J.S. Mill and the Indian land question: From the political economy of small proprietorship to the support of ryots and British Imperialism?

Introduction

Most classical political economists have dealt with the economic condition of India at some point or other. Adam Smith (1723–1790), for example, in analysing the economic development of nations during the last quarter of the 18th century, cited India as a typical example of a backward country (Smith, 1976 [1776]). Other eminent classical political economists, including David Ricardo (1772–1823), Robert Malthus (1766–1834) and James Mill (1773–1836), authored economic and monetary treatises on the economic policy of the British government in India (Ambirajan, 1978). However, John Stuart Mill (1806–1874) was the classical political economist most interested in Hindoos matters. As is well known, J.S. Mill was the eldest son of James Mill, the author of the celebrated The History of British India (1817) (Mill, 1981). Mill, like his father, joined the East India Company in 1823 and became an Examiner of the company by December 1830 until the company lost its charter in 1858 (Bell, 2010; Moir, 1990). His experience assisted Mill in gathering information about Indian society and its (long) history. Some of his ideas are included in his Indian writings, which are limited to official texts, annexed in the collected volume Writings on India and in some (extended) references in his Principles of Political Economy (1848). After he retired from the East India Company, he wrote (very) little about India.

Mill’s ideas for India are associated with British policy and the role of the East India Company, for which he worked for 35 years. Mill justified the British rule in India, conducted through the East India Company (Williams, 2020). In his correspondence with one of his favourite disciples, John Elliot Cairnes (1823–1875), he characterised India as a semi-civilised country (CW 3: 1045). ¹ Furthermore, in many instances, he justified the British rule in India as a typical example of a benevolent government helping the transition of India towards a higher state of improvement (CW 19: 576–577). Mill’s views on India are connected with a broad 19th-century literature that presented colonisation’s economic and cultural advantages. As Bell (2010: 38) observes, during the 1820s and 1830s, an increasing number of thinkers and political economists, including Nassau William Senior (1790–1864), Robert Torrens (1812–1884) and Herman Merivale (1806–1874), ‘came to view colonies in a more positive light – as potential sites of economic productivity, social amelioration, and civilizational potential’.

Mill is not an exception to this rule. In his Considerations on Representative Government (1861), he pointed out that the improvement of India was associated with a good despotism provided by a more civilised country, Great Britain (CW 19: 576). In his Writings on India, authored following the abolition of the East India Company and his consequent retirement, Mill provided an analytic Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India during the Last Thirty Years (1858). This Memorandum illustrates his belief in the critical role of the company in providing public works (roads, railways, canals, irrigation, etc.) and promoting India’s economic development. In addition, Mill praised the East India Company for introducing modern technologies in India (Tunick, 2006) while at the same time he presented the establishment of order and security, the institutionalisation of property rights, the rationalisation of judicial procedure and the development of Indian education as critical improvements in Indian society (Williams, 2020).

However, Mill’s imperialism differs from what most historians understand as British policy in India. Mill’s imperialism, among other things, is associated with his political economy, particularly regarding the system of small proprietorships. What is argued here is that his views on the Indian land question are crucial in comprehending this association. Mill’s knowledge of India’s land tenure and agricultural techniques (and practices) made him support the formation of small proprietorships through a system that ‘ascertain accurately the persons and classes of persons, who by law or usage had a beneficial interest in land, and the nature and extent of the beneficial interest of each’ (CW 30; Mill (1990): 97).

This article argues that Mill’s proposals on the Indian land question are essential in understanding his imperial views. Many illuminating works attempt to connect his thoughts on India with his imperialist attitude (see inter alia Beaumont and Li, 2022; Habibi, 1999; Sullivan, 1983; Tunick, 2006; Williams, 2020; Zastoupil, 1983), while other important contributions attempt to sketch out Mill’s views on the Indian land question and associate these views with his political economy regarding India’s economy (see inter alia Black, 1968; Moore, 2009; Pradhan, 1976; Rorabacher, 2017). However, this article attempts to move beyond these enlightening contributions by placing Mill’s thoughts on the Indian land question into the perspective of the history of economic thought and associating these thoughts with his imperial views. This topic has received little attention in the literature and is important to understand Mill’s political economy and political theory. In addition, the article also aims to connect these views with Mill’s motif of the relativity of economic doctrines and his subsequent critique of the classical land solution of the tripartite system. ²

Last, the article attempts to show that Mill’s thoughts on the Indian land question (as on the Irish one) are associated with his radical views concerning the understanding of economic phenomena. As with Ireland (see inter alia De Mattos, 2020; Manioudis, 2020), Mill, in discussing land tenure relations in East India, stressed the importance of custom, culture and history in understanding economic phenomena and formatting (appropriate) economic policies. The case of India, among other cases, persuaded Mill that the English political economy is not an effective means of providing practical solutions to all other cases. His adoption of the relativity of economic doctrines thesis enforced his conclusion that the blind introduction of Western economic ideas (i.e. free sale and transfer of land, abolition of custom, etc.) in countries different from Great Britain would be baneful for the great majority of people. ³

The article is structured around three sections. In the first section, an attempt is made to delineate how Indian (economic and social) history helped Mill to develop his views on the relativity of economic knowledge. In the second section, Mill’s defence of ryots and small proprietorship is presented, while in the third section, we discuss the connection between Mill’s political economy and his tolerant, in Tunick’s (2006) terminology, imperialism. The concluding section summarises our findings.

The relativity of economic doctrines and the role of custom and culture

As has been shown elsewhere (see inter alia Gillig, 2016; Manioudis, 2021; Schapiro, 1943), Mill moved beyond the Ricardian tradition by holding the view that the laws of distribution are influenced by historical, social, cultural, political and even religious factors. Mill’s distribution theory, contrary to Ricardo’s, is in a dynamic process of social and historical alteration. According to Mill’s theory, the distribution of wealth is a social matter that is (heavily) dependent on human will. In this vein, as is shown in his Principles of Political Economy, the society has the power to arrange its form/institutions of distribution. More specifically, in the Preliminary Remarks of his Principles, he argued that the ‘laws of distribution’ are part of human institutions since ‘the manner in which wealth is distributed in any given society depends on the statutes or usages therein obtaining’ (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 21). In addition, in the second book of his Principles, which is devoted in distribution, Mill illustrated the influence of custom in forming human institutions. In his additions in the subsequent editions of his Principles, he conceded that institutions are not invariable and static. Through these additions, Mill described institutions, as Schumpeter (1954: 506) observes, as ‘man-made, changeable, malleable, and progressive’ entities. Mill, like Smith, stressed the role of power by noting that the distribution of wealth is subject to the rules of the ruling class. It follows, then, that power is a decisive element of distribution as all ‘privileged and powerful classes [. . .] have used their power in the interest of their own selfishness’ (CW 3: 760). Mill believed that government policy is a crucial factor in determining (and directing) the production and (even more) the distribution of wealth. Following Smith, he noted that if a government is tyrannical and rapacious, ‘it is not likely that many [agents] will exert themselves to produce much more than necessaries’ (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 112). For Mill, this explained ‘the poverty of many fertile tracts of Asia, which were once prosperous and populous’ (p. 112). Within his political economy, custom, culture and the institutional framework are critical factors in accelerating (or limiting) economic advancement.

In his Autobiography (1873), which is regarded as one of his most mature texts, Mill pointed out how Saint-Simonians helped him to understand ‘the very limited and temporary value of the old political economy, which assumes private property [. . .] and freedom of production and exchange as the dernier mot of social improvement’ (CW 1; Mill (1965 [1848]): 174). For him, institutions, as historically variable and specific entities, matter. Thus, due to their historical nature, the conclusions of political economy ‘being all adapted to a society thus constituted, require to be revised whenever they are applied to any other’ (CW 8; Mill (1974 [1843]): 903). Naturally, then, according to Mill, Indian cultural and social norms (and institutions) were important both for distribution and for choosing the appropriate economic policies. Interestingly enough, his thesis on the relativity of economic doctrines differentiates his views on India from other liberal philosophers, including, among others, his father James Mill (Marwah, 2019; Williams, 2020).

Mill believed that economic policy should be based on a thorough knowledge of each country’s cultural, social and historical circumstances. Following this, he noted that the conclusions of the old political economy, as he named it, are, in fine, inapplicable to India (CW 8; Mill (1974 [1843]): 903). For instance, any institutional reform of the Indian land system, such as preserving small holdings, should be associated with India’s language, religion, customs, institutions and social norms. He believed that some decisive errors of British governance in India ‘arose from the inability of ordinary minds to imagine a state of social relations fundamentally different from those which they are practically familiar’ (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 320). According to Mill, such an attitude – of turning economic principles of relative validity into general theorems – is British in its instigation and fatal for the progress of the political economy. In this way, he moved away from the Ricardian political economy that proposed universal laws as invariant across time and place. According to Mill’s political economy of distribution, there is ‘no sacrosanct principle or inflexible law of income distribution’ (Platteau, 1985: 5). Mill held the view that laws of distribution are not ‘iron laws’ but are relative to human institutions as ‘the manner in which wealth is distributed in any given society depends on the statutes or usages therein obtaining’ (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 21).

The relative character of his political economy is evident in his views regarding land ownership. Following this relativity, Mill was sure that the classical tripartite system of large farms is not a one-size-fits-all model of land use. Especially for India, he was convinced that the classical tripartite system was inapplicable. His views were fortified by a civil servant of the India Office, named Northcote, who, in the Annual Congress of the Social Science Association in October 1869, noted that:

The facts are stubborn and cannot be bent [. . .] the leading fact in the case is, that the national idea of the relations of landlord and tenant is something totally different from the national idea in England. (Steele, 1968: 77)

Mill, in turn, in discussing the typology of land systems, pointed out in his Principles:

In other cases again the labourer does not own the land, but owns the little stock employed on it, the landlord not being in the habit of supplying any. This system [. . .] is nearly universal in India, and in most countries of the East; whether the government retains, as it generally does, the ownership of the soil, or allows portions to become, either absolutely or in a qualified sense, the property of individuals. In India, however, things are so far better than in Ireland, that the owner of [the] land is in the habit of making advances to the cultivators, if they cannot cultivate without them. For these advances the native landed proprietor usually demands high interest; but the principal landowner, the government, makes them gratuitously, recovering the advance after the harvest, together with the rent. The produce is here divided as before, between the same two classes, the landowner and the labourer. (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 237)

Mill’s engagement with the Indian land question played an important role in developing his views regarding the historical specificity of economic doctrines. His radical, by 19th-century standards, belief that economic knowledge should take into account society’s customs, traditions and culture vividly illustrates his departure from classical (Ricardian) political economy. This departure seems crucial in determining (and directing) his views on the distribution of wealth and the subsequent formation of his proposed economic policy, especially in British colonies. Mill’s approach refers to a policy of deference to customs that are crucial in promoting economic efficiency and fairness. Considering this, the second section shows that Mill’s political economy of small proprietorship, which was formed through various influences, is the basis of his belief that the British deference to customs in Indian land property rights was successful in terms of land economic policy.

Small proprietorships: The defence of ryots

As noted above, Mill’s relativity of economic doctrines formed the basis of his radical economic views regarding the distribution of wealth. His views on small proprietorships are a typical example of this development. On the one hand, Mill’s support of small proprietorships had a theoretical background stemming from his close acquaintance with the works of Sismondi and other Utopian Socialists (Mill, 1981). Mill used Saint-Simon and Sismondi’s observations to illustrate the improved productivity of small-scale proprietorships. His close acquaintance with Saint-Simonian ideas helped him to find new answers to old questions (McCabe, 2021: 20). On the other hand, his views also have an experimental character due to his experience with the Indian administration through the East India Company. An additional stimulus was provided by his father, who detected the unique features of the Indian case by noting that, contrary to Great Britain, the Indian cultivator had the most significant portion of interest in the cultivation of his soil (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 316–323).

Winch (2002: 12) points out that Mill, as his father James Mill, was committed ‘to preventing encroachments on the ryotwari system in operation, chiefly in Madras and Bombay, by advocates of the zemindari alternative that was based more on English notions of private property’. Mill opposed the zemindari settlement that was introduced in Bengal by Lord Cornwallis (1738–1805). Under the zemindari system, the land was conferred to zemindars (native landlords), who rented land to cultivators for a particular share of the product as compensation. The zemindars, as official landowners, had the right to evict peasants from the ground at their will. As Pradhan (1976: 8) observes, ‘Under this dispensation, the cultivator became the direct responsibility of the landlord or the zemindari and could not deal directly with the government’. Mill believed that the zemindari system was a total failure as it prevented the cultivator from improving his land, as an increased product value would not affect the cultivator but raise the rent against himself. Mill was sure that the zemindari system was inappropriate for securing a property through long leases.

On the other hand, the ryotwari system, introduced by Thomas Munro (1726–1827), secured a right to property through long usage. The ryotwari system allowed the ryot (small peasant) to secure his land rights and acquire new land for cultivation through a direct deal with the government. Government cannot eject the ryot who paid his rent. Mill explained the ryotwari system in detail in his Memorandum of India. As he pointed out under the ryotwari system in Mandras:

[T]he land is not made over to great landlords but the actual cultivator, the peasant himself, is regarded as the proprietor of the soil, subject to the payment of the Government demand. He has the option annually of increasing or diminishing his holdings; and, in the words of the Madras Government in their last report has all the benefits of a perpetual lease, without its responsibilities, inasmuch as he can, at any time, throw up his lands, but cannot be ejected as long as he pays his dues. (CW 30; Mill (1990): 97)

In his Principles of Political Economy, Mill conducted a close comparative examination of the land systems in both Ireland and India. ⁴ He pointed out that in India, the ryots, who were the actual tenants of land, ‘were generally assured of fixity of tenure at fair, officially determined rents and the disposal of the occupancy of their holdings, whether they held from governments or from a landlord’ (Steele, 1968: 66). He noted that the Indian ryot enjoyed greater security than the Irish tenant and proposed a similar administration of Irish cottiers. ⁵ Mill noted that the proper remedy for Ireland lies in adopting the Indian model of tenure (Steele, 1970) and concluded that England’s government of India was far more successful than her administration of Ireland (Black, 1968). Thus, it is not surprising that Mill called on English rulers to act in Ireland as they had done in the case of India, namely to reconcile themselves ‘to the idea that their business was not to sweep away the rights they found established, or wrench and compress them into the similitude of something English’ (Mill, 1982 [1868]: 519). Mill’s preference for the land system of ryots is tightly associated with his heretic view, compared to the classical tripartite system, that the institution of small proprietorships and prescriptive rights is an effective means for preserving economic peace and social cohesion.

Mill’s knowledge of the Indian economy and society seems to be the basis of his support of the institution of small farming. His description of the Indian land system and his discussion of ryots are annexed in his Principles of Political Economy. Mill regarded the ryotwari system as ideal due to the fact that it recognised no intermediaries (as the zemindari system) and conferred the land to cultivators by securing prescriptive rights through the direct relationship between the tenant and the state. According to Black (1968: 325), Mill moved towards ‘the old school of Indian administrators, notably Sir Thomas Munro, who had developed the ryotwari system of land-revenue settlement in Mandras in the early years of the nineteenth century’. Mill’s narration illustrates his historically specific approach, which stands against Ricardo’s classical rent theory and Torrens’s tripartite system. He pointed out that custom influences the tenure of land. More specifically, in allaying the condition of the Indian ryot, he noted that ‘In India, for example, and other Asiatic communities similarly constituted, the ryots, or peasant farmers, are not regarded as tenants at will, nor even as tenants by virtue of a lease’, but they ‘are thought entitled to retain their land, as long as they pay the customary rents’. Thus, according to Mill, the adoption of fixed rent

is a proof that there was once an effective limitation, a real customary rent; and that the understood right of the ryot to the land, so long as he paid rent according to custom, was at some time or other more than nominal. (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 240–241)

In presenting the condition of Indian agriculture, Mill argued that India’s farming system is operated through small farms and pointed out that the total land product is small. However, he also stressed the fact that due to its fertility and favourable climate to vegetation, land could ‘yield food in abundance for many more than the present number of inhabitants, without departing from the system of small holdings’ (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 121). Mill believed that a well-administrated governance of Indian agriculture could develop its productive forces and enhance its productivity. Thus:

[T]he best chance of an early development of the productive resources of India consists in the rapid growth of its export of agricultural produce (cotton, indigo, sugar, coffee, &c.) to the markets of Europe. The producers of these articles are consumers of food supplied by their fellow-agriculturists in India; and the market thus opened for surplus food will, if accompanied by good government, raise by degrees more extended wants and desires, directed either towards European commodities, or towards things which will require for their production in India a larger manufacturing population. (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 121–122)

Furthermore, the ‘civilising’ mission of the British administration of India lies in providing technology and infrastructure to tenants. He stressed that ‘the tanks, embankments, and works of irrigation’ are indispensable in increasing agricultural productivity (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 121). For Mill, the British government in India ensured that rents in India remained at reasonable levels. This policy moved parallel to the Indian (customary) tradition and contributed to the (daily) subsistence of the Indian ryot. Mill regarded the fixity of tenure as an attempt to ascertain cultivators’ rights. He observed that the British government of India, despite its fallacies, ⁶ ruled out the transfer of British institutions to Indian land. He believed that the British government deferred to Indian customs and secured that the small farmer (ryot) should be regarded in India as the universal landlord (CW 3: 904).

Thus, the history of the Indian land case was influential in shaping Mill’s views regarding the institutionalisation of small proprietorships in India. According to Mill, a detailed knowledge of Indian customs, tradition, religion(s), and language(s) and a thorough understanding of its socio-economic and political institutions were necessary to formulate an efficient solution to the agrarian question. He stressed the fact that the knowledge of the Indian land tenure, of its agricultural methods and practices, was essential to successfully pursue the British mission in India (Cohn, 1997). He noted that ‘the study of India must be as much a profession in itself as law or medicine’ (Williams, 2020: 417). As an experienced Examiner of the East India Company, Mill knew that the accumulation of information was a laborious and challenging process since the information was provided by the Indian people themselves (CW 19). However, he stressed the need to systematise the knowledge of Indian society to secure the existence of a benevolent government and the appropriate institutions. It is no surprise then that Mill was always anxious that the fragmentary knowledge of Indian society (and its history) might lead to mistaken policies and problematic institutions. Mill’s political economy of small proprietorships (and his support of small holdings) in India indicates his view that the proper management of colonies necessitates the tolerance of its traditions, customs and institutions. In this vein, the following (third) section illustrates how his defence of ryots is tightly associated with his political theory and his tolerant imperial views.

Mill’s defence of ryots: A typical example of Tolerant Imperialism?

As is well known, Mill’s imperialistic views were shaped empirically through his job in India House and his close acquaintance with James Mill’s History of British India (Schultz, 2007: 107–108). ⁷ According to Sullivan (1983), Mill’s working experience in the East India Company shaped his subsequent philosophical and political thoughts. In a similar vein, Marwah (2011) stresses his father’s influence on his views on colonialism. James Mill’s classic History of India is full of imperialist thoughts and considers India an exception to Britain’s general policy towards imperialism. Scholars disagree on how to characterise Mill’s imperialism. On the one hand, Mill was criticised for defending despotism – colonialism for non-Western regions (Parekh, 1995). Other scholars, like Dossa (2002), Drayton (2000) and Lal (1998), perceived Mill’s imperialism as a racist attitude towards these countries. On the other hand, various contributions show the ‘consistency’ between Mill’s liberal and imperial thoughts. Pitts (2005: 20) rejects Mill’s connection with racism by stressing how he ‘criticised the nineteenth-century penchant for biological explanations of human difference’. Furthermore, Tunick (2006) notes that Mill’s Defence of the British rule in India is an example of ‘tolerant imperialism’, while, arguing in a similar vein, both Sullivan (1983) and Williams (2020) characterise Mill’s views on colonisation as an example of liberal imperialism. In a similar vein, Beaumont and Li (2022) note that Mill’s liberalism moved him away from paternalistic imperialism and closer to what is named a legitimate empire.

Thus, although Mill was influenced by his father’s imperialism, he also departed from it in certain ways. As recent literature has shown (see inter alia Beaumont and Li, 2022; Tunick, 2006), Mill’s imperialism differed from the 19th-century classical imperialism. Sullivan (1983: 605) rightly observes that from the late 1820s, Mill rejected the classical anti-imperialist tradition and ‘developed the argument that the retention and expansion of empire best served England’s economic and political interests’. His arguments on colonisation appeared in his Principles of Political Economy and Considerations on Representative Government. Mill defended colonisation and remained an undisputed spokesperson for British imperialism until he died in 1873 (Tunick, 2006). In this way, he influenced various figures in the 19th (and early 20th) centuries: from liberal imperialists to Fabian socialists and historical economists. Mill turned out to be one of the most prominent defenders of the British Empire through his theory of colonisation. Mehta (1999) notes that Mill’s liberal justification of the Empire lies behind his (frequent) tolerance of undemocratic and non-representative institutions. Many scholars, including Mehta (1999), found Mill’s defence of the British Empire ‘ironic’, while others, like Parekh (1995: 96), accused Mill of attempting to justify a monistic (Western) ‘vision of the good life’. Indeed, Mill, in contrast to the classical anti-imperialist tradition of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), was an open supporter of both colonisation and maintenance of the British Empire as was grouped with an increasing number of orthodox and radical thinkers who positively viewed colonies (Bell, 2010: 38). In this sense, his imperialism should be regarded as an integral part of his political and economic thought. ⁸

Of course, as Williams (2020) rightly points out, Mill sometimes had uncertain and ambivalent claims about the possibilities and problems of British colonialism. Consequently, his imperial views follow a complex process. Initially, Mill defended colonisation on the grounds of falling profit rates at home. He believed that the formation of colonies effectively counteracted the tendency for profits to fall. Later, his colonial views were associated with social and intellectual progress brought about by colonisation: peace, economic prosperity and moral advancement. Mill stressed the ethological character of colonisation and justified imperialism at this stage mainly on cultural grounds. In this phase, Mill expressed his views that civilised nations are responsible for promoting the uncivilised nations’ moral and material improvement (Tunick, 2006). Ironically enough, in his On Liberty (1859), he pointed out that ‘Despotism is a legitimating mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement’ (CW 18: 224). This famous justification of despotism (and imperialism) gained fierce criticism from various scholars who stressed that his claims for barbarian people were purely imperialist. ⁹

The economic argument did not disappear since the acculturation of barbarians is per se associated with the economic benefits to the Empire. Mill considered colonisation mutually beneficial and regarded it ‘as an economic advantage for England and her colonies and dependencies’ (Sullivan, 1983: 609). In his own words:

No one will deny it to be, that the planting of colonies should be conducted, not with an exclusive view to the private interests of the first founders, but with a deliberate regard to the permanent welfare of the nations afterwards to arise from these small beginnings [. . .] To appreciate the benefits of colonisation, it should be considered in its relation, not to a single country, but to the collective economic interests of the human race. The question is in general treated too exclusively as one of distribution; or relieving one labor market and supplying another. It is this, but it is also a question of production, and of the most efficient employments of the productive resources of the world. (CW 3: 970)

However, Mill believed colonisation was a ‘civilising mission’, and his views were associated with the (imperial) liberal thought of the 19th century (Marwah, 2011). In this vein, according to Goldberg (cited in Schultz, 2007: 112), Mill presented the human face of colonialism: ‘The world was to be directed by the most developed and capable nations whose self-interests nevertheless would be mitigated and mediated by the force of utilitarian reason’. (p. 132). Following Mill’s view, the trends of improvement in less developed countries were:

[F]irst, a better government: more complete security of property; moderate taxes, and freedom from arbitrary exaction under the name of taxes; a more permanent and more advantageous tenure of land, securing to the cultivator as far as possible the undivided benefits of the industry, skill, and economy he may exert. Secondly, improvement of the public intelligence: the decay of usages or superstitions which interfere with the effective implementation of industry; and the growth of mental activity, making the people alive to new objects of desire. Thirdly, the introduction of foreign arts [. . .] and the introduction of foreign capital, which renders the increase of production no longer exclusively dependent on the thrift or providence of the inhabitants themselves, while it places before them a stimulating example, and by instilling new ideas and breaking the chains of habit (CW 2; Mill (1965 [1848]): 186–187).

It is well known (see inter alia Bell, 2010; Sullivan, 1983) that Wakefield’s views influenced Mill’s imperialism. However, as Bell (2010: 46) rightly observes, Wakefield’s conception of ‘colonisation was ultimately more conservative than Mill’s’. In reality, Wakefield proposed the transposition of hierarchical British social relations to the colonies, recreating ‘the new societies in the image of the old’ (p. 46). In contrast, Mill believed that the Empire’s intervention should be adapted to the colony’s institutions, customs and social norms. Mill’s relativist political economy turned away his imperialist views from the simple imposition of Eurocentric cultural values.

In contrast to Wakefield, Mill believed that the moral and economic development of India did not imply the simple transplanting of British institutions but was a slow and complicated process that should be based on India’s history (Kurfist, 1996). Tunick (2006) rightly puts Mill’s imperial views under the ‘tolerant imperialism’ umbrella. Indeed, Mill wanted England to civilise India but not with a forced assimilation of British institutions. In his On Liberty, Mill was explicit in saying:

I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilised [. . .] I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should put an end. (CW 18: 291)

In this vein, as Tunick (2006) observes, tolerant imperialism is associated with Mill’s early views on civilisation.

Civilisation is not connected with the linear diffusion of the Western idea. Still, it implies certain preconditions, such as the rule of law (which would rule out arbitrary taxes and other exercises of coercion), the diffusion of technology (which lets people protect against natural disasters) and the development of cooperative schemes and efforts. These preconditions would allow people to pursue their experiments in living. ¹⁰ Mill did not seek to make India like England. In his mind, a governor (like the English Empire) should have a deep understanding of the Indian social and economic history, secure the cultivator, and safeguard the benefits of his industry, skill and economy. Mill was ready to tolerate even illiberal (in his mind) practices of Indians. His respect for Indian (formal and informal) institutions forced him to tolerate even conflicting views. According to Mill’s tolerant imperialism, Indians should not abandon their traditions and customs. His tolerant imperialism is associated with deference to religion, protection of property rights and maintenance of institutions and associations of Indians. Mill accepted the civilising nature of imperialism and stressed the necessity of imposing institutions to promote efficiency and fairness in colonies. He believed that civilisation is promoted through mastering nature. He thought that science, knowledge and technology were essential to this. Thus, as Tunick (2006: 592) points out, this does not mean colonies should become Western counterparts. For instance, Mill criticised ‘bad instincts’, such as cruelty, and stressed the importance of establishing the rule of law and developing cooperative ventures. However, he did not believe that civilisation is associated with the blind imposition of European institutions.

For Mill, the mission of civilising a society does not imply the enforcement of Western (or British) ideas and institutions upon the colonies. In Mill’s view, the civilising direction of imperialism promotes a synthesis between modernisation (and civilisation) with tolerance. This synthesis is attained in his tolerant imperialism. Among other things, Mill believed that civilisation (e.g. material and moral improvement) implies the importance of sufficient property security. In his famous paper Civilisation (1836), Mill pointed out:

We accordingly call a people civilized, where the arrangements of society, for protecting the persons and property of its members, are sufficiently perfect to maintain peace among them: i.e. to induce the bulk of the community to rely for their security mainly upon social arrangements, and renounce for the most part, and in ordinary circumstances, the vindication of their interests (whether in the way of aggression or of defence) by their individual strength or courage. (CW 18: 120)

Thus, Mill’s tolerant imperialism is tightly associated with the support of small proprietorship. Mill believed that protecting ryots was a crucial precondition of civilisation, peace and material improvement. This is illustrated by his view that the English policy towards the defence of ryots was a correct choice. We may say that his radical political economy for the maintenance of small holdings and the protection of small cultivators is associated with the imperialist option to defend the policy of the East India Company towards Indian cultivators. His staunch support for maintaining small holdings in India is connected with the second phase of his imperialism and is associated with what Tunick (2006) called tolerant imperialism. His defence of ryots differentiated Mill from other thinkers in two ways. First, it differentiated him from Ricardian political economists of large and capitalistically cultivated farms. Second, it differentiated him from the classical (Wakefieldian) imperialism of the violent imposition of Eurocentric institutions and cultural values across colonised nations. What is argued here is that Mill’s tolerant imperialism is associated with his relativity of economic doctrines and the historically specific character of his theory of distribution. Mill’s radical political economy – evident among other things in his rejection of the wage fund doctrine, his preference for cooperations and his support of small proprietorships – is connected with the later phase of his imperialist political thought.

Mill was sceptical about imposing the European ideas of rationality, progress and classical political economy upon colonised nations. The example of Indian ryots, and his call for the institutionalisation of small holdings in India, is a ‘core element’ of his (radical) political economy and is tightly connected with his views on his tolerant imperialism. His scepticism led him to note in the 1909 edition of Principles, edited by Sir William Ashley (1860–1927), that it was a rational choice of the English Government in India to ‘inquire into the rights which existed and were respected in practice, and to protect and enlarge those’ (Mill, 1909 [1848]: 325). Thus, Mill’s radical views on land property rights under the influence of Utopian socialists and rebellious thinkers should be viewed through the lens of his tolerant imperialism thesis, which is an integral part of his political thought. Mill did not think that the principle of liberty was waived for less developed countries. His political economy of small proprietorships is associated with his belief that tolerating colonies’ practices is vital in promoting their material and moral improvement. Thus, his tolerant imperialism, which allows for deference towards customs and traditions, while still seeking to civilise people, is manifest in his position on small proprietorships, which supports the ryotwari system of giving ryots their (customary) security.

To sum up, Mill’s staunch defence of the ryotwari system and his tolerant imperialism, which defers customs and traditions and seeks to promote civilisation, seems to be associated with his democratic theory. Mill’s liberalism, as Beaumont and Li (2022) observe, has led him to support a legitimate empire in which a civilised state through, inter alia the rule of law, the diffusion of technology/knowledge and the development of cooperative schemes prepared less civilised foreign people for liberal democratic self-rule. ¹¹ His political economy of small proprietorship and the applicability of the harm principle reflect Mill’s thoughts on democracy and representative government. ¹² This view is exemplified in his discussion of the criterion of a good form of government in his Considerations of Representative Government in which he points out that what less civilised communities ‘require is not a government of force, but one of guidance’ (Mill, 1977: 395).

Conclusion

It is well known that most historians of economic thought regard Mill as an influential figure in the post-Ricardian era of political economy. Similarly, many scholars have characterised Millian political economy as a typical by-product of Ricardo’s magnum opus. However, Mill’s political economy includes a variety of innovative and heretic, one may say, arguments. Mill was influenced by Utopian Socialists and supported the formation of small proprietorships and associations to face the difficulties of capitalist development. At the same time, he endorsed colonisation to avoid the Stagnant State of advanced economies such as Great Britain. Mill remained an imperialist thinker who ‘justified’ colonisation in both economic and moral terms. However, his imperialism differed from other thinkers, such as Wakefield, and turned into tolerant imperialism. This article shows that the Indian land case allowed Mill to use his political economy of small proprietorships to document his imperialist views. We note that the institutionalisation of small proprietorships is associated with Mill’s tolerant imperialism, according to which the colonialist should recognise the need to promote institutions consistent with Indian traditions, customs and history. The connection between Mill’s small proprietorship and tolerant imperialism illustrates the political character of the Millian economic theory and evidences the fact that the history of the Indian land issue is an essential element in understanding the formation of modern Indian society. Mill’s views on small proprietorships and a type of tolerant government are necessary for recontextualising the evolution of the Indian economy. Finally, we may say that Mill’s views of small proprietorships, as were embedded in his tolerant imperialism, may help to better understand the transition from the earlier colonialist phase of the British Empire to the stage of the new imperialism of 1875–1914.