Abstract

The author of the present volume has been a career diplomat with wide experience of having taken up several assignments in the South Asian region, such as, India’s Ambassador to Bhutan and Afghanistan and Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh. He was Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of External Affairs, 1989–1992.
After his retirement in 1996, the author has written extensively on security issues including non-traditional security and also on other matters relating to India’s external interests, particularly India’s relations with South Asian neighbours, and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). He is currently committed to regional cooperation as member secretary of the Indian Council for South Asian Cooperation and as editor-in-chief of South Asian Survey, the biannual journal/publication of the Council. The author’s insights have been deeply sharpened by his frequent interaction in both track 1 and track 2 meetings and conferences in some of which I had the pleasure of participating with him.
The book under review bears the imprint of both his professional background and also his scholarly insights. Bringing out the synergy between peace and cooperation, the author provides a lucid analysis of how an understanding of regional cooperation is essential for comprehending contemporary international relations. After establishing historical and theoretical contexts, the book compares three substantive efforts at regional cooperation: SAARC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU). Each organization is systematically analyzed in terms of (a) drivers, (b) history and culture, (c) story of cooperation and (d) impact.
The first chapter of the book provides a historical background to regionalization. The author argues how both regionalization and globalization are inseparable and symbiotically linked. Hence, this section brings out the background of both globalization and regionalization.
The second chapter brings out the economics of regionalism highlighting the models, theories and definitions. It examines the idea of regionalization: levels of cooperation; the fields of activity; the differences between regionalism, regionalization, regional cooperation and regional integration. It further examines models of regional trade.
The third chapter brings out the regionalization theories in its eight dimensions: functionalism, neo-functionalism, realism, liberal intergovernmentalism, social constructivism, transactionalism and the new regionalism. As stated by the author:
The different theories purport to explain why and how far states are prepared to go with regionalisation and how much of their national interest they are prepared to sacrifice for its success. This depends on their assessment of how much they expect to gain from it as well as how much normative value it has; the latter is mainly a shared belief that cooperation is good in itself.
The author states how attempts are being made to bridge the explanatory gap between the traditional integration theory and new regionalism theory through empirical research on the genesis, functionality, emergence of regional identity and impact.
In Chapter 4, the author states that before any of the theories can ‘kick in’, certain socio-political preconditions must be fulfilled within the regional context. He states, ‘Without those preconditions, none of the areas or levels of cooperation or activities can even begin, and the various trade models would be quite in-operational and the theories irrelevant.’ Thus, the broader socio-political context provides the fuel for the vehicle of regionalization; theories give ‘details of the direction taken by that vehicle’.
The three preconditions are the following: first, absence of internal coercion (e.g., under the imperial system) is inherently unstable. For stable and successful regional cooperation, the first necessary precondition is that the ‘promotion or use of violence or coercion or the threat of it, will be abjured by all participating states’.
The second necessary precondition, closely linked to the first, is that states accept each other’s sovereignty and legitimacy, since the questioning a state’s existence or right of control over its territory and citizens is the most general cause of violent conflict.
The third necessary precondition is a mutual dispute settlement system that is seen as impartial enough to inspire trust among the participating states. This really means that the option of settling mutual issues by any form of coercion is removedby mutual agreement. The author is quick to add that this does not mean disputes have to be solved before regional cooperation can begin. ‘If one state believes it is important enough to settle its dispute with another, it should have an assurance of justice; only then it will guarantee peace.’ Regrettably, the author notes that all of them are absent in South Asia. Thus, in this region ‘regional cooperation may go forward in hesitating steps, but has little chance of sustained success’. This is in contrast to the author’s earlier statement that without those preconditions, none of the areas or levels of cooperation or activities can even begin.
Next the author examines the ‘sufficient conditions’ for regional cooperation. The author argues that extra-regional coercion, on the other hand, is not a necessary precondition, but it is a ‘strong sufficient condition’. The US political and economic pressure on Europe to face what was regarded as the threat from the Soviet Union is one standard example. However, it could be a strong disincentive to cooperation when, for example, the US put pressure on Pakistan to prevent it from cooperating with India. Hence, we are left guessing as to whether or not external pressure forms a ‘strong sufficient condition’ or otherwise. Since it depends on the context, any generalization on this count is not possible.
The two other sufficient conditions mentioned by the author are ‘utilitarian self-interest and shared norms and values’. The author argues that even if the necessary conditions are durably in place, this does not ensure cooperation. It is the sufficient conditions that give drive to the desire for regionalization. In my view, if ‘sufficient conditions’ exist, then the ‘necessary conditions’ by definition have to be subsumed under it, since sufficient conditions imply that no other condition is required to be fulfilled. What the author really implies is the presence of both the ‘enabling’ or ‘facilitating’ conditions which must co-exist with the necessary conditions to promote regional cooperation on a stable and sustainable basis.
Ever since the emergence of SAARC, there have been long debates as to whether conditions for its success exist. I recall political scientists debating this issue highlighted three essential requirements for the success of any regional organization. These were (a) the presence of an external threat perception, (b) the existence of one pivotal power in the grouping which would lead the organization and (c) the acquiescence by other members in the grouping to the lead provided by the pivotal power. In this book, the author does not take note of two of these prerequisites. There is some linkage with only one of them, viz., an external threat perception through a coercion of an external power as one of the sufficient conditions (as in EU). This factor is surprisingly quite downplayed in the author’s case study of ASEAN. In case of South Asia, the author correctly assesses that each member’s external threat perception varies as the smaller countries are more than eager to align with the extra-regional forces to either turn away from regionalism or use a regional group to serve great power interests.
The author however shows light at the end of a tunnel. He states that the ‘socio-political context in the region is such that the third kind of force of shared norms, values, traditions and culture is the only force to bring the region together’ (p. 94). He hopes that these commonalities, along with frequent summit and other level meetings could generate sufficient utilitarian self-interest and a learning process that could take regionalization forward. However, if India’s smaller neighbours emphasize their distinctiveness in the socio-political context, the task may become that more problematic. This is brought out in Chapter 4 discussing the SAARC drivers.
Fortunately, Article VII of SAARC Charter provides for the formation of action committees for projects involving more than two, but not all member states. It is heartening to note in this context that Joint Working Groups (JWG) of the sub-regional grouping of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) on Water Resources Management, Power/Hydropower and Connectivity have held two meetings since January 2015. As the four countries are getting set to appreciate the utilitarian model of regionalism, India is playing a pivotal role in this project.
In Chapter 7 on ‘SAARC: The Story of Cooperation’, the author provides personal insights in the origin of this organization. When Bangladesh White Paper on Regional Cooperation was received by India, the author was Joint Secretary in the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of External Affairs. He wrote a fairly detailed note on the proposal, its background, the reactions of other South Asian countries and what India’s reactions should be. In a footnote to this chapter, the author tries to dispel the myth, popular in academic circles at that time, that India’s policy makers were fearful that the smaller neighbours would ‘gang up’ against India and aggravate India’s isolation in the region. In his view, none of the concerned ministers or officials ever thought along these lines. He admits, however, that India’s caution about the proposal was based on the possibility that it would give opportunity for further external interference in the region, which an early summit without adequate preparation would have ensured. But how could have external interference increased without the preference for the same by India’s smaller neighbours, including Pakistan? Besides, was it not due to India’s concerns that led to four secretary-level meetings precisely to ensure that the summit adequately protected India’s interests? And, did not the two core principles of SAARC’s Charter at India’s initiative, viz., the principle of unanimity and exclusion of bilateral and contentious issues give India the requisite buffer against the ‘ganging up’ of India’s neighbours?
Referring to ASEAN as the second example, the author states,
‘While in South Asia there was only one kind of bond working for cooperation, and that too, an uncertain one, here there were two strong bonds, the utilitarian and those norms and values. This made for stronger cooperation.’ Further, the common culture generated the ‘ASEAN Way’—a uniquely informal and relaxed method of taking decisions—which marks the distinctiveness of this region.
In the context of ASEAN, the author dispels the widely held view that the threat from international communism was the main driver. He states that none of the ASEAN leaders ever mentioned anything like this, nor has any serious scholar from the region. Bonds of utilitarian self-interest played an important role in ASEAN. The strongest of these was the joint rejection of any role of any great power in the region. The Bangkok Declaration (1967) asserted their determination to ensure their stability and security from external interference. In reality, the ‘external interference’ the declaration mentions, implicitly focused on Communist China. In fact, China’s recent assertive behaviour in its South China Sea maritime disputes with ASEAN states has only brought them closer to the US. In my view, there can be no questioning that the current external threat perception of ASEAN is Communist China.
The third example of regionalism provided by the author is the EU. ‘Here, the necessary preconditions exist while sufficient conditions are strong, and juxtaposed with these, all three kinds of bond making for regional cooperation are present.’ The author states that external coercion played an important role in European regionalism. A perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the US pressure to the members to combine to meet the threat was an important dimension. However, the strongest bond pulling the states together, in terms of utilitarian self-interest, is the ambition for the grouping to be a super power.
One wonders why in spite of so many favourable factors the EU today is struggling to survive its existing membership. Europe is in the midst of a political and economic crisis that threatens to unravel decades of European integration and derail the world’s recovery from the great recession.
The key problem is that Europe and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) want Greece to carry on with a previously agreed programme of spending cuts, labour market reforms and tax rises. In contrast, Athens is rejecting any further changes to pensions, taxes or reforms in general. This presents the Greek Prime Minister a dilemma: If he does not make concessions to lenders, then he will not get any funding. But if he does, he could end up out of the office. The domino effect of Greece’s exit has been widely debated and discussed. The author discusses this issue, paradoxically, in his chapter on ‘EU: The Story of Unity’ (Chapter 13) under the section ‘Blowback’. The author is correct in his assessment that the Euro has been a political rather than an economic project. The lesson for other regions is not to mix economics with politics.
An Appendix to the volume includes a succinct glossary of nearly a hundred regional cooperation organizations which considerably adds to the worth of the volume. This volume is a must read for all scholars and practitioners of regional cooperation around the world.
