Don’t shoot the messenger: How business leaders get their bearings on a matter of science

Background

The 2007 election of the Labor Party was a turning point for climate change policy (Daily Telegraph, 2009; Flannery, 2008; Peters, 2008). The Rudd government ratified the Kyoto Protocol and prepared a national emissions trading scheme (Coorey, 2009; Wong, 2008). Following a turbulent public debate, the legislation was withdrawn, the Labor leader replaced, and the new leader – Julia Gillard – went to the 2010 election promising there would be no tax on carbon (Sydney Morning Herald, 2010). This was reversed subsequently, and a carbon tax has now been implemented. The unpopularity of this tax has been a major problem for the Labor Party.

Around the world, attempts to implement climate change policies have resulted in intense public debate. Opposition to climate change policy, often led by conservative organizations, has focused on the supposed weakness of the science and the predicted economic damage from climate change policies (McCright and Dunlap, 2000: 510). Those calling for action have been labelled as emotional, ill-informed and extreme (Jacques et al., 2008: 352; see also Jennaway, 2008). Business leaders are in a powerful position as spokespeople about the potential economic impacts of any legislation. As Guy Pearse (2007) has shown, they have had both a public and policy development role in the climate change debate. This research uses interviews with 40 business leaders in the Hunter Region of New South Wales (NSW). The research finds that while levels of concern about climate change vary, there are important areas of commonality. Environmentalists and scientists are distrusted and the growth economy is sacrosanct. While climate change may be acknowledged, there are limits to acceptable remedies and participants argue that any measures to alleviate climate change must be cost-neutral for business.

Methods

The research was carried out in the major coal mining hub of the Hunter Valley, which is home to the world’s largest coal port (Australian Coal Association, 2009). The region has a long association with the coal industry through mining, power production and coal exports, but the benefits of this have recently been contested by those concerned about the health and environmental impacts of mining, including climate change (Connor et al., 2008: 77). Coal production in NSW has continually risen – in 2007/08 135 million tonnes of saleable coal was produced, compared to 167 in 2011/12 (NSW Mining, 2012). The Hunter is a hub of debate over mining approvals, with the NSW government recently changing the approval process that would prioritize the projected economic contribution of a mine above other considerations (Harris and Sainsbury, 2013).

Interviews were conducted in two stages. Ten participants were involved in the initial study in early 2009, and a larger sample of 30 was collected in late 2010/early 2011. Participants were in mid- to high-level management positions of prominent businesses with operations in the Hunter region and were identified through local and national media, as well as industry advocacy networks. Interviews were semi-structured, covering the participants’ views on the public debate about climate change, government policy, practical business responses and personal opinions about the future in relation to the issue.

The majority of participants in the 2009 sample were representatives of stakeholder businesses in the climate change debate. They included: coal mining and exports (1), shipping (1), aluminium (1), aviation (1), consultancy (2), business advocacy (1), technology and science (1), climate and business advocacy (1) and natural resources (1). The second sample was intended to involve business leaders from various industries that are likely to have different priorities in relation to climate change. The resulting 2010/11 data set included people from the following industries: law (2), health professions (1), insurance (1), finance (2), tourism (1), fitness (1), viticulture (1), horsebreeding (1), farming (1), coal (4), aluminium (1), business advocacy (2), construction (1), maintenance (1), infrastructure (2), aviation (1), consultancy (3), renewable energy (2), research (2).

Interviews were fully transcribed, and brief notes were taken about the interview location and how it was organized. Qualitative analysis of individual transcripts was carried out to identify themes and discourses in each interview. These were cross-referenced to seek out commonalities and differences among participants. As a qualitative project, the study does not provide knowledge of the predominance of particular viewpoints within the business community as a whole – the data is more suggestive than definitive.

The sociological framing of climate concerns

Recent years have seen a number of prominent sociologists focus on climate change. Ulrich Beck’s (2009, 2010) theorization of our response to climate change encompasses a broad range of social changes in response to risk. Risk society is brought about through the recognition of the potential mega-hazards produced through the process of modernity. The response to this recognition is a drastic change in how society is organized.

In responding to risk, Beck theorizes an opposition between global capital, governments and civic movements:

Global risks empower states and civic movements … on the other hand, they disempower globalized capital because the consequences of investment decisions give rise to global risks, destabilize markets and awaken the power of the sleeping consumer giant. (2009: 66)

Such an opposition helps to explain the difficulty governments have faced in attempting to implement climate change mitigation policies, as well as ongoing conflicts between environmental movements and industry in Australia. Beck’s (2010) more recent work has argued that, for this reason, a cosmopolitan approach to the social analysis of climate change – and presumably any proposed solutions – is needed. Certainly the data collected for this research indicates that the prevalence of national interest arguments is a problem, although this is not discussed in detail here.

Because environmental risks ‘cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially: they encompass nation states, military alliances and all social classes’ (Beck, 1995b: 1), Beck argues that traditional class allegiances are breaking down (see also Bauman, 2000: 148–65). Environmental risks ‘cut across the social order’ with the potential to ‘split the business camp’ (Beck, 1995a: 28). Parties which benefit from an industrial activity that causes environmental problems compete with parties that suffer from that problem. The latter form the basis for Beck’s version of ‘ecological modernization’ as they see ‘decisive action to counter climate change as a source of new opportunities for markets and growth’ (2009: 102) and argue for a ‘modernisation of modernity’ (2010: 173). This type of response to climate change is to be expected from business leaders in industries which are not wedded to greenhouse-intensive industries, such as renewable energy or those in the service sector.

Anthony Giddens has also emphasized the differential responses from business industries to climate change, arguing against the ‘easy demonising of the industry lobbies’ and that they ‘are quite frequently divided’ (2011: 122). Giddens’ overall suggestions about responding to climate change emphasize political feasibility within a parliamentary democracy rather than any drastic realignment of the values of consumer capitalism. John Urry, on the other hand, is more critical of the role of consumer society and argues that this is embedded within the neoliberal paradigm (Urry, 2011: 60–3). Urry argues that sociology needs to acknowledge the resource limits of the planet and offer an analysis that will account for this. In doing so, he puts forward a number of potential forms of social organization that will, to paraphrase, bring society into climate change. These include perpetual consumerism, local sustainability, regional warlordism, and low carbon, digital networks (Urry, 2011: 144–54). The data here alludes to some of these potential outcomes in relation to climate change, but suggests that the climate change debate is far from reaching any consensus on these possibilities. Rather, the data suggests that although there are some differences between business leaders in terms of their responses to climate change, there is overall agreement about the importance of economic growth. This appears to inform a strong distrust of environmentalists and scientists who argue in favour of climate change mitigation measures.

Class and climate change

As Giddens’ comment about the easy demonization of business interests suggests, some social scientists identify the problem of climate change as being embedded in the capitalist mode of production (Baer, 2008). From this perspective, people within the business community are seen to oppose measures to contain climate change in order to defend their profits. Business scepticism about climate science is an ideological response, a defence of class interests. In mounting this defence, business leaders may align themselves with their workers, arguing that legislation to limit climate change poses a threat to their standard of living. As the prominent eco-socialist academic and activist Joel Kovel puts it, ‘the labor movement itself … dependent on jobs within existing capitalist workplaces, often shares with capital resistance to environmental protection’ (2007: 256). Indeed, the NSW Minerals Council has run numerous campaigns encouraging workers and community members to support mining in their region.

The idea that business people attempt to mobilize the public against environmentalists in order to defend their own economic interests is clearly useful to an extent. It helps explain the link between climate scepticism as a media phenomenon and business funding (McRight and Dunlap, 2010), the resistance of both business and the public to adequate climate policies (Hamilton, 2010), the public opinion studies which show resistance to measures which might increase taxes or the costs of energy to the consumer (Leahy et al., 2010), and the link between party political allegiance and views on climate (Dunlap and McRight, 2008).

This analysis is certainly useful in explaining the divisions (and possible alliances) between business, the environmental movement and the public. However, our own research suggests a new interpretation.

While most analyses treat environmentalism as a ‘civic movement’, we argue that it is important to think about its class location and the way this is perceived by other social actors (see also Gow and Leahy, 2005; Leahy, 2003). Other approaches to class may help us to draw this social landscape more carefully. John Ehrenreich and Barbara Ehrenreich (1979) argue that modern capitalism (since the early 20th century) has increasingly relied upon a mediating ‘professional managerial class’ (PMC) whose role is to provide technical advice to capitalists and to manage and guide the working class. The PMC is also resented by the working class for their privilege and control functions (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1979: 17). A persistent fantasy of the PMC is to envisage a technocratic takeover of society; ‘all aspects of life would be “rationalized” according to expert knowledge’, the capitalist class would be ‘swept away to make room … for a rising class of experts’ (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1979: 22). We argue that the interview data presented here suggests that many of the business leaders perceive both environmentalists and climate scientists as a ‘class of experts’ who have little concern for, or knowledge about, the material conditions of the working class.

To further explore this idea, we make use of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1989) theorization of class as a matrix, with class positions based on different forms of ‘capital’. On the one hand there is economic capital, based in material possessions. On the other, there is cultural capital, competence in the skills legitimated by the educational apparatus. These differences are the basis for social antagonism:

The fractions whose reproduction depends on economic capital, usually inherited – industrial and commercial employers at the higher level, craftsmen and shopkeepers at the intermediate level – are opposed to the fractions which are least endowed (relatively, of course) with economic capital, and whose reproduction mainly depends on cultural capital. (Bourdieu, 1989: 113)

These social positions are associated with different lifestyle choices and values – a ‘habitus’ which animates taste across a wide range of social fields. The nature of the rivalry that is of particular interest for this research is summarized: ‘Whereas the dominant fractions of the dominant class … incline towards a hedonistic aesthetic of ease and facility … the dominated fractions (the “intellectuals” and “artists”) have affinities with the ascetic aspect of aesthetics’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 176). An important aspect of Bourdieu’s analysis traces cultural affinities between the rich and the working class. They are alike in valuing the material pleasures of life, while those with cultural capital disdain these materialistic pursuits, favouring various kinds of aesthetic asceticism (1989: 214–19).

We can treat views about the environmental crisis as a field in which these rivalries between classes (or class fractions) are played out. Members of the business community respond to the issue of climate change in terms of their habitus. They perceive the warnings of scientists and the instructions of environmentalists as coming from a section of society towards which they have a long-standing animosity – those with high cultural capital and less economic capital than their own. They interpret the messages of scientists and environmentalists through this lens. The policies recommended by these groups are seen as the coming out of the asceticism to be expected from this social location. Attempts to regulate society by science are interpreted to represent the most recent version of technocratic utopianism.

The fact that environmentalists are drawn from this section of society with high cultural capital cannot be in doubt. A number of studies have found concern for the environment to be stronger among middle-class, well-educated, urban and younger populations (Strandbu and Skogen, 2000; Threadgold, 2012; Tranter, 1999). Strandbu and Skogen (2000) point out that these values, and support for environmental protection, often align with high levels of ‘cultural capital’ as Bourdieu (1986: 243–8) theorizes it. There is no doubt that the leading scientists who are nominating climate change as a problem are also drawn from the section of society with high cultural capital.

Support for government intervention?

A key test of whether climate change is disrupting traditional class structures as argued by Beck (1995a, 1995b) might be seen in the way business leaders are responding to legislative proposals aimed at curbing greenhouse gases. The data from 2009 indicated that participants within industries that have higher carbon outputs were more resistant to legislative measures (Bowden, 2009). They put strong conditions on any support for legislation – that trade-exposed industries should be given exemptions from the scheme and, perhaps more importantly, that the scheme only go ahead within the framework of a new global agreement (Bowden, 2009). Ultimately, the Copenhagen conference in 2009 failed to agree on any replacement for the Kyoto Protocol; at least a part of the reason for Prime Minister’s Rudd’s backdown on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) and the leadership coup that followed. On the other side of the debate, participants from industries such as renewable energy and research were much more supportive of the CPRS, and were enthusiastic about the ability of industry to adapt to the legislation. These earlier findings support Beck’s (1995a, 1995b) analysis of the split within the business community in terms of winners and losers from environmental reform. On the other hand, they also showed the numerical and financial dominance of those in the business community who opposed meaningful reform.

By 2010/11 this limited support for regulation had evaporated. Even those business leaders who were concerned about climate change were not supporters of the newly proposed carbon tax. Their opposition was focused around economic concerns, job losses, and a general distrust of government. ‘Richard’ is the CEO of a finance organization, which had participated in a number of government schemes to support greenhouse gas reductions and undertaken a program to reduce its own carbon footprint. When asked about the carbon tax, Richard’s main concern was that it could have an impact on employment:

Paul Howes [of the Australian Workers Union] would say, well my workers down in the Illawara would lose their jobs and you know, if they closed Port Kembla, there’d be massive unemployment in the Illawara.… Are there real jobs in their local community that they can do, now? I tell you what, I wouldn’t be banking on something in the solar industry given what we’ve seen in the last three years. (Richard, finance, 2011)

Even for someone concerned about climate change and willing to participate in projects to mitigate it, there is no confidence that alternative jobs could be found for people working in carbon-intensive industries. For this reason, Richard was opposed to the carbon tax.

For ‘Lisa’, who convinced her managers to create an environmental division in her work place, the carbon tax is too ‘negative’ and costly:

Everything seems to be negative with this whole climate change thing, instead of, ‘you can change the world, we can all do this’, all that sort of stuff, we’re ‘oh well because of this climate change thing and all of these – you know, all of this situation – you’re going to pay more for your electricity, you’re going to pay more for your water and now we’re going to bring a carbon tax in and everyone’s going to pay more for everything’. (Lisa, maintenance, 2011)

Although Lisa is passionate about the environment, she is not happy about the idea of having to pay for environmental protection. As above, what is being emphasized is the material damage to be inflicted on ordinary people.

While in 2009 there was some support for carbon trading, by 2010/11 there was little support for the carbon tax. This could easily be a result of the particular circumstances of the carbon tax debate. The announcement that the government would, in fact, go ahead with a carbon tax, despite an election promise to the contrary, suggested that the prime minister could not be trusted, which was of course an emphasis of campaigns against the tax. There were no doubt other factors: the failure of the Copenhagen summit, the global financial crisis, the well-publicized problems with the roll-out of the insulation program and problems with the solar rebate scheme.

Yet it would be wrong to over-emphasize changes in the extent of business opposition to a carbon price, as revealed in our data. In the 2009 study, business leaders who opposed the CPRS and were sceptical about climate change dominated the responses. The business leaders who were more favourable were drawn from renewable energy and research – a small fraction of economic activity in the region. By 2010/11, even this marginal support for government regulation had dissipated. In both data sets, the key arguments against regulation were in terms of the likely impact on the economy. Regardless of the industry in which they were involved, there was little support for a carbon tax.

The split in the business camp?

Within Beck’s (2009) framework of analysis for environmental risk, we would expect the business community to be split – with some business leaders more concerned about climate change and more enthusiastic about the new green technology. It is true that within our data, there were participants with such views. Yet arguments for change were focused on the cost savings to be made, a ‘win-win’ situation for businesses, premised on the claim that efficient business practices will also help the environment (Young and Tilley, 2006: 403). This position was used to avoid a split in the business community by opposing any actual regulation of the capitalist economy.

These business people expressed the opinion that economic efficiency was the‘common-sense’ approach to climate change:

Business can see that there’s money to be saved and it’ll make a difference to their bottom line so, now, it’s really worthwhile, you know what I mean – even when they, even if they don’t believe that it’s going to make a difference to the world or anything like that, it’s going to make a difference to their business – which is good. (Lisa, maintenance, 2011)

It really should be a debate around ah, we have natural resources that we use, for our daily lives – those resources are finite, those resources are vital, and they’re scarce. What can we do about making them last longer? Then it doesn’t matter what causes them, it doesn’t matter what causes them at all, if you have a debate that’s framed in that way that whole – sides – disappears. (Danielle, lawyer, 2011)

By reframing the debate around efficiency, questions about climate science become superfluous. There is no need for legislation because business just needs to be educated about the advantages for their bottom line. So, green alternatives for business are proposed hypothetically as the way to move forward, but they are also a means of opposing the actual control of global capital through the carbon tax.

Looking at other business leaders, who were self-declared sceptics regarding climate change, we can see how they took up these themes to present their own views as moderately pro-environment:

[D]on’t get necessarily hung up on whether there is climate change or not. Does it make sense to be doing something to capture the carbon and do something with it? So it’s about, in my view, sustainability. I think that personally we need to be quite careful about branding everything climate change. What I am convinced of personally – and it’s good business practice as well – is not to waste precious resources. (Paul, shipping, 2009)

What I do believe in is minimizing footprint. Ah on the environment – ok. That’s a good thing to do. Minimize our footprint, maximize the efficiency of our industrial processes. Minimize waste, ah – um maximize ah the ongoing ah – ongoing support of ecology. And all those things, all those things that are traditional green things I believe in. I – I really hate this, the lies and the fear that comes from the greenhouse – supposed greenhouse effect. (Anthony, consultant, 2011)

So while these two sides of business might have differing views about climate change, this issue does not ‘split the business camp’ as Beck proposes. Instead, the ‘win-win’ approach provided by ‘sustainability’ functions to allow antagonism to the carbon tax and emphasizes a shared common perspective. The promise of ecological modernization becomes a hegemonic model for resistance to any effective climate change proposal.

Those business people who may believe in the reality of climate change voluntarily abdicate this ground for making claims about policy, declaring that this issue is not important if another is to be found. Measures that will have no detrimental impact on business or consumers are seen as adequate. Julie puts it like this:

You know I guess there are community groups and organizations out there who are on the extreme side. And there are others who just look at the economic side of things and there are others who are a bit more neutral, and I guess that’s what [my organization] is – considering all, all action that needs to be rational, kind of, not be detrimental to businesses or to households. (Julie, climate change and business advocate, 2009)

Within this framework, there is no course of action that can be taken in the case where environmental protection and economic growth come into conflict. Those who would argue that environmental concerns should take priority over the economy are at the extreme end of the spectrum.

This data suggests that Beck’s forecast that the business community could split over environmental issues is yet to be realized. Rather, participants who are aware that their peers have differing views about the science of climate change make an effort to avoid having that discussion. By appealing to a shared set of values, they argue that it is possible to continue our affluent lifestyle without making major changes, that the science of climate change is irrelevant and that a carbon tax is not necessary.

Views of environmentalists and scientists

In establishing this business consensus, environmentalists and climate change scientists are constituted in very negative terms. The views of interviewees fit well with Bourdieu’s analysis of class and class fractions.

Environmentalists are depicted as unrealistic, emotive, and irrational:

This morning I was listening to Climate Action Newcastle who are going down to Sydney today to lobby for a 100% renewable energy target by 2020. I mean that would be fantastic, that would be wonderful, but it’s just not going to happen. It’s just not practically possible. (Joe, business advocate, 2009)

The Greens are bad. You know they’ve got their little group of experts talking about the same issues in these debates and I think the Greens are always really emotive – that’s very easy to dismiss, you can then dismiss their message, you know, if they’re not presenting their arguments on economic – and a rational basis, for business, it’s too easy to dismiss them. It’s just about the emotive – radical – fringe. (Danielle, lawyer, 2011)

There seems to be this religious fervour – about climate change. (Amanda, coal, 2009)

In the class politics that Bourdieu describes, the materialist position is the rational one and environmentalism is ‘emotional’, a term which could also used to describe the artistic bent of those with high cultural capital. Environmentalism is religious because the values that animate it are not the real material values which run the world. The dismissive phrase, ‘their little group of experts’, calls into question the scientific basis of claims made by those with high cultural capital. These claims must be discounted because they are misleadingly presented as being based in science; in fact they are motivated by a rejection of material, economic ‘needs’.

Similar arguments are made about climate scientists, those who provide arguments for the environmentalist lobby group to attack materialist rationality. ‘Paul’ and ‘James’ see scientists as being religious in their pursuits:

One of the things that shocked me … is the brutalness of scientists for their own mantra … and their ability to sword someone else of their fellow scientists who doesn’t agree.… I find the fundamentalism of the scientists to be actually breathtaking. (Paul, shipping, 2009)

It’s science meets religion … there’s a bit of a mantra that’s hard to break. (James, water supply, 2009)

Paul undermines the claim of those with high cultural capital to speak on the basis of neutral knowledge. This is just a front beneath which lies naked self-interest. The scientists’ predisposition to find fault with materialism is like a religion in that it is not based on any kind of neutral rationality. Scientists and their environmentalist followers are put into the same frame: caught up in the fervour about climate change, they are not being rational. In fact, environmental science masks the material interests that lie behind it:

I’d love someone to actually get the scientists to bank their house on what they’re predicting… I’m very sceptical of scientists, of universities, because it’s about funding and research and boy here’s a new topic where I get into it. (Paul, shipping, 2009)

See even with research, the essence with research is ‘I want to get a certain result, so this is how I’m doing my research.’ (John, finance, 2011)

So scientists are part of an economically privileged group that is merely pretending to put moral concerns in front of material interests. Their real motivations are research grants. They are not people who would actually bet their own house on it. Their claims are depicted as moral posturing (Bourdieu, 1989: 256).

Environmentalists, too, are depicted by participants as having questionable motivations. ‘Steven’ is the CEO of a coal mining company, who has been following the debate about the potential health impacts of coal dust in the region.

I don’t think probably people in Sydney really give a toss for the health of people in Singleton.… Climate change, I think that is the single biggest issue at their level.… Um and it’s much easier to be quite, um – I won’t say holier than thou – it’s quite easier to be, to condemn, etc. when you’re actually removed from the realities of, of the benefits that mining brings to, to local regions. (Steven, coal, 2010)

The phrase ‘holier than thou’ fits exactly with Bourdieu’s descriptions of the viewpoints of those with economic capital where those with cultural capital are concerned. This intellectual elite hypocritically forgets their own material well-being while attempting to undermine the material power of the rich – their real game. In the meantime they forget that what they propose could reduce the real material well-being of the ordinary populace.

These interviewees also suggest that what is implied by environmentalism is nothing other than an attempt to uproot modern society:

We will have social anarchy if we implement the environmental call to stop coal. (Paul, shipping, 2009)

What environmentalists propose is a utopian fantasy:

People are living in la la land if they think [coal’s] going to be gone overnight. (Julie, climate change and business advocate, 2009)

What environmentalists and scientists propose is a technocratic fantasy of society regulated by impartial neutral science. What lurks beneath this fantasy is the grubby world of material interests, the unavoidable political reality for all parties, even those claiming to be ‘holier than thou’.

The defence of materialism

In their attack on environmentalism, interviewees appeal to the ‘ordinary’ person. Materialist values and the growth economy are depicted as a ‘common-sense’ approach shared, globally, across society:

I go to you and say – I will double your bill. I will triple your bill. Your electricity bill. What will you say? You will say, ‘No, I don’t want that.’ (Frank, aluminium, 2009)

Those people [in China] have a real – they want a lifestyle the same as what we have in Australia … and one part of me says, ‘Is that an unreasonable request, seeing that we have that?’ And I know people say, ‘Well no, you can’t have that because you’ll harm the planet’, and they say, ‘Well, is that fair that you have it, and you want us not to have it?’ (James, water supply, 2009)

Inherent in participants’ comments is a belief in the right of all people to consume at the same level of those in richer countries – a right they see as being under threat if climate mitigation policies are implemented. Yet as John Urry (2011) has convincingly argued, such a perspective is extremely problematic in terms of recognizing that limitations to resources will inevitably mean that this situation will need to change.

This is linked to another argument that is commonly found in the popular debate about climate change – that mitigation policies might cost jobs:

I mean Tomago [aluminium], it’s got 1200 employees but it’s got another three or four thousand in suppliers, you know people engaged in supplying. I mean that’s a huge social impact the day that that company decides to close. (Joe, business advocate, 2009)

Maybe I’ve got my head in the sand but it, if it [the coal industry] does [close], there’s, there’s, there’ll be serious problems.

What we have here are the class politics specified by Bourdieu. Business leaders put themselves on the same side as workers – both groups are opposed to the environmentalists who lack an understanding of the importance of basic material needs.

This alliance examined

It is certainly true that the critique of environmentalists as an elite who do not take into account the material realities of life is shared by many working-class members of the public. Gow and Leahy’s 2003 survey in this same Hunter region found that ‘56 percent [of respondents] agreed that environmentalists “do not know a lot about the issues they demonstrate over and … forget that other people’s jobs may be involved”; [while] 29 percent disagreed’ (Gow and Leahy, 2005: 132). On the other hand, when interviewed about environmental problems, residents from the Hunter region expressed a concern about environmental issues which was just as extreme as that of the environmentalists; returning a range of 60–90 percent of ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ in response to questions about environmental problems (Gow and Leahy, 2005: 124). They also blamed business (and government) for these problems; 76 percent thought those who build and run factories and cut down forests cause dangerous pollution; 96 percent thought businesses should pay for the environmental damage they cause (Gow and Leahy, 2005: 126–7).

Whether similar levels of concern about the environment would be registered in the Hunter today is a moot point. In Australia at large, the temporary support for a price on carbon has dissipated. The Lowy Institute has conducted polls on global warming since 2006. The statement most consistent with political support for strong measures is that ‘Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs’ (Hanson, 2012: 6). Support for this position has dropped from 68 percent in 2006 to 48 percent by 2009 and 36 percent by 2012 (Hanson, 2012: 6). Those polled in 2012 were mostly opposed to the carbon tax (63 percent). Only 35 percent were in favour. Those against the tax were more concerned with potential job losses than any other issue (Hanson, 2012: 5). This change should not be seen as indicating that the majority of people actually believe that business leaders can be trusted to save the environment. It is more likely that they do not trust environmentalists to look after the material interests of ordinary people.

So while business leaders make use of a ‘shared interest’ argument with the public, it seems more likely that the public distrusts business people and environmentalists in equal measure. Further, when the business leaders of this study defend the rights of all to enjoy material wealth they seem to forget the current realities of inequality – between both business and the working class, as well as between rich and poor nations – issues which are discussed in more detail by Beck (2010) and Giddens (2011).

Some conclusions

The lack of qualitative data on business leaders’ attitudes to climate change makes any national comparison of the data presented here problematic. In April 2011 the Sydney Morning Herald attempted to survey the top 50 Australian Securities Exchange companies on their support for the carbon tax, and received only 23 responses. Of those, while 12 were positive, the authors noted that ‘support was heavily qualified with a growing list of demands for compensation’ (Yeates and Murphy, 2011: 10). Our research can only be seen as identifying some of the discourses around climate change operated by business leaders in the Hunter. While these discourses are readily available in the public arena, further research would be useful to ascertain the extent to which they are employed nationally, and their impact on public policy.

What is clear is that these participants do not see industries easily transferring through a process of ecological modernization. Although there is some differentiation among participants about the science of climate change itself, there is strong resistance to a legislative response. Interviewees defend business against the machinations of scientists and environmentalists and side with the supposed views of the working class and the poor of the world in preferring jobs. Interviewees ignore the potential threats that climate change might pose to the ongoing functioning of the economy, a point which is aptly articulated in the work of John Urry (2011). Participants who are concerned about climate change recommend efficiency as a ‘win-win’ strategy for business and the environment.

The framing of class in the work of the Ehrenreichs and Bourdieu is very helpful in mapping the antagonism between business leaders and the two social groups that are calling for tough action on the environment. There is a confrontation between those with high cultural capital and those with high economic capital – between the PMC and the capitalist class. The former defend asceticism and the higher values of life while the latter defend everyday material comforts. Certainly this is how business leaders see the issues. Scientists and environmentalists are people employed in comfortable, secure occupations, influencing policy from ‘on high’ but with no real understanding of the importance of material well-being in people’s everyday lives (Johnson, 2007: 196). The interviewees construct themselves as sympathetic to the desire for comfort, convenience and growth shared by the population at large and by the poor of developing nations. They claim more concern for social justice issues than their environmental and scientific counterparts.

The possibility that scientists and environmentalists are correct about the science is buried by participants’ reaction to the ‘asceticism’ of those with high cultural capital. Even those who are concerned about climate change do not want to defend the science. If scientists are not to be trusted it is hard to argue a case for a carbon tax. Indeed, business leaders who are more sceptical about climate change can strenuously argue against the legislation. Rather than a split within the business community, as Beck and others have predicted, this article suggests that even those who are concerned about climate change resist any measure which might cost businesses money.

Tainter (1988: 50) asks an important question in considering why advanced civilizations may collapse, having ignored pressing environmental issues. How can a collapse take place in a complex society where the whole administrative apparatus is set up to monitor and control the economy and take note of changes that threaten the flow of wealth? Here we can see a partial answer to this conundrum for our society. The function of monitoring the flow of wealth in capitalism has been delegated to the subordinated PMC. This class has its own power base in knowledge (cultural capital) and is in a de facto contestation with the ruling class; a struggle that reveals itself in numerous everyday disputes over taste and values. In these disputes, the ruling class defends the pragmatic good sense of a materialist perspective while the PMC defends ascetic or altruistic positions.

In this context it is no wonder that claims that the whole energy and transport infrastructure must be rewritten and that growth itself must be questioned are seen as predictable offerings from those with high cultural capital, defending their class interests. It is difficult for business leaders to see these representatives of the environmentalist movement as truly disinterested. This is certainly the sense that we get from our interview material. Environmentalists and scientists alike are accused of being out of touch with the material aspirations of ordinary citizens, of being unrealistic about what is economically possible, of masking grubby self-interest beneath a cloak of altruistic concern, of being fundamentalist about environmental matters, a stance which is religious in its divorce from the material world. To really take on board what environmentalists and scientists are saying about global warming is radically opposed to the class ‘habitus’ of business leaders.