Abstract
This volume documents a selection of lectures on human dignity and the right to a decent existence from a legal and philosophical perspective.
The starting point is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), form the basis of universal human rights law. In their introductory article, Gunnarsson and Weiß outline the right to human dignity, raising fundamental questions about its conceptualisation. An essential question is whether human dignity is the basis of all human rights as a stand-alone right, or whether it is mediated through specific human rights. Another central question concerns the origin of human dignity: Is it granted to every human being because they are humans, or is it acquired through performance?
Neuhäuser’s article moves within this area of tension. According to him, individual personality (genetic characteristic, socialisation, social relationships and skills) is an essential part of human dignity. Accordingly, human dignity is not only affected in absolute poverty when physical existence is not (sufficiently) guaranteed. Rather, a person deserves respect for both their humanity and their individual personality, including their performance. This would necessarily mean that not every person is or can be treated with equal respect.
Van Bueren takes a broad approach to human dignity. Building on the classic social-contract theories, she drafts a new social contract, setting human dignity at its core while ensuring effective implementation through the instruments of law. This contract not only refers to the liberal freedoms enshrined in the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights, but also to the social rights set out in the ICESCR and in the European Social Charter. As to the addressees, the new social contract applies equally to all people. Through the inclusion of social rights, social segregation can be prevented.
The chapter by Lohmann points in a very similar direction. He distinguishes three categories of dignity: (1) “special dignities,” (2) “general dignities,” and (3) “the human dignity” in international human rights protection. While the first two, according to Lohmann, are not suitable for avoiding social inequality and establishing rights, “human dignity” is a universal, egalitarian, individual, absolute and therefore unconditional concept. It is based on freedom, equality, autonomy and a dignified existence in the sense of an appropriate standard of living, covering not only the minimum subsistence requirements, but also social relationships and “self-responsible concern.”
Pierik calls for shared responsibility of the wealthy states for ensuring a dignified existence for all people at the global level. The author makes a distinction between “corporate responsibility” and “shared responsibility.” The author applies the concept of “shared responsibility” to wealthy states, and allocates to them the duty to guarantee all people the right to a dignified existence. Nevertheless, he considers this as hardly feasible, both due to the complex negotiating procedure within the international community and with regard to the enforcement of law.
Cornelisse also focuses on the global responsibility of states. She examines human dignity in the context of migration and freedom of movement in Europe, especially regarding the implementation of human rights by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. She criticises the lack of regulation that would oblige the host state to take positive measures for ensuring a dignified existence for refugees. This is, however, not the case in EU asylum law, which obliges the EU Member States to safeguard human dignity of the persons concerned.
With this broad spectrum of legal and philosophical approaches to human dignity, the book makes a valuable contribution to the highly topical discourse on the effectiveness and enforceability of social rights in general and the right to a dignified existence in particular. The gap between the abstract concept of human dignity, on the one hand, and its concrete implementation, on the other, is in the focus of all contributions.
One important aspect is the allocation to the state actors of the responsibility of assurance. Nevertheless, the participation of the persons affected in the realisation of their rights is not overlooked. Ensuring social participation, which, in addition to the basic needs of daily life, is also part and parcel of a dignified existence, also fosters political participation, enabling persons to change their situation for the positive. Autonomy, however, corresponds to the transfer of personal responsibility, as expressed by the principle of “help for self-help.” In this interdependency, autonomy and personal responsibility are essential components of human dignity.
The exploration of the right to a dignified existence from different disciplinary perspectives allows for comprehensive and differentiated insight into the subject matter in all of its intricacy and complexity. The international and supranational orientation of the contributions show that the guarantee of social rights is not a purely national task, but must also be solved globally. The COVID-19 crisis may serve as another example: it has driven many people into existential need and cannot be overcome by national initiatives alone. Again, the importance of international human rights protection as a legal yardstick for joint action of states is evident.
Reading this book offers an enrichment for all those generally involved in international human rights protection. The question of whether human dignity stands for itself as a human right or arises from the composition of individual rights is answered by all of the work’s authors within the meaning of the latter. Yet, they do not rule out its classification as a stand-alone right. Considering human dignity as a whole which is more than the sum of its parts would appear justified, particularly when interpreting human rights contemporarily, i.e. taking into account changing social conditions and challenges. Where there are gaps in the protection of concrete rights, human dignity can, if necessary, close them – but only if this stands for itself as a right.
