Abstract
In recent years, multiculturalism has been declared a failure both in Europe and the Anglophone West. This diagnosis went hand in hand with an excessive focus on gendered cultural practices in culturally diverse societies, such as forced marriages or ‘honour killings’; the raise of anti-immigration political movements and the adoption of stricter legal rules in the areas of immigration and citizenship. This article aims to capture the legal, social and political responses to ‘failed’ multiculturalism under the banner of post-multiculturalism. In doing so, it identifies the major shifts that characterises post-multiculturalism and discusses their implications particularly for the citizens of Europe and various ‘others’. A close analysis of the recent shifts in the areas of rights, migration law and policy debates in various culturally diverse societies reveal that post-multiculturalism reinforces rather than counteracts the problematic features of multiculturalism. Drawing on the insights suggested by the literature on neo-liberal governmentality, the article points out the paradoxes of post-multiculturalism and their implications for culturally different Others.
The criticism of multiculturalism is as old as multiculturalism itself. Since the 1970s when multicultural policies began to be implemented in various countries, criticism has never been lacking. In recent years, this criticism became more intense and began to be combined with a diagnosis indicating the end of multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Multiculturalism has been declared to have failed not only in continental Europe, but also traditionally migrant-receiving societies such as Canada and Australia (e.g. Chapman, 2010; Ercan, 2011; Levey, 2009). The most striking aspect of the recent multiculturalism debate has been the agreement it has generated between traditionally opposing voices and ideologies. This time it was not only the conservative parties that attacked multiculturalism for contributing to the social breakdown or the growth of terrorism; previous supporters of the model have also scrutinized the state of multiculturalism in culturally plural societies (Vertovec, 2010). This has led to the emergence of a widespread agreement in both scholarly and policy debates that we are now entering a ‘post-multicultural’ era (Kymlicka, 2010; Vertovec, 2010). These are not only claims of critics. As Lesinska and Markowski et al. (both in this issue) demonstrate, the rhetoric of European political leaders and the key policy measures in the areas of immigration and migrant adaptation take a decisively ‘post-multicultural’ shape and direction.
Like ‘multiculturalism’, 1 ‘post-multiculturalism’ has been a contested term. One crucial question that this term raises is whether the prefix ‘post’ implies the continuation of multiculturalism or a retreat from it. Scholars such as Vertovec (2010) and Kymlicka (2010) use the term ‘post-multiculturalism’ to present a particular phase of multiculturalism, in which the emphasis is ‘to foster both the recognition of diversity and the maintenance of collective national identities’ (Vertovec, 2010: 83). These two ideals seemed to have pulled in different directions under the old model of multiculturalism. In fact multiculturalism has often been criticized for prioritizing the maintenance of culture at the cost of strong national identity (e.g. Goodhart, 2004). Unlike multiculturalism and as a way of moving forward, post-multiculturalism is claimed to offer a way of combining strong national identity with the official recognition of cultural diversity. As such, it is usually associated with the introduction of various new strategies such as citizenship and/or language tests and citizenship ceremonies (Vertovec, 2010). These strategies are claimed to have been developed not to renounce the recognition of diversity, as Vertovec notes, but to confirm the emergence of an interesting mixture of a strong common national identity coupled with recognition of cultural diversity.
In contrast to these rather optimistic observations, in this article we argue that post-multiculturalism implies a departure from multiculturalism in many important ways and entails significant paradoxes. To substantiate this claim, we focus on the ways in which contemporary societies have been dealing with the issues of culture and cultural diversity, especially since multiculturalism had been declared to be ‘dead’. Our analysis reveals important changes in the areas of law and policy, in both institutional and discursive terms, signalling a shift from multiculturalism towards the reaffirmation of mono-culturalism. We identify five trends that are observable in nearly all immigrant-receiving countries albeit in different degrees and intensification. These entail: (1) an excessive focus on gender inequality within traditional minority cultures; (2) the shift from ethnicity and culture towards religion (in particular Islam); (3) the increasing emphasis on social cohesion and security; (4) the emergence of new forms of racism; (5) the relativization of international and transnational human rights law. We argue that taken together, these tendencies herald a retreat from rather than revival of multiculturalism and pave the way for the emergence of new forms of racism in culturally plural societies.
The article proceeds in two parts: in the first section, we offer an analysis of the above-mentioned tendencies, which we see as a transition from multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism. In the second half of the article, we conceptualize these shifts as paradoxes and assess them from a perspective of neoliberal governmentality. This perspective allows us to uncover the disempowering outcomes of potentially empowering discourses associated with post-multiculturalism.
From multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is a contested concept defined differently by different scholars and is given varied institutional expression in different countries. Even within the same country, over time, a multiculturalist agenda might take different directions (Vertovec, 2010). Multiculturalism is commonly conceptualized in terms of ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1992), ‘differentiated citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 1995) or ‘the rights of ethno-cultural minorities’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Despite this conceptual variety, the underlying principle of multiculturalism that distinguishes it from other ways of accommodating ethnic and cultural diversity (i.e. assimilation) is that it is based on the official recognition of such diversity. As such, multiculturalism certainly depicts more than a demographic composition of a culturally plural society; it is about adopting a wide range of public policies, legal rights and, in some cases, constitutional provisions for the accommodation of cultural differences (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). This may entail, for example, providing funding for denominational schools, allowing cultural or religious dress codes and diets in public schools and workplaces, and the adaptation of specific regulations to exempt members of certain minority groups from requirements that are at odds with their culture.
Since 1971 when multiculturalism was first inaugurated in Canada, it has been adopted in modified forms in many countries including Australia, Britain, the United States and the Netherlands (Levey, 2009: 75). Yet recent years have witnessed a remarkable retreat from multiculturalism in all of these countries. The discourse of multiculturalism has begun to be replaced with the notions of national identity and belonging. These notions are seen as urgently necessary conditions to counteract the fragmenting forces of multiculturalism leading to the emergence of parallel lives. Different countries have responded differently to the crises of multiculturalism. These crises, which eventually gave rise to the discourse of post-multiculturalism, have been evident in nearly all countries, including those that never implemented multiculturalism as an official policy (such as Germany).
In what follows, drawing on the recent public and policy debates on the failures of multiculturalism in different countries, we aim to unpack five tendencies that we believe characterize post-multicultural era.
An excessive focus on gender inequality within traditional minority cultures
The first and arguably most visible indicator of shift towards post-multiculturalism is the excessive focus on gender inequality in minority cultural groups in Europe and the Anglophone West. In recent years, the popular and policy discourse in nearly all migrant-receiving countries have been dominated by issues related to the treatment of girls and women in traditional cultures, such as women wearing the hijab; girls subjected to genital cutting; young people forced by their families into marriage with unknown and unwanted spouses; young women murdered by family members for behaviour said to offend the principles of community or family honour (Phillips and Dustin, 2004; Saharso and Lettinga, 2008; Sauer, 2009). Such ‘cultural practices’ became an arena of heated controversies over the politics of integration and religious and cultural differences (Phillips and Saharso, 2008).
The excessive focus on the maltreatment of women in culturally diverse groups has led to two related developments. First, it reinforced the perception of minority cultures as inherently oppressive and coercive – thus fundamentally different from the mainstream society (Phillips, 2007: 23–5). In public and policy debates, gender inequality has been taken ‘as especially significant in exposing the gap between majority and minority cultures, and degrees of integration are sometimes measured by degrees of assent to women’s rights’ (Phillips and Saharso, 2008: 293). Second, the way mainstream media and politicians framed these cases (as culturally harmful practices rather than gender-based violence) has fed into the stereotypical distinctions between liberal and illiberal, modern and traditional, enlightened and backward cultures (Ercan, 2014). In this context, culture is taken to be something that applies only to minority groups whose ‘cultural practices’ are blamed for a lack of cohesion in society more widely. While non-minority women are presented as fully developed agents, the behaviours of women in minority groups are explained through their appeal to culture (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007: 24). Culturalised women are denied agency and seen as inferior subjects who need to be ‘appropriately corrected’ and in need of ‘rescue’ (Douzinas, 2013: 53–4).
The shift from ethnicity and culture towards religion
Another tendency that characterizes the post-multicultural era is the shift of emphasis from culture and/or ethnicity towards religion. In recent years, in many countries, religion has emerged as a major social signifier and was given a prominent role in understanding and resolving the problems related to migrant integration. Particularly in the post-9/11 era, we observe a strong tendency towards ‘Islamization’ of identities and issues (Grillo, 2010; Linder et al., 2010; Ramm, 2010; Silvestri, 2010).
The shift towards religion has manifested itself particularly in the perception of incompatibility of Islam with freedom of religion. Freedom of religion replaced discourse on cultural issues with discourse on democracy and its values. As a result Islamic religious symbols, such as minarets or burqas, became contrasted with the values of democracy and freedom and led to law’s preoccupation with ‘fearful symbols’ (Gunn, 2005). This preoccupation initiated the expulsion of Islamic religious symbolism from the broadly conceived public sphere, which expanded to encompass not only the sphere of authority but also as Taylor (2003) notes, the spheres of access and appearance.
The sphere of access and appearance became heavily protected from adherents of Islam choosing to manifest their religious symbolism. In 2009 the Swiss referendum, following an Islamophobic campaign, democratically sanctioned introduction of a ban on the construction of minarets into the Constitution of Switzerland (Article 72, amended 29 November 2009). Despite the omnipresence of church towers present in nearly every city, town and village of Switzerland, the existence of four minarets resulted in a ban on construction dictated by the protection of ‘local culture’ (Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger, 2009).
Similarly, in 2011, France passed a law banning concealment of the face in public(Loi no. 2010-1192), punishing it with a maximum of a 150 euro fine and/or by an obligation to take a class on the meaning of citizenship. The allowed exceptions included concealment of the face allowed by law to protect the anonymity of the person concerned, or that was justified for health or professional reasons or on professional grounds, or that was part of sporting, artistic activity or traditional festivities or events (Loi no. 2010-1192). The broad scope of exceptions suggests that the ban is strictly aiming at women wearing full face veiling (Nanwani, 2011).
In terms of the sphere of access, the religionization of subjects has reinforced the connection between religion and both citizenship and migration policies. Such a shift has been visible for instance in the Netherlands. In 2011, the government proposed a law that has put more restrictions on retaining double citizenship. Auke Zijlstra, a member representing the Freedom Party (PVV) in the European Parliament, claimed that allowing immigrants from ‘Islamic countries’ to retain dual citizenship had negatively impacted the integrity of Dutch society (Koskelo, 2012). A similar tendency to link religion with migration and the sphere of access is exemplified by a statement of the Finnish Minister of Interior Päivi Räsänen who indicated that Finland should welcome more Christian refugees because of their cultural proximity to Finnish citizens (Honkamaa, 2011).
This expulsion of religionized subjects from the sphere of access and appearance has fed into the perception of the inability of immigrants with Muslim background to integrate in host societies. This in turn has led to the construction of Muslim identities as a threat to the – broadly understood – security of the state.
The increasing emphasis on social cohesion and security
The central criticism against multiculturalism has been the argument concerning the ghettoization of cultural communities and emergence of ‘parallel societies’ (Goodhart, 2004; Halm and Sauer, 2006). This line of criticism has been particularly influential in European countries, where it has prompted the emergence of new policies and discourses which emphasized the need for a common national identity, social cohesion, citizenship and civic integration. This went hand in hand with the introduction of citizenship classes as a compulsory part of the school curriculum (e.g. in Britain in 2002), and citizenship and language tests (examples include the UK, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Singapore, Australia, Finland). Under these new regimes, migrants are required to demonstrate knowledge of the values of the mainstream society. These are seen as corrective measures to counteract the dangerously fragmenting forces of multiculturalism.
In this context, even in traditionally migrant-receiving countries such as Australia, there has been a move away from multiculturalism to a social cohesion agenda, as a result of which the term ‘multiculturalism’ was officially replaced in government documents by the word ‘citizenship’ (Batainah and Walsh, 2008). Most notably, in 2007, the Australian government changed the name of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). Similarly, in the EU, the need to guarantee social cohesion has become part of the process of drafting migration policies. For instance, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008) underlines that because poorly managed migration may disrupt the social cohesion of EU countries, management of immigration must take into consideration Europe’s reception capacity.
The increased emphasis on social cohesion in both the EU and beyond is coupled with the perception of immigrants as a threat to national values and the security of the state and society (Guild, 2009: 7–8). The shift towards security in immigration discourses and perception of migrants as a threat to national security gained impetus after 9/11 and later terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK. This securitization of migration can be considered as another element of the post-multicultural shift, resulting in a tightening of migration laws and limits on migrants’ access to rights. This corresponds with what is elsewhere characterized as a ‘technology of morality’, relying on the perception of those forced to use irregular ways of reaching western states as unethical subjects, ready to use any opportunity to violate the migration laws to acquire better living conditions (Kmak, 2012). This perception results in stricter policies aiming at limitation of ‘immoral behaviours’ of migrants and leads to more instances of abuse or violation of migration laws. In consequence, those policies reinforced the perception of immigrants as the threat to security.
The EU migration policies provide a good example of protection from ‘unethical’ subjects. Adoption of stricter legal measures has been justified by the need to strengthen the security of EU citizens and to protect external borders (e.g. Kmak, 2013, 2014; Kostakopoulou, 2000). These measures force numbers of those in need of protection, and those aiming to find work in one of the EU countries, to choose irregular ways of reaching the EU territory. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the numbers of irregular immigrants and prompts states to call for even tighter migration policies. The strengthened measures for controlling irregular migration influence the perception of immigrants as unable to adhere to western social norms, and in consequence as a threat to national values, social cohesion and security. The negative perceptions of migrants have been strengthened recently by the economic crisis, which resulted in growing unemployment and the adoption of highly unpopular austerity measures coupled with anti-immigration discourses. We perceive those changes in approaches towards immigration as characteristic of the post-multiculturalism era.
The emergence of new forms of racism
The perception of the threat and the focus on securitization, coupled with the reactions of states to increasing numbers of irregular immigrants in their territories, triggered the emergence of new forms of xenophobia and racism-like practices. Both before and in the context of the crisis of multiculturalism it has been pointed out that the boundaries of what has traditionally been considered as racism have been blurred (Lentin and Titley, 2011; Mills, 1999). Yet the fact that the discourse embraces issues of culture rather than race does not automatically mean erasing the problem of race-thinking (Phillips, 2007: 56). In contrast to traditional racism, new forms of ethnocentric race-thinking have shifted the focus of racist practices beyond issues of race. This process was initiated by the necessity for protection of the state and its laws from illiberal subjects. These subjects, seen as ‘the barbarians’, in Douzinas’ words, ‘were no longer beyond the city’ (2013: 53). The perception of a threat from ‘enemies within’ (2013: 53) became coupled with colonial ways of thinking. It meant passing judgment on those ‘to be corrected’ in much the same ways as colonialism passed its judgment on ‘savage cultures’. Consequently, this reproduced stratifications and exclusions focusing on essentializations of those seen as a threat (Huggan, 2009). Sharma (2009) argues that ‘cultural hysteria’ has led to the process of marking of ‘particular others’ and to the perpetuation of the ‘universal regime of whiteness’. This regime, however, can no longer be understood purely in racial terms, but must be seen also in terms of culture and power. As Mills (1999) convincingly argues, whiteness is not related to a colour at all but is instead a set of power relations.
Mirroring this diagnosis, post-multicultural era features multiple forms of racism – both old and new. Those seen as ‘barbarians within’ have been denied agency due to their cultural, religious or racial ‘condition’. The extensive focus on religion discussed above can be seen as a particularly tenacious example of this process. But the shift towards religion did not erase the cultural ‘conditioning’ just as the softening of the race argument did not entirely erase old forms of racism. The coexistence of many forms of ‘conditioning’ of the ‘other’ expanded the existing forms of racism and shifted attention from race to issues such as religion, cultural difference or citizenship as a symbol of political origin. As a result, many forms of racism coexist. In the context of Europe, for instance, new forms of racism are exemplified by the constant invocation of a Eurocentric cultural regime and the equating of it with liberation, freedom, democracy and progress. Culturally ‘conditioned’ subjects are as those who transgress these values and consequently are marginalized and rejected.
Relativization of international and transnational human rights law
Finally, the shift from multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism is also observable in the relativization of human rights regimes in various countries when it comes to the resolution of culturally contested issues. This is particularly visible in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Initially, the Court was reluctant to intervene in the resolution of cultural conflicts. Gradually and consistently with the general expansion of its jurisprudence (Lasser, 2009), the ECtHR has developed its own interpretation of principles such as for instance ‘religious pluralism’ (Gozdecka, 2009).
However, the trend towards expansion of own principles was reversed when the Court was confronted with cases concerning Islamic dress code such as Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2 Sąhin v. Turkey, 3 Şefika Kőse v. Turkey 4 and Dogru v. France. 5 In all these cases, the ECtHR emphasized the need for the preservation of the national system and non-interference with principles such as secularism (Gozdecka and Jackson, 2011). In the case of Dogru, for example, the proportionality of the restrictive measure was justified primarily by the necessity to protect the constitutional system of France. The Court underlined that ‘the purpose of that restriction on manifesting a religious conviction was to adhere to the requirements of secularism in state schools, as interpreted by the Conseil d’Etat’ (Dogru, v. France, para. 69).
This tendency towards the affirmation of the primacy of the constitutional sources in the face of culturally contested issues has expanded even further in the post-multicultural era. Recent judgments in the cases such as the revised Lautsi v. Italy, 6 S.H. v Austria 7 or A. B. and C. v Ireland 8 confronted traditional constitutional regimes with new demands of recognition. In all of these cases, the applicants challenged the established status quo in areas touching upon cultural issues that have always been controversial. These included recognition of non-religious position in an environment influenced by traditional Catholic symbolism, as well as recognition of abortion and the right to in vitro fertilization in legal systems with a previously dominant religious tradition. These recent judgments relied on an even wider application of the already wide ‘margin of appreciation’. The paramount considerations of the Court in these cases were the ‘constitutional traditions’ (Lautsi v. Italy, para. 68), ‘profound moral views of a nation’ (A.B. and C. v. Ireland, para. 126) and not substituting ‘itself for the competent national authorities’ (S.H. v. Austria, para. 92). In the A.B. and C. v. Ireland case, the Court found that ‘the profound moral views of a nation’ constituted a sufficient ground for diverging, if necessary, from the principle of consensus between the member states. Even though the judgment eventually recognized some of the applicants’ claims, the juxtaposition of the consensus with ‘the moral views of a nation’ signifies a retreat from the expanding dialectic of inclusion and the return of traditionally perceived cultural homogeneity. It is visible, for instance, in the acknowledgement of the importance of a ‘constitutional tradition’ in Lautsi v. Italy and the recognition of the state’s ‘privilege’ to decide whether or not to perpetuate a tradition. Consequently, as Simmons (2011: 71) puts it: ‘Those whose fundamental rights are being infringed must justify why they wish to do something different from the majority and must provide an alternative means to meet the state’s compelling interests.’
The paradoxes of post-multiculturalism
The tendencies outlined above are flawed with multiple paradoxes. With the term ‘paradox’ we wish to capture the disempowering outcomes of those discourses, which seem empowering at first glance. For instance, as we argued above, the excessive focus on gender inequality in traditional cultures led to the denial of minority women’s agency rather than their emancipation. The paradoxical tendencies of post-multiculturalism become particularly manifest when viewed from the perspective of neoliberal governmentality.
In Foucauldian understanding, neoliberal governmentality constitutes a mode of power aiming to manage and control populations through procedures, institutions and tactics based on the economic rationality of neoliberalism and through apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2007: 108). The primary aim of neoliberal governmentality is to guarantee freedom to subjects by creating – by reference to security and danger – conditions under which individuals can exercise this freedom (Foucault, 2008: 65; Lemke, 2012: 45–6). Under neoliberalism, freedom constitutes therefore a positive effect of governmental actions and the primary mode of control of subjects (Brown, 2003: para. 17). Examples we outlined above as central features of post-multiculturalism reveal parallels between post-multiculturalism and this central feature of neoliberal governmentality.
What Brown sees as ‘control through freedom’ is expressed by the administration of freedoms ‘for’ the subjects, rather than by the subjects. As a result, some subjects are seen as those who must be ‘liberated’ from constraints they are ‘unable’ to free themselves from. Women who are to be liberated are seen as consumed by their culture. In other words, as Brown (2006: 171) puts it, while non-liberal subjects are usually ‘depicted as “ruled” by culture or religion’, liberal subjects are ‘depicted as ruled by law’ and therefore subject to governmentalization.
This detachment and management of culturalized subjects leads to the emergence of good and bad subjects, allowing for their subsequent control and governance. This control is visible in the focus on security, social cohesion and citizenship as discussed above. The paradox of the cohesion and citizenship argument lies in the coupling of freedoms and emancipation with homogeneous and ‘coherent’ understanding of citizenship. Those marked as standing outside the definition of a good citizen become ‘lesser human beings’ (Douzinas, 2013: 56) constituting a threat to security. This in turn leads to the increased control of access to freedoms through access to citizenship. The recent controversies about access to citizenship depending on the value/features of particular foreigners illustrate this tendency well. For example, the amendment to British Nationality Act allows for the possibility of removing citizenship from foreign-born citizens in cases considered as ‘conducive to the public good’ (UK Border Agency, 2006). At the same time we can observe emerging possibilities to obtain citizenship by those with substantial financial resources (Joppke, 2010: 18). This reveals the neoliberal tendency to commodification of citizenship and moralization of freedom and its consequences through differentiation between ethical (self-responsible) and unethical (delinquent, lazy, irresponsible) citizens (McNevin, 2011: 61). Post-multiculturalism attempts to relieve the ‘threats’ posed by those falling outside the narrow category of a ‘good’ citizen by a paradoxical control of the movements of populations in forms perceived as ‘non-discriminatory’ administration of security (Balibar, 2006: 43).
This moralization of freedom in neoliberalism is also evident in another paradox connected to the emergence of new forms of racism. As Balibar (2006: 37) illustrates, the perception of insecurity and the concept of ‘unassimilable difference’ coincide and stigmatize particular groups. Those who are seen as a threat to security frequently have no security themselves, but they become subjects of security control. The mechanisms of citizenship described above and concept of ‘unassimilable difference’ reinforce each other leading to the creation of what Spivak (1991: 241) describes as ‘identity talk’. Post-multiculturalism masks the moral judgment on the newly racialized subjects’ ‘inferiority’ with discourses on religious, cultural and political origins. This dressing of control mechanisms in ‘identity talk’ makes new forms of racism difficult to distinguish. Post-multicultural ‘identity talk’ relies heavily both on the conservative critique of social fragmentation of cultural groups and the progressive critique of ‘essentialization’. It focuses extensively on difference and the need to break down the hermetic sealing between cultures. Paradoxically, though, it does so by controlling and marking newly racialized subjects with the help of essentialized notions of culture and religion. In addition, it brings together the subjects’ political origin (citizenship) and essentializing images of difference. As a result, post-multicultural cautions recreate even stronger perceptions of group homogeneity of culturally ‘conditioned’ subjects. Rather than pushing them into ‘parallel societies’, they create socially stratified class-like ghettos based on the concepts of difference outlined above.
Finally, as noted before, post-multiculturalism, with its central focus on management of freedom, leads to the affirmation of national legal systems’ sole right in governing the resolution of cultural conflicts. The shift towards the centrality of constitutional regimes instead of greater contextuality and embeddedness of international human rights in national systems (Helfer, 2008; Weiler, 2010) reinforces locally homogeneous understandings of rights and endows states with quasi-rights-like privileges in administering homogeneous notions of ‘tradition’. The employment of rights in the protection of local traditions from contestation reveals the transformation of rights from an ideally conceived ‘relative defense against’ power (Douzinas, 2013) to the tools used in the modality of its operations. In consequence rights cannot be seen as able to protect minorities against the state but rather must be viewed as a measure of control of those minorities.
Conclusion
In this article, we aimed to identify the main characteristics of post-multiculturalism by focusing on the shifts that occurred in the areas of law and policy in various societies after multiculturalism was declared to be ‘dead’. We do not wish to claim that all countries which have been tackling the recent crises of multiculturalism demonstrate all of the post-multicultural tendencies identified in this article. In the context of Australia, for example, while there is a shift of focus from multiculturalism to social cohesion, we do not observe an excessive focus on gendered cultural practices, such as forced-marriage or so called ‘honour killings’. In other words, similar to the way countries differ in their practice of multiculturalism, they also differ in their responses to the crises of multiculturalism and the way they feature post-multicultural tendencies identified in this article.
We argued that post-multiculturalism entails several paradoxes, which become evident particularly when seen from the perspective of neoliberal governmentality. This perspective enables us to uncover contemporary ways through which diversity is managed in culturally diverse societies. These include management of freedom in post-multiculturalism administered through religion, culture, citizenship, race and human rights. In this process concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens and those who are ‘unassimilably’ different are produced by reference to security and social cohesion. These terms then allow for an increased control of diversity by the adoption of seemingly emancipatory and ‘non-discriminatory’ laws and practices.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received funding for three-year projects from the University of Helsinki Funds.