Social democratic Euroscepticism: Labour’s neglected tradition

Abstract

The referendum result of 2016 creates a timely opportunity to reappraise Euroscepticism in British politics. This article examines the Eurosceptic tradition within the Labour Party, specifically its moderate wing. During the referendum campaign, Euroscepticism within the Labour Party was presented as a temporary phenomenon limited to the ‘hard left’ of the Party in the early 1980s. However, this view neglects a much longer tradition of Euroscepticism on the moderate wing of the Labour Party dating back to the earliest post–Second World War attempts to foster European unity. This article seeks to restore that tradition and concludes that it is built on a clear conceptualisation of social democratic ideology.

Keywords

Euroscepticism federalism intergovernmentalism internationalism Labour Party social democracy sovereignty

Introduction

The 2016 referendum on continuing UK membership of the European Union (EU) and ongoing withdrawal process is a timely moment at which to revisit the social democratic tradition in British politics and examine its long-term Eurosceptic tendency. Commentators frequently referred to the Bennite left’s heyday in the early 1980s during the EU referendum campaign as the high watermark of Labour Party Euroscepticism, including the 1983 manifesto commitment to withdraw from the European Economic Community (EEC) without a referendum. However, far from being a temporary phenomenon in the early 1980s restricted to the Left of the Party, it has been a much more enduring tradition – albeit one that was neglected and then apparently forgotten since 1987 – that continues to be expressed by those within and without of the Parliamentary Labour Party.

The focus of the literature on Labour’s Eurosceptic tradition addresses the history of Labour’s relationship with Europe. It considers Labour’s initial reluctance as a ‘missed opportunity’ to shape the institutions of the Community from the outset, signifying a belief in British exceptionalism as a victorious power at the end of the Second World War and the importance of the Commonwealth. The resulting sense of semi-detachedness caused by the mythology of Britain’s power is deemed to be problematic for Britain generally, and Labour specifically (Liddle, 2014). There is also a significant amount of literature on the 1975 referendum on continuing Britain’s membership of the Common Market (Baimbridge, 2006; Butler and Kitzinger, 1976; King, 1977) and the broader historical development throughout of British Euroscepticism the 20th century (Broad, 2001; George, 1998; Young, 1999). Euroscepticism has been analysed through the prism of key events along with the activities and influence of the sceptics within the two main parties (Forster, 2002). Jones and Keating in their formative study of Labour and the British State identified three linked arguments that underpinned the debate within Labour: instrumental, patriotic and constitutional (Jones and Keating, 1985). Further accounts focus on key individuals such as Robin Cook who became New Labour’s Foreign Secretary (Anderson and Mann, 1997).

Other authors have focused on the economic and political benefits of membership, whether it be the search for economic growth, the social policy dimension of Maastricht compared to the cold hostility of Thatcherism or combating transnational problems in a globalised and interdependent world (Brown, 2016). Indeed, much of the literature on social democracy and Europe has been favourable towards European integration and therefore consisted of works of advocacy, arguing for further integration to meet the needs of social democratic parties (Cramme, 2012). Alternatively, European integration has been viewed as the means by which parties of the centre-left could resolve their electoral and political problems, through releasing the energy contained in civil society (Diamond, 2016).

This article differs from other texts on Labour and Europe as it shows theoretically and empirically, that there was historically a close association between the Labour Party and a Eurosceptic conception of social democracy. King, when writing on the divisions within Labour over Europe in the post–Second World War era, rather dismissively considered that ‘the anti-Europeans, in one way or another, resisted the modern world; the pro-Europeans, by contrast, accepted it’ (King, 1977: 38). J.P. Mackintosh, the pro-European Labour MP and former academic thought the anti-Marketeers had ‘no overall philosophy, only a discrete group of fears’, fundamentally worried about change (Mackintosh, 1971). Yet, the objections of Labour’s Eurosceptics far from being based on ‘resisting the modern world’ or a ‘fear of change’ were concerned with what they regarded as the cost and consequences of British membership for social democracy and for the Britain they wanted to create.

In order to identify this social democratic Eurosceptic tradition and analyse how it evolved, the article will look at factors internal and external to that tradition. The internal factors include how the tradition emerged, how it viewed the nature of European integration and how it defined key terms such as sovereignty. External factors include the evolving nature of the EEC/EU (for instance, as it developed new policy competences), the balance of domestic political forces (such as the changing attitude of the Labour Party towards the EEC in response to Thatcherite policies in the 1980s) and the shifting international context, including such things as the decline of the Commonwealth. Throughout this article, these explanatory factors are interwoven with empirical developments. In reality, conceptual issues and empirical developments interact. Politicians do not formulate their ideologies in the abstract.

The article will begin with a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the Labour’s Euroscepticism focusing on the Party’s conceptualisation of sovereignty, federalism and internationalism, outlining how they played out in the immediate post–Second World War period. The article will then turn its attention to the inter-party and intra-party debates of the 1950s, before examining in more detail Hugh Gaitskell’s seminal conference speech of 1962 – ‘the end of a thousand years of history’ – and its legacy in creating a social democratic Euroscepticism. Interest will then shift to the ‘Europeanising of Labour’ in the 1980s and 1990s under successive leaders through to the present, including an examination of the motives of Leave supporting Labour MPs in the EU referendum, 2016.

Jim Bulpitt wrote (1996) that the political debate over European integration is a conceptual jungle. All of these concepts have been subject to definition and redefinition. Indeed much of the academic and popular debate has hinged on the particular definition given to such concepts. The concepts of central relevance to our article are social democracy, Euroscepticism, sovereignty, federalism and internationalism. We use the term social democracy to refer to the moderate wing of the Labour Party. The Labour Party, just as the Conservative Party, is itself a coalition formed to capture enough parliamentary seats to defeat the other (Gilmour, 1969). The Labour Party has a social democratic wing and a more radical socialist wing. The former has held control of the Party for the majority of the time, and certainly when Labour has been in government. The term social democratic is problematic as even moderates within the Labour Party have called themselves democratic socialists. Hence, the campaign group set up to support Gaitskell’s leadership was the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) and the Labour right in the 1980s deliberately called themselves democratic socialists in order to distinguish themselves from the defectors to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Nevertheless, the term social democracy has frequently been used by moderates in the Party and is also a useful way of distinguishing the moderates from the radical left. Hence, this article is about the Euroscepticism of Labour’s moderates.

The second concept needing definition at this stage is that of Eurosceptic. Bulpitt distinguishes between four positions on European integration in British politics: anti-European, Eurosceptic, Euro-pragmatist and pro-European (Bulpitt, 1992). He applied these terms to the Conservative Party, but they are also relevant when looking at the Labour Party. Whereas Eurosceptics complain about European integration but ultimately go along with it, the antis – with whom Bulpitt identified – oppose membership altogether seeking either a fundamental renegotiation or withdrawal. The 2016 referendum somewhat superseded this position since the failure of David Cameron’s renegotiation (as the sceptics deemed it) and the prospect of an in–out referendum meant that individuals had to decide on which side of the argument they were now on. If pragmatists could be characterised as waiting for Godot, then Godot had now arrived in the form of the referendum. Bulpitt considered the pragmatists as fundamentally undecided on the issue and hence making a pragmatic decision on each separate development within the integration process. In the context of the referendum, they had to decide whether they were ‘in’ or ‘out’.

Hence, the article maintains that there is a clear tradition of social democratic Euroscepticism within the Labour Party since 1945. Social democratic mean being associated with the more moderate wing of the Party in contrast to the more ‘fundamentalist’ or socialist left of the Party. Eurosceptic connotes being, initially, opposed to membership and then, once the United Kingdom became a member of the EEC, resistant to all subsequent attempts at further integration if not supportive of outright withdrawal such as in the 1975 referendum, the 1983 General Election when the Party pledged to withdraw from the EEC (a policy supported not just by advocates of the Alternative Economic Strategy of the Party’s left wing but also relative moderates) and during the Brexit referendum. Therefore, we make a distinction (adapting Bulpitt) between pro-Europeans, pragmatists and sceptics. The relative strength of these positions would vary depending on the political context. The personnel would also change with the passage of time. But, nevertheless, there is a consistent social democratic Eurosceptic tradition along the lines we have defined it here and will demonstrate throughout the article.

Sovereignty

Many of these internal Labour Party debates hinged on conceptions of sovereignty. For some, membership of the EEC was, in effect, the end of national sovereignty residing through the people in the Westminster Parliament. Peter Shore, who ‘was not a left-winger’ (George, 1998: 78) affirmed, ‘I did not come into socialist politics in this country to connive in the dismantling of the power of the British people as represented in their parliament and in their government’ (Labour Party, 1972: 205). For others, sovereignty would not be diminished and may even be enhanced by membership of the EEC. Mackintosh suggested in the debate on entry into the European Community in 1971 that ‘the decision to join with the other powers was not in fact a derogation or loss of sovereignty; it was in reality an increase in the effective power of this House’ (Mackintosh, 1971).

Michael Freeden (1996), in his analysis of political ideologies, argues that ideologies are particular configurations of concepts. These concepts range in importance from core, through adjacent to peripheral. When applying this model to European integration, the concept of sovereignty has been core to the debate, and therefore has been of central importance in the internal debates within the Labour Party. What makes these ideologies fluid is that the concepts are themselves contested. There is no right and wrong definition of concepts such as sovereignty since they are capable of different meanings. Hence, for the concept of sovereignty, rival conceptions are between sovereignty defined as an absolute or indivisible term which is either possessed or lost, and sovereignty understood as something which is divisible, that can be shared or pooled. To define the EEC as ‘taking away’ British sovereignty from the latter perspective is mistaken since sovereignty is in effect shared between the member states and the EEC. These diverging notions of sovereignty exist within the established parties and cut across the left–right ideological divide.

The debate over sovereignty divided the Labour Party from the outset, and this requires some further explanation since it goes to the heart of social democratic ideology. Orthodox Marxists have a very clear conceptualisation of the state. The state is effectively the ‘executive’ of the economically dominant class. In a capitalist society, the state is a ‘capitalist state’. Hence, writing in response to the German social democrats’ Gotha Programme of 1875, which committed them to the parliamentary system, Marx wrote that any attempt to implement socialism through established democratic means would be bound to fail (Marx, 1941). Even if victorious in a parliamentary election, social democrats would come up against the opposition of the capitalists and be unable to implement their programme. The only way to achieve communism was through a violent revolution which would destroy capitalism. However, social democrats lacked a theory of the state. Some saw the established state as the way in which to implement socialism and so a gradualist approach was required in which the social democratic party would eventually gain a parliamentary majority and implement at least some of its socialist programme. From the mid-20th century, this approach seemed justified by events (Williams, 1950). Labour had indeed formed a parliamentary majority and implemented its manifesto commitments including elements of public ownership and a welfare state. It was only later, with the difficulties encountered during the governments of the 1960s and 1970s that Labour began to doubt its ability to implement socialism through the central state and began looking for alternatives (Jones and Keating, 1985).

One of those alternatives was a more pluralist tradition which saw the state as one, but only one, way of implementing socialism. Indeed, for some, the primacy attached to the central state in the postwar era had been detrimental to the advance of socialism. Trade unions, other voluntary organisations and local government were among the range of alternative ways of implementing socialism. The pluralist tradition within the Party had been largely subsumed by Fabian statism after 1945 but resurfaced in the 1980s as Labour remained in opposition. The pluralist conception of social democracy had been present in the interwar years, notably the ‘guild socialist’ ideas of G.D.H. Cole but also, for a time, in the work of Harold Laski (Foote, 1997). Laski and Cole were – along with R.H. Tawney (who was himself influenced by Cole’s ideas for a period) – the leading intellectuals in the Labour movement in the interwar years. Labour had its origins in local politics and the trade unions and so these thinkers were building on those traditions. In the 1980s, writers such as Paul Hirst (1989) and David Marquand (1988) rediscovered this earlier pluralist approach to socialism. The Westminster Model of British politics had become discredited primarily through the actions of the Thatcher government, and unable to respond to a more pluralistic and diverse society and economy. Consequently, constitutional reform was necessary to avoid a repeat of the Thatcher experience, place limits on the actions of government and bring about a ‘new politics’. After the 2010 General Election defeat, there was a critique of the New Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown of being too statist and again stressing the need to rediscover the pluralist tradition (Glasman et al., 2011; Philpott, 2011).

Consequently, the Fabian statist tradition can be regarded as more of an elitist model of social democracy, seeing socialism as something that is best implemented by the imposition of socialism from above. The model best capturing this view is that of Joseph Schumpeter’s (1947) democratic elitism. Here the electorate’s only role is to make a choice between two rival political elites which then govern on behalf of the electorate. In contrast, pluralism demands an active citizenry, manifesting itself most strongly in constitutional reform. Throughout the postwar era, Labour governments sought to operate within the parameters of the Westminster model, including the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system. Although FPTP kept Labour out of power for long periods of time (notably 1951–1964), it did allow the prospect of large parliamentary majorities and through them the capacity to deliver socialism. Where constitutional reform was carried, it was usually perceived as ways to enable the more efficient implementation of socialism, for example, by reducing further the powers of the House of Lords (1949) or reducing the power of the Treasury (the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs in 1964). Even the growing interest in devolution to Scotland and Wales in the 1970s could be seen more as a way of defeating the electoral challenge of the nationalists than a new-found concern for the decentralisation of power. It was only with the election of the Labour government in 1997 that constitutional reform was given greater priority as economic and social reform was relegated in importance. However, the initial enthusiasm for constitutional reform dried up given Blair’s personal lack of interest after securing a three-figure majority. Hence, it is broadly true to state that throughout the postwar period (1945–1979), the Party was dominated by democratic elite theory, an approach to which Gaitskell personally, and the wider Revisionist movement he led, subscribed.

However, one policy area in which pluralist voices were more clearly heard was that of European integration. The issue of sovereignty was more divisive and therefore more difficult for Labour to deal with in a European context. For Revisionists, it was the essential task of the Labour Party to form a government in order to implement socialism. Sovereignty resided within the nation state. If socialism meant equality, as Gaitskell had stressed, then equality could only be realised through central government. However, membership of the EEC would erode that sovereignty. In contrast, pluralists believed that Labour should enter the EEC and in so doing, sovereignty would not be undermined but rather pooled.

Federalism

A second area of internal party dispute for Labour in the 1950s and early 1960s, just as in the Conservative Party was over the nature of European integration itself. Few in British politics have been outright exponents of federalism. Instead, pro-Europeans have tended to argue that the EEC/EU is better understood as intergovernmentalist in its nature since the major decisions are taken by the member states themselves. National interests are represented in the Council of Ministers and all major steps towards closer integration are taken at summits in which the major actors are nation states. Moreover, the existence of the veto meant that anything which the British government did not wish to see implemented could be blocked. Finally, after the two failed attempts at membership under Harold Macmillan and Harold Wilson, respectively, the pro-Europeans argued that the failure to commit to membership from the outset had disadvantaged the United Kingdom since decisions were being made without its involvement, which would affect the United Kingdom even if it did not join and which it would have to accept eventually since joining was inevitable. As Britain had fallen behind other countries within the European Community, the remedy would be through wholehearted commitment to the intergovernmentalist process. Fears articulated by the Eurosceptics were unfounded since the nation state remained the most important actor within the EEC.

However, the opponents of entry argued that this focus on intergovernmentalism was misplaced, and from the outset there was concern among Labour revisionists over federalism. Anthony Crosland wrote there was:

an almost unanimous view in this country that great sacrifices would be entailed by any large-scale surrender of sovereignty to a European political authority. No doubt if there were impressive countervailing advantages which the federalist could point to, the view would be different. But this is not the case. (Crosland, 1951: 143)

The real nature of the EEC was supranational and for the Labour supporting academic William Pickles, laissez-faire economics would be the method to achieve the federalist goal (Pickles, 1962: 6). According to Hugh Gaitskell, ‘we would be foolish to deny, not recognise and indeed sympathise with the desire of those who created the Economic Community for political federation’ (Labour Party, 1962: 11). The founding fathers of European integration believed in a functionalist approach to political unity – uniting specific areas of the economy and policy which would then ‘spill-over’ into other areas. Pragmatic cooperation would not be sufficient, cooperation was itself to foster ever closer union. Hence, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created, which they hoped would spill over into other areas of economic activity, leading in turn to monetary union and eventually political union. Moreover, the institutions of the EEC also had a supranational bias according to opponents of entry. The Commission would have a powerful role in proposing policies. The Court of Justice would interpret these laws in a way which encouraged further integration and the Parliament would sit according to ideological blocs rather than nation states. Hence, some in the Labour Party opposed even the ECSC and later opposed direct elections to the Parliament, while their concerns expressed over the role of the Commission were similar to those which Margaret Thatcher was later to articulate. For leading opponents of membership such as Peter Shore, the attempt to hide the reality of federalism from the British people was tantamount to a conspiracy: ‘I hope everyone will do their utmost to drive this home to all with whom they are associated: we are being lied to’ (Forsyth, 2001: 24).

Internationalism

A third broad area of dispute between Labour pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics was over internationalism. Socialism, those on both sides of the debate argued, was an internationalist creed. For pro-Europeans, it therefore made no sense from a socialist perspective to oppose membership of the EEC. The EEC was an international organisation and so it was therefore ‘socialist’ to be a member of this organisation alongside other international organisations such as NATO and the UN. Opposition to membership of the EEC, they argued, was pandering to nationalism:

The concept of socialism in incompatible with insularity. If we could only achieve our goals by cutting ourselves off from the world, there would be something wrong with the goals … an inward-looking re-orientation would encourage the conservative not the progressive forces in Britain. Those who are most suspicious of foreigners are most nervous of change. (Campaign, 1962)

Membership of the EEC would allow Britain to influence the future direction of the EEC, rather than be a political and economic ‘backwater’ without a world role. Roy Jenkins, who would become the leading arch-European in the Labour Party, affirmed that socialism could not be constructed in an autarchic framework and that European entry offered the best remedy against a drab decline away from the world’s mainstream (Hansard, 1961).

Certainly individuals such as Peter Shore and Douglas Jay, who opposed membership were deemed to do so because of their nationalism and xenophobia, and therefore viewed as ‘little Englanders’. King wrote that:

the fact is that, like many Conservative opponents of the Common Market, they could not bear the idea of foreigners making decisions affecting the lives of ordinary British citizens; they could not bear the fact that Britain no longer had a large role to pay in world affairs. (King, 1977: 38)

Yet the Eurosceptic social democrats argued that they had Britain’s full scale of international commitments in mind. Jay thought membership of the ‘six’ would signal a retreat from Britain’s global responsibilities, deeming:

there is no case for such a surrender to an organisation representing one corner of one continent, and offering no benefits in return. The suggestion that this country should be politically more closely united with Germany or Italy then New Zealand and Australia is both ridiculous and abhorrent to any sane man. (Jay and Jenkins, 1962: 1)

In particular, great stress was placed on the Commonwealth. Shortly before Gaitskell’s 1962 party conference speech, he met with Commonwealth leaders, many of whom were concerned about the effects of EEC protectionism on their countries (Camps, 1964). Although membership of the EEC gave countries access to the internal markets of the EEC without tariffs, there would be tariffs imposed on countries outside the EEC and this would be likely to include the Commonwealth countries. In 1983, right-wing Labour MP Austin Mitchell proclaimed, ‘the first commitment to true internationalism will be to withdraw from the selfish club of the Common Market to attach ourselves to the world. Membership has been a snare and a delusion’ (Mitchell, 1983: 122).

Political context

Many of the post–Second World War Labour ministers were hostile to calls for European integration, including Clement Attlee who dismissed European unity as a ‘time wasting detour’ on the road to world government (quoted in Harris, 1995: 315). In the 1960s, Attlee raised concerns about the impact of British membership for the Commonwealth, Labour’s economic policy and the diverse history and traditions found within the nations of Europe (Hansard, 1962; Hennessy, 2001: 173). Other leading figures on the social democratic wing expressed reservations: Herbert Morrison considered it a threat to British sovereignty or a time wasting talking shop (Donoughue and Jones, 1973: 482); Ernest Bevin told a young James Callaghan that ‘they don’t want us’ (Callaghan, 1987: 79); and Denis Healey wrote a piece in 1950, approved by Hugh Dalton, rejecting Robert Schuman’s plan for pooling coal and steel resources. For Healey and Dalton, ‘the Labour Party could never accept any commitments which limited its own, or other freedom to pursue democratic socialism, and to apply the controls necessary to achieve it’. (Healey, 1950). Hence, the early postwar attitude of Labour moderates was one of hostility rather than mere ambivalence towards the issue of European integration.

Gaitskell faced a political context of rival political parties being largely pro-European. Despite a debate about whether membership was compatible with the historic commitment to free trade (Douglas, 2009), the Liberal Party offered little criticism and most Conservatives were supportive of Harold Macmillan’s application. However, Labour was more divided and Gaitskell’s Deputy Leader, George Brown, supported membership, as did the increasingly high profile Harold Wilson. In contrast, Peter Shore, as Head of the Research Department, and Douglas Jay were opposed to membership. The ‘Gaitskellites’ were therefore divided and the CDS split 75:25 in favour of the Common Market (Campaign (1962) 18th July, cited in Haseler, 1969: 228–229). CDS wrote in October 1960, that ‘we are convinced Europeans, certain that Britain’s destinies are inextricably bound up with those of a resurgent and united Europe’ (CDS Manifesto, October 1960). In contrast, the wider Party was overwhelmingly sceptical, including the Shadow Cabinet which contained only a handful of pro-Europeans at this stage.

The Fabian Society had contributed to the debate on British entry by publishing two pamphlets – one strongly pro-membership by Evan Luard and one opposed to membership by William Pickles. For Luard (1961), the case for entry was overwhelming. The threats to national sovereignty and the future of the Commonwealth were greatly exaggerated, while there were clear economic benefits from membership. But ‘in the long run, to secure the true benefits of membership of the European club, she will have to pay the fees in full’ (Luard, 1961: 24). There was no viable half way house. In stark contrast, Pickles (1962) stressed that the matter was essentially political, not economic, and that membership would entail a loss of legal sovereignty. Moreover, the price of entry into the EEC would be severe for the Commonwealth. Overall, the economic case favoured staying out. Should the Conservative government take Britain into the EEC without consulting the people then a future Labour manifesto should pledge withdrawal, a decision made irrelevant by De Gaulle’s veto. For Pickles, ‘from Britain’s point of view, the EEC is the wrong body, doing the wrong job, in the wrong way’ (Pickles, 1962: 35). The alternative was staying out of the EEC and forging closer links with the Commonwealth, a more genuinely internationalist body since it was a mixed bloc, ‘bringing together black, white and brown, rich and poor, Asian, European and African, and influencing each other through overlapping memberships’ (Pickles, 1962: 33)

The Commonwealth continued to hold considerable sway over Labour and Conservative politicians well into the 1960s. Underpinning these more sceptical voices on European integration was a view that Britain was still a leading power and that British history was exceptional. Britain had stood alone in Europe in 1940 while America refused to enter the war and was to emerge from the Second World War triumphantly. Since then, the Commonwealth had developed from the Empire, and British politicians felt that they had to honour the national role at the head of the Commonwealth. It was illogical to grant independence to former colonies only for Britain to lose its freedom by joining the Common Market. Such attitudes continued to hold sway on the political class of the 1950s and into the 1960s.

Gaitskell’s speech

Gaitskell’s speech to the 1962 Labour Party conference was in many ways the high watermark of social democratic Euroscepticism. Gaitskell argued neither for isolationism or European integration but instead for closer ties with the Commonwealth:

For we are not just a part of Europe – at least not yet. We have a different history. We have ties and links which run across the whole world, and for me at least the Commonwealth, the modern Commonwealth, which owes its creation fundamentally to those vital historic decisions of the Labour Government, is something I want to cherish. (Labour Party, 1962: 12)

Moreover, the speech expanded on Gaitskell’s belief that the implementation of social democracy relied on the apparatus of the nation state. Much of Gaitskell’s speech was careful economic analysis, questioning whether Britain was forced to go into Europe; or if the domestic economy would necessarily be the stronger for it; and would the Commonwealth automatically gain as a result, the answer to which was ‘no’. Membership of the Common Market would not automatically bring economic efficiency and, in total, the economic arguments were evenly balanced.

However, Gaitskell’s comments on the constitutional, historical and political aspects of membership were distinct from the careful economic analysis, making it a political decision of fundamental principle. The idealism of a united Europe was to be admired but Europe’s past was chequered, containing figures such as Hitler and Mussolini, and Gaitskell was not prepared to forget the sacrifices made by New Zealand, Australian and Canadian forces at Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli. The idea of a Federal Europe would mean Britain becoming ‘no more than a state (as it were) in the United States of Europe, such as Texas and California … it does mean the end of Britain as an independent state’ (Labour Party, 1962: 11). Gaitskell continued, ‘it means the end of a thousand years of history … and it does mean the end of the Commonwealth’ (Labour Party, 1962: 12).

The Commonwealth was a central plank to Gaitskell’s opposition and was not to be undermined by joining the Community. While an association with Europe could be beneficial on the right terms and help spread British influence, this was not to be achieved by selling the ‘Commonwealth down the river’ (Labour Party, 1962: 13):

Where would our influence be in the world without the Commonwealth? It would be very much less. And I believe with all my heart that the existence of this remarkable multi-racial association, of independent nations, stretching across five continents, covering every race, is something that is potentially of immense value to the world. (Labour Party, 1962: 16)

Five conditions of entry had to be met: binding the safeguards for the Commonwealth, guarantees safeguarding the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries, freedom for Britain to conduct her own foreign policy, retention of Britain’s right to plan her own economy and guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture. Labour were not closing the door on entry as the conditions put forward were neither ‘impossible’ nor ‘unreasonable’ (Labour Party, 1962: 23). Yet, if they were not to be met, ‘we must stand firm by what we believe, for the sake of Britain, and the Commonwealth and the world; and we shall not flinch from our duty if that moment comes’ (Labour Party, 1962: 23).

Hence, Gaitskell’s speech highlighted an attachment to both the state and the nation. In order to bring about the desired goals of greater equality and social justice, there needed to be a sovereign state capable of implementing Keynesian economics within the nation state. But the emotional rhetoric of Gaitskell’s speech included an attachment to the British nation. The British had a noble historical tradition and sound constitutional arrangements that should be defended.

Legacy

It was to prove to be Gaitskell’s last conference speech. Within a few months he had died from an obscure virus. The ensuing leadership contest was ostensibly between two pro-Europeans. George Brown was explicit in his support for membership of the EEC, even at the 1962 conference following Gaitskell’s speech. Wilson’s position on Europe – as much else – was always difficult to be sure of, subordinated as most things were to keeping the Labour Party united. However, it would seem reasonable to conclude that he was always a pro-European. He had made statements sympathetic to European integration in the early 1960s, applied for membership during his premiership in the ‘alter that decade’ and, although opposing membership as being on the ‘wrong terms’ under Heath’s government, then presided over the ‘renegotiation’ which resulted in much the same terms which were then confirmed in the referendum in 1975 (Young, 2004). Although the referendum was associated with Tony Benn, clearly on the left of the Party by this stage, it was first proposed by Jay in 1970 (Meredith, 2013: 92). However, Wilson’s Cabinets remained divided. He established a European sub-committee of the Cabinet to consider membership in the 1960s. Its members were Brown, James Callaghan, Denis Healey, Douglas Jay, Fred Peart, Herbert Bowden and George Thompson. Of its members, only Brown was in favour. Healey, Peart and Jay were strongly against making an application for membership while the others were agnostic (Meredith, 2013: 78).

It would be a mistake to see this assessment as a final one since what Gaitskell’s speech did was to confirm the existence of a strongly Eurosceptic position in the Labour Party which included Attlee, Bevin, Morrison and Dalton prior to Gaitskell’s intervention and which created the legacy of a social democratic Eurosceptic tradition. At first, this sceptical approach towards European integration was strong within the Party. Although there were strongly pro-European voices in the 1960s – particularly once Brown was replaced as the senior pro-European by Jenkins, who became a figurehead around which the pro-EEC lobby within the Party identified – there were also strong voices against. Jay and Shore, already mentioned, were the strongest Eurosceptic voices and they were joined by the likes of Healey and Callaghan who held broadly Eurosceptic opinions prior to membership. Crosland also regarded the issue as unimportant and that membership should not be pursued if it would tear apart the Labour Party while doing nothing to achieve greater equality. His relationship with the pro-Europeans was strained and he believed that Jenkins in particular had come to dislike socialism (Meredith, 2013: 81). David Owen who had entered Parliament as a pro-European did not share the same enthusiasm for Europe as others that joined the SDP. As Foreign Secretary in the Callaghan government, he prided himself on causing difficulties for the Brussels bureaucrats and rooting out the ‘federalists’ at the Foreign Office (Owen, 1991: 248). In 2016, Owen vocally campaigned for Britain to withdraw.

Gaitskell’s speech also influenced the next generation of Labour’s social democratic Eurosceptics including Bryan Gould, Austin Mitchell and Gwyneth Dunwoody who would hold senior positions within the Shadow Cabinet and/or the National Executive Committee and in the left–right battles of the early 1980s. Mitchell supported the manifesto commitment to withdraw from the EEC: ‘Anglo-Gaullism should govern our approach to the EEC’ (Mitchell, 1983: 174). Gould, in particular, regarded the process of European integration as favouring the interests of capitalism. Speaking on the single market he said, ‘the advent of a single European market, based on the free movement of capital, goods and labour, and therefore hostile to intervention by government, has also contributed to the creation of a Europe fit for multinationals’ (Gould, 1989: 34–35). A novel contribution to social democratic Euroscepticism at this stage came from the academic and political activist Stephen Haseler who wanted to see a more populist form of social democracy against what he regarded as the elitism of the Jenkinsites. Such populism would include a patriotic rejection of European integration (Haseler, 1981).

In retreat: Social democratic Euroscepticism since the 1980s

By the late 1980s, Euroscepticism was deemed unpalatable within the Labour Party and was increasingly marginalised as the Party’s position shifted towards pro-Europeanism. The failure of the Alternative Economic Strategy and the ‘Mitterrand experiment’ in France encouraged Labour to ‘modernise’ under Neil Kinnock between 1983 and 1992 and duly the Party became more pro-European. The European Commission’s decision to add a social policy dimension similar to Labour’s domestic policy agenda appealed to Labour and the trade unions – especially after Jacques Delors had, in September 1988, advocated a ‘Social Chapter’ – in the face of the economic and social policies pursued by the Conservative government.

There were immediate political benefits to Labour’s shift in policy. Thatcher’s increasing hostility to the EEC, something which contributed to her removal from office in November 1990, and the deep divisions over European integration in the Conservative Party in the 1990s were in contrast to Labour’s largely united sympathetic approach towards the European project. Labour promised a constructive engagement with Europe rather than the ‘isolationism’ of the Conservatives. Moreover, the reality of membership made some moderate their initial opposition as the issue had become one of making pragmatic judgements on subsequent integrationist steps. For leading social democrats such as Jenkins, who was a passionate believer in integration, the issues were straightforward. Britain had to integrate and was playing ‘catch up’ after being slow to join.

Yet concerns over the loss of sovereignty due to integration and its impact on social democracy were for the former Labour Minister Eric Deakins side-lined. Deakins – who identified as neither on the left nor the right – considered Labour had ‘not yet come to terms with the problem of creeping federalism’. The Labour leadership had been ‘seduced by the idea of an EEC with a majority of left-wing governments [working] together to achieve faster economic growth, thereby substantially reducing unemployment’. Importantly, and echoing the concerns of Gaitskell, Deakins argued:

A gradual and continuous erosion of national sovereignty is a necessary corollary of EEC membership, but the Labour Party, especially Neil Kinnock and the Shadow Cabinet, is either unaware of or unconcerned about this … the British Parliament being reduced to the status of a regional or county council and so there would be no chance for a Labour government to carry out its major policies. In such circumstances, with no national control over vital policies, there would be little point in people voting Labour. (Deakins, 1988: 164–165)

Despite defections by Labour ‘moderates’ to the SDP in the early 1980s – many of whom left Labour due to its hostility to Europe – other prominent pro-Europeans remained such as Roy Hattersley, Jack Cunningham, Giles Radice and John Smith, who would assume the leadership in 1992. Moreover, Eurosceptics were side-lined; Bryan Gould, who had chaired the group dealing with economic policy for Labour’s policy review Meet the Challenge, Make the Change, was shuffled out of his job as trade and industry spokesman. He had opposed both membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and ‘moves towards a European monetary union’ as it would deprive a Labour government of crucial policy-making powers. Peter Shore complained at the 1996 Labour Party Conference that his viewpoint on the consequences of economic and political union that had once been deemed respectable was not given any time (Labour Party Conference, 1996).

Since the late 1980s, therefore, the Labour Party has been predominantly pro-European. The Labour Party had embraced the EU as an integral part of its governing ideology, accepting the principle that the nation state could no longer tackle significant issues independently in the face of a globalised economy. Instead, collective ends could be met through ‘pooling sovereignty’, cooperation, interdependence and co-ordinated policy making with like-minded European counterparts (Brown, 2016). The argument was a continuation of those articulated by pro-Europeans in the post–Second World War era, underpinned by a belief that ‘national sovereignty was of little use where political action can only be effective if taken as part of a wider collectivity than the nation state’ (Liddle, 2014: xiv). Withdrawal, it was argued, would result in economic decline, job losses and reduced world influence. Indeed, emphasising social aspects of EU membership has often occurred at the expense of the domestic achievements of Labour governments. For instance, Harriet Harman professed, ‘it’s the EU that made our governments pass laws to ensure employers give paid holiday, paid maternity leave, rights for part-timers. So long as we’re in the EU no Tory government can try and take those rights away’ (Harman, 2016). The first part of Harman’s statement is incorrect; Labour governments in fact introduced many of the measures to which Harman referred.

This is not to say that the Labour leadership has not disappointed its most pro-European supporters. Blair effectively gave the decision-making power of whether Britain entered the single currency to Gordon Brown by declaring it an economic matter. Brown developed ‘five tests’ which had to be met in order for Britain to enter and eventually ruled that the tests had not been met. No doubt a restraining factor on Blair’s pro-Europeanism was also his desire to maintain the support of the Murdoch press. His wish to maintain a very close relationship with the United States after the election of George W. Bush and the 9/11 terrorist attacks also meant that he supported the Iraq War against the wishes of majority opinion with the EU. However, the Labour government was not reverting to Euroscepticism. Instead, its attitude is best seen as ambivalence consistent with the Party’s pragmatist position. Regardless, many Party activists and commentators by the time of the 2016 referendum believed that it had always been the position of the Labour Party to be pro-European, perhaps with the exception of the early 1980s. Such a view was reinforced by the majority of the British labour movement campaigning for a Remain vote in the referendum.

Nevertheless, not all those in the Parliamentary Labour Party would share the same zeal for European integration. Austin Mitchell reflected that Kinnock, Smith, Blair and Mandelson had become ‘infected with “Europeanism”, then turning into a substitute for socialism’ (Mitchell, 2004: 265). Kate Hoey, the Labour MP for Vauxhall disliked the manner in which her colleagues – including some sceptics – responded to the signing of the Social Chapter. For Hoey, ‘if these things are so important, and we’re in power, why don’t we do it? We didn’t want to as we wanted to hide behind this cloak’ (Hoey, 2011). The former Labour MP for Birmingham Edgbaston, Gisela Stuart’s political journey from pro-European German-born British citizen, to Chair of the Vote Leave campaign is an interesting story. Her experience of working in the EU as one of the House of Commons representatives on the European Convention and a member of the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe in the early 2000s made her sceptical of European unity. Stuart argued that the EU must become more responsive to the needs of its member states and citizens. Moreover, ‘many in Labour are too reluctant to oppose some of the nonsense … Those in favour argue that European integration is good without being specific’ (Stuart, 2003: 10). At the launch of Vote Leave, Stuart explained how those experiences of working in the EU influenced her belief that Britain and the Labour Party were better off outside of the EU:

we can return real democratic control to important areas of national life; from international trade, the right to work and live in Britain, to business regulation … We are an outward-looking country – one that looks not just to Europe but to the wider world too. (Stuart, 2016)

Moreover, backbench MP Graham Stringer invoked the earlier language of the absolute conception of sovereignty saying, ‘if you don’t have sovereignty you don’t have security’ and that the need to gain the consent of less-developed democracies in Eastern Europe for laws affecting the United Kingdom was an ‘insult to British parliamentary democracy’ (Stringer, 2016). Other prominent advocates of Leave included Frank Field and John Mann, both on the Right of the Party.

In addition to the Eurosceptic’s concern with sovereignty, there was also an economic case put forward by organisations such as Labour Leave. This economic argument centred on the continuing viability of Keynesian economics and the limits which membership of the EU placed on national economic policy including rules on competition which restricted the ability of a future Labour government to nationalise industries or to develop regional and industrial policies (Mitchell, 2017). There was also a belief that a post-Brexit Britain would have greater autonomy to develop more favourable trading arrangements with other countries once outside the Customs Union. Labour Eurosceptics have expressed their concern that the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn has backtracked on previous commitments to withdraw from the Single Market and the Customs Union. Corbyn himself has appeared ambiguous on the issue. He was closely associated with the Alternative Economic Strategy and the Labour Left’s Eurosceptic position more generally. However, many of his MPs, as well as prominent Peers such as Lord Mandelson and Lord Adonis and former luminaries such as Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell, have been vocal in their opposition to the views of the Eurosceptics. Moreover, there persists a strongly pragmatic position within the Labour Party, neither strongly Leave nor Remain. Just as the Conservative Party contained ‘reluctant remainers’ so too did Labour.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has demonstrated that there is a tradition of Euroscepticism on the moderate, or social democratic, wing of the Labour Party since 1945. At first, those who held to this social democratic Euroscpetic position rejected calls for closer European integration after the Second World War, instead placing more emphasis on the links with America in the context of the Cold War and also of the Commonwealth. Postwar Labour figures such as Attlee, Bevin, Dalton and Gaitskell held to this social democratic Eurosceptic view; indeed the latter’s final party conference speech in 1962 was the high watermark of that tradition. The tradition was maintained, however, including the likes of Jay and Shore in opposing membership in the 1970s, and then those who opposed subsequent closer integration and finally by those who campaigned for Leave in the 2016 referendum.

That tradition can be identified by a commitment to an indivisible notion of sovereignty, a model of political economy predicated on national autonomy and a belief in an internationalism which transcends Europeanism. Its relative strength depends on the ability of those who hold to this view to articulate it effectively, the relative balance of forces within the Parliamentary Labour Party and the evolving domestic and international political contexts. It certainly waned from the late 1980s with the emergence of Conservative Euroscepticism but was never completely eclipsed as even the Blair and Brown governments compromised its pro-Europeanism and then re-emerged in the referendum in 2016.

Although the Conservatives were divided during the referendum – and the Brexit negotiations have the potential to reopen the internal Tory divisions over Europe depending on what the final terms of leaving the EU are – it has so far been the Labour Party which has most struggled to come to terms with Brexit. The electorate – including a significant minority of Labour voters – in voting to leave the EU has severely challenged the accepted wisdom in the Labour Party regarding the benefits of pooling sovereignty, internationalism through the EU and intergovernmentalism. Consequently, such positions have become harder to justify and therefore crucial principles of Labour’s social democracy require reassessment. The new political reality will heighten the debate within British politics and the Labour Party around ideas of the nation state and sovereignty, and looking beyond the EU as Britain assumes a global role through free-trade agreements and new alliances with emerging economies. To create an electorally attractive policy agenda, the Labour Party could do well to rediscover the thoughts of the Eurosceptic social democrats who stressed the importance in domestic policy of sovereignty and the nation state, and internationally, a global outward-looking Britain. Labour could do worse than rediscovering its Eurosceptic social democratic tradition.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jasper Miles

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