Regime-type composition of an intergovernmental organisation and dispute settlement mechanisms

How does the regime type composition of an Intergovernmental Organization’s (IGO) membership influence its institutional design choices around Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSMs)? Examining panel data from 1950 to 2019, with original data collection, we argue that IGOs predominantly composed of authoritarian states have low incentives to create or maintain strong DSMs. Additionally, we demonstrate that the variation in DSM design can be explained by the heterogeneity in the political regime types of IGO members. This article revisits the conceptualization of IGO membership heterogeneity and empirically tests several propositions concerning its impacts on the level of delegation to DSMs. While existing research offers conflicting views on the relationship between heterogeneity and delegation to DSMs, we address inconsistencies in the literature and support the claim that political heterogeneity leads to skepticism and thus results in a weaker form of DSM. Our study highlights the growing significance of authoritarian states in global governance and expands the scope of current understanding of the rational design of institutions.