Overview of recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee of Social Rights (June 2023 – December 2023)

Introduction

This case law report (June 2023 – December 2023) discusses two cases before the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) and two cases before the European Committee of Social Rights (hereinafter: ECSR). ¹ The first case (Pająk and others v. Poland) concerns the introduction of a lower and different retirement age on the basis of sex for judges of the Polish Constitutional Court. In line with an earlier decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU), the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). In the case of X and others v. Ireland, the ECtHR had to examine the extent to which the residence requirement for receiving child benefits violated Article 14 ECHR, read in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR (hereinafter: AP). Child benefits were paid only to claimants who were fully resident in Ireland, and the applicants, who were awaiting a decision on their residency status, did not fulfil this requirement under Irish law. The ECtHR concluded that there was no breach of Article 14 ECHR. Collective complaint no. 167/2018 (Sindacato autonomo Pensionati Or.S.A. v. Italy) concerned the alleged violation of Article 12, § 3 ESC due to the total or partial suspension of the automatic indexation of a large share of pensions in 2011. The measure was extended in 2015 and revised in 2018, taking into account the position of particularly vulnerable persons. The ECSR concluded that only the extension of the suspension in 2015 was in breach of the ESC, as the Italian government failed to justify why such an extension was necessary in the light of the economic situation at the time. In the last case (collective complaint no. 185/2019, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Belgium), the applicants argued that their right to social assistance had been violated, as they had not received social assistance benefits following a police investigation. The ECSR did not go along with the applicants’ claim.

Pająk and others v. Poland ² : Newly introduced differential treatment in retirement age and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex

In the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, the ECtHR had to examine the lowering of the retirement age for judges of the Polish Constitutional Court. Previously, the CJEU had considered the question of whether this reduction was compatible with the EU legislation on equal treatment. ³ The case before the ECtHR concerned several former Polish Constitutional Court judges who challenged legislative amendments which lowered the retirement age for judges, from 67 to 60 years for women and to 65 for men, and had made the continuation of a judge's duties after reaching retirement age subject to approval by the Minister of Justice and by the National Council of the Judiciary (hereinafter: NCJ) (para. 5). The applicants had all reached the age of 60 when the legislation lowering the retirement age was adopted. Their applications to remain in office as judges until the age of 70 were unsuccessful. One of the applicants also lodged a request with the NCJ, without success (para. 6). Before the ECtHR, the applicants complained of violations of several rights under the ECHR, including discrimination on the basis of sex and age. This case report will only discuss the claim that the change in Polish legislation was incompatible with the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, read in conjunction with the right to private life in Article 8 ECHR. ⁴

When reviewing the Polish legislation in light of Article 14 ECHR, the ECtHR first addressed at length whether the case at hand fell within the scope of application of Article 8 ECHR (para. 206 and further). The ECtHR first recalled that while Article 8 ECHR does not establish a general right to employment or access to public services or to the choice of a particular profession, the concept of ‘private life’ in a broad sense does not generally exclude professional or commercial activities (para. 208 and the case law cited in this paragraph). As the majority of people have numerous opportunities to interact with the outside world through their work, professional life is part of the zone of interaction between the individual and others which, even in a public context, can, in certain circumstances, fall under the notion of ‘private life’ (para. 208, see also the earlier case law cited in para. 207). The ECtHR clarified that the concept of ‘private life’ is applied through two different approaches, that is, the motive-based and the consequence-based approach (para. 210). When the motives behind adopting a measure affecting someone's professional life have no connection with their private life, a question can still arise under Article 8 ECHR as to whether this measure has had or may have serious negative consequences on their private life (see also para. 211). The harm suffered by the applicant is assessed in relation to their life before and after the contested measure. To determine the seriousness of the consequences of a professional dispute, it is necessary to analyse, in light of the objective circumstances of the case, the subjective perception that the applicant claims to have. This analysis encompasses both the material and non-material consequences of the contested measure (para. 213).

In the case at hand, the ECtHR observed that no element related to private life was mentioned in the reasons for the ministerial decision refusing to authorise the continuation of the judicial functions of the first, second and fourth applicants. Therefore, it must be determined whether, based on the file and the substantiated allegations made by the applicants, this measure had serious negative consequences on the constitutive aspects of their ‘private life’, namely: (a) their ‘intimate circle’; (b) their ability to establish and develop relationships with others; or (c) their reputation (para. 214). The ECtHR first recognised that the contested measure led to a considerable drop in income, which also made it more difficult for them to find other opportunities for paid activity (para. 215). As the ECtHR also held in earlier case law, this conclusion does not mean that the disputed measure automatically falls within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. It remains up to the applicants to show that the required level of severity is reached (para. 211 and 212). Regarding the opportunities to establish and maintain relationships with others, the ECtHR observed that all the applicants without exception emphasised the negative impact of the contested measures on their respective professional careers and personal and professional development prospects (para. 217). Furthermore, the applicants were not only deprived of the opportunity to continue their judicial work, but were also completely removed from the working world in general and forced to retire eight, nine and seven years earlier. The Court held that the contested measure had clear negative repercussions on the career and prospects of the applicants (para. 217). Regarding the professional and social reputation of the first, second and fourth applicants, the ECtHR held that it could not ignore the underlying context of the measures in question, which occurred as part of a controversial government reform, motivated by the executive's desire to remove the most experienced and potentially undesirable judges (para. 218). The measure at hand also had broader negative repercussions on the integrity of the applicants. According to the Court, the necessary level of severity was reached to fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR.

As to the test applied by the ECtHR with regard to Article 14 ECHR, the Court first repeated the need for a difference in the treatment of individuals in comparable situations (para. 256). It also stressed the broad margin of discretion in the social domain, as held in earlier case law (para. 257). However, it is less easy to justify differential treatment when this difference is based on sex. The progress towards sex equality is an important goal of the Council of Europe, and only strong considerations can warrant considering such differential treatment compatible with the ECHR (para. 258).

In the case at hand, the contested measure clearly introduced differential treatment based on sex regarding the mandatory retirement age for judges. As it concerned an intellectual profession, biological differences between men and women, and any considerations related to their role in society, have no impact on the ability of either to perform such professions (para. 259). The ECtHR found that the Polish government had not produced any evidence to convince the Court that female judges in general, or the applicants in particular, were less able to perform their professional duties properly after the age of 60 than male judges in a similar situation. In addition, the ECtHR was particularly concerned about the obligation imposed on the aforementioned category of female judges to prove, by means of a medical certificate, that they were still mentally fit to sit as judges (para. 259). Regarding whether the differential treatment could be objectively and reasonably justified under Article 14 ECHR, the ECtHR observed that the CJEU, in earlier case law, had found that the Polish legislation violated EU equality law. According to the ECtHR, there was no need to depart from the decision of the CJEU, particularly as several of the arguments put forward by the Polish Government had already been raised before the CJEU. Despite this judgment of the CJEU, the applicants’ circumstances had not changed and the discrimination they complained of remained (para. 261). ⁵

Judges Wojtcyzek and Paczolay delivered a joint dissenting opinion. They argued that the case at hand did not fall under the scope of application of Article 8 ECHR, as the level of severity required by Article 8 ECHR was not reached. The judges referred to earlier case law, in which they made a similar claim. ⁶

The following comments can be made on the case at hand. This case is part of a series of cases before international courts challenging the recent reforms of the previous Polish government for violating international and EU law. Numerous cases have been brought before the ECtHR alone. ⁷ This case can be added to that list. The difference in treatment in this case is clear. Where a single retirement age applied until 2017, this age was both lowered and adjusted according to sex. Moreover, women faced an additional, even humiliating measure: if they wished to serve beyond the statutory retirement age of 60, they had to present a medical certificate proving that they still possessed the necessary mental capacity.

The ECtHR is relatively brief in its analysis of Article 14 ECHR, which is perhaps not surprising given the facts of the case. The CJEU had previously found that the Polish legislation violated EU equality law, and the Polish government relied heavily on arguments previously developed before the CJEU. More elaborate was the reasoning of the ECtHR as to the material scope of Article 8 ECHR, drawing on earlier case law where a distinction was made between the motive-based and consequence-based approach. In light of the severity of the consequences, which the ECtHR reviewed at length, the Court reached the conclusion that the necessary level of severity was met: a finding that was disputed by the judges in the dissenting opinion.

X and others v. Ireland: Residency requirement and child benefits ⁸

X and others v. Ireland concerns two applications (nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20) challenging the Irish condition of eligibility for child benefit, imposed by Irish law. The applicants argued that it discriminates against those who, although lawfully resident, have not yet been granted or or are not yet recognised as possessing a right of residence. The applicants relied on the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 ECHR, in conjunction with the right to family life in Article 8 ECHR and the right to property in Article 1 AP (para. 1). In the first application (no. 23851/20), X, a Nigerian national, applied for child benefits for her daughter. Her application was initially rejected on the ground of lack of habitual residence, linked to her not yet having been granted a right of residence. After being granted a right of residence on the basis that she was the mother of an Irish citizen, X became eligible for child benefit and has been receiving it since then (paras. 5 and 6). In the second application (no. 24360/20), Y, an Afghan national, applied for child benefit for her son M during the asylum and family reunification procedure (paras. 7 et seq.). The initial refusal was overturned after Y was granted leave to reside in Ireland. Child benefits were awarded with effect from the date on which the parent was granted the right to reside in Ireland (para. 10). The two cases concerned the right to child benefits prior to parents being granted a right of residence.

The ECtHR first examined whether the matter fell within the scope of Article 1 AP. The Court held that the Irish child benefit, by virtue of its universal nature and its payment to habitually resident parents, gave rise to a proprietary interest under the right to property in Article 1 AP. As already stated in earlier case law, where Member States have in force legislation providing for the payment of a social security benefit, that legislation must be regarded as giving rise to a property right within the meaning of Article 1 AP (paras. 67–68, and the citations of earlier case law, e.g. the Beeler judgment, ⁹ discussed in an earlier case report ¹⁰ ). The ECtHR added, however, that only the parents’ entitlement fell within the scope of Article 1 AP, since the Irish child benefits were granted only to parents and not to the children, who subsequently had no proprietary interest of their own (para. 70).

In a second step, the ECtHR considered whether the present case could fall within the scope of application of the right to family life in Article 8 ECHR, for both parents and children. The Court reflected on the purpose of the Irish child benefit, i.e. a financial contribution by the Irish State to parents or persons in loco parentis to meet some of the costs of raising children. As part of a wider system of social support for families with children, it is a universal benefit in the sense that it is paid at the same rate to all recipients regardless of their means. There is no requirement in the Irish legislation that it should be used solely and exclusively, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the qualifying child (para. 73). The ECtHR held that the Irish child benefit does not fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR, on the basis of the criteria set out in the Beeler judgment. According to the Court, it cannot be considered that the purpose of the benefit is to promote family life and that it necessarily affects the way in which it is organised. The Court did not consider that the child benefit was or could have been of such importance that the applicants, as in Beeler, would have organised the main aspects of their daily life, at least in part, on the basis of it. Moreover, the Court also emphasised that the period to which the complaint referred was relatively short (just over a year for X and E, and eight months for Y and M) (para. 74).

The ECtHR went on to review the compatibility of the Irish legislation with Article 14 ECHR, read in conjunction with Article 1 AP, for the parents alone (para. 87 et seq.).

It first considered whether X and Y were in an analogous or relevant similar situation to persons who had a right of residence and could therefore be habitually resident in Ireland under the relevant legislation. X argued that under the Ruiz Zambrano case law of the CJEU, she had a right, under primary EU law, to reside in Ireland from the date of her daughter's birth, which placed her in a substantially similar position to other categories of persons who had a right to reside on other legal grounds (para. 90). The ECtHR did not review EU law, as it is not competent to apply or examine alleged violations of EU law (para. 91). It noted, however, that the Irish Supreme Court had considered this claim at length. The latter clarified that, as a matter of EU law, the right of a parent to reside in an EU Member State on the basis of the Ruiz Zambrano case law could be the subject of an application to the relevant authority, which must have the opportunity to consider such an application. It found no basis in relevant EU law for the proposition that, where a right of residence is granted in such circumstances, all residence-related benefits must be granted retroactively (para. 93). The ECtHR concluded that X did not then have a status similar to that of legal residence and that she was therefore not in a comparably similar situation in terms of legal status to her chosen comparators, i.e. parents with a legal right to reside in Ireland (para. 94). As regards Y, the Irish Supreme Court found that she did not have a right to reside in Ireland prior to the Minister's decision on her application for family reunification with her son. It follows that she too was not in a relevant similar position to the same chosen comparators (para 94).

Lastly, the ECtHR considered whether the applicants could, on some other basis, be said to be in a relevant comparable situation to persons enjoying a right of residence in Ireland, taking into account the legal and factual elements of their situation in the particular context (para. 95). The subject matter of the case is entitlement to a universal (i.e. non means-tested) statutory social security benefit payable to all parents who satisfy the eligibility criteria, including the criterion of residence, which has a legal element (right of residence) and a factual element (habitual residence) (para. 96). The ECtHR stressed the essentially national character of social security systems (para. 98). ¹¹ It also emphasised that, under the ESC, states may require not only residence but also a prescribed period of residence before granting non-contributory benefits to persons entitled to equal treatment in respect of social security (para. 97). ¹² Each of the applicants had applied for child benefits at a time when their personal immigration status had not yet been determined and when their basic material needs were being met by the system of direct provision. Their immigration status changed with the granting of residence rights, within a relatively short period of time (para. 99). In light of this, the Court found no difference in treatment under Article 14 ECHR and therefore held that there had been no violation of that provision (paras. 100–101).

In the following paragraphs, I briefly comment on the case. Firstly, the case illustrates the complexity of international, European and national law, and the relationship between migration law (setting the limits on entry into an EU Member State) and social security and social assistance (setting limits on entitlement to benefits). No analysis of migration law or the applicable EU law will be undertaken in this case law report. What is clear from this case, however, is that States parties to the ECHR have some leeway in granting benefits during the application phase of a right to residence, which in this case was only a short period. One might wonder to what extent the ECtHR would have reached a different conclusion if the period of application had been longer, lasting a few years. In this respect, the present case must be distinguished from earlier case law in which long-term residents were not granted child benefits. ¹³

Another aspect that comes up in the present case is the scope of Article 8 ECHR and its relationship with the Beeler judgment. The test developed in Beeler was criticised in the dissenting opinion attached to the case, which argued that it opened the door to a wide range of situations, possibly even applying to all social security benefits. In the case at hand, the ECtHR drew a clear distinction between this case and the earlier Beeler judgment, holding that the purpose of Irish child benefits could not be considered to be the promotion of family life and to necessarily affect the way in which it was organised. The ECtHR has identified a number of factors which are relevant in determining the nature of the benefit in question and which should be examined as a whole. These include in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for granting, calculating and terminating the benefit, as laid down in the relevant legislation; the effect on the organisation of family life, as provided for by the legislation; and the practical consequences of the benefit, having regard to the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid. On the basis of these criteria, the Court concluded that the Irish child benefit did not fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. The Court also referred to the universal nature of the benefit and to the fact that the money was not required to be spent directly or indirectly on the upbringing of a child. Again, the ECtHR emphasised the importance of the short period during which the applicants did not receive Irish child benefit.

The decisions of the ECtHR in X and others v. Ireland and Beeler v. Switzerland feel rather contradictory. Child benefits play an important role, in particular for low-income families, helping them to ensure an adequate standard of living; such benefits are also granted specifically to raise children. Beeler, on the other hand, concerned a survivor’s benefit that was no longer granted when a child reached adulthood. In earlier case law, the ECtHR had also clearly mentioned that by granting benefits to large families, member states are able to demonstrate their respect of family life, within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. ¹⁴

In the case at hand, the ECtHR emphasised that a benefit must have such an impact as to make people consider important aspects of their daily lives after receiving the benefit. The decision of the ECtHR in the present case makes it more complex to apply the condition formulated in the Beeler judgement, that is, when does a benefit have such an impact that it allows people to organise key aspects of their daily lives? In this respect, it could be argued that family benefits in most cases do not fundamentally affect the key aspects of organising a family's daily life, as mentioned in the test applied by the ECtHR. Although they play an important role, they are often of a universal nature and are not so generous that they lead to a significant reduction in the working time of households. In addition, such benefits, like other social security benefits, should not be used to achieve, directly or indirectly, a specific objective, such as, in the present case, the upbringing of children. Would that mean that no such benefits will fall under the scope of Article 8 ECHR?

The fact that the Irish child benefit fell within the scope of application of the right to property, at least for the parents in this case, may explain the ECtHR's conclusion as to the material scope of Article 8 ECHR. The Court could already examine the case in the light of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 1 AP. However, one wonders whether the ECtHR might not have reached a different conclusion for the applicants’ children, who were legally resident in Ireland but did not receive child benefit because their parents had not yet obtained a right of residence. For them, one could argue that they find themselves in a similar situation to that of other children residing legally in Ireland. ¹⁵

S.AP. Or. S.A vs. Italy: Suspension of the automatic indexation of Italian pensions and the right to social security

In collective complaint no. 167/2018, ¹⁶ S.AP. Or. S.A. argued that Italy had infringed the requirement, contained in Article 12, §3 ESC, to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level, by suspending the automatic indexation of pensions in 2011 and 2015, resulting in a significant reduction in statutory pensions and in the purchasing power of pensioners (para. 2). According to the complainant organisation, the suspension in 2015 could not be justified by the prevailing financial circumstances and by the need to maintain budgetary equilibrium, since the Italian macroeconomic and financial outlook was stable at that time (para. 9, and paras. 23–25). S.AP. Or. S.A. held that the Italian government had not sufficiently considered alternative measures, and that the cumulative effect of the suspension also disproportionately impacted vulnerable groups (paras. 23–25). In response, the Italian Government maintained that the contested measure was reasonable and necessary to balance the budget and meet public finance goals. Italy held that the indexation mechanism was maintained for pensions below three times the minimum pension, with a gradual decrease for higher pensions. The measure was needed due to the imperative requirement to guarantee the financial viability of the Italian public pension system, to ensure intergenerational solidarity at a time of prolonged economic crisis, while respecting the protection of essential levels of civil and social rights (para. 27). The Italian Government further stated that the measures were temporary and had been substantially mitigated by the adoption of Decree-Law No. 145/2018 (para. 29).

The ECSR first reiterated the principles arising from Article 12, §3 ESC, which includes the obligation to endeavour to raise the level of social security progressively to a higher level (para. 34 and further). The Committee recalled that Article 12, §3 ESC obliges States to improve their social security systems. The extension of schemes, protection against new risks or increases in benefit rates are examples of improvements (para. 35). A restrictive development of the social security system does not automatically violate Article 12, §3 ESC. However, any changes to a social security system must ensure the maintenance of a basic compulsory social security system that is sufficiently comprehensive (para. 36). The Committee has also stated that, in view of the close relationship between the economy and social rights, the pursuit of economic objectives is not incompatible with Article 12, §3 (para. 37, and the earlier discussion in collective complaint no. 172/2018). ¹⁷ However, economic crises should not lead to a reduction in the protection of rights recognised by the ESC. Governments are therefore obliged to take all necessary steps to ensure that the rights of the ESC are effectively guaranteed at a time when the beneficiaries are most in need of protection (para. 38). In view of its earlier case law, the ECSR considered that the lack of an increase in the real value of certain social security benefits over a given period as referred to in the present complaint is not per se incompatible with Article 12, §3 ESC (para. 39). The ECSR went on to examine whether the Italian measure complied with the principle of proportionality, which is also explicitly laid down in Article G ESC (paras. 39–40).

In its assessment of the measures taken in 2011, the ESCR considered that, given the economic context at the time, it was appropriate to introduce restrictions on social security benefits. It emphasised that the proportionality of the measure was adequately ensured by exempting the lowest pensions from the total or partial suspension of the indexation mechanism for old-age pensions. Consequently, the Committee concluded that the total or partial suspension of indexation in 2011 does not constitute a breach of the ESC. It recognised the legitimacy of Italy's conclusion that the measure was necessary in light of the specific circumstances and was in the public interest (paras. 48–49). However, with regard to the extension of the suspension in 2015, the ECSR criticised the lack of consideration of alternative measures and considered that the restrictions were not proportionate. The ECSR found that the Italian Government has not sufficiently demonstrated that all relevant criteria were taken into account in 2015 when assessing the need for restrictions (paras. 51–54). The ECSR concluded that the measures taken in 2015 were not in conformity with Article 12, §3 ESC. In 2018, the Italian government adopted corrective measures which led to a significant restoration of the indexation mechanism, in particular for the poorest pensioners (paras. 56–57). The subsequent corrective measures in 2018 bring Italy back into compliance with Article 12, §3 ESC as regards the indexation mechanism for old-age pensions (para. 58).

The following comments can be made on this case. It builds on earlier case law of the ECSR, in which the Committee had to review (significant) reductions and/or restrictions of social security rights. Recent case law reports have discussed the decisions on collective complaints no. 165/2018 ¹⁸ and no. 172/2018 ¹⁹ , where the ECSR applied a similar reasoning. Limitations to social security rights can be introduced and are compatible with Article 12, §3 ESC, when they seek to achieve a legitimate aim and are necessary to achieve that aim. In the case at hand, the ECSR reviewed the Italian legislation, differentiating clearly between the economic situations in 2011, 2015 and 2018. Whereas a first set of measures could be justified in light of a difficult economic forecast, this was not the case with the prolongation of the 2011 measure in 2015. Similarly to its approach in other cases, the ECSR stressed the need for alternative measures and an adequate justification, which, it argued the Italian government did not put forward. This was different from the changes made in 2018, when the Italian government took some steps to correct the reductions made earlier. The ECSR stressed the importance of taking into account the position of vulnerable persons.

European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Belgium: the right to social assistance in police operations ²⁰

In collective complaint no. 185/2019, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) argued that a large-scale search operation carried out by the Belgian police on 7 May 2019, targeting Travellers at 19 halting sites across Belgium, resulted in the seizure of caravans, vehicles and property, as well as the freezing of the bank accounts of many families within the Traveller community. The actions were based on suspicions of criminal activity, leading the ERRC to argue that these actions by the Belgian authorities violated several articles of the ESC: Articles 1, §2 (right to work); 11, §1 (right to health protection); 12, §1 (right to social security); 13, §1 (right to social and medical assistance); 15, §3 (right of persons with disabilities to independence, social integration and participation in community life); 16 (right of the family to social, legal and economic protection); and 17 (right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection). In addition, the ERRC claimed that the operation amounted to ethnically targeted collective punishment, in violation of Article E (non-discrimination) in conjunction with the above-mentioned provisions of the ESC (para. 2). According to the ECSR, several of the allegations made by the ERRC were not sufficiently substantiated (para. 38 and further). This led the ECSR to examine the situation only in light of the right to social assistance in Article 13, §1 ESC, together with the prohibition of discrimination in Article E and the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection in Article 16 ESC. In this case law report, we will discuss only Article 13, §1 ESC.

The ECSR considered the alleged violation of Article 13, §1 ESC. The ECSR stressed that Article 13, §1 ESC guarantees the right of persons in need to adequate social assistance and, in case of sickness, to adequate medical assistance (para. 56 and further)). This means that member states must ensure an enforceable individual right to social and medical assistance, including the right to appeal to an independent judicial body regarding decisions. The ECSR found that everyone in Belgium is entitled to ‘urgent medical assistance’, which covers various forms of health care, regardless of the status of their bank accounts (para. 59). The information provided by the ERRC does not point to any specific shortcomings in the system of medical assistance to Travellers (para. 60). The ECSR acknowledged that the freezing of bank accounts affected access to benefits and that some individuals have been denied assistance (para. 61). However, it noted that Belgian law provides for various forms of social assistance, including financial assistance, which can be paid in various ways, even if a bank account is frozen (para. 62). The ECSR also held that the ERRC did not provide clear evidence that the Travellers concerned were persons in need or that the police operations automatically made them ineligible for social assistance (para. 63 and further). The ECSR reached the conclusion that Article 13, §1 ESC had not been violated (para. 70).

The following brief comments can be made on the present case. With regard to Article 13, §1 ESC, the ECSR refers to the Belgian legislation, and it appears that no violation of Article 13, §1 ESC occurred. The ECSR underlined the current Belgian legislation on social assistance, which remained accessible for the persons concerned. This meant that their right to social assistance was not violated. ²¹

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.