Abstract
2019 marks an especially important year for British-Czech bilateral relations. As a year of both centenary celebrations of opening of the British Embassy in Prague and Brexit, it makes for a fascinating paradox: a symbol of a century-long continuity on one hand and a year of serious disruption on the other hand. Against this background, the overarching aim of this article is to investigate Brexit implications for British-Czech bilateral relations, placing this assessment in the context of the long-term evolution of these relations and relating it to debates within the scholarship on the effects of Brexit. At the same time, it addresses some of the wider political questions that will determine the nature of Brexit’s supposed effects on the future direction of individual bilateral relations between the UK and EU27 member states.
Introduction
2019 marks an especially important year for British-Czech bilateral relations, from at least two perspectives. First, it is a year of centenary celebrations of the opening of the British Embassy in Prague (promoted by the #STOLET hashtag): it was back in 1919, in the very aftermath of the First World War, that the United Kingdom opened its embassy in then newly born Czechoslovakia. Second, 2019 is ‘a year of Brexit’ – that is, the year in which the United Kingdom is expected to leave the European Union (EU). As the literature-based expectations go, the outcome of the British in/out referendum is supposed to have a profound impact on individual bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and EU27, including the Czech Republic. Because of Brexit, the mutual relationship is facing moments of profound political change and will find itself forced to adapt to the new circumstances. The United Kingdom’s departure is ‘by definition a matter of breaking things’ and British-Czech relations will surely not be left undisturbed by the separation (cf. Drake, 2018: 97). 2019 therefore makes for a fascinating paradox: a symbol of a century-long continuity on one hand and a year of serious disruption on the other hand.
With the looming reality of Brexit drawing closer, the overarching aim of this article is to investigate its implications for British-Czech bilateral relations, placing this assessment in the context of the long-term evolution of these relations and relating it to debates within the scholarship on the effects of Brexit. At the same time, it will address some of the wider political questions that will determine the nature of Brexit’s supposed effects on the future direction of individual bilateral relations between the UK and EU27 member states.
To this end, the article sets out to answer two research questions: (1) What is the nature of British-Czech bilateral relations? (2) What are the repercussions and implications of Brexit for British-Czech bilateral relations? The author aligns herself with the view of Martill and Sus (2018: 2) but also others (Fierke and Jorgensen, 2015; Griffiths, 2007) that ‘(a)pplying a question-driven approach, rather than focusing on specific theoretical frameworks or methodologies, allows us to benefit from a greater plurality of existing scholarly approaches and to consider a greater variety of competing – and complementary – processes at work’.
Yet essentially, the paper is a qualitatively based single-case study, with this method chosen for its ability to help gain in-depth insights, thereby allowing for a careful, information-intensive examination of a given phenomenon as well as for a focus on unique details and context (Gerring, 2011; Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2014). Leaving the symbolic importance of the centennial aside (which in itself is worthy of detailed reflexion), there are several reasons why the author limits her analysis to just one case and why she chooses the Czech Republic as a typical (representative) case to study Brexit implications for bilateral relations between Britain and other EU member states (bar the UK’s key strategic partners such as Germany, France or Poland). Crucially, among the key European bilateral relations, British-Czech relations are rarely given pride of place. In fact, the British-Czech bilateral relationship does not stand out in any way, shape or form. The bilateral cooperation between the two entities is not a top priority for either side. They are, to borrow from Paterson (2018: 88), neither’s ‘singular other’. The relations lack the centrality of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the United States or the Czech Republic’s with Germany. The relationship is also devoid of the great historical symbolism and high-level institutionalisation that characterise the London-Paris axis or the Czech-German and Czech-Slovak relationship. Instead, the Czech Republic represents an example of a middle-sized, middle-level EU member state whose relations with the United Kingdom are characterised by generally successful, but rather quiet, pragmatic cooperation on a range of policy issues and good but not outstanding trade relations – as is the case of the majority of such EU member states. Moreover, the country’s economic exposure to Brexit consequences is neither exceptionally high nor low (Chen et al., 2018; Department of Finance, 2018; Irwin, 2015) and nor is the size of the Czech diaspora living in the United Kingdom, or the number of British nationals in the Czech Republic. Neither did the Czech Republic come up with any country-specific, distinct priorities vis-à-vis Brexit or the future UK-EU relations, as did, for instance, Spain or Ireland, and which would have impacted heavily upon its policy-making towards the United Kingdom. Findings drawn from the Czech case might thus serve as a suitable illustration of Brexit implications for the United Kingdom’s bilateral relations with this type of EU countries.
The article unfolds in the following manner. The first part offers a state-of-the-art overview of the research on British-Czechoslovak/Czech relations and the implications of Brexit thereupon as well as information on the data used for this study. Without pretending to be exhaustive, the next section reflects upon the nature of British-Czech relations, taking into account their historical context as well as the political, economic, security and other dimensions. Owing to space constraints, the coverage of many issues within the historical overview is necessarily brief and incomplete, with the chapter not intended to be an exhaustive account of mutual relations. Nonetheless, it serves as a useful point of departure for building up the background for the third part of the paper which explores Brexit implications for the bilateral relations, looking inter alia at the strength of (dis)incentives for enhanced post-Brexit collaboration on both sides as well as the political feasibility of such a partnership. Finally, drawing on this analysis, the last section provides some concluding remarks.
Literature review and data
Even though the relevance of bilateralism has been questioned in today’s complex, multi-layered policy environment, it remains ‘the dominant practice in international relations’ (Renard, 2015: 22) and ‘a key, yet changing, feature of what might be viewed as a “post-modern” (or perhaps “post-Westphalian”) foreign policy’ (Bátora and Hocking, 2002: 3; for more on this see, for instance, Barston, 2013; Berridge, 2015; Melissen, 2005). The EU provides an especially intriguing laboratory to study bilateral relations in that it ‘both embraces bilateralism as part of its densely-textured pattern of multilateral interactions whilst at the same time providing both a new context for and alternatives to traditional bilateral diplomacy’ (Keukeleire, 2003; for bilateral diplomacy specifically within the EU context see, for instance, Bátora and Hocking, 2002; Hill and Wallace, 1996; Hocking et al., 2012; Smith and Tsatsas, 2002). Yet the fact that relations between individual EU member states ‘remain an underexplored yet crucial area’ represents ‘a major shortcoming of EU studies, resulting from a bias towards the EU-level of European politics’ (Sattich and Inderberg, 2018: 1).
In line with this, there is rather limited literature on the British-Czechoslovak/Czech bilateral relations and their long and rich past, let alone the effects of Brexit thereupon. The issue of British-Czech relations has been regularly addressed in the Czech Foreign Policy series published annually since 2007 by the Institute of International Relations in Prague (usually in Czech; the bilingual version is available only for some editions). 1 Adding to this are historical accounts of selected parts of the British-Czechoslovak relationship, usually in the 1930s–1940s (Dejmek, 2003; Kuklík, 1998, 2007; Kuklík and Němeček, 2010; Novotný, 2016; Pajer, 2016; Polišenský, 1968; Rajlich, 2004; Smetana, 2008 among others).
Moving to the effect of Brexit on the mutual relations, apart from the brief reflection thereupon in the latest volume of the aforementioned series (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018), there is virtually zero coverage of the topic, either in English or in Czech. This pattern of neglect is deeply reflective of the lack of basically any general debate on the issue. There is – somewhat understandably – no such a discussion going on in the United Kingdom but also in the case of the Czech Republic, hardly any attention in the public debate has been paid to the post-Brexit bilateral diplomatic coordination with the United Kingdom as such. The first sign of change came in February 2019, when the National Convention on the European Union, launched by the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, initiated a tendering procedure for organisation of an expert roundtable on ‘Setting up the future relationship with the United Kingdom after Brexit’. The roundtable will take place during the first half of 2019 and is about to generate some debate which is, however, likely to remain élite-driven and confined to expert and political circles.
At the same time, and despite the relatively rich literature on the consequences of Brexit in general, there has been comparatively little academic analysis on its implications for individual bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and the EU27. 2 This is rather surprising, because the issue is a compelling focus for scholarly attention. Indeed, the author agrees with Hill (2017) that ‘(o)ne of the many imponderables in the post-Brexit world is the way in which Britain’s key bilateral relationships with its [. . .] European partners is likely to change’. The exceptions have been restricted to bilateral relationships with Ireland (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017; O’Brennan, 2019; Wright, 2018) and the United Kingdom’s erstwhile European partners, such as France (Drake, 2018; Pannier, 2016) or Germany (Ischebeck-Baum, 2017; Paterson, 2018; Saxi, 2019), concentrating mostly on the security and defence context. Aside from the academic literature, a limited number of (rather shorter) blogposts and papers have been produced on the subject, too (see, for instance, Hill, 2017; Park, 2017; or Tombs, 2018 as examples on France).
The data used for the analysis come from a number of different sources, with purposive sampling as a key data selection technique. As defined by Elo et al. (2014), purposive sampling is ‘suitable for qualitative studies where the researcher is interested in informants who have the best knowledge concerning the research topic’. Put another way, the author chooses the data that were expected to be valuable sources on various aspects of British-Czech relations.
More specifically, the article is based in part on an extensive analysis of primary materials, including governmental/ministerial public pronouncements, speeches, interviews, official documents, and press releases. The study draws additionally on information arising from semi-structured elite interviews, email communication and numerous off-the-record meetings with diplomatic sources, senior civil servants and other officials from the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom alike, many of whom have been direct participants in or witnesses to EU renegotiations, withdrawal negotiations and/or their preparations. While the Czech side included four ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Trade and Industry), the Office of the Government, the Czech Embassy in the United Kingdom, Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union and Members of the European Parliament, the British interviewees come from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for Exiting the European Union, the British Embassy in the Czech Republic and the European Parliament. These interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis between September 2017 and November 2018. Even though the assurance that the interviewees’ comments would not be directly attributed has helped gather interesting and original data, it makes using direct quotes while preserving anonymity a challenge. Naturally, also a host of secondary sources that add an extra layer of opinion and interpretation to the information found in primary sources have been used.
Nature of British-Czech bilateral relations
Generally speaking, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic have long maintained a fundamentally sound and stable relationship that runs wide, rather than deep, across many areas of activity and is broadly devoid of any greater politicisation or polarisation (cf. Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 113). With its central dynamic having remained remarkably consistent all along, the relationship has traditionally seen little tension or outright discord. Instead, the trend of mutual interactions is one of generally successful, but quiet and sparsely publicised, ‘practical, pragmatic (rather than strategic), depoliticised, and decentralised bilateral cooperation in various areas of mutual interest and at multiple levels of governance’ (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 104).
At the same time, British-Czech relations have always been intrinsically asymmetrical, with the United Kingdom being the larger and strategically, politically and economically much more powerful partner out of the two. To be sure, the countries’ diplomatic networks and military and other capabilities are far from being of a similar size. One interviewee even suggested that the Czech side sometimes feels a bit neglected by its British counterpart, sensing that the United Kingdom devotes a disproportionately high level of resources into bilateral diplomacy with countries such as France, Germany or Poland. Accordingly, it has become established in the culture of the mutual relationship that it is the Czech governing elites that have traditionally put much greater rhetorical emphasis on the importance of mutual ties. Adding to this has been a discernible affection (a warmth even) for the British people in the Czech Republic and a certain abiding fascination with many things British.
In order to understand the nature of British-Czech bilateral relations, it is helpful to assess three distinct phases of their development: (1) the period until the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU in 2004; (2) the period between 2004 and the 2016 British in/out referendum; and (3) the period since the 2016 referendum until now.
Bilateral relations until 2004: Rich heritage
As this year’s centennial reminds us, the mutual relations draw on the rich heritage, based in part on historical experience. To give just a few salient examples, the United Kingdom became one of the centres of Czechoslovak resistance during the First World War and played an invaluable role in the very foundation of Czechoslovakia, helping form a new and independent state in 1918. The countries were allies and trading partners in the interwar period, too. During the Second World War, elite Czechoslovakian pilots joined the forces of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and gained distinction during the Battle of Britain for their bravery and skills. The service of Czechoslovak pilots in the British aerial warfare force is, indeed, a famous chapter in Czechoslovakian military history (Pajer, 2016; Rajlich, 2004). London also served as a centre of the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, headed by Edvard Beneš, the former Prime Minister and the then-president of Czechoslovakia since 1935, in the 1940–1945 period (Kuklík, 1998). There was, however, a darker side to this affinity, revolving around memories of the ‘1938 Munich agreement betrayal’ and British guilt about appeasement (for more on this, see Dejmek, 2003; Smetana, 2008).
After the Second World War, mutual relations were heavily influenced by the Cold-War logic, with both countries being on the opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. 3 In that sense, 1989 Velvet Revolution is considered a key turning point in mutual relations. Following the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia and formation of the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993, diplomatic relations between the countries were immediately established. In the 1990s, the United Kingdom championed Czech accession to the EU (as part of its long-standing aim to widen EU membership), being one of only three countries, alongside with Ireland and Sweden, that opened up its labour markets to all new member states immediately in 2004. What is also important to note is that the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), a key political party and the traditional bearer of soft Euroscepticism in the country, was modelled on the British Conservative Party (Hanley, 2008), with whom it later, in 2009, formed the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament.
Bilateral relations in 2004–2016: Metamorphosis in the EU context
Since the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU in 2004, a crucial context for British-Czech relations has been provided by the EU, with the Czech Republic having long regarded the United Kingdom as its important (both strategically and ideologically) like-minded partner within the European power game. Indeed, there are close and often explicit linkages between the Czech and British approach to the EU, with both countries having shared a similar outlook on a range of EU policy areas, including deepening of the single market, further liberalisation of global trade, attitudes towards the Eurozone (of which they are both non-members), nuclear power, the EU Emissions Trading System, coupled with a preference for a strong transatlantic link in the EU’s foreign and security policy 4 and the emphasis on avoidance of any duplication of NATO’s role by the EU (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2017; Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 110). For its part, the Czech Republic has also valued the United Kingdom’s emphasis on pragmatic EU decision-making and seems to have an understanding for the politics of ‘minimalist engagement’ traditionally promoted by British governments. Like the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic has also typically approached the European integration pragmatically, accentuating the importance of tangible benefits and sharing similar ‘anti-federalist’ leanings. In this sense, as an EU’s awkward but acknowledged and respected member state, the United Kingdom provided, not infrequently, a convenient shield for the Czech Republic in voicing its Eurosceptic viewpoints (Szent-Iványi et al., 2018: 14–15).
Joint membership of the EU has opened up a new complex system of multi-level governance in which both countries began to interact with each other in multiple forums and in multiple ways (cf. Hix, 2011; Kohler-Koch, 2003; Nugent, 2017). Czech and British civil servants got to know each other both within the formal institutional framework as well as in the numerous informal spaces offered by Brussels. As a result, a thick network of bilateral contacts, exchanges and consultations on a day-to-day basis has developed between the two, anchored – rather conveniently and somewhat automatically – within the EU institutional and policy-making setting. This network goes beyond equivalent bilateral meetings between an EU member state and a third country both in its breadth and depth. The interviewees reiterated this point by saying that ‘it is extremely easy to get to the British now’ and ‘we are in contact with our British colleagues almost every single day’. In practical terms, the Czech Republic has gradually become increasingly more reliant on the British expertise and capabilities in various fields (be it in the area of environmental protection, security, science or research). As a Czech Ministry of Environment official prosaically put it, ‘Whenever we are unsure of something . . . whenever we need some advice, we always approach our British colleagues first’. From the Czech perspective, the British are ‘reliable partners’ and ‘the cleverest ones’. By contrast, however, there seems to be no reciprocal engagement in a sense that the British would, too, draw on the Czech expertise.
This fits with Ricketts’ (2018: 1) observation that the EU membership ‘involves continuous coordination on a vast range of issues, and creates the habit of thinking and working together’. Bátora (2005: 53–54) adds some further insight on the European integration leading to a metamorphosis at the level of bilateral diplomatic relations within the EU which involves ‘new notions of what is legitimate conduct, additions to the existing repertoire of diplomatic language, shifts in professional values, norms and principles, which would in turn entail changes in diplomatic socialization in member states’ foreign services’ (similarly also Bátora and Hocking, 2007).
Further afield, both countries have long promoted mutual ties in the security and defence arena, with the mutual collaboration strongly embedded within the wider multilateral framework of NATO and EU membership. Most importantly, it is the British Military Advisory and Training Team for Central and Eastern Europe programme, established in 2000 and commonly viewed as ‘the crown jewel of bilateral cooperation’, that constitutes the main pillar of mutual cooperation in this respect (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 111; Kasáková, 2016: 240). Regarding police cooperation, the United Kingdom ranks as one of the EU countries with a relatively high record of suspects extradited to the Czech Republic via the European Arrest Warrant (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 111).
Moreover, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom, both of them open economies, enjoy close (albeit distinctly asymmetric) economic and trade relationships. The United Kingdom has long been listed as the Czech Republic’s fourth largest export partner, surpassed only by Germany, Slovakia and Poland, and the second largest when re-exports are included. The trade turnover between the two countries has more than tripled since 2000 (Czech Statistical Office, 2018). For some sectors, such as automotive and electronic equipment, the United Kingdom (which ranks among the top 10 foreign investors in the country, too) is a crucial market (Czech Statistical Office, 2018). As illuminated in Table 1, the Czech Republic runs a large trade surplus with the United Kingdom (cf. Brusenbauch Meislová, 2017). By way of comparison, however, the Czech Republic is only the United Kingdom’s 18th largest import partner and 39th largest export market (Czech Statistical Office, 2018).
Czech–UK mutual trade (combined figures, in billion CZK) 2013–2017.
Source: Compiled by author, based on Czech Statistical Office, 2018.
It is also worth making the point that the partnership runs smoothly in the areas of science, research and education, with the United Kingdom long featuring as one of the most popular Erasmus+ destinations for Czech students and teachers alike. Last but not least, also personal-level ties remain quite strong, with a sizable (from the Czech perspective) Czech community living in the United Kingdom. As for the size of expat populations, the precise figure of Czech nationals resident in the United Kingdom is unclear, but the estimates range from 40,000 (MI, 2019) and 50,000 (Gov CZ, 2018b) to almost 100,000 (MFA, 2018b). Simultaneously, the country hosts only relatively few British citizens, with the estimates putting the number at 8,000 (GOV CZ, 2019).
Bilateral relations since 2016: In the name of Brexit
With the view of the above, it comes as little surprise that the Czech Republic strongly supported keeping the United Kingdom inside the EU. There was, overall, a shared opinion among Czech political leaders that a Brexit would harm both European and Czech interests. On the other hand, during David Cameron’s EU renegotiations, the Czech Republic aligned strongly with other Visegrad Group countries’ position of fierce opposition to Cameron’s proposals to put limits on EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019; Kaniok, 2017: 42; Kasáková, 2016: 238). As such, the Visegrad Group countries were portrayed as ‘a major obstacle to the British EU reform proposals’ (Pacher, 2016) and the ‘major stumbling block that thwarted David Cameron’s attempts’ (Foy and Byrne, 2016). 5 At the same time, however, the Czech Republic welcomed Cameron’s aim of safeguarding interests of countries outside the Eurozone and was very pleased that he won guarantees of non-Eurozone members not being required to fund euro bailouts. In the eyes of the British, the country’s stance inevitably came across as ‘egoistic’ and ‘self-absorbed’, to phrase it in the words of one interviewee.
As the expectation and hope were that the United Kingdom would remain a member state, the result of the close-run referendum was met with dismay, disappointment and bewilderment in the Czech Republic. Indeed, although the possibility of a Remain loss was theoretically acknowledged prior to the vote, it came as a surprise (or a shock, even) when it actually materialised. Accordingly, the prevailing tone surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU has been therefore one of ‘disappointment’ (GOV CZ, 2016b) and ‘regret’ (GOV CZ, 2016c). These sentiments of sadness were strongest right after the referendum, in summer 2016, but have been echoed on a regular basis ever since.
During the Article 50 negotiations, the Czech official position over Brexit has largely converged with that of EU institutions, both in terms of substance and procedural preferences, with the government speaking highly of the EU’s unified front on Brexit. Yet its compliance with the EU position has not been absolute. Taking stock of the existing evidence, there are at least three examples of the contrary. In the first one, dating back to January 2017, a leading member of the Czech government – interior minister Milan Chovanec – criticised the EU27 on its handling of the negotiations and called for the Czech Republic to unilaterally launch talks with the United Kingdom, instead of waiting for an EU-UK deal (ČT24, 2017a). The second example concerns the Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, memorably telling a BBC interviewer in September 2018 that he would like to see the United Kingdom hold a second referendum on EU membership, as it would ‘solve the problem quite quickly’ (BBC Four, 2018). The third defection from the EU27’s common position pertains to the Visegrad Group’s announcement at the 2016 Bratislava summit that the group was prepared to effectively veto any Brexit accord between the United Kingdom and the EU that would restrict their citizens’ rights to live and work in the United Kingdom (BBC, 2016). Last but not least, also the Lex Brexit described below can be read as a certain aberration from the EU’s united front.
Relatedly, in interviews and other primary sources, one can trace a certain degree of sympathy with the United Kingdom and its interests (similarly, also Fella et al., 2018: 44), typified by Prime Minister Babiš’s statement of September 2018 that he felt ‘sorry’ for the United Kingdom (BBC Four, 2018) or Minister of Foreign Affairs Zaorálek’s statement that ‘the British discontent with the EU can be understood’ (MFA, 2016). From the Czech point of view (and especially during the first weeks after the referendum), it was the United Kingdom (rather than the EU) facing ‘the difficult task of initiating the withdrawal process’ and awaiting ‘great worries’ (GOV CZ, 2016a). One might read these statements as further evidence of the Czech Republic’s close links with the United Kingdom and their somewhat reflexive emotional and sentimental underpinning.
No less importantly, towards the end of 2018, the Czech government put an increased emphasis on the legal status of the estimated 8,000 UK nationals living in the Czech Republic, promising to declare – in the case of a no-deal scenario – a transitional period for UK expatriates until the end of 2020, which would, within specified areas, guarantee British citizens ‘the same treatment as if they were citizens of the European Union’ (GOV CZ, 2019). In January 2019, the Czech government did pass this so-called Lex Brexit, which is considered ‘the most generous of proposals made so far by any member state for Britons settled in the EU’ (O’Carroll, 2019). In fairness, though, it should be added that the Czech government clearly communicated the message that it was ‘counting on there being a reciprocal move’ (GOV CZ, 2019).
Brexit and its impact on British-Czech bilateral relations
Since, inevitably, the issue of Brexit implications for bilateral relations still remains shrouded in mist, it might be helpful to look at three distinct but intimately related elements of the question: (1) Are there any aspects of British-Czech relations in which the impact of the referendum (or the prospect of a Brexit) is already visible? (2) What are the main expectations and/or concerns regarding the Brexit impact on mutual relations? (3) Have some steps been taken already in order to prepare for these anticipated Brexit implications?
Stocktaking of the Brexit effect so far
There are three aspects of British-Czech bilateral relations in which the impact of the referendum (or the prospect of a Brexit) seems already visible. First, owing to Brexit, the importance of bilateral British-Czech ties has been reiterated more often than ever before, with both sides invariably keen to praise them. Accordingly, the commonalities and traditions underpinning them were vigorously highlighted (both countries as ‘friends and allies for generations’ and the ‘deeply rooted’ history named among the relationship’s foundations) (GOV CZ, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b; MFA, 2017a: 142, 2017b). 6 Likewise, since the referendum, the Czech Republic has heard more often than ever before about the ties of friendship and valuable partnership and that it mattered ‘greatly’ to the United Kingdom (GOV CZ, 2018a; GOV UK, 2018a), almost as if the British representatives were all reading from a single script. Although some in the Czech Republic have been flattered by this lofty rhetoric, interpreting this as proof of the growing strategic importance of the mutual relationship, the reality has much more to do with the British need to secure support of EU27 for a favourable deal and the resultant lobbying of individual governments as potential allies in Brexit negotiations (cf. Barigazzi, 2018 or Boffey, 2017; for more on this, see further below). The fact remains, though, that with the Czech Republic as a part of the much stronger side of the bargaining table, Brexit has helped dilute the acute historical asymmetry of power which had long been a key defining feature of mutual relations.
Second, from the in/out referendum through to the present day, the British-Czech bilateral relationship has been substantially influenced, if not overshadowed, by the withdrawal process. Even though cooperation at the working level has been largely unaffected, Brexit has become ‘an omnipresent issue of virtually every bilateral meeting and/or interaction’ (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 104). As one Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs official succinctly observed, the bilateral dimension currently: comprises as little as one per cent of Czech-UK interactions. While the exact percentage is irrelevant here – leaving aside the fact that it might be impossible to gauge with any precision – it serves well to illustrate that the bilateral agenda is perceived as heavily side lined by and inextricably linked to Brexit (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 104–105).
Into this mix enters the Brexit-imposed high degree of uncertainty, unpredictability and anxiety, which has also made, to an extent, the conduct of bilateral relationship more difficult than usual (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 105).
Third, the relationship seems inevitably affected by the ‘arm-wrestling’ over the terms of the United Kingdom’s disengagement between the United Kingdom and EU27. Off-the-record interviews indicate a certain source of bewilderment among the Czech political elite at the United Kingdom’s indecision and slowness to formulate a coherent approach to the negotiations. This relates to the fact that many in the Czech Republic have been frustrated, exhausted and even exasperated by the slow pace of the withdrawal process as such, preferring instead to focus on more pressing matters such as migration, budget negotiations, Macron’s reform agenda or resurgent Russia. In addition, in the immediate aftermath of the British referendum some Czechs became a target of British anti-migrant sentiment. It was especially the death of a Czech citizen, Zdeněk Makar, and the 2017 not-guilty verdict of the Old Bailey court which acquitted a Briton, Raymond Sculley, over his murder that raised substantial emotions in the Czech Republic (with several thousand people having signed a petition calling for justice for Makar) and caused much diplomatic activity at the highest political levels (with Prime Minister Sobotka holding a phone talk with British Prime Minister Theresa May or the Czech MFA handing over a diplomatic note about the issue to the United Kingdom) (ČT24, 2017b, 2018). Furthermore, as illustrated by public opinion polls, even though the Czech public generally holds the British in high regard and despite various pronouncements by British officials designed to negate the negative perceptions of Brexit (and by extension the United Kingdom as such), the country has recently suffered a slight drop in approval ratings among the Czechs, with this popularity decline widely attributed to Brexit (CVVM, 2017, 2019).
Reflecting upon the future: Expectations and concerns
As to the kind of bilateral relationship that the countries have signalled that they would seek with each other post-Brexit, both have reaffirmed their unwavering commitments to retain good, above-standard bilateral relations, expressing a hope that Brexit will disrupt the relations as little as possible (see, for instance, GOV CZ, 2018a, 2018b; MF, 2018; MFA, 2017c; MFA, 2018a on this). Yet neither side has spelled out what these lofty visions should and/or would entail in conceptual or practical terms.
From the Czech perspective, Brexit is ‘hugely consequential’, presenting ‘a challenge’ and a ‘turning point’ for the mutual relations with the United Kingdom. What emerges clearly from the interviews with the Czech representatives is a worry that, due the loss of a direct dialogue between the countries, previously supported by the formal and informal structures of the Union, the level of regular, automatic and routine contact on a day-to-day basis will not be the same once the United Kingdom leaves the bloc. 7 In a country that has ‘long directly benefited from the wealth of British expertise’ and its key networks, there is a serious concern widespread across the political spectrum ‘if (let alone how and when) the thick network of bilateral contacts, exchanges, and consultations’ as well as the channels and mechanisms for knowledge exchange will be replicated bilaterally post-Brexit (Brusebauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 110). To be more specific, the Czechs, convinced that the mutual relationship ‘will suffer from the reduced contacts in Brussels’, are afraid (once again, in a rather prosaic manner) that their British colleagues ‘will be suddenly gone’ and are unsure ‘how we will gain access to the British. Via the embassy again? Reliance on the bilateral Prague–London channel will be too complicated and time-consuming’. Given the evidence of the advantage(s) derived by the Czech Republic from the mutual relations, there is an adamant belief among the interviewees that it is the Czech Republic that proportionally stands to lose more from Brexit.
Interestingly – but also logically, to a great extent – these concerns seem to be largely one-sided. Matters stand differently for the United Kingdom, with British representatives having developed a rhetoric of conviction that Brexit will not weaken the British relationship with the Czech Republic but will instead serve as a catalyst to strengthen it. This is well in line with the ‘Global Britain’ motto (politically very useful at the domestic level) whereby the British government has been ‘painting Brexit as a unique opportunity to rethink its foreign and security policy: stronger, more influential, more global’ (Major and von Ondarza, 2018: 1; for an informed discussion, see Glencross and McCourt, 2018 or Harrois, 2018).
(Re)defining bilateral relations for the post-Brexit era: Incentives and dilemmas
There seems to be a general consensus in the academic literature that the United Kingdom will need to expand its representation in EU member states to substitute for the coordination done via EU bodies (for more on this, see further below). Arguably, some plans have already been formulated on how to strengthen the British Embassy in the Czech Republic in response to the increased demands of maintaining effective diplomatic relationships in the EU27 capitals. Officially, however, nothing has been confirmed as of yet.
A point often overlooked is that EU member states will also most probably need to reinforce their capacities in the United Kingdom to manage the effects of Brexit. In June 2017, the Czech Government decided to open a new Czech Consulate General in Manchester, staffed by seven people, which started functioning in March 2019. There is a widespread tacit understanding that the Manchester Consulate has been strengthened because of Brexit but, officially, Czech representatives are reluctant to say this aloud, referring instead to the attempts ‘to improve its consular services and promote its economic and social ties with entities in the northern part of the UK’. Brexit was also cited as a key reason behind the slight strengthening of the Czech Embassy’s capacities in London in 2017 (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 11).
Significantly, the interviewees cautiously revealed that in April 2017, the British Embassy in Prague approached the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an initiative designed to establish a strategic partnership between the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Yet, even though some initial deliberations took place, the Ministry put the discussions on hold after a month, out of fear that the county might be accused of breaking ranks with the EU27 and undermining ongoing Brexit talks. The Czech Republic’s dismissal of the British proposal came as a great, unpleasant shock to many in the United Kingdom, with one of the interviewees describing it as a ‘surprisingly cold shower’. It was not until mid-December 2017, when the withdrawal talks moved on to their second phase, that the concept of enhanced relations was revived. Since then, the Czech Republic, which seems to have gradually and carefully adopted a view that the principles of EU cohesion are not irreconcilable with a strengthened post-Brexit bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom, has tried to pragmatically keep channels more open by not refusing the dialog (rather unofficial and off-the-record one) on a new vista of bilateral cooperation. This said, the country still retains certain wariness about talking too openly about exclusively bilateral arrangements with the United Kingdom (as opposed to France or Poland, for instance).
As it stands now, there are some ideas floating around on how to make use of the current Brexit dynamics to build yet closer, broader and deeper links with the United Kingdom. One of the ideas is that the post-Brexit form of cooperation might draw upon the concept of the Enhanced Political Dialogue which was established between the two countries in December 2010 and which seems rather forgotten these days (Brusenbauch Meislová and Tomalová, 2018: 113). Another idea is that the new consultation format might be modelled along the lines of the Czech-German Strategic Dialogue which was signed in 2015 and which has been hailed as a significant upgrading of relations between the two countries (for that matter, among others see, for example, Tallis, 2016). Yet another practical proposition revolves around the idea of structured ministerial consultations that could replace the habitual contact at regular EU meetings. Considered areas for joint action include, for example, promoting a more liberalised economic model for Europe, strengthening intelligence-sharing, bolstering defence and security cooperation, sanctions policy towards Russia and intensifying cooperation in science and research. Nevertheless, none of these ideas represents a potential quantum leap. Rather, they reflect the efforts on both sides to preserve continuity in the relationship despite Brexit and to make pragmatic use of existing channels and established working relations. Both sides highlight, though, that in the present turbulent times, continuity in itself is positive.
In order to evaluate the political feasibility of the enhanced post-Brexit bilateral arrangement(s), let us now look at the strength of (dis)incentives for close, forward-looking collaboration on both the British and Czech sides. For the United Kingdom, the incentives are perhaps less conflicting. The existing scholarship on Brexit consequences seems clear on a host of anticipated implications, including the prospect of the United Kingdom losing ‘access to many of the multiplier effects of EU membership’ (Martill and Sus, 2018: 4; not dissimilarly also Biscop, 2016; Hill, 2018; Major and von Ondarza, 2018; Ricketts, 2017). Most prominently, as a non-EU member, the United Kingdom will cease to be a part of the EU’s decision-making forums: ‘Given the amount of information made available in these forums [. . .] such meetings have proven invaluable to the member states over the years, Britain included’ (Martill and Sus, 2018: 4). As such, Brexit is poised to weaken the United Kingdom diplomatically and spotlight the constraints that individual nation states face (Major and von Ondarza, 2018: 1).
Such a prospect of limited participation in EU processes has led the United Kingdom to look for alternative forums and seek to reinvigorate its bilateral relationships in Europe (Major and von Ondarza, 2018: 3, 7). As noted by Ricketts (2018: 1), Brexit will put a ‘much greater load on bilateral relations with its [the UK’s – author’s note] former partners’. On that account, the FCO (which has been underfunded and which, since 2010, deprioritised its European network in favour of its Asian network will therefore have to ‘work harder through bilateral contacts to influence EU decision-making, and it will have to become more entrepreneurial in foreign policy if it is to exert real influence’ (Ricketts 2018: 3; similarly House of Commons, 2018: 15). There is a significant degree of consensus that to this end, the FCO will need to invest considerably more energy in broadening and deepening its bilateral relationships with EU member states: FCO will have to devote more resources than it currently deploys in both Brussels and the EU27 capitals, because the two are interdependent [. . .] we will need to reinforce our effort in the capitals [. . .] because the FCO is now very, very thinly stretched across the EU capitals. We have got away with it partly because we have been able to do the work in Brussels in the Committees (House of Commons, 2018: 15; a similar point is well covered also in Martill and Sus, 2018).
8
Another reason for London to seek a closer partnership with the Czech Republic pertains to the belief that the country holds – just like any other EU27 member state – certain sway over the Brexit talks (cf. Besch and Odendahl, 2017). Indeed, some Czech interviewees see the special, unusual and sudden attention that the United Kingdom has recently devoted to the Czech Republic as masking the true nature of British intentions – that is, to play ‘divide and rule’ and, in an astute political move, to exploit potential divisions on the EU side to its advantage. According to some, the British think that the Czech Republic – due to the importance of Anglo-Czech trade in general and its very large trade surplus with the United Kingdom – would choose its economic interests over the EU principles. Since this would be in the country’s own interest, the argument goes, it will try to soften the EU27 position to provide the United Kingdom with a satisfactory deal.
In the case of the Czech Republic, two geostrategic interests need to be reconciled when considering the prospect of enhanced cooperation with the United Kingdom. On one hand, what emerges clearly from the interviews and the documentary evidence is the conviction that there is a strong case for close cooperation with the United Kingdom along a variety of fronts. The Czech Republic has a particular stake in limiting the adverse repercussions of Brexit on the bilateral relations, keeping the United Kingdom by its side and making the relationship relevant to the United Kingdom. The formative calculations of Czech policymakers are founded on the acute awareness that, even post-Brexit, the United Kingdom will remain a significant (if somewhat diminished) global actor, not least in terms of its formidable economic and political assets, extensive diplomatic reach, wide organisational networks, unique security and defence capabilities, status as a nuclear power and a UN Security Council member, high defence spending and experienced armed forces.
On the other hand, as noted in the above discussion, the Czech Republic has put a lot of emphasis on the EU’s unity vis-à-vis Brexit. So, while the challenge here is to balance these twin pressures, the account of development of the last 2 years show that despite the strong tradition of party-based Euroscepticism and general ‘Eurosceptic leanings’ (for a detailed analysis thereof see, for example, Kaniok and Havlík, 2016; Kaniok and Hloušek, 2018), the Czech Republic’s first political priority is to protect the cohesion of the single market. In this sense, building a privileged bilateral partnership with a post-Brexit UK comes second. And the same goes also for the economic considerations, too: the Czech Republic which is economically dependent on the EU (Menšík, 2018; Zachová, 2018) values the integrity of the single market more than the potential tariff-free access to the British market. Hence, it is the EU that will have a priority, should a conflict arise between these two concerns.
Conclusion
The article has assessed two research questions (the first on the state of British-Czech relations; the second one on Brexit implications thereupon), considering the different processes and dynamics associated with each. Out of the two, it is especially the question on how the United Kingdom’s extrication from the EU will affect British-Czech bilateral relations that is a subject of numerous competing pressures. Exploring the issue in a year that paradoxically, and somewhat ironically, constitutes a powerful symbol of strong continuity in the course of British-Czech bilateral relations on one hand and of a profound change on the other hand has rendered its analysis an engrossing undertaking.
Essentially, the Czech case is illustrative of the impact that the dynamics of the United Kingdom’s departure is likely to have on the development of individual bilateral relationships between the United Kingdom and EU27. Highly disruptive of the status quo, Brexit represents a turning point in (and a stress test for) the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. As things stand now, the mutual relations find themselves in a rather peculiar situation, overshadowed by the complexities of the withdrawal process. Interestingly enough, the article has pointed out the shift in the balance of power within the bilateral relationship, with Brexit having diluted the acute historical asymmetry that had long been a key defining feature of British-Czech interactions.
Moreover, consistent with the emerging literature, the author opines that there is a risk that even in a best-case scenario, Brexit might create the risk of the two countries drifting apart, damage British-Czech cooperation and relegate it further down the countries’ list of priorities. In the short run, the relationship might be (and already has been, if only to a slight degree) potentially affected by the acrimonious arm-wrestling over the terms of the United Kingdom’s disengagement and the future set-up of UK-EU relations. In the long run, Brexit will change the context for and complicate interactions between both countries, with the Czech Republic standing to lose inter alia the ‘easy access’ to the British expertise which has been, since 2004, facilitated through the constant day-to-day processes of consultation and policy-making between the two actors within the EU structures.
Viewed against this background, it seems reasonable to argue that to compensate for the loss of EU ties and institutional linkages, the United Kingdom will need to weigh carefully its bilateral diplomacy towards EU27 member states – both to its key European partners such as Germany and France, but also to less important ones, such as the Czech Republic. In other words, even though it is clear that some of the United Kingdom’s bilateral relationships will need to be prioritised over others (especially the relations with France and Germany and the triangulation of relations between the three countries), the country is expected to devote more in resources for diplomatic efforts at a bilateral level with all EU27 member states. Although the rationale for enhanced cooperation is different both in the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, it appears in neither state’s interests that the mutual relations should be dismantled after Brexit. Instead, as the article has shown, some attempts at damage control are already underway.
Finally, this is not to say that the novel process of ‘de-europeanization’ of mutual bilateral relations will be in any way dramatic. Even though the article abstains from predicting where the process will end, such a scenario seems unlikely, because despite the above-described changes to intra-EU bilateral diplomacy, the structure of bilateral diplomatic relations between EU member states have thus far remained largely intact. Indicative of this is the fact that, to phrase it in Bátora and Hocking’s (2007: 12) words, the embassies of EU member states in other member countries have continued ‘enacting their traditional role and maintaining organizational structures, routines, functions and procedures on par with embassies outside the EU’ (similarly also Bátora, 2005: 53).
The article should conclude with an acknowledgement of its limitations. Given its reliance on a single case, the key problem revolves around the degree of reliability and generalisability of the results. And even though the author believes that choosing the Czech Republic as a typical case is well-founded, applying a broader comparative perspective that would allow to draw wider conclusions is a promising future research avenue. The inquiry remains primarily exploratory and therefore more in-depth research needs to be conducted before any definitive conclusions can be reached about Brexit implications on bilateral relations between the UK and EU27 member states. Indeed, there is definitely a lacuna when it comes to bringing together observations that span all 27 EU member states. Another shortcoming that merits attention is the potential for (sub)conscious bias in the interviewees’ perceptions. Yet, the author hopes that the fact that each of the interviewees has been involved in a different role and task ensures that they have approached British-Czech relations from various angles and brought different perspectives to their study. As such, the breadth and width of data considered hopefully help mitigate the biases from individual actors. Finally, with Brexit representing the ultimate moving target, this article is inevitably a work in progress, very much like the withdrawal process itself.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on the earlier version of this manuscript. Of course, all remaining errors are my responsibility.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: The writing of this article was supported by the Grant Agency of Masaryk University through the ‘Perspectives of European Integration in the Context of Global Politics’ project (MUNI/A/1025/2018).
