Abstract
Religious diversity and social cohesion have long been seen to be at odds with each other. Classical sociology, grounded in the Westphalian solution to religious conflict in Europe presumed that a single religion was necessary for social cohesion. The issue of religious diversity and social cohesion has come to the fore as once religiously monochrome societies have become diverse through migration and, to a lesser degree, conversion. While European nations question the possibility of multicultural and multi-faith societies living in productive harmony, Australia offers an example of a successful multicultural and multi-faith society. Australia has produced a multicultural society through a policy of social inclusion and mutual respect, in contrast to European policies which produce separate community development. This cross-national comparative study reveals demographic and socio-cultural differences that are likely to explain some of the comparative success of Australia in producing social inclusion and avoiding the ‘othering’ of religious minorities, especially of Muslims. Australia has a particular demographic that features multiple substantial minority religious communities living in ways that promote daily encounters among people of different backgrounds.
Religious diversity and social cohesion have long been seen to be at odds with each other. Is a harmonious and productive religiously diverse society possible? The capacity for religious differences to cause conflict is well known: the Crusades, the European wars of religion following the Reformation, the ongoing conflict in Ireland and today the clashes in the Middle East only begin a very large list. Classical sociology, grounded in the Westphalian solution to religious conflict in Europe presumed that a single religion was necessary for a state to enjoy social cohesion (Beyer, 2012). Berger’s (1967) classic work presumes that some unifying cultural system is needed for a society to function. Parsons seeing religion as a mechanism of social control declared that ‘the ideal type of a fully integrated society of a certain kind would have one completely integrated religious system’ (1951: 308). Davis and Moore, following Durkheim, declared that religion is necessary because ‘human society achieves its unity primarily through the possession of by its members of certain ultimate values and ends in common’ (1945: 244). This integrative function of religion has long been asserted as the solution to the disintegrative capacity of religious diversity.
Although examples of harmonious and productive religiously diverse societies can be found – Andalusia, Sicily and, in a strange way, the United States, which is united more by a ‘civil religion’ than by a single traditional religious brand (Bellah, 2005; Herberg, 1955)– the issue of religious diversity and social cohesion has come to the fore as once religiously monochrome societies have since the mid-20th century become diverse through migration and, to a lesser degree, through conversion. Muslim majority countries, for the most part, declare Islam to be the religion of the state and provide state support for religious facilities and education. They approach the social inclusion of religious minorities by giving qualified freedom to certain other religions (Bouma et al., 2010; Richardson 2004). While several European nations have recently come to question the possibility of multicultural and multi-faith societies living in productive harmony (Lesińska, 2014), Australia offers an example of a successful multicultural and multi-faith society.
This article offers a cross-national comparative study that examines demographic and socio-cultural differences that contribute to Australia’s success. As with any cross-national comparative sociological study, a broad-brush approach is used to identify differences in multicultural policy discourse and practice along with social factors that partially explain the differences observed. In this way the explanation of broad social differences is sought at the same level. While this necessarily does not do justice to the myriad local variations, these variations take place within the larger frame and cannot, in themselves, constitute an explanation for the larger differences. First, the fact of Australia’s success and type of multiculturalism will be established.
Multicultural Australia
Since the vigorous promotion of British immigration had failed to produce sufficient numbers for a growing economy, Australians officially dropped a ‘British and White’ ethnic and racial basis to national identity in the 1970s with the collapse and abandonment of the ‘White Australia’ immigration policy, which had been in place since the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 (Castles, 2001; Galbally, 1978; Jupp, 2001; Wooden et al., 1994). Abandoning a ‘British and White Protestant’ core to the Australian national identity occurred just as multicultural diversities were becoming the palpable daily reality and multicultural policies were being implemented. There is a sense, given its continuing acceptance by so many, that being ‘multicultural’ has become a core element of the Australian identity. This reflects Australia’s approach to multicultural policy, and is enabled by Australia’s demographic complexity and socio-cultural support for respectful integration of diversity.
But what is meant by ‘multicultural’? And at what level is multicultural understood or analysed, the empirical level of acknowledging the reality of difference, the pragmatic level of tolerance and permission, or the normative level of declaring diversity to be desirable and prescribing it in law and morals? There is much diversity as to the meaning of the term multicultural, the realities to which it refers, and the policies and efforts designed to promote it (Beaman, 2007; 2012). According to Joppke: The institutional solutions to the intercultural conflicts that inevitably arise in plural societies and which are primarily religious vary between the poles of giving minority religions the same public status that majority religions already enjoy (the German-English model) or driving them all out of the public sphere (the French-American model). (2004: 240)
Whichever pole is approached, multiculturalism requires all religions, numerous or not, to be treated ‘neutrally’. When examined this dimension of multiculturalism too has great variation (Beaman, 2012; Lyon and Van Die, 2000).
The critical issue for Joppke (2004) appears to be the degree to which the state takes into account in its social policies culturally and religiously specific aspects of the diverse cultural groups comprising a society. He raises the case of permitting hospital-based female genital circumcision as a pragmatic compromise that results in a ‘better’ solution than prohibiting it altogether, which is likely to lead to home-based or overseas circumcisions. Whether one agrees with this or not, implementing multicultural policies requires a host of such pragmatic solutions. For example, Australia permits the burial practices of Muslims, Jews and Indigenous people. Unlike France, wearing headcovering – hijabs, turbans, yarmulkes – is largely a non-issue in Australia where, for example, the Victorian Police have uniforms incorporating turbans for Sikhs and hijabs for Muslim women, and most banks permit employees to wear uniforms that conform to cultural prescriptions, most schools permit cultural variation to school uniforms, and a great diversity of culturally specific garb is evident in most shopping precincts and on public transport. Keddie (2014) suggests that such diverse, local and pragmatic approaches engendering autonomy are a more effective way to implement multicultural policies.
The aim of Australian multicultural policy has been ‘the smooth and effective settlement and integration of (non-British) immigrants’, given the ‘failure of assimilation policies to secure such an effective integration’ (Pakulski, 2014: 25). The goal of the policy was to produce social cohesion with social integration as the mechanism (Pakulski, 2014: 26). According to Pakulski, Australian multicultural policies recognised that ‘integration is gradual and depends on a sense of belonging’, which ‘develops through families, neighbourhoods, and friendship circles as well as integrated religious and ethnic groups and communities’ (2014: 29). Both the state and civil society have roles to play in making from a multicultural reality a successful society. While separate ethnic and religious organisations are permitted and encouraged, one of their chief roles is to act as intermediate linking and mediating structures between individuals and the society, promoting a primary commitment to the nation while sustaining particular cultures, languages and religions. These policies were integrative, reciprocal and respectful, and backed up by major state-sponsored programs to build social cohesion through social interaction. According to Pakulski, basic principles of equity and reciprocity shaped the implementation of Australian multicultural policy (2014: 29–33).
Australian multicultural policy focuses on migrant integration through reciprocal respect (Pakulski, 2014). Not only is it a case of requiring the dominant culture, which is already highly diverse, to be ‘recognised’ by migrants, but the dominant culture also is to recognise and respect migrants, even as they or their parents or near relatives were recognised and respected when they were migrants. The foundation of Australian Multiculturalism remains the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989) which declared that multicultural policies involved:
cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth; and
economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.
According to Castles: [Australian] multiculturalism was seen as a system of rights and freedoms, which were limited by an overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and rule of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the national language, and equality of the sexes (2001: 809).
Australian multicultural policies intended to promote social cohesion and productivity through social inclusion based on mutual respect have been pursued at many levels of government and with different modes of implementation. For example, the State of Victoria government includes an Office of Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship and support for the Victorian Multicultural Commission, while the Victorian Police are advised by a Multicultural Council, a Multi-Faith Council and have religious representatives on the high-level Multicultural Portfolio Reference Group. In different ways and to different extents each State has structures in place to promote inter-group harmony and inclusion. A wide array of Ethnic Communities Councils across Australia, the Australian Multicultural Foundation, and the Office of Multicultural Affairs – and even a Special Broadcasting Service, which was separate to the Australia Broadcasting service and added a television channel radio outlets promoting multiculturalism through cultural diversity – were established and continue today.
Australia has become an example of multicultural success. First, multicultural realities and policies enjoy wide popular acceptance. A series of national surveys conducted nearly annually from 2007 to 2014 reveals that consistently about 88% of Australians consider multiculturalism to be a ‘benefit to Australia’ (Markus, 2014a). A national survey also reported high levels of acceptance of diverse religious communities (Bouma, 2012). Markus considers that the acceptance of migration and multiculturalism in Australia is ‘possibly the highest current level of positive sentiment toward immigration in the world’ (2014b: 1). Second, while there are occasional protests over the building of mosques, temples, shrines or schools, these are not violent and are usually resolved in ways that enable widely different groups as disparate as Exclusive Christian Brethren and Scientologists to be accorded the same rights as other groups to worship, to raise their children in their faith (or none), and to participate in policy debates as long as they contribute to national social cohesion and accord similar rights to other groups (Jupp, 2009; Richardson, 2001). In this Australia has moved toward ‘deep equality’ beyond mere tolerance and accommodation (Beaman, 2014), including a high level of acceptance of Muslims (Bouma and Hughes, 2014; Woodlock and Arnold, 2012). This does not mean all groups are seen as equally desirable (Bouma, 1995, 2012) but that each has the right to exist so long as the laws of the land are respected. Aside from the wars against and massacres of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, which remains a huge and unresolved issue, many people and religions from many origins have made Australia home and have been incorporated into its civic, corporate, governmental and economic life (Bouma, 1996; Jupp, 2001, 2007).
Multicultural policies in Europe and the United Kingdom are very different. While there are many ‘multiculturalisms’, the range of views runs from ‘minority integration through cultural recognition’ (Joppke, 2004: 237) to the recognition of parallel, separately organised communities. Lesińska (2014: 42) notes that while there has been a backlash against multiculturalism, ‘none of the countries whose leaders criticised “multiculturalism” has ever embraced “genuine” multiculturalism; a programme of state-aided integration without an expectation of cultural assimilation’. European policies have resulted in separate ethnic and religious communities living in isolation and thus have not produced integration, social inclusion and social cohesion, let alone mutual respect. While this fraught relationship takes different forms in different countries and locations, the overall pattern remains one of demanding assimilation rather than promoting social and civic inclusion resulting in isolation. This has resulted in a form of society where it is possible to treat a particular religious minority, usually Muslims, as ‘other’, as problematic and less than fully welcome. Such polices may lead to ‘enclave societies’, as Turner warns (2007). Commentators sometimes wonder when Australia’s multicultural success will follow the path to ‘failure’ taken by Holland or France. Angela Merkel decries Multikulti as a failure (Weaver, 2010). European anti-immigration and anti-Muslim marches seem to gain numbers.
In comparison, Australia like France has suffered highly dramatic terrorist events; Charlie-Hebdo and the Sydney Lindt cafe siege. In Australia these events have not resulted in sustained anti-Muslim actions, rather the tweet #Illridewithyou went viral when one Muslim woman expressed fear about taking public transport while wearing head covering. Yes, there are a few figures espousing negative views, but they have not secured significant followings or electoral leverage. Similarly, support for extremist views such as introducing Shari’a law among Muslims remains very low (Woodlock and Arnold, 2012). Although there have been changes in the level of support for multiculturalism among Commonwealth governments (Castles, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Keddie 2014) and there remain challenges in Australia, the foundational acceptance of diversity and multiculturalism remains (Richardson, 2013).
This article employs a comparative approach in order to seek to explain how Australia’s multicultural policies have been successful, while they seem to have failed in European countries. The article focuses on harmonious inter-religious relations as a proxy for a multicultural society. While the differences outlined above in the nature of the multicultural policy implemented are critical to this success, there may well be demographic differences that underpin the success of Australia’s policy of social inclusion leading to mutual respect. Specifically, differences in the religious composition of societies and the distribution of religious groups influence the ways groups interrelate. These demographic factors may enhance or undermine the capacity to declare a particular group as ‘other’ and to demonise them in ways which have not occurred in Australia. Following an examination of demographic differences, several socio-cultural factors are also discussed.
Demographic factors and differences
Demography has been shown to play a significant role in the ways religious diversity is socially constructed and managed (Bouma and Hughes, 2014; Bouma and Singleton 2004; Forrest and Dunn 2010). There are substantial demographic differences between Australia and many other countries. First, Australia is a society of immigrants. According to the 2011 Census 25% of Australians were born overseas (the highest percentage among OECD countries) and 50% of Australians either were born overseas or have at least one parent who was born overseas (ABS, 2012b). Australia is clearly a settler society and, aside from Indigenous people, has been since 1788. Only in the 1920s through the 1940s was Australia a settled ‘British’ society, primarily as a result of the White Australia immigration policy, which promoted and enabled British migrants and excluded others (Castles, 2001; Jupp, 2001). Stories of migration and the struggles of settling are living memories in most families. The reality that most Australians have themselves experienced the need for social inclusion and for mutual respect that is the usual experience of migrants makes such an immigration and settlement policy easier to implement. This demographic foundation, and extent of diversity and migration, is not shared by many other countries. While similar levels are found in Canada and New Zealand they are certainly not true of the United Kingdom or of European countries.
Differences in Religious Profile
Second, there are substantial differences in the religious profiles of Australian compared with former British colonies and European nations. One effect of Australia’s history of migration has been to produce a demographically multi-religious society. The emergence of this religious diversity is shown in the census data presented in Table 1.
Australia’s religious profile, 1947–2011.
MCPRU = Methodist, Congregational, Presbyterian, Reformed, and Uniting.
Source: Data from ABS Census reports compiled by the author.
Australia’s religious diversity becomes more evident when the proportions of the less numerous groups reported in the 2011Australian Census are examined. For example, the 2011 Census (ABS, 2012a) reports that there were more Buddhists (2.5%) than Baptists (1.6%); more Muslims (2.2%) than Lutherans (1.2%); more Hindus (1.3%) than Jews (0.4%). Sikhs (0.3%) had increased from 0.1% in 2006 and were as numerous as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Latter Day Saints and the Salvation Army; there were four times as many Witches (8000; 0.04%) as Quakers (2000; 0.01%); 17,000 Pagans (0.08%), 14,000 Baha’i (0.06%); and Atheists numbered 59,000 (0.27%) but they had increased by 88%.
The outstanding demographic feature of Australia revealed in Table 1 is that at no time has one religious group held a majority, the Christian community having been denominationally divided, diverse and often conflicted along multiple divisions from the beginning of European settlement (Carey, 1996; Hogan, 1987; Jupp, 2009). In a very real sense, Australia has been religiously, culturally and linguistically diverse for 50,000 years of Aboriginal habitation and since European settlement commenced in 1788. Although there was historically a considerable British Protestant presence, in 1986 that gave way to Catholics, who became both the most numerous single religious group and the most institutionally robust (Dixon, 2005). Now those declaring ‘no religion’ are about equal in numbers to Catholics. Australia has always been religiously and ethnically diverse, religious diversity is ‘normal’, not a new condition to be rectified to restore the ‘old order’.
Australia’s current religious profile when compared to those of other countries demonstrates the degree and ways Australia’s religious composition is different (see Tables 2 and 3).
Religious diversity in former British colonies and USA, est. % in 2010.
Source: Pew Forum (2012). These data were used to make cross-national comparisons as they have been recently compiled according to the same criteria, making them the most reliably comparable data available given the lack of a religious identification item in the censuses of most countries. Because Pew did not include Sikhs, and they are a substantial community in these former British colonies, Sikh data from their censuses have been added.
Sikh sources: Australia (ABS, 2012a), New Zealand/Aotearoa (Statistics New Zealand, 2013), Canada (Statistics Canada, 2011), and the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2012).
Religious diversity in selected European countries NZ/A.
Source: Pew Forum (2012).
Australia is demographically different when compared with other countries in the British Commonwealth and the United States in having three substantial religious communities other than Christian. The UK and Canada both have substantial Muslim communities but the rest are much smaller. New Zealand and the United States each have one substantial but smaller group, with Jews in the USA and Hindus in New Zealand being the largest among them, but they are not as proportionally substantial in comparison with the religious minorities in other countries. The difference this makes in terms of multicultural success is that there is no single religious group in Australia that can be seen as ‘them’; there are several. In Australia, Buddhists and Muslims are of nearly equal numbers and Hindus are well on their way to being similarly numerous, and each of them is roughly as numerous or more so than Christian groups such as Presbyterians, Baptists and Lutherans. In Canada and the UK, however, Muslims clearly form the single comparatively large ‘other’ and are more ethnically homogeneous, enabling them to be seen as a ‘them’ over against ‘us’.
Religious diversity in Australia is further complexified by ethnic diversity, as most migrant religious groups are quite internally diverse in terms of national origins. After those nominating ‘British’ as their ethnicity, no ethnicity in Australia forms a sizeable proportion of the population, unlike France where North Africans dominate non-French and Germany where Turks dominate non-Germans. For example, Australian Muslims come from over 65 different countries with no single origin comprising more than 30%. Buddhists are ethnically diverse, combining those from western origins with Vietnamese, Cambodian, Thais, Japanese and others. The Lebanese in Australia are nearly equally divided between Muslim and Christian. Thus both the diversity of other religious minority communities in Australia and their ethnic diversity makes it difficult to develop an ‘us vs them’ orientation. ‘They’ are too diverse to promote a single divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
The situation in Europe is different again. From the data presented in Table 3 it can be said that Europe is demographically Christian with substantial Muslim communities. While, as in Australia, national percentages may mask local diversity and variation, they do give a social fact about the context within which such variation occurs and is perceived. While Europeans rarely go to church (Burkimsher, 2014) many do identify as ‘Christian’ when asked (Pew Forum, 2012). Again, this provides a demographic context that is more conducive to the ‘othering’ of one religious group and in Europe setting up an ‘us vs them’ relationship with Muslims.
There is an additional demographic difference between Australia and Europe. Australian ethnic and religious diversities are found living together in mixed urban contexts characterised by churning housing markets (Bouma and Dobson, 2005: Bouma and Hughes, 2014). The only concentrations of religious groups occur around religiously specific schools and religio-specific services, like the provision of halal or kosher foods. Contra Kymlicka (1998) and Joppke (2004), Australian multicultural policies and realities have not promoted separation and ghettoisation (Bouma and Dobson, 2005; Bouma and Hughes, 2000, 2014; Forrest and Dunn, 2010). Indeed, some country towns actively seek migrants, including refugees, as their presence keeps schools, banks, chemists and other services open and available (Akbarzadeh et al., 2006).
Australia’s religious diversity contrasts with European societies, which have much lower rates of immigration and long established and violently contested national cultural identities. The reality base for some of these identities may be eroding, particularly as those with pre-diversity experiences and war experiences age and die. Nonetheless, they appear to be able to motivate voters and politicians to raise issues of the threat to social cohesion and productivity of ethnic and religious diversity. A demographic context in which a single group is a visible cultural minority that exceeds 2% of the population seems to be conducive to processes of ‘othering’; demonisation, fear-mongering and policies of non-inclusion. In the context of European economic difficulties, it appears that Muslims are being used as scapegoats.
Socio-cultural differences
In addition to the demographic differences outlined above, there are societal and cultural differences between Australia and other countries that have contributed to Australia’s multicultural success. First, Australia has had comparatively low rates of unemployment and has been in need of workers particularly since the Second World War (Wooden et al., 1994). Industry has welcomed high rates of migrant intake and programs designed to bring migrants to Australia (Bertone, 2007). While these programs commenced with attempts to attract British workers, many northern European refugees were accepted immediately following the war and then migration programs were extended to southern Europe and other nations, including Turkey and Egypt. For most of the time of migration migrants could not be seen as ‘taking the jobs’ of those already here, reducing the pressure to signficantly ‘other’ arriving migrants.
Second, for the most part migrants have been welcomed. This is not to say it has all been smooth sailing, but no group has been singled out as rejected or unwelcome. In fact each wave of migration has their hardship stories and reports of success, but eventually find acceptance (Jupp, 2001, 2009). Part of the Australian welcome is the fact that migrants have been granted social services and health benefits upon arrival and citizenship shortly after; one year until recently when it was raised to two years. This degree of civic and social inclusion again is in stark contrast to European countries, where citizenship is nearly impossible to obtain.
Third, cultural support for multicultural mutual respect and integration has come from the major religious groups which have theologies, policies and programs promoting respect for those of other religious backgrounds (Bouma, 2013). There is a basic Australian allergy to intense, high-demand religion or politics (Bouma, 2006; Thornhill, 1992). Moreover, there are many ways people from different religious communities are brought together to interact. There are many organisations promoting healthy inter-religious relations: the Council for Christians and Jews, Religions for Peace, the Jewish Christian Muslim Association, the Inter-faith Youth Corps and many others. Following a very successful Parliament of the World’s Religions in 2009, most city councils in the Melbourne region have interfaith groups. Regular Iftar dinners conducted during the holy month of Ramadan have played a major role in bringing Muslims and others together for a meal and information about Islam. These dinners range from substantial formal occasions sponsored by banks, universities, State and Commonwealth parliaments, and the police to small gatherings in the homes of Muslims. While there are organisations opposing migration and some migrant groups, particularly Muslims, they do not have much traction in the wider community.
Fourth, there has been no history of violent conflict between groups except the wars against Indigenous populations. Unlike Canada, with its history of French Catholic vs English Protestant wars, New Zealand with its Maori Wars, the United States with the Civil War, during which many Christian denominations split into northern and southern groups, or Europe with its history of inter-religious conflict including the 100 Years’ War, the Inquisition and others. In this context it is worth noting the revival of Orthodoxy in Russia and the post-Soviet Republics, which has included clamping down on the religious diversity that had sprung up immediately following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Europe, including the former Eastern Bloc, is becoming more religious and less tolerant of religious diversity.
Conclusion
First, Australia is an example of a comparatively religiously diverse and successful multicultural society. While being very diverse it is not riven by inter-group conflict and hostility. Second, part of this success reflects the aim of Australian multicultural policy; social inclusion including respect for difference and mutual respect. Third, this cross-national comparison of religiously diverse societies demonstrates the roles of demographic differences and of socio-cultural factors in producing successful diverse societies. Australia has been working at implementing its multicultural policy since at least the early 1970s, has a particular demographic that was not deliberately planned and features multiple substantial minority religious communities living in ways that promote daily encounters among people of different backgrounds. Part of Australia’s successful implementation of multicultural polices is the result of demographic and socio-cultural factors particular to Australia.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.