Zeitenwende as a foreign policy identity crisis: Germany and the travails of adaptation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

While Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented a shock to countries across Europe, it was perceived as a particularly fundamental challenge in Germany – a ‘Zeitenwende’ as Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it. This article argues that the Russian invasion undermined widely shared foreign policy ideas, triggering a foreign policy identity crisis. This crisis allowed for significant ideational change and decisions previously considered unattainable. However, other elements of Germany’s foreign policy identity have proven to be remarkably resilient, shaping the response across various policy areas. The absence of a new consensus that could be linked to other elements of the German collective identity has slowed adaptation in some areas and allowed opponents to push back. While German foreign policy has changed significantly since the beginning of the invasion, additional adaptation will not be as swift and extensive as many of Berlin’s partners would like and as the changing security environment arguably demands.

Keywords

European security German foreign policy ideational change identity Russia-Ukraine war

It requires troublesome work to undertake the alteration of old beliefs.

—John Dewey (2008 [1933]: 136)

Introduction

On the morning of 24 February 2022, as Russian tank columns rolled into Ukraine and missiles rained down Ukrainian cities, the shockwaves were felt across Europe – especially strongly in Germany. Many Germans had wanted to believe until the last moment that Vladimir Putin’s threats were just a bluff. A ruthless, full-scale war of aggression on European soil had no place in the German imagination. In a special session of the Bundestag 3 days later, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (2022) captured the perception of an epochal break using the German word Zeitenwende, which the official English version of record published by the Chancellor’s Office translated as ‘watershed’. While the international media often spoke of a ‘turning point’, the term Zeitenwende carries an even more fundamental sense of rupture that characterised the prevailing perception in Germany, which immediately understood the beginning of the war as the end of an era. ‘We are living through a watershed era’, as Scholz put it, ‘and that means that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before’ (Scholz, 2022).

Since the Chancellor’s speech, German elites and the wider population have been trying to make sense of the Zeitenwende. The widely shared perception that Russia’s war on Ukraine marks a historic turning point for the country has sparked an ongoing debate about the necessary adaptation of German foreign and security policy. Although Chancellor Scholz never referred to his own policies as a Zeitenwende, emphasising instead that the Russian war of aggression represented a turning point to which Germany must respond, the term has become a synonym in public perception for the efforts of the government to adapt German foreign policy to new realities. Given its ubiquitous presence in the public debate, Zeitenwende was voted word of the year in Germany in 2022 and quickly made its way into the international debate (Barber, 2022; Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache, 2022). There is now frequent mention of Scholz having ‘announced’ or ‘declared’ a Zeitenwende and the need to implement it. This shift in understanding is understandable, as Scholz in his speech announced a series of decisions that broke with long-standing positions within much of the political landscape, particularly within his own party. Scholz not only declared that Germany would deliver weapons to Ukraine but also announced significant increases in defence spending. Moreover, the Chancellor stressed that Germany would change course to free itself from dependence on Russian energy. He also reported that the government intended to procure armed drones for the Bundeswehr and to soon decide on a successor for the ageing Tornado jets, Germany’s dual-capable aircraft (DCA), securing Germany’s long-term participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) nuclear sharing arrangement (Scholz, 2022). All these issues had been highly contested for years – and were now linked to the notion of the Zeitenwende in the public mind.

Yet, two and a half years after Scholz’s speech, scholars – just like pundits and politicians – still disagree whether the widely perceived geopolitical Zeitenwende has triggered a Zeitenwende in German foreign policy. Most of the first wave of academic literature on Germany’s post-2022 foreign policy stressed the significant rupture in German foreign policy that broke with many long-standing beliefs and traditions (Blumenau, 2022; Bunde, 2022). This assessment is supported by more recent research. Applying Charles Herrmann’s criteria for foreign policy change (Hermann, 1990), Patrick Mello (2024) observes an ‘international orientation change’ in Germany’s foreign policy. According to Mello, the German government did not just change specific policies and defined new goals. It also implemented change in various policy domains and began to redefine its foreign policy role, further moving away from its ‘civilian power’ identity. Liana Fix (2024) goes even further: for her, Zeitenwende essentially means ‘the end of civilian power’.

However, other scholars hold that such conclusions are premature, as Germany’s ‘new foreign policy’ remains heavily contested (Dück and Stahl, 2023). Some also argue that the path-breaking decisions in 2022 were merely ‘face-saving’ measures (Handl et al., 2023: 514) that had to be taken in the face of Russia’s brutal aggression. For them, the longer-term adaptation launched by the government has been slow, incremental and generally inadequate to counter the threat posed by a revisionist Russia, prompting critics to argue that the notion of a Zeitenwende in German foreign policy represents a ‘false promise’ (Helferich, 2023) or an ‘illusion’ (Ulatowski, 2024).

In contrast, this article’s survey of continuity and change across various Zeitenwende policies reveals a mixed ‘Zeitenwende scorecard’ (Stent, 2022). In some areas, the extent and speed of change have been remarkable, whereas progress has been limited and cumbersome in others. And while decisions in some policy fields appear irreversible, a stable consensus on a new German foreign policy remains elusive. The ‘real existing Zeitenwende’ calls for an explanation: Why was the German government able to implement policy changes in 2022 that previously seemed unattainable? And what explains the peculiar patterns of change and variation across policies adopted in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

In this article, I provide a constructivist interpretation that understands the Zeitenwende as a foreign policy identity crisis, in which widely shared foreign policy ideas deeply ingrained in Germany’s post-Cold War foreign policy identity have been shattered. The stark consequences of Russia’s invasion meant that the German government could implement policies, which seemed impossible just a few weeks earlier. Focussing on five specific policy changes that the Chancellor announced in his speech and that the German public associates with the Zeitenwende – an increase in defence spending, a new Russia policy, the delivery of weapons into an ongoing military conflict, the reduction of Germany’s energy dependence and a stronger role in NATO – I survey change and continuity in German foreign policy since February 2022. Drawing inspiration from earlier works on German foreign policy change, I will pay attention to ‘foreign policy discourse, public opinion and governmental decisions and action’ (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001: 65) to analyse to what extent Russia’s war has affected the dominant foreign policy ideas in Germany and trace whether this change has been translated into specific decisions with material implications. In a nutshell, while many foreign policy mantras have been challenged, the absence of a consensus, at least in some areas, on replacement ideas that could be linked to other elements of German collective identity has slowed the adaptation process. As the shock subsided, the ‘stickiness’ of some elements of Germany’s foreign policy identity allowed opponents of far-reaching change to push back against what they see as change that goes too far. While many of the decisions made by the German government since Russia’s full-scale invasion have broken with German conventions (Blumenau, 2022) and are difficult to reverse, competing domestic interpretations of the Zeitenwende and of the success of the government’s new policies have limited the extent of change. In the absence of additional shocks, German foreign policy can be expected to change only incrementally – meaning that adaptation will likely fall short of catching up with the changes in Germany’s security environment.

Theoretical framework: External shocks, identity, ideas and foreign policy change

Russia’s war of aggression clearly represents one of the ‘big events’ in international politics that allow scholars to study how different actors perceive and react to the same external shock. Like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the war ‘is like a strong beam of light that gets filtered by national lenses, of different self-conceptions and institutional practices, which create distinctive political responses’ (Katzenstein, 2003: 732).

Germany’s particular response to the war is hard to grasp without paying attention to identities and ideas on the domestic level (see Martill and Sus, this Special Issue), which not only shape how German policymakers see themselves, the world and their place in it but also define the scope for foreign policy adaptation.¹ I build on a line of constructivist research that has used identity – and other closely related ideational variables ranging from culture and norms to roles – to explain continuity and change in German foreign policy. Research in this tradition has often highlighted the remarkable continuity in the face of a rapidly changing environment or an increase in material power, which represented a major puzzle for competing approaches (Banchoff, 1999; Berger, 1996; Duffield, 1999; Risse et al., 1999). It has used collective identity to account for the particularly German characteristics of German foreign policy, ranging from a strong identification with and support for both the transatlantic alliance (Hampton, 1998) and European integration (Risse et al., 1999), a deep commitment to Ostpolitik and a partnership with Russia (Siddi, 2018), to a general disdain for military power (Harnisch and Maull, 2001). Identities, after all, create a sense of a collective ‘we’ that binds individuals to an imagined community, define what is unique about that specific community and establish boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – often invoking historical lessons. For Germany, this meant that dominant identity constructions emphasised the difference not only to Germany’s Nazi past but also from its own allies that, from a German point of view, were stuck in the power politics of the past that Germany had overcome (Crawford and Olsen, 2017). This sense of superiority arguably led German politicians to pursue a foreign policy that was different from those of ‘normal’ powers, but rather maintained the identity of a ‘civilian power’.

My analytical focus lies on the key ideas that are ingrained in dominant foreign policy identity constructions, understood as those elements of a collective identity that refer to a nation’s relationship with the outside world, constructed in elite-driven discourses (Risse, 2012) and assumed to ‘underlie a state’s external behaviour’ (Hill, 2013: 133). As Jeffrey Legro argued, we should understand ‘identity not as a monolithic entity but as a collage of fossilized policy ideas’ (Legro, 2009: 39). He likens policy ideas to ‘standard operation procedures’ that are internalised to such a degree that they ‘become such a standard reference point for action that they take on a value in their own right and define self-image. Policy ideas fuse into identity’ (Legro, 2009: 41).

In the German case, we can identify several foreign policy ideas that are so widely shared and internalised that they have turned into foreign policy mantras incorporated in Germany’s post-1990 foreign policy identity (Bunde, 2022). Some of these ideas that amount to standard operating procedures for Germany’s civilian power are particularly relevant here. First, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification, German policymakers consistently argued that ‘there can only be security in Europe with Russia, not against Russia’. This credo, which provided the basis for a policy of engagement with Russia, was repeated in countless speeches, party manifestos and interviews. Second, similarly shaped by the formative experience of Ostpolitik during the Cold War, generations of German politicians believed in the idea of Wandel durch Handel (change through trade) or the pacifying effects of interdependence (De Jong, 2024), following a ‘commercial logic’ and doubting that economic dependence would ever be exploited geopolitically (Szabo, 2017; Wood, 2023). In Germany’s foreign policy discourse, this was reflected in the mantra that pipeline deals with Russia were merely business projects without security implications. Third, German leaders were reluctant to treat military power as a ‘normal’ instrument in their foreign policy toolbox – epitomised by the mantra that ‘there are no military solutions’, affirming and reflecting the German anti-militarist culture (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001; Berger, 2003) and the self-image of a ‘civilian power’ (Harnisch and Maull, 2001).

Such foreign policy mantras are taken for granted by large swaths of the elites and society and thus define the realm of what is possible for a state’s foreign policy. Importantly, these ideas are intersubjective and collective ideas in the sense that they even affect those individuals who might hold different ideas. However, foreign policy ideas and identities are always contested to a certain degree. Some elements of a collective identity may be more stable than others, just as contestation varies over time. The extent to which dominant identity constructions are contested is an empirical question (Abdelal et al., 2009; Allan, 2016). While identity-based accounts often stress continuity, as identities by definition provide a necessary sense of stability for actors, they can also account for change. A focus on specific elements of identity, in this case ‘fossilized policy ideas’, promises to be particularly helpful because it allows us to study identity contestation in practice rather than debate abstract categories. Rather than asking whether Germany’s identity is still that of a ‘civilian power’, a focus on the policy ideas linked to the civilian power ‘narrative’ (Eberle and Handl, 2020: 47–48) allows us to study how political actors reconstruct crucial building blocks of German foreign policy identity.

Although identity change is thus usually incremental and sudden shifts are unlikely, seismic events and moments of crisis can trigger more rapid and radical change. Legro (2000: 254) suggests that change in collective ideas is more likely to occur under the following conditions: ‘(1) when events generate consequences that deviate from social expectations, (2) when the consequences are starkly undesirable and (3) when a socially viable replacement idea exists’. A ‘socially viable’ replacement idea must be compatible with other identity elements and be considered effective to become widely accepted. If new ideas do not produce positive results, proponents of previously dominant ideas may be able to roll back ideational change, allowing for the return of the ‘old way of thinking’ (Legro, 2009: 46).

The Zeitenwende as a ‘foreign policy identity crisis’

On 24 February 2022, Germany’s foreign policy found itself in a ‘shambles’, as an editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung stressed: ‘It is experiencing a moral debacle that could not be greater’ (Von Altenbockum, 2022). For years, German policymakers had belittled warnings from their allies on the Eastern flank and failed to take appropriate action. But Russia’s invasion not only represented a moral debacle but also highlighted how ill-prepared the country was for such a scenario. Not only did Russia’s invasion demonstrate that many foreign policy beliefs, which had been widely shared by both the German elites and the wider public, were untenable (Bunde, 2022). Many policymakers also seemed to realise for the first time that the underinvestment in the country’s armed forces had consequences, that the government’s political room for manoeuvring was significantly curtailed by the country’s energy dependencies and that Russian leaders were not interested in security with Europe. For too long, the mainstream had discarded warnings by the expert community that contradicted their mind-set (Michaels, 2024). Indeed, for some critics, Germany’s self-conception was a ‘collateral damage’ of the war, as the worldview informing German policy collapsed (Heinemann-Grüder, 2022).

In other words, Russia’s full-scale invasion caused a foreign policy identity crisis in Germany. As Stefano Guzzini (2013: 46–47) notes, ‘a foreign policy discourse or tradition experiences an “identity crisis” when the smooth continuation of its interpretative dispositions encounters problems, as taken-for-granted self-understandings and role positions are openly challenged, and eventually undermined’. This definition fits Germany’s mainstream foreign policy discourse in early 2022, crystallised in the notion of the Zeitenwende. Key policymakers stressed that Russia’s invasion meant that Germany was facing ‘a new reality’ (Scholz, 2022), that ‘the war in Ukraine is waking us all up from a self-righteous dream’ (Lindner, 2022) or that ‘we have woken up in a different world’ (Baerbock, 2022b). They also agreed that the war ‘requires an unequivocal response’ (Scholz, 2022) and ‘necessitates the revision of the very tenets of our foreign policy’ (Baerbock, 2022a). These interpretations seemed to be shared by the public. In a public opinion poll in May 2022, 70% of respondents in Germany agreed that the invasion was a turning point in world politics, while 68% also saw it as a turning point for their country’s foreign and security policy – the highest numbers in all G7 countries (Bunde and Eisentraut, 2022: 13–14).

Focusing on five important aspects of Germany’s foreign policy adaptation, the following sections aim to provide a nuanced understanding of change and continuity. As Germany’s response to Russia’s war of aggression can arguably only be understood if the failure to adequately respond to Russian revisionism before 2022 is considered, I sketch the relevant German policies and the dominant ideas that informed them in the lead-up to the invasion before describing the changes that have occurred since February 2022.

The end of the peace dividend? Germany’s changing position on defence spending

While the German population is sometimes wrongly labelled ‘pacifist’, it is well-established that the German public is – at least in comparison to citizens in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (US) – ‘less inclined toward maintaining and displaying a readiness to use military force’ (Gravelle et al., 2017: 762). Anti-militarism – although continuously being reinterpreted (Stengel, 2020) – is deeply rooted in German society, which has concluded that ‘there are no military solutions’ to political problems. This scepticism has been reflected in Germany’s relative neglect of its armed forces since the end of the Cold War (Longhurst, 2004). Seen through the dominant German lens, spending a lot of money on an instrument that was likely not helpful for solving Germany’s key foreign policy changes was not considered rational.

Whereas the (West) German expenditures on defence in the 1980s still amounted to between 2% and 3% of GDP, the defence budget of unified Germany – in contrast to other key NATO allies – noticeably decreased and remained significantly below 2% in the past two decades. According to a study by the ifo Institut, which uses NATO’s 2% spending target and the 20% investment target as the relevant benchmarks, ‘Germany has accumulated 680 billion Euro peace dividend and 230 billion Euro investment deficit – which are both more than one-third of the total for European NATO members’ since 1991 (Dorn et al., 2024: 7). While German governments slowly increased defence spending since NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014, which prominently mentioned the 2% target in its final communiqué, Berlin was still far from reaching this goal in 2022. For years, prominent politicians fought against the target, which they considered an arbitrary number. Rolf Mützenich, the influential chairman of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag and a long-time critic of increased defence spending, even likened the debate on the 2% goal to ‘worshipping the golden calf’ (Brössler, 2020). But while experts warned of Germany’s dangerous neglect of defence and the resulting depletion of its armed forces (Giegerich and Terhalle, 2021), even those who, at least on paper, were committed to reaching this goal did not prioritise military spending.

Initially, Russia’s full-scale aggression appeared to end this debate, as German elites confronted the reality of their military’s unpreparedness for a full-scale war in Europe. On 24 February 2022, General Alfons Mais, Chief of the German Army, wrote in a public LinkedIn post that Germany’s armed forces were ‘more or less empty-handed’, with ‘extremely limited’ options for supporting the alliance (Straub, 2022). German leaders felt helpless in the face of a revisionist power, which clearly believed in ‘military solutions’, prompting a decisive shift in policy. In his Zeitenwende speech, Chancellor Scholz announced that the government would establish a special fund of 100 billion euros for equipping the Bundeswehr and ‘now – year after year – invest more than 2% of our gross domestic product in our defence’ (Scholz, 2022: 13–14). Finance Minister Christian Lindner captured the sentiment of many, acknowledging that ‘for many years, we have enjoyed a peace dividend. The Bundeswehr was neglected. [. . .] The era of neglecting the Bundeswehr must come to an end’ (Lindner, 2022).

Public opinion also showed a renewed recognition of the importance of defence spending. The annual public opinion survey conducted by the Bundeswehr’s Center of Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw) in June and July 2022 found that 59% of respondents supported increased defence spending – an 18-point rise from the previous year (Graf, 2022: 4). In 2023, a NATO-wide survey revealed that 55% of German respondents believed their country should allocate more to defence, the second-highest rate after Bulgaria (NATO, 2023a: 10).

Despite political commitment and public support for increased defence spending, Germany missed the 2% goal in both 2022 and 2023, meeting it in 2024 only by including additional budget items, such as military aid to Ukraine. While the government argues that some investments require time, critics question its dedication to the 2% target and accuse it of ‘creative accounting’ (Hamilton, 2023). Observers also worry about the government’s long-term commitment to prioritising defence investments and its apparent lack of urgency (Wolff et al., 2024). Germany is, however, expected to meet the NATO spending target in the coming years, as investments paid for using money from the special fund supplement the regular defence budget. In its 2023 National Security Strategy, the government reiterated that it would ‘allocate two percent of our GDP, as an average over a multi-year period, to reaching NATO capability goals, initially in part via the newly created special fund for the Bundeswehr’ (The Federal Government, 2023: 13). While the debt-funded special fund may serve as an elegant short-term solution, it also obscures some unavoidable trade-offs. So far, the government has not decisively adjusted its multi-year budget planning for 2027, when the special fund is supposed to be spent, leaving unclear how it intends to bridge the budget gap. As Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has noted, this gap – estimated to amount to 25 billion euros in 2027 – cannot be addressed through minor cuts in other budget lines. Furthermore, critics argue that the current budgetary plans not only jeopardise the sustainable modernization of the Bundeswehr but also shift fiscal burdens onto the next federal government and future generations (Dorn and Schlepper, 2023). Under challenging economic conditions, the ‘traffic light coalition’ finds it particularly difficult to agree on a viable path forward.

Public opinion researchers caution that support for increased defence spending may be short-lived if the salience of Russia’s war against Ukraine diminishes (Mader, 2024; Mader and Schoen, 2023: 543). This challenge is exacerbated by the prevailing view in NATO that the 2% target is now ‘a floor, not a ceiling’ for defence spending (Stoltenberg, 2023). As agreed in the Vilnius Communiqué, ‘in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order’ (NATO, 2023b: §27). While Germany struggles to meet the pre-Zeitenwende spending threshold, its neighbour Poland is projected to allocate almost 5% of GDP to defence by 2025 (see Sus, this Special Section). However, only a few German leaders have begun advocating for an even higher budget, which experts believe will be necessary to achieve NATO’s new capability targets. Pistorius, who has publicly warned that Russia might attack a NATO country within 5–8 years (Timotija, 2024), noted that the NATO target ‘can only be the starting point’ and that Germany might be forced to spend as much as 3.5% of its GDP on defence (Rogers, 2024).

In sum, while NATO’s 2% target is no longer a point of contention among the parties in the political centre, the allied debate has moved further. Security experts indicate that the deteriorating security environment will likely require more substantial and expedited increases in defence spending and defence industrial capacities (Wolff et al., 2024). However, it remains uncertain whether German politicians and the public are prepared to confront the fiscal trade-offs and implement the long-term adjustments in public spending that the Zeitenwende demands.

Security with Russia no more? Germany’s changing relationship with Russia

Since the Ostpolitik of the 1960s and 1970s, credited in Germany with facilitating the end of the Cold War and unification, German governments have pursued a cooperative approach towards the Soviet Union and later Russia (Forsberg, 2016; Lough, 2021; Stent, 2022). Many Germans believed in a long-term partnership with Russia to avoid new dividing lines in Europe, following the mantra that security in Europe could only be achieved ‘with Russia, not against Russia’. However, this led German leaders to prioritise relations with Russia, often downplaying concerns from allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite some disagreements among Germany’s political parties about specific questions, there was ‘an uncanny degree of consensus when it comes to Russia policy’ (Chivvis and Rid, 2009: 105), undisturbed by shifts in Russian behaviour. German policymakers largely failed to address the growing divergence between their idealised view of Russia and the reality, preferring to believe that Russia was moving in the right direction (Lough, 2021: 110). While analysts and human rights activists warned about Russia’s domestic and foreign policy developments, official German policy stuck to a policy of engagement, trying to accommodate Russia.

Even after Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea, German leaders clung to a vision of European security that viewed Russia as a partner. In March 2014, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014) rejected criticism that his foreign policy was based on illusions: ‘I remain deeply convinced that security in and for Europe can only be achieved together with Russia and not against Russia. This realization remains correct despite the current crisis’. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2015, when the so-called separatists threatened to occupy large swaths of Ukraine, Chancellor Angela Merkel (2015) also emphasised that ‘we want to work with, not against Russia, in shaping security in Europe’. While the German government grew more sceptical of Vladimir Putin and made sure that the European sanctions introduced in response to the annexation of Crimea remained in place, it did not fundamentally reassess its Russia policy. In contrast, ‘the three principles of the civilian power narrative – multilateralism, anti-militarism and normative focus on democracy and human rights – were [. . .] articulated much more vocally toward the Kremlin’ (Eberle and Handl, 2020: 54). As Forsberg (2016: 23–24) noted, ‘the overall goal of aiming at partnership with Russia and the tendency to emphasize diplomacy and negotiation rather than military force have not changed [. . .]’.

Similar patterns emerged in public opinion. Despite a decline in favourable views of Russia from 50% in 2010 to 27% in 2015, many Germans still believed that continued engagement was preferable to harsher measures: While a majority of US respondents (54%) in a 2015 Pew Research Center survey thought that US policy was not tough enough on Russia, 62% of German respondents believed it was too tough (27%) or about right (35%). Similarly, only 27% of Germans believed the European Union (EU) was not tough enough on Russia, compared to 59% of US respondents (Stokes et al., 2015). Russia’s aggressive behaviour in subsequent years did not shift the dominant approach, as the ‘Ostpolitik narrative’ proved remarkably resilient (Siddi, 2018). Although Germany was not alone in misreading Vladimir Putin’s interpretation of Russia’s interests, it was seen as the key proponent of an approach to Russia that was based on ‘hoping for the best’, as Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (2023) later conceded.

In contrast to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s war of aggression in 2022 triggered a fundamental reassessment of Russia (and Germany’s definition of its relationship with Russia) among German policymakers, paving the way for a different Russia policy. In his Bundestag speech, Olaf Scholz (2022) asked whether ‘we have it in us to keep warmongers like Putin in check’ and began to rephrase the traditional German mantra:

Yes, in the long term security in Europe cannot be achieved in opposition to Russia. But for the foreseeable future, Putin is jeopardising this security. That is why I say very clearly that we accept the challenge that now faces us – with clear-headed resolve.

In her public statements, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock put forward another adaptation of the mantra. Admitting that ‘we did not listen to the warnings of our neighbours who urged us to take the threats emanating from Russia seriously’, Baerbock (2023) emphasised that ‘[w]e know that for the foreseeable future, President Putin’s Russia will remain a threat to peace and security on our continent and that we have to organise our security against Putin’s Russia, not with it’.

In general, public opinion seems to cautiously agree with the new formula. Data from the Munich Security Index show that 47% of respondents agree that ‘European security can no longer be achieved with Russia, but only against Russia’, while only 19% disagree.² A majority now views Russia as a threat: 66% of respondents in the 2022 ZMSBw survey considered Russia’s foreign and security policy a threat to Germany’s security, an increase by 31 percentage points compared to 2021. Furthermore, 67% agreed that Russia was no reliable partner anymore, up from 37% in 2021 (Graf, 2022: 3). While German respondents (and their French and Italian counterparts) in the Munich Security Index had previously been more reluctant to oppose Russia economically and militarily than respondents in the other G7 states in November 2021, these differences had vanished in May 2022 (Bunde and Eisentraut, 2022: 19–20).

Although the general direction of change is obvious, views of Russia and preferences for Germany’s policy have become more politicised, though. The political fringes on the far-right and the far-left push back against ‘warmongering’ and voice support for ‘peace negotiations’ with Russia, arguing that Germany needs Russia as a partner (Hartleb and Schiebel, 2023). Overall, however, there has been a decisive shift in threat perceptions in the German mainstream, which is reflected in official documents. The 2023 National Security Strategy describes Russia as ‘the most significant threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area’, noting that ‘Russia is directly threatening our security and that of our allies in NATO and the EU’ (The Federal Government, 2023: 11–12; 22).

Military solutions after all? Germany’s changing position on weapons deliveries

The widespread disdain for the military as a ‘normal’ instrument and scepticism about its usefulness have also shaped Germany’s position regarding weapon deliveries. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, both the German public and decision-makers in Berlin were hesitant to assist Ukraine. While Germany, along with France, played a key role in the diplomatic negotiations within the so-called Normandy format (Hyde-Price, 2015: 607–611; Oppermann, 2019: 490–492), delivering weapons to Ukraine was considered taboo. In early 2015, many US politicians and experts supported providing military assistance to deter Russia (Daalder et al., 2015), but the majority in Germany believed this would only add fuel to the fire. Chancellor Angela Merkel, speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2015, condemned Russia’s actions but emphasised that ‘the crisis cannot be resolved by military means’ (Merkel, 2015). When pressed by US senators, Merkel expressed doubt that Western weapons would change Putin’s calculus: ‘The problem is that I cannot imagine any situation in which improved equipment for the Ukrainian army leads to President Putin being so impressed that he believes he will lose militarily’ (cited by Stanglin, 2015). Public opinion echoed Merkel’s position, with two thirds of Germans opposing arms deliveries to Ukraine in February 2015 (Schmidt, 2015). A Pew Research Center covering seven key NATO member states found that support for sending military assistance to Ukraine was lowest among Germans, at only 19% (Simmons et al., 2015).

Politicians who challenged the consensus against military support faced massive political backlash. For instance, when Green Party co-chair Robert Habeck (2021) after a visit to the frontlines in Ukraine in 2021 noted that Ukraine’s request for ‘defensive weapons’ was ‘difficult to deny’, a public outcry from across all political parties and the wider public forced him to walk back his statement. The strength of the German orthodoxy at the time is evident in the fact that Habeck was publicly repudiated by politicians who have been widely regarded as the most fervent advocates of weapons deliveries to Ukraine since February 2022, including Free Democratic Party (FDP) politician Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann or Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) foreign policy spokesman Johann Wadephul (Naumann, 2021).

But as Russia’s threatening behaviour intensified in 2021, the German mainstream’s position became increasingly untenable. Less than a month before Russia’s all-out invasion, when more than 100,000 Russian troops were assembled at Ukraine’s borders, then German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht offered to send 5000 combat helmets to Ukraine. This announcement was widely ridiculed as emblematic of the government’s disconnect from reality (Schuetze, 2022). Still, on 7 February 2022, Lambrecht reiterated the government’s reluctance to provide lethal support: ‘It has long been the clear stance of the federal government, even in previous legislative periods, that we do not supply weapons to crisis zones to avoid further escalation’ (Lambrecht, 2022).

Only after Russia’s full-scale invasion did the German consensus crumble. But while the German government sent a first batch of (mostly outdated) light weaponry such as anti-tank rocket launchers and Stinger surface-to-air missiles (Amann et al., 2022), it was due to intelligence and weapons supplied by the US and other allies that Kyiv did not fall, prompting many Germans to re-evaluate their stance. After all, German reluctance had not prevented escalation, whereas the weapons deliveries of Berlin’s allies helped the victims of aggression to prevail. The impressions of the first weeks of Russia’s military campaign, including reports of atrocities in Bucha (Gall, 2022), galvanised German support for arms deliveries and brought about a complete reversal in public opinion. According to the ZDF Politbarometer in early March, 31% were in favour of delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine, while 63% opposed it. At the end of April, the situation was reversed: 56% of the respondents were in favour of the delivery, only 39% were against it (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2022).

However, Germany’s weapons deliveries primarily included systems that could be seen as ‘defensive’. For instance, the government provided the Gepard anti-aircraft tank, crucial for defending against Russian drones (Axe, 2023). However, it was reluctant to send ‘offensive’ weapons. Although howitzers and multi-rocket launchers followed before the summer, Germany refrained from sending main battle tanks that could have helped Ukrainian forces to retake more territory during their summer offensive. In October 2022, Germany delivered the first of several advanced IRIS-T SLM air defence systems, which the Bundeswehr does not yet possess, while debates on the delivery of Leopard 2 main battle tanks persisted for months. It was not until early 2023 that Chancellor Scholz and US President Joseph R. Biden eventually agreed that both Germany and the US would send main battle tanks. By then, Ukraine had missed opportunities to retake more territory, allowing Russian forces to regroup and strengthen their defences. Moreover, Germany’s lack of support also limited the success of weapon deliveries, seemingly lending credence to the old argument that there was no military solution to the conflict.

The cumbersome process notwithstanding, Germany has become not only one of the key financial supporters of Ukraine but also a crucial supplier of military aid – second only to the US (Trebesch et al., 2023). Once a laggard, the German government has begun to put pressure on European partners it perceives as not pulling their weight in supporting Ukraine militarily. After doubling the 2024 budget for military aid to Ukraine to 8 billion euros, Chancellor Scholz urged other EU member states to increase their efforts, stating that ‘arms deliveries for Ukraine planned so far by the majority of EU member states are by all means too small’ (quoted in Von der Burchard, 2024). Alongside the prime ministers of Denmark, the Czech Republic, Estonia and the Netherlands, Scholz published a letter in the Financial Times, calling ‘on friends and partners of Ukraine to recommit to sustainable long-term military support for Ukraine as a joint European responsibility’ (Scholz et al., 2024). Against the backdrop of Germany’s long-standing reluctance to supply weapons to conflict zones, this shift represents a remarkable change within a comparatively short period of time.

Yet, this does not imply that the Germans are shedding their anti-militarist attitudes. Chancellor Scholz has consistently emphasised the need for careful decision-making, considering potential escalatory risks and coordinating with key allies before proceeding with military aid. Despite substantial support, this cautious approach has contributed to a widespread perception of Germany’s reluctance, perhaps even unwillingness, to help Ukraine regain the initiative, resulting in both domestic and international criticism.

Strikingly, German leaders still seem to distinguish between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ weapons. The pattern that was visible in the lengthy debate on the delivery of Leopard 2 main battle tanks is being played out again in the debate on the Taurus long-range missiles. While France and the UK have sent SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, respectively, allowing Ukraine’s armed forces to strike Russian high-value targets far behind the frontlines, the German government has refused to authorise the supply of Taurus missiles with an even longer range, fearing they could be used to strike the Kerch Bridge or targets in Russia. Chancellor Scholz appears concerned about violating Russian red lines, potentially drawing Germany into the conflict (Hasselbach, 2024; Larson, 2023). His refusal is contested even within his own coalition, as prominent parliamentarians advocate for delivering Taurus missiles. For the time being, the focus lies on air defence and other capabilities that help Ukraine defend itself rather than those that would help attack Russian forces. Scholz certainly believes to be in line with a majority of German citizens who are receptible to warnings of a potential escalation of the war. According to the ARD DeutschlandTrend poll in early March 2024, 61% opposed the delivery of Taurus (The Economist, 2024). While the artificial distinction between offensive and defensive weapons may appear strange to military strategists, it can be reconciled much better with Germany’s foreign policy identity.

In sum, taking into account Germany’s traditional position on military aid, the government’s decision to send advanced weaponry to Ukraine ‘reflects a strategic and psychological revolution’ (The Editorial Board, 2023). However, Germany’s reluctance to supply some of its most capable weapons and the slow, hesitant decision-making process, often criticised as ‘Salami slicing’ (Fix, 2024: 50) or a ‘piecemeal approach’ (Handl et al., 2023: 512), have constrained Ukraine’s options on the battlefield, making the liberation of all occupied territories less likely. Furthermore, the lack of Ukrainian success on the battlefield, partly a result of limited Western support, strengthened the arguments of those advocating for negotiated settlement with Russia rather than a focus on ‘military solutions’.

The end of business as usual? Germany’s liberation from energy dependence on Russia

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine not only demonstrated that German foreign and security policy had misread Russian intentions; Moscow’s simultaneous weaponisation of its gas deliveries also highlighted the complete fiasco of German energy policy (Umbach, 2022; Wood, 2023). For years, German politicians had argued that Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, was a reliable energy partner, dismissing allies’ warnings that Berlin’s reliance on Russian gas posed a vulnerability not just for Germany but for the whole of Europe (Dyson, 2016). Despite some German foreign policy experts questioning whether the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, initiated in 2015, after the annexation of Crimea, served German and European interests (Umbach, 2018), most political parties and the wider public believed the project was separate from geopolitics. Not only did Germany accept that more than 50% of its gas imports came from Russia, it even allowed German chemicals giant BASF to swap the country’s largest gas storage facility for shares of gas fields in Russia (Kędzierski, 2022).

This outlook remained largely unchanged even amid Russia’s increasingly hostile actions, including cyber-attacks on the German Bundestag and the ‘Tiergarten murder’ in Berlin, committed in broad daylight. Following the poisoning of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny who was treated in a German hospital, two thirds of German still supported the continuation of the project in 2020, rejecting calls to end it (Appunn, 2020).

German leaders pursued the project even at the cost of alienating key allies. When the US threatened sanctions against companies involved in pipeline construction, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania’s state government established a foundation using Nord Stream 2 funds ‘to play middleman in the construction of the pipeline’ and shield participating companies (Bennhold and Solomon, 2022). In July 2021, the US and Germany eventually struck a compromise, which promised German investments in Ukraine and support for extending the gas transit agreement between Moscow and Kyiv as well as threatened further actions if Russia should ‘attempt to use energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine’ (Federal Foreign Office, 2021) in exchange for US acquiescence in the project’s completion. After taking office in December 2021, Chancellor Olaf Scholz maintained the pipeline’s characterization as purely commercial and rejected calls for using the pipeline as political leverage in the unfolding crisis between Russia and Ukraine, pointing out that the Federal Network Agency, Germany’s regulatory agency for gas, would decide on the operating permit of the pipeline ‘in a completely non-political way’ (quoted in the article by Wettengel, 2021). Public opinion also largely supported the government’s position until the beginning of the full-scale invasion. In January 2022, 67% of the respondents still wanted Nord Stream 2 to go into operation; only 24% were opposed (Haerder, 2022).

Only 2 days before the war, after Russia had formally recognised the ‘People’s Republics’ of Luhansk and Donetsk, did the German government formally halt the certification procedure. Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck noted that ‘the geopolitical situation urgently calls for a reassessment of Nord Stream 2’ (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2022).

In his Zeitenwende speech on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Scholz (2022) promised ‘to eliminate our dependence on imports from individual energy suppliers’ through investments in renewable energies, coal and gas reserves, and two LNG terminals. Yet, Germany had hardly any room for manoeuvring in the beginning, as it was frantically struggling to free itself ‘from the grip that has been tightened around Germany in recent years, either through ignorance or through strategic blindness’, as Habeck (2022) put it. While critics demanded immediate cessation of Russian energy imports, the government resisted, fearing economic crisis. This resulted in European countries inadvertently bankrolling Russia’s war effort. According to estimates, Europe paid 643 billion euros in excess market costs for fossil fuels, dwarfing Europe’s support to Ukraine (Colgan et al., 2023). Furthermore, the German government mustered enormous financial resources to help its citizens weather the high energy prices that seemed to threaten domestic support for the government’s course. By mid-2023, it had earmarked about 158 billion euros to shield consumers from the consequences of the energy crisis (Sgaravatti et al., 2023) – putting the 100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr into perspective.

Although the government made clear that Nord Stream 2 did not stand a chance to be revived, some politicians from across the political spectrum continued to float the idea of allowing Nord Stream 2 to go in operation. In summer 2022, when Russia cut gas supplies flowing through Nord Stream 1 to just 20% of the possible volume and called on Germany to open Nord Stream 2, public opinion was divided: while 53% opposed using Nord Stream 2, 39% believed the government should allow the pipeline to go into operation amid gas shortages. Interestingly, there were significant differences between the supporters of different parties, with 93% of Alternative for Germany (AfD) supporters in favour of opening the pipeline compared to only 13% of Green Party supporters (ntv, 2022). This debate largely subsided following Russia’s August 2022 gas cutoff and September’s pipeline explosions. Although fringe voices – including the AfD and Saxony’s Minister-President Kretschmer – still called for pipeline repairs and not excluding Russian gas from the future German energy mix (Deutsche Welle, 2022), mainstream German opinion no longer views Russia as a reliable energy partner. While significant parts of the German population and, consequently, many political leaders remained very concerned about the economic effects of uncertain gas supply and high energy prices for a long time, few now disagree with the political decision of the German government to wean Germany off its dependency on Russian energy. A notable 78% of respondents in the ZMSBw survey, conducted between June and July 2022, advocated for increased autonomy from Russian gas supplies, while a mere 7% opposed it (Graf, 2022: 3).

Unlike other policy fields, the policies the government adopted did not militate against other German key beliefs. While parts of the coalition, most importantly the Greens, compromised on extending nuclear power plant operations by 3 months and minimising permit standards to expedite LNG terminal construction, there was broad support for reducing energy dependence on Russia. Finance Minister Christian Christian Lindner’s (2022) description of renewable energies as ‘freedom energies’ demonstrates that it was much easier for the government to find a positive framing for their new energy policy. In contrast to the cumbersome process in other policy areas, the government thus proved willing and able to adapt and implement many of its decisions in record time. In December 2022, the first LNG terminal entered service, opening doors to suppliers like Qatar. The experience of Russia’s weaponisation of energy has likely permanently altered German policy; given the substantial investments in energy independence, a return to dependence on Russia appears highly improbable.

A key security provider? Germany’s changing role in NATO

For decades, German defence policy has been shaped by the country’s membership in NATO. In contrast to some other allies, Germany always thought of its security and defence in the multilateral context provided by the Alliance (Kaim, 2022). Yet, in the post-9/11 period, Germany was often accused of being a reluctant ally shirking its responsibilities (Noetzel and Schreer, 2008). Although many Bundeswehr officers seemed content with a stronger focus on territorial defence after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the traditional focus of the German armed forces, politicians in Berlin hesitated to put too strong an emphasis on collective defence and deterrence. While Germany agreed to lead one of the four multinational battle groups deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland within the framework of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) adopted at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, it insisted on adherence to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which it interpreted as prohibiting permanent deployment of substantial combat troops to the territory of the ‘new’ member states. From the German point of view, the goal of the deployment of NATO troops to the Eastern flank was reassurance rather than deterrence, as many German politicians believed that they needed to ‘calm down’ their allies, not deter Moscow, since a Russian attack on NATO was inconceivable for them. Moreover, many German policymakers did not want to ‘provoke’ the Russian government and recommended restraint. In June 2016, when several NATO members participated in the Anaconda 16 and Sabre Strike exercises (Vandiver, 2016), Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier made international headlines with a statement in the tabloid Bild am Sonntag that captured German concerns:

What we should not do now is further inflame the situation with loud sabre-rattling and howls of war. Anyone who believes that symbolic tank parades on the eastern border of the alliance will create more security is mistaken. We would be well advised not to provide any pretexts for a new, old confrontation (Uhlenbroich, 2016).

Moreover, Germany not only emphasised restraint in conventional deterrence. While other member states sought discussion on responses to Russia’s nuclear rhetoric, new delivery systems and arms control treaty violations, German policymakers spent years debating whether to maintain Germany’s DCA contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission. In December 2021, the new coalition agreed on a compromise that included both a commitment to replace the ageing Tornados, Germany’s DCA and plans to become an observer to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Arguably, this decision in favour of nuclear sharing was not so much the consequence of a wide-spread belief in the necessity of nuclear deterrence but rather reflected concerns about Germany’s role within NATO (Bunde, 2024: 97–103).

Germany’s strong ‘multilateral reflex’ (Tuschhoff, 2005) and commitment to NATO also shaped its response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the early days of the war, Germany policymakers believed Russian forces would likely capture Kyiv and feared a NATO member state might become the next target of Russian revisionism. In his Zeitenwende speech, Chancellor Scholz (2022) thus unambiguously stressed:

President Putin should not underestimate our resolve to defend every square metre of NATO territory together with our allies! We are absolutely serious about this. When we welcome a country into NATO, we commit to defending that country as a partner and ally. Just as we would defend ourselves!

To underline its commitment, the German government intensified support to its allies on the Eastern flank. Bundeswehr units deployed as part of the NATO enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA), including with a new Czech-led multinational battle group in Slovakia (Handl et al., 2023: 510). Most significantly, Berlin announced the permanent deployment of a robust combat-ready brigade to Lithuania, substantially upgrading the German-led multinational battalion in Rukla. While communication about the specifics of the brigade, ‘the beacon project of the Zeitenwende’ (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2023: 13), caused some irritation (Gotkowska and Graca, 2023), Berlin’s decision to be the first eFP-lead nation to deploy a brigade to one of the Baltic States demonstrated its commitment to collective defence – and an adaptation of previous policies of restraint. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis noted in December 2023:

Lithuania and Germany now have a much more similar threat assessment. The emergence of Zeitenwende is clear evidence of this. Germany’s decision to deploy over 5,000 troops in Lithuania is a decision of geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic importance for both countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2023).

While Germany’s focus – like NATO’s – remained on conventional responses to Russian aggression, Berlin also strengthened its commitment to nuclear sharing. In his Zeitenwende speech, Olaf Scholz (2022) indicated Germany would decide on a new DCA ‘in good time’, hinting at the possibility that, in contrast to earlier plans, the air force might buy F-35 fighter jets. The decision to procure F-35, the most capable aircraft chosen by the other nuclear host countries, was announced weeks later, and a contract was signed by the end of the year. Notably, after years of intense and sometimes emotional debate on the future of nuclear sharing, there was not much opposition to the decision (Bunde, 2024: 88; 103).

The broad consensus on Germany’s strengthened role within NATO is telling. While the Bundeswehr is struggling to put together the necessary capabilities and personnel for the permanent brigade in Lithuania and the first of two promised fully-equipped divisions (Rinaldi, 2023), there is strong political support for Germany’s increased contributions to NATO’s defence and deterrence in Berlin. Reflecting a changing threat perception of Russia, public opinion also seems to support these policies (Graf et al., 2024). The ZMSBw survey had historically shown a gap between support for items measuring ‘principled allied solidarity’ and support for specific examples of ‘practical allied solidarity’ such as the Bundeswehr’s participation in eFP. After the invasion, this gap narrowed significantly, although support for practical allied solidarity remained lower than that for general statements in support of NATO (Graf, 2022: 7). Similarly, while far from being enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence, German public opinion showed no major opposition to the government’s political decisions (Graf, 2022: 13).³ Other surveys conducted before and after the invasion indicate that German public opinion has become more ‘hawkish’ regarding nuclear deterrence (Onderco, 2024; Onderco et al., 2023), allowing the government to invest in another crucial capability underwriting allied solidarity.

Arguably, Germany’s increased contributions to NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrence efforts reflect the crucial role that the commitment to multilateralism in general and multilateral cooperation within NATO in particular plays in German foreign policy. In that sense, the government’s decisions not only reflect changing threat perceptions in Berlin, now much closer to its allies on the Eastern flank, they also reinforce Germany’s self-image as a reliable NATO ally, fully compatible with Germany’s traditional foreign policy identity.

Conclusion

As this article has shown, the observable patterns of the ‘real existing Zeitenwende’ align with constructivist expectations regarding identity and foreign policy change. From this perspective, the Russian invasion caused an identity crisis in Germany, characterised by the collapse of several widely shared beliefs that had been under pressure for some time. This external shock also presented a window of opportunity that Scholz and his government could exploit to implement what most experts considered long-overdue policy changes. The fact that Scholz only consulted with a very small circle and presented the key elements of his Zeitenwende speech as a fait accompli (Blumenau, 2022: 1898) suggests that the Chancellor wanted to avoid a lengthy debate in his own party, duping those who had long argued against the decisions put forward by Scholz but now had not much of a choice but to support him. But a receding sense of urgency after Ukraine proved able to withstand and even push back Russian forces meant that additional steps of adaptation and implementation turned out to be much more cumbersome. Recently, politicians on the political fringes have tried to push back against key Zeitenwende policies, questioning the deliveries of weapons to Ukraine and German investments in deterrence and pleading for a less-confrontational policy towards Russia. While the centre remains strong and the general changes are supported by large parts of the elites and the population, advocates of additional and more far-reaching adaptation are facing increasing opposition, which appeals to previously dominant beliefs questioned by the Zeitenwende. The traditional ‘civilian power’ elements of Germany’s foreign policy identity, while in crisis and subject of intense contestation, have continued to affect German perceptions and decisions.

Arguably, the development of Germany’s post-2022 foreign policy confirms that ideational change, as a necessary requirement for sustainable policy changes, is rare and depends on a number of conditions (Legro, 2000: 254). Russia’s war of aggression clearly deviated from German expectations and produced massive negative consequences – fulfilling two necessary conditions. But the question whether ‘socially viable replacement ideas’ exist is harder to answer, as the evidence is mixed or still unclear. I suggest that the patterns of change and resistance to change can indeed be explained by the contours of Germany’s dominant identity constructions, as reflected in some key policy ideas. Adaptation proved most successful where the relevant foreign policy ideas collapsed in the face of contradictory evidence, damage was obvious and new policies resonated with those elements of Germany’s ideational structure that had not been undermined by the war. For instance, deploying a combat-ready brigade to Lithuania was relatively straightforward: Previous restraint had failed to appease Russia, backlash from Allies was considerable and the brigade symbolised a new German approach in line with core elements of Germany’s foreign policy identity as a reliable NATO ally. Similarly, Russia’s weaponisation of gas evidently demonstrated that Nord Stream 2 was not just a commercial project, and that Russia was not a reliable energy supplier anymore. Germany’s dependence on Russian gas not only severely restricted Berlin’s freedom of action, it also turned out to be costly for German citizens. Given that the government could find alternative sources of energy and frame them positively, pursuing energy independence from Russia received wide support.

In contrast, a new consensus on weapon deliveries has not emerged. While the belief that sending weapons could only be escalatory was successfully questioned in Ukraine, the German mind-set seems to still distinguish between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ weapons. Support for German weapon deliveries that directly save the lives of Ukrainians citizens such as air defence systems is strong, whereas support for weapons that could help Ukraine defeat Russia remains limited. In the face of the war dragging on and without a convincing ‘theory of victory’ that would resonate with most Germans, the belief that ‘there are no military solutions’ persists. The logic of deterrence remains alien to many policymakers and the public, resulting in the continued emphasis on de-escalation and the exclusion of military options that could arguably help end the war on favourable terms for Ukraine. The recent pushback against the announced deployment of US medium-range missiles to Germany underlines the wide-spread scepticism of deterrence, particularly in the country’s east (Thurau, 2024). Despite Russia’s deployment of potentially nuclear-armed missiles that can reach most of Europe in minutes (Schneider and Arnold, 2024), a considerable part of German elites and the public view a conventional response that puts Russian targets at risk as escalatory. Similarly, while many Germans now accept that ‘security with Russia’ is impossible for the time being, they remain sceptical that ‘security against Russia’ offers a viable long-term solution. While not disputing the need for stronger collective defence, they believe that Germany and its allies will have to live with the fact that Russia as a nuclear power will play a key role on the European continent and cannot be defeated but only contained. In these cases, change remains incremental rather than revolutionary, facing persistent opposition based on long-term beliefs that have not been fully undermined by Russia’s war. Germany’s foreign policy mantras have been severely damaged, but they have not been fully replaced and remain influential.

This article could only provide a general and preliminary overview of the changes across various Zeitenwende policies. However, it clearly demonstrates that there is not only a significant degree of variation across policy areas but also significant contestation of some of the key changes implemented since 2022, begging the question how sustainable the changes are. Public opinion scholars note that while policy attitudes on issues like defence spending and Russia have shifted due to the war, the durability of these changes is uncertain, and their influence on unrelated attitudes and underlying postures remains limited (Mader and Schoen, 2023). Future research will be able to provide more conclusive answers and offer more detailed assessments of specific Zeitenwende policies. As some examples already demonstrate, in-depth discourse analyses of parliamentary debates (for a recent example, see the article by Heck, 2024) or other relevant fora, combined with ideational process tracing, could contribute to a better understanding of the development of German foreign policy over time. Likewise, future research could focus more explicitly on the party politics of the Zeitenwende and investigate legislative-executive relations (Wagner et al., 2017), dissect different party ideologies (Hofmann, 2021), analyse contestation from the parties on the political fringes (Hartleb and Schiebel, 2023) and provide a nuanced analysis of the various ‘discursive formations’ that can be found across party lines (Dück and Stahl, 2023), tracking them over an extended period.

From a constructivist perspective, the future of Germany’s foreign policy will depend on the results of the ongoing discursive battle on the true meaning of the Zeitenwende, which is essentially a debate about Germany’s identity. In the absence of further shocks that might enable more fundamental change, the adaptation of German foreign and security policy to the new security environment as the ‘alteration of old beliefs’ will remain, in John Dewey’s words, ‘troublesome work’.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, the co-editors of the Special Issue, as well as Falk Ostermann for their very constructive feedback on previous drafts of this article. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the BJPIR editors for their helpful comments.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Tobias Bunde

Notes

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