Officer involved domestic violence

Abstract

Very little is known about officer-involved domestic violence (OIDV). Although the International Association for Chiefs of Police has developed model policies about OIDV, the extent to which agencies adopted these policies across the United States remains unclear. Similarly, research on and attention to OIDV have diminished substantially since the 1990s. Officer training on OIDV is also rare, but pilot studies examining the use of new curriculum show promise. Yet, there is so much more to be done. This article reviews research and policy on OIDV and seeks to provide motivation for uniformity of policy implementation and officer response to OIDV, calling for transparency via research and reporting.

Keywords

Officer-involved domestic violence police response OIDV model policy police training

Domestic violence is a serious social issue recognized by the World Health Organization (2013) as a “global health problem of epidemic proportions”. Over the years, widespread policy changes have improved victim and officer safety by means of greater victim advocacy and enhanced police response (Oehme et al., 2016). Such policy changes prove applicable, as domestic violence-related calls to law enforcement remain the largest category of calls received by police (Friday et al., 2009; Hendricks, 1991). Domestic violence affects people of all ethnic, socio-economic, and educational backgrounds, including law enforcement professionals. If police experience domestic violence at the same rate as the general public, studies estimate that 60,000 to 180,000 law enforcement families would be affected by domestic violence annually (Waters and Ussery, 2007). Experts (Waters and Ussery, 2007; Mark Wynn, personal communication, 2018) consider this estimate very conservative, particularly because victims of officer-involved domestic violence (OIDV) are reluctant to report abuse. Victims of law enforcement officers are particularly vulnerable because their abuser has knowledge of local shelter locations, can navigate the criminal justice system and has been professionally trained in the use of firearms. Although victims may be reluctant to report for those reasons, many may also fear that their accusations will not be taken seriously by officers or prosecutors and realize reporting could jeopardize their partner’s career and livelihood. With the exception of testimonials, very little empirical data supports these assumptions. This article provides a short literature review on OIDV, examines model policy and addresses some of the barriers toward uniform policy implementation with hopes to reignite discussion in ways that can increase knowledge, uniformity and transparency.

Research on the topic of OIDV is scarce and falls painfully short of providing information on the extent and impact of OIDV. Early studies found that between 24% (Neidig et al., 1992) and 40% (Johnson, 1991; Neidig et al., 1992) of officer families sampled experienced some form of domestic violence. Neidig et al. (1992) compared these results with known rates of domestic violence within the public (Straus and Gelles, 1990) and concluded that OIDV occurred in 20–40% of law enforcement families. Despite the aforementioned studies being over 25 years old, any internet search of the topic of OIDV today will reveal domestic violence may be two to four times more prevalent in law enforcement families compared than in the general public. Of course, when OIDV cases become public, journalists reveal anecdotal incidents of OIDV and rely upon these outdated statistics. This assertion can alarm the public and propagate mistrust, which is precarious in a political climate that now questions police use of force and calls for transparency and accountability of police misconduct.

Over the last 18 years, four additional studies have contributed to our understanding of OIDV. Three of the studies used one survey item to assess OIDV (Gershon, 2000; Klein and Klein, 2000; Valentine et al., 2012), whereas the other utilized the Conflict Tactics Scale (Blumenstein et al., 2012). Results from these studies showed rates of OIDV ranging from 4.8% to 28%. When one considers recent findings by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Black et al., 2011) that one in four men (28.5%) and one in three women (35.6%) in the United States have experienced stalking, physical violence or rape by an intimate partner; it appears that the prevalence of OIDV may actually be commensurate with the general public.

Further, the variability of the statistics noted can be attributed to many things. Inconsistencies in sampling procedures, research methodologies, and definition and measurement of domestic violence make it difficult to impose generalities regarding the true prevalence of OIDV. Other studies offer more tangential ways of measuring OIDV. For instance, Ryan (2000) surveyed 210 law enforcement officers and found that 54% of officers admitted they knew of officers involved in domestic violence, 16% knew of incidents of unreported OIDV, 31% knew of members in their department who had been disciplined for OIDV, and 55% claimed intervention and prevention programs would be helpful. Similarly, Russell and Tannenbaum (2016) obtained data from 299 officers in 27 states, and found more than half (51.3%, n = 156) reported they had been called to respond to a domestic violence incident which involved another law enforcement officer. These findings show OIDV is a common occurrence, yet it remains difficult to obtain a greater understanding of OIDV using such piecemeal approaches to data collection. This lack of information can result in potential bias in law enforcement response, increase liability, threaten agency morale, and jeopardize victim safety and perpetrator accountability.

Always sensitive in nature, response to an OIDV incident coincides with concern for the safety and justice of victims and law enforcement officers (Russell and Tannenbaum, 2016). Mark Wynn, a retired law enforcement officer and trainer in OIDV policy, believes there is much to consider when responding to OIDV. Not only are there first responders, there are dispatchers, first-line supervisors, detectives, and police chiefs. With so many working parts involved in carrying out a response to OIDV, an individual’s variable level of training, policy knowledge and/or potential bias may impact the process at any time, not to mention decisions of charging and prosecution (Mark Wynn, personal communication, 2 February 2018).

Studies examining the prosecution of officers who commit OIDV suggest they have trouble policing themselves and tend to be treated leniently (Feltgen, 1996; Levinson, 1997; Stinson and Liederbach, 2012). Early studies in 1998–1999 found that of 23 domestic violence complaints filed against Boston police officers, not one resulted in criminal prosecution (Police departments fail to arrest policemen for wife abuse, 1998). During the same time-period, 42% of OIDV cases were prosecuted in San Diego, California, compared with an overall 92% prosecution rate for domestic violence (Thornton, 1998). Similarly, between 1990 and 1997, Los Angeles Police Department investigated 227 cases of alleged OIDV, of which 91 (40.1%) were sustained; of the 91 sustained by the department, only four (1.8%) resulted in a criminal conviction. The Los Angeles Inspector General concluded that the penalty imposed on officers found guilty of OIDV “was exceedingly light when the facts of each incident were examined” (Domestic Violence Task Force, 1997).

Unfortunately, not much has changed since the 1990s. Recent research suggests that punishment remains lenient and rarely results in unemployment (Bjorhus and Webster, 2017). A 2012 study analyzed 324 cases of OIDV that resulted in the arrest of 281 officers between 2005 and 2007. The criminal dispositions of those involved in OIDV reported only 32% of officers lost their job. Prosecutorial dispositions of OIDV cases revealed that in 40% of the cases, simple assault was the most serious charge. However, most of the time officers were charged with lesser offenses that could be used in plea bargaining to avoid an assault charge. This suggests that a large percentage of officers who commit assault are rarely charged with assault due to discretionary decisions within the criminal justice system and loopholes (Stinson and Liederbach, 2012). It is suggested that OIDV is often pled down to avoid assault charges because of the Lautenberg Amendment (Stinson and Liederbach, 2012).

The Lautenberg Amendment (1996) refers to a federal gun control act that prohibits individuals (including officers) from owning or using a gun if they’ve been convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Therefore, OIDV leading to a misdemeanor conviction has significant, career-ending repercussions. Despite the serious implications associated with Lautenberg, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are reluctant to adopt national standards on how to handle accusations of OIDV (Golden, 2001).

We understand that although such studies suggest cases of OIDV are treated more leniently, there are practical limitations that need to be considered before making broad generalizations relating to research results when there is a lack of uniformity in officer response and information reporting systems. Therefore, we would be remiss if we did not identify some of the obstacles that should be considered when conducting research or seeking to promote policy change that allows for uniform reporting and response. For example, with the exception of the aforementioned studies, little is known about the outcomes of OIDV cases. One of the biggest problems when researching this topic is that each state specifies its own statutes, definitions, and charges associated with domestic violence. Further, management information systems (MIS), early intervention systems (EIS), officer training, intervention, and prevention in OIDV vary widely among states and LEAs. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recognized some of these issues and created a model policy in an attempt to encourage a more standardized approach to domestic violence.

Creating national standards

In 1999, the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center enacted The Model Policy on Police Officer Domestic Violence. Currently used throughout the United States, this model consists of five tenets: prevention, education and training; early warning and intervention; incident response protocols; victim safety and protection; and post-incident administrative/criminal case actions.

According to the model policy, the content of training for OIDV should: (a) affiliate with domestic violence professionals in their community; (b) require at least 40 hours of baseline training; (c) communicate effectively with police dispatchers; and (d) receive proper training. With regards to training, after completing the police academy, probationary officers have a field training officer who educates them on multiple issues, including domestic violence. In addition, officers can maintain competency through roll call training which provides opportunities for departments to ensure officers understand the domestic violence protocol. In this context supervisors can provide short video clips or presentations to reinforce academy training and field training (National Crime Justice Service, 1999).

The early warning and intervention tenant emphasizes the responsibility of the department to conduct an extensive background check, ensuring the candidate has not been convicted of domestic violence. Departments currently have a zero-tolerance policy for domestic violence when screening potential police recruits. Throughout the application process, any reported instances of elder abuse, domestic violence, or child abuse should be well documented. During the department psychological examination, it is crucial for the psychologist to determine if the candidate has or had any violent or abusive tendencies. Prior to a domestic incident occurring, supervisors may be able to identify dangerous tendencies in certain candidates. Tendencies include but are not limited to: officers concerned with having full power and control, verbal disputes, tardiness, use of force during arrests, and substance abuse issues. An early intervention, typically provided to officers and family members, consists of internal or external counseling. This not only ensures the officer’s career and standing, but most importantly the overall well-being of all parties involved (National Crime Justice Service, 1999).

Incident response protocols vary by jurisdiction and department. A police department’s response to an OIDV sets the tone for future calls and exposes where the department stands on that particular issue. When responding to an OIDV, two main things can affect one’s judgement: rank differences and collegiality. It is crucial for the dispatcher to notify both the on-duty supervisor as well as the chief of police, ensuring the call is not handled informally. Regardless of the involved officer’s legal jurisdiction, a field supervisor should be requested to the scene by the responding unit. While at the scene, it is crucial to take photographs, video and witness statements, with documentation accounted for by the on-duty supervisor. All officers involved determine arrest based on probable cause. However, in the event that an arrest is not made, all weapons should be removed from the premises as a safety precaution (National Crime Justice Service, 1999).

In 2003, Police Chief David Brame from Tacoma Washington shot and killed his wife and turned the gun on himself in a drug-store parking lot while his two children watched just feet away. The Tacoma killing led to policy reforms such as the Crystal Judson Domestic Violence Protocol Program. The program was a part of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, designed to provide LEAs federal funding for implementing OIDV protocols. In particular, this policy recommended the creation and implementation of policy and procedures related to domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and other crimes committed by LEA employees. Paramount to this program was creating a coordinated response to ensure victim safety. The state of Washington responded by going beyond recommendations and enacting a law requiring all LEAs to adopt a policy for OIDV. During this time, the IACP strengthened efforts to convince departments to create and enact policies and procedures designed to address OIDV (Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2005).

Following the culmination of research studies and recent publicity of OIDV, the IACP addressed this issue in a 2003 White Paper, stating “the rate of domestic violence is estimated to be at least as common as that of the general population and limited research to date indicates the possibility of higher incidence of domestic violence among law enforcement professionals”. The report continued, “The problem exists at some serious level and deserves careful attention regardless of estimated occurrences” (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 2003).

Implementation of national standards

It is essential that departments adopt OIDV-specific policies, if for no other reason than as a proactive stance to protect the department from liability. As law enforcement administrators, it is not always easy to balance victim safety with abuser accountability, particularly if it exposes the department to liability. Some LEAs including Chicago, Columbus, Nashville, and Charlotte have embraced the IACP model, adapting it to suit their jurisdictions. States such as New Jersey and Florida created OIDV policies and models in an effort to encourage other states to adopt similar guidelines; whereas other states, including Washington, mandate law enforcement entities to create procedures and policies for OIDV. Cheema (2016) suggests individual jurisdictions develop legislation outlining policies, which at a minimum requires each agency to enact, follow with discretion, and develop other policies as needed. Suggested policies include training provisions, policy development, and officer education about the complexities of OIDV. Florida State University inspired this movement through their partnership with The Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Model policies establishing procedure and protocol guidelines to prevent, investigate, report, and respond to OIDV exist, yet research demonstrates that many police departments are hesitant to adopt and reinforce these policies (Cheema, 2016).

Unfortunately, only a small portion of LEAs nationwide adopted OIDV policies. This causes a gap within the justice system, resulting in a wide variation in response tactics. Some agencies utilize guidelines when responding to an OIDV call and some do not, leaving police with liberal discretion when responding to OIDV in the absence of formal protocol. Studies investigating police policy on OIDV tend to find that between 25 and 38% of agencies have policies and procedures in place for OIDV (Cohen et al., 2013; Lonsway, 2006; Townsend et al., 2006). One study (Townsend et al., 2006) surveyed more than 14,000 LEAs across the United States on the policies and procedures prepared for domestic violence calls. Their study found 38% of departments had a current policy covering OIDV. In the same year, Lonsway (2006) investigated 78 large police agencies from across the country to identify the number and content of OIDV policies in place. She found only 29% of agencies had an OIDV policy. A more recent study (Cohen et al., 2013) investigated police policy on OIDV and found only 25% of 56 of the largest police departments throughout the nation adopted OIDV policies drafted by IACP. Lonsway (2006) suspects these numbers are artificially high; particularly when considering the content of the OIDV policies. Lonsway’s (2006) analysis of the content of these policies revealed the guidelines implemented differed widely across agencies in scope, focus and requirement. Further, the majority of policies included few of the provisions associated with the IACP model. The fact that few states have adopted the model policy and the inconsistency of policy creation and implementation impedes our ability to understand the prevalence and impact of OIDV. More than 15 years after the IACP White Papers, there remains no accountability to adopt and implement OIDV policy and procedure (Mennicke and Ropes, 2016).

Identification and prevention

In accordance with the early warning and intervention tenant, it is imperative to conduct background checks to screen potential police recruits, and psychological examinations to identify violent or abusive tendencies. Both can be done by interviewing the officer’s past and current partners. Although some departments have sought to provide more thorough screening during the hiring process to identify OIDV, this does not affect officers already employed within the system (Police Officer Domestic Violence, 1999).

Whereas some departments have adopted “zero tolerance” policies for all LEA employees, some advocates and academics question the effectiveness of this method of handling OIDV (Wetendorf and Davis, 2003). For example, pleading down cases to avoid consequences of the Lautenberg Amendment may result in future offenses. Further, because these policies have not addressed the boundaries or the critical point at which some aspects of the policy are enacted, then it is not clear whether “zero tolerance” applies to the results of an internal investigation or a criminal conviction, or both. Moreover, because violence exists within a continuum, we must consider which behaviors meet the criteria of “zero tolerance”. This policy can also impact a victim’s willingness to report, as statements of abuse are not confidential, leaving victims to fear retaliation from the abuser and the abuser’s co-workers (Wetendorf and Davis, 2003). Perhaps norms on “zero tolerance” might be more likely to be upheld if plea or “charge” bargaining in such cases were not allowed. Although the law affords officers the same rights as public citizens (including plea bargaining), they are unique in that officers better understand how to navigate the criminal justice system and often have preexisting relationships with judges and prosecutors (Mark Wynn, cited in Jeltsen and Liebelson, 2017) that can provide unique advantages when it comes to criminal justice decisions.

In 2017, the Star Tribune conducted an investigation of court records of the Minnesota’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board and followed 629 officers (current or former) since 1995, of which approximately 48% (n = 301) had felonies or gross misdemeanors. Of the cases that began as charges of felony or gross misdemeanors (which would lead to license revocation, or initiate a review by the POST board), over one-third resulted in misdemeanor convictions without discipline by the board. The investigation also found many other officers with charges reduced to petty misdemeanors or dropped altogether, so the information never reached the POST board’s review. Results such as these often decrease public confidence in law enforcement integrity, compromising accountability and increasing public mistrust.

Officer accountability and efforts to understand prevalence and incidence of OIDV are impeded by potential bias in knowing the offender is a “colleague” and not necessarily having the schema and/or training to respond to OIDV incidents. While officers follow strict policies and training mandating investigation and response in cases of domestic violence when civilians are victims, the interpretation and implementation differs when victims are family members of police officers (Mark Wynn, personal communication, 2017). Police might be less likely to report their fellow officers when they know an arrest will prohibit them from using a firearm and jeopardize their job (Lonsway, 2006). The “Code of Silence” associated with secrecy to protect a fellow officer only reduces our understanding of the pervasiveness of this problem. Some believe this code of silence leads to issues of collusion and negligence. For example, Mark Wynn stated “whenever you are aware of a crime and you don’t hold someone accountable, then you’re colluding with a criminal” (cited in Moughty, 2013). Wynn believes officers are negligent when they believe in the intent of the law “to protect the victim and hold the offender accountable” but do not apply that belief to someone with whom they work (Mark Wynn, personal communication, 2 February 2018).

Unfortunately, there is little information on the extent to which officers are reporting known incidents or suspicions of OIDV to supervisors or internal affairs. While the State of Washington’s Model Policy for Officer-Involved Domestic Violence specifically states, “Any employee who becomes aware of domestic violence committed by a sworn employee must immediately report that allegation to their supervisor” (p. 2), we remain unaware of protocols in effect for reporting suspicions of abuse. We recognize the fine line between weighing officer rights and public safety when reporting suspicions, and individuals may differ in their perceptions of which behaviors constitute abuse or predict potential OIDV. Therefore, identifying problem behaviors and risk factors associated with OIDV may facilitate OIDV prevention.

Even with very little research on officer training and prevention of OIDV, one recent study conducted by Oehme and colleagues (2016) examined pre- and post-test responses to case scenarios of OIDV as a function of officer training. Their results found that officer training on prevention of OIDV led to more victim-supportive behaviors, including arrest and filing internal reports. Although this research offers affirming insight into implementation of OIDV training, we must consider the extent to which these findings can be generalized to actual OIDV incidents. However, there is hope that training in OIDV can assist officers in identifying behaviors associated with domestic violence and ultimately aid in responding through more uniform and transparent protocol.

Training in response to OIDV

There are very few studies examining the effectiveness of training methods to improve police officer response, knowledge and attitudes about domestic violence (Wheller and Morris, 2010) and only one study examining OIDV training and prevention (Oehme et al., 2016). Traditional academy training and continuing education rarely provide in-depth information on responding to OIDV. Effective training on OIDV should include specific issues, such as the notion that training enables perpetrating officers to influence respondents and investigators in their favor (Wetendorf and Davis, 2003). It is also imperative that officers comprehend issues associated with victim vulnerability, and how police subculture can influence willingness to report an abusive colleague. Effective training should also stress ethics, professional decision-making, victim assistance and safety, making referrals, and prioritizing victim safety in response to alleged OIDV (Oehme et al., 2016; Wetendorf and Davis, 2003). Moreover, effective training utilizes both departmental and community resources when necessary.

In 2009–2013, researchers from Florida State University assisted in the effort to create effective training that included all the aforementioned elements (Oehme et al., 2016). Scholars worked in collaboration with national, state and local stakeholders, the Executive Director of the Police Chiefs Association, and chiefs and sheriffs from across the state to develop “The National Prevention Toolkit on Officer-Involved Domestic Violence” (the Toolkit), designed as an easily accessible OIDV training curriculum for supervisors and rank and file officers. Until 2016, no research had examined the effects of law enforcement training on OIDV. Researchers from Florida State University investigated the effects of the web-based training by investigating 852 officer responses to OIDV scenarios before and after their participation in the online training. Researchers observed notable increases in victim support, number of reports filed, and arrest between the pre- and post-training answers. The authors of the study believe the Toolkit would influence officers to intervene in OIDV cases. Post test, nearly 75% of participants reported that they would attempt to prevent a possible or actual case of OIDV by filing a report or intervening personally. Roughly 79% of officers reported that the Toolkit would have a positive effect on an officer’s willingness to report other officers for intimate partner violence. This research suggests that training can benefit victim support, reports filed and arrest. However, because no pre–post-test measures were conducted on filing a report to prevent a possible or actual case of OIDV or personally intervening it is difficult to attribute this finding to training. Although this study has opened the door to providing evidence for training in OIDV, we have only begun to scratch the surface of recognizing the effectiveness of police training in OIDV (Oehme et al., 2016).

Although the training and resources to prevent OIDV are becoming more accessible, they remain largely underutilized despite the preliminary research suggesting benefit through implementation. Although additional research is needed to identify whether OIDV training results in higher rates of reporting and/or leads to a reduction in OIDV, gathering these statistics is extremely problematic. As noted, state definitions or charges of domestic violence and reporting system variations across LEAs primarily inhibits such research. To address this problem, it is necessary to reduce variability in policy adoption, implementation, and response across LEAs to provide a more uniform approach. Providing access to data and a systematic method to report OIDV across agencies is a logical next step toward greater uniformity and transparency.

Recommendations for uniform response and transparency

Despite established guidelines for OIDV policy and procedure, departments lack uniformity in their adoption and implementation and seem to take a laissez-faire approach toward OIDV policy and procedure. The IACP provided a model for OIDV, essentially providing ethical and procedural guidelines to respond to OIDV. We believe such guidelines encompass a minimum standard of ethical response, yet many agencies continue to refrain from adopting these standards. Many organizations seek to move beyond a profession’s ethical standards. For those agencies that have adopted OIDV policies, perhaps we can move beyond minimum expectations and seek a higher standard of OIDV policy that works toward enforcing all agencies to adopt policy that adheres to the IACP model and consequently, a more uniform response. However, adopting a policy serves no purpose without training and facilitating an organizational culture that promotes a “zero tolerance” view of OIDV. Law enforcement should consider this not only a responsibility, but also a duty to ensure accountability and transparency.

Both the IACP model and the Toolkit exist to provide a uniform policy in a way that enables departments to take an individualized approach based on agency needs. Just as the state of Washington took steps to require all LEAs to adopt state policy and procedures, we believe state (and federal) legislative action mandating law enforcement entities to create procedures and policies for OIDV using IACP guidelines will satisfy a minimal standard of response. This is particularly important as such laws can then mandate policy compliance, and state and federal funding should be dependent upon policy implementation and reporting. If we can create uniformity in policy and procedure this could provide a foundation that can begin to address some of the obstacles associated with variability and allow for a more reliable examination of OIDV.

In order to begin the process, it is necessary for agencies, jurisdictions and organizations to work together to effectively aid agencies in the implementation and adherence. Organizations such as IACP, POST, International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training, Police Executive Research Forum, Lexipol and LEAs, should work to agree upon standardized terminology and policy requirements. For example, discussions of defining what constitutes OIDV, or “zero tolerance” and whether conditions mandate reporting of “suspicions of abuse” should be discussed. Further, state and federal policy requirements should also include clearly defined measures of response and reporting procedures.

Accountability is also a crucial element toward success. Individual officers and LEAs must be held accountable for implementing policy, training, and reporting. Accountability is essential in achieving LEA goals and reducing problem behaviors, ultimately resulting in greater public trust (Walker, 2007). Agency adoption, training, implementation, and reporting are not possible without the administrative agency accountability. LEAs who adopt and implement policy, training and reports of OIDV could be subject to financial rewards to incentivize agencies to participate or reduce federal or state funding. In terms of accountability for individual officers, outcome of internal and external misconduct evaluations must be reported. Cases of OIDV are often reported to POST state commissions or citizen review committees. However, without uniformity of response and definition, these reports are vulnerable to lesser charges, dismissal of charges, or failure to report to POST, again due to variability of definitions and sequence of events via protocol. For example, the state POST agencies typically receive reports of firings for OIDV, and officer misconduct. However, if the POST commission receives no record of officer misconduct, and/or the state lacks a POST commission, an officer may be fired from one agency and hired at another. Uniformity and transparency proactively minimize these problems by addressing them at their source.

A uniform approach enables useful data and greater transparency through standardization of terminology and conditionality. Departments should not be afraid to participate in research to examine the prevalence and response to OIDV. Obtaining large representative samples of various LEAs and comparing policy and procedure implementation increases the transparency of departments as they relate to OIDV, consequentially garnering trust and legitimacy of those departments. Transparency can also improve police morale and increase accountability (McDonald and Paromchik, 1996). Just recently, the Police Executive Research Forum and the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted the importance of building trust between police and community. They recommended that “to embrace a culture of transparency, law enforcement agencies should make all department policies available for public review and regularly post on the department’s website information about stops, summonses, arrests, reported crime, and other law enforcement data, aggregated by demographics” (Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, p.15, 2015). In response to a question about whether such transparency was realistic in our current political climate, Mark Wynn (personal communication, 2 February 2018) stated, “it’s not only realistic, it’s 20 years late, the culture has always been resistant”. Wynn also commented that just as it would be important to know how many of our officers were drug dealers, wouldn’t they want to know if their officers committed OIDV? Both are serious crimes, so why is there a reluctance to report OIDV?

Currently, there is no government agency or state or national data repository collecting information on OIDV, despite the knowledge and suspected prevalence of this phenomenon. Although law enforcement standards and training associations such as POST or International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training have databases that capture criminal offenses of officers and have the capability to decertify officers, the system is only as good as the information provided. As we have seen, if OIDV incidents are pled down or simply not reported, then there will always be issues of unreliability.

History has demonstrated data collection is vital to identifying trends and patterns. Additionally, the transparent climate may encourage law enforcement agents to assist their counterparts during times of crisis, possibly preventing future OIDV. The development of a national standard ensures data collection and transparency amongst all law enforcement entities; including public and private sectors. There are three main tenets designed to persuade agencies to distribute OIDV data: (a) government stipend, (b) resource allocation, and (c) additional training and programs. Providing additional resources to police agencies for programs, training, or equipment incentivizes agencies to participate in the program. This also serves as a cost-effective solution to the problem. For example, addressing OIDV issues in a timely manner prevents the escalation of future altercations. Resultant, preserved agency resources can be allocated to another section of the department.

Although the recruitment process is the most crucial screening period for a candidate, studies conducted on potential predictors of violence in officer candidates are rare. LEAs can provide greater access to such data, assisting in providing early warning signs of OIDV before and after candidates become sworn law enforcement officers. In the same regard, LEAs should collect and share data identifying predictors of OIDV by sworn officers based on officer conduct and department transfer rates. Overall, an increase in OIDV data may result in a more comprehensive understanding of this issue, while suggesting methods to combat it.

Historically, the U.S. government disseminated data regarding state and government entities for decades. In 1929, the International Association of Chiefs of Police established the Uniform Crime Reports program. Since 1930, over 18,000 law enforcement entities nationwide have contributed Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collection for analysis. While limitations accompany both systems, we believe making minor changes to the UCR could be helpful in collecting OIDV data. For example, the FBI was effective in changing the definition of sexual assault in 2013. Using this system, LEAs accommodated for the new definition of sexual assault, fundamentally adapting their reporting. As LEAs possibly utilize the federal definition for reporting domestic violence, including occupation as a variable of interest; the collection of OIDV data can promote transparency and unity by suggesting direction for future policy, procedure, and demonstrating the need for additional, empirical research. As suggested by the minimal data currently available, a future involving greater accountability, uniformity, and transparency requires additional intervention and resources with respect to OIDV.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and Brandon Fisher for his editorial assistance.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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