what we say in any UN resolution we pass and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily; but in return we ask for two things of you: that the U.S. should choose the UN path and you should recognize the fundamental overriding importance of re-starting the MEPP, which we will hold you to. (Blair, 2003)

Blair survived the vote. Just enough Labour MPs gave him the benefit of the doubt.¹⁰ Bush phoned Blair to congratulate him. The war could begin.

So what explains Blair’s last minute bargaining success? Blair negotiated well. Willingly or unwillingly, he was able to credibly threaten to walk away from the table if Bush did not deliver. The MEPP was thus a real deal breaker. In addition, Blair was able to signal that his hands were tied. It was not him making these demands but his intransigent cabinet members and Labour Party MPs. In short, it was uncertainty and (implicit) threats that led to the American agreement.

Did George W. Bush follow through on his promise to Blair to bring peace to the Middle East? Jonathan Powell (2010: 279) believes he did. He writes, ‘[Bush] honestly intended to but was unable to in practice’. The record states that on 4 June 2003, Bush chaired a summit in Aqaba, Jordan, at which Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas committed themselves to the Road Map. Nevertheless, in early September 2003, Abbas resigned and developments ground to a hold. By this time, conditions in Iraq were starting to deteriorate, and the Israel–Palestine controversy became less of a priority for the Bush administration. This developmemt was also true for Blair, who got distracted by major domestic political challenges, including inquiries into the flawed intelligence relating to the Iraq War. Blair retained his interest in the issue nonetheless. Shortly after he decided to step down in 2007; he sent a private note to Bush asking whether the United States would support the creation of a position for him, as a special envoy of the Quartet for Middle East Affairs (Rice 2011: 587).¹¹ The Bush administration agreed and Blair served in this function until 2015.

Conclusion

Generations of British policy-makers have attempted to leverage the ‘special relationship’ to influence US decision-making. The concept of the ‘special relationship’ is based on unwavering loyalty and closeness or as David Manning put it, ‘the only way we exercise … influence [in Washington] is by attaching ourselves firmly to [the United States]’ (as quoted in Kampfner, 2003: 17). The underlying logic on how such closeness provides bargaining leverage is based on access to private information, affection and trust. Nevertheless, US–UK negotiations over Iraq provide an example of how British bargaining power was indeed greatest in moments of British (often unintentional) wavering in US support. Blair was able to gain concessions from President Bush on two occasions: the Crawford meeting and days prior to the actual invasion. On both occasions, Blair could credibly threaten that Britain would not participate in the intervention, if British demands were not headed. In contrast, the June 28 note, in which Blair declared his resolute support for the intervention (that is, ‘I support you, whatever’), wielded very little results – at least when it came to the MEPP.

All other explanations accounting for Blair’s bargaining failure cannot explain the results we witnessed to the same degree. UK power capabilities and Blair’s ‘conviction’ to enter the war did not change over the course of the negotiations and thus cannot explain the divergences. Moreover, there is no evidence that Blair focused less on President Bush and more on other power brokers (i.e. the ‘neocons’) while at Crawford and in the immediate lead-up to the war. As a result, this third explanation for why Blair failed in his bargaining endeavours also lacks explanatory power.

No general conclusions can, of course, be drawn from this one case of US–UK negotiations. Still, the case constitutes a good opportunity to reflect upon UK bargaining strategy vis-à-vis the United States. In the case of Iraq, it appears that uncertainty of British support coupled with implicit threats to walk away from the negotiations resulted in greater pay-offs than unqualified support. This result, of course, does not put the entire logic undergirding the ‘special relationship’ into question. Yet, it does suggest that going forward British administrations should consider the option of injecting on occasions some ambiguity and suspense into their relationship with the global hegemon.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Simone Cruikshank Rivera for terrific research assistance and the European University Institute (EUI) for hosting her while much of this article was written. The author also thanks Robert Keohane, Karen Alter, Hendrik Spruyt, Ian Hurd, Steve Nelson, Alex Thompson, Ulrich Krotz, Stefanie von Hlatky, Stefano Recchia and the anonymous reviewers and editors at BJPIR for valuable help and guidance.

Funding

This research benefitted from the generous support of the Farrell Fund at Northwestern University.

Notes

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