The emergence of network media logic in political communication: A theoretical approach

Abstract

In this article we propose a concept of network media logic in order to discuss how online social media platforms change political communication without resorting to technological determinism or normalization. We argue that social media platforms operate with a distinctly different logic from that of traditional mass media, though overlapping with it. This is leading to different ways of producing content, distributing information and using media. By discussing the differences between traditional mass media and social media platforms in terms of production, consumption and use, we carve out the central elements of network media logic – that is, the rules/format of communication on social media platforms – and some consequences for political communication.

Keywords

Media logic network political communication social media virality Web 2.0

Introduction

Ever since the internet emerged, researchers have been interested in how it has been utilized by politicians (Loveland and Popescu, 2011: 2). Part of the explanation for this attention is that the rise of the internet coincided with less civic participation and growing dissatisfaction with representative democracy (Dahlgren, 2009: 159). This resulted in perceptions of the internet as a kind of “magic elixir” (Stromer-Galley, 2000: 113) that would increase citizen participation and hence legitimize the representative democratic system. While early studies generally departed from such positive expectations of the influences of the internet, later studies have been more negative, suggesting that offline structures of political, economic and other sources of power are mirrored online (the so-called normalization hypothesis, see Lilleker et al., 2011 for an overview). But although research on normalization underlined this politics-as-usual approach, researchers continue to be fascinated by the internet in the hands of political actors, as the vast amount of literature on online campaigning, e-participation and e-governance illustrates. This is especially the case with the increasing use, and perceived importance, of so-called social media platforms. Within political communication there is a sense that something is changing when bringing political campaigning and communication to the online realm of social media. However, deterministic analyses and study designs have not fully succeeded in accounting for this (see also Miller, 2011).

On the basis of the above, this article seeks to contribute with a different theoretical framing of the rather deterministic arguments that either portray the internet as the solution to all of the problems liberal democracies face, or as merely reinforcing the existing political practices and power balances. By conceiving of social media platforms as intertwined with the rise of a network media logic, a logic distinctly different from – though overlapping with – that of the mass media, we may move beyond framings of social media platforms as inherently good or bad, while avoiding resorting to an argument that they are neutral (see also Feenberg, 2010: 17–18; Miller, 2011; Street, 1997: 34 for similar attempts, though not referring to media logics). In other words, the theory of media logics allows us to address this non-neutrality without resorting to either technological determinism or normalization.

We start this paper by accounting for the theory of media logics, describing the changing media and communication landscape with the rise of social media platforms and their characteristics and formats. From these discussions we proceed to outline the contours of a network media logic through comparison to traditional mass media logic in terms of media production, dissemination and use.

Media logics

Theoretical approaches to media logics can be traced back to Altheide and Snow’s book from 1979. Altheide and Snow talk about logic in the singular. We however prefer to talk about plural logics since we believe there are several different and overlapping logics at play, as some of the critics of the media logics argument have highlighted (as will be attended to shortly). By departing from an understanding of media as a social force in society, the aim of Altheide and Snow is to understand the role of media in our lives (as constituting and recognizing social reality). This they achieve by treating media as forms of communication that have particular logics of their own. According to them, “media logic functions as a form through which events and ideas are interpreted and acted upon” (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 240). They particularly emphasize that media logics are interactive and based on various participants (such as audience/user interpretation as well as media content and organization), rather than on one-way relationships in which media dictate the definitions of reality (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 236). In this way, they amend research interpreting media as stimulus/response conditioning, and they underline that both communicators and audiences/users employ media logics when presenting, as well as interpreting, various phenomena (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 10).

It is not a case of media dictating terms to the rest of society, but an interaction between organized institutional behavior and media. In this interaction, the form of media logic has come to be accepted as the perspective through which various institutional problems are interpreted and solved. (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 15)

This is important since, as will be discussed shortly, media logics have been accused of being linear, which is not the case, as the quote above shows. Although Altheide and Snow (1979: 12) admit that their perspective is media-centric, it is clear from their approach that media and other societal institutions cannot be studied separately and that causal explanations treating them as separate entities will mislead us (see also Miller, 2011: 3). The theory of media logics is thus suitable as a theoretical backdrop when aiming to go beyond deterministic framings of social media platforms as separate entities either bringing about change or merely being incorporated into existing power relations.

Media logics and mediatization are so tightly intertwined that current debates within mediatization deserve a mention here. Livingstone (2009) defines mediatization as the “meta-process by which everyday practices and social relations are historically shaped by mediating technologies and media organizations” (foreword p.x, see also Krotz, 2009: 24). Hjarvard (2008: 113), when discussing mediatization, explicitly refers back to the term “media logic” as something to which society and its institutions are submitted to an increasing degree. Mediatization is thus used both to describe a general meta-process (on par with globalization, individualization and commercialization, see Krotz, 2009: 25) and from an institutional perspective (see Hjarvard, 2008) to analyze the interplay between media and other social institutions. It is particularly within the institutional perspective that media logics are referred to, not least in relation to the institutions of politics (see Mazzoleni, 1987; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009).

The theory of media logics is different from mediatization in that the theory of mediatization refers to a general tendency in which almost all parts of society are affected by the media, whereas the theory of media logics attempts to uncover to what in media platforms, their organization and practices, the institutions of society are adapting. However, the term “logic” is contested. Couldry (2008) criticizes what he claims is a tendency in some mediatization approaches to identify “one single type of media-based logic that supercedes older logics” (Couldry, 2008: 378) and that social transformations are “too heterogeneous to be reduced to a single media logic” (Couldry, 2008). Similarly, Krotz (2009: 26) argues that media logic is a misleading concept since there are no media logics independent of cultural and societal contexts and independent of history. Lundby (2009) is particularly persistent in his criticism of media logics singularity (Lundby, 2009: 104), its linearity (Lundby, 2009: 105) and it being fixed, referring to rules/formats rather than to processes and forms of social interactions (Lundby, 2009):109–110). We agree that different logics both in the media and in the political realm, coexist and may have different weight/importance due to situations, actors and other circumstances, something that also may change over time and thus is not fixed. We would also argue that media logics as specific norms, rules and processes both influence and are influenced by the involved actors. However, we do not agree with Lundby (2009: 116) that the concept should be abandoned all together. This might be the case if aiming at heterogeneous theorizing about mediatization as a meta-theory bearing upon every aspect of society and all of its actors. Our aim, however, is less grand. Departing from recent discussions in political communication, we find media logic illuminating as a theoretical concept to discuss the non-neutrality of social media platforms without resorting to determinism or normalization. It is also clearly stated in the original theory that media logics should not be understood as media dictating reality or that media logics should be understood as independent from history, society or culture. And although there are instances where Altheide and Snow (1979) claim that the media is the dominant force to which other institutions have to conform, that “political logic is gradually being transformed by media logic” (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 115), Krotz (2009: 24) emphasizes media in a similar manner when defining “mediatized” as being dependent on the media (even though he claims that communication is the basic practice of mediatization, see page 25). Also, media logics is less of a general meta-theory as it attempts to uncover the norms, rules and processes that structure communication. And the aim of this article is not to resolve the conceptual debates about mediatization and the role of media logics in it, but to put forward the concept of a network media logic as one way to uncover how social media platforms interact with politics and political communication.

Altheide and Snow (1979: 103) state that politics is one of the social institutions most closely aligned with the evolution of media forms and thus bears the most notable marks of media’s influence. Media logics, they argue, have clearly informed political styles, cases, issues and even outcomes (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 136). A study of the German parliament shows for example that the quantity of information-related activities has increased sharply, whereas the quantity of decision-making activities has remained fairly constant (Kepplinger, 2002), which indicates the increasing importance of media coverage for politics (see also Street, 1997). To obtain media coverage, politicians have had to adhere to the dramatization style in media discourses, to short soundbites, as well as to visual and entertainment formats (Altheide, 2004: 294). Asp (1986) showed early that politics was influenced and changed by such media demands. Within political communication research, media logics are sometimes used as an anti-thesis to presumed party logics, suggesting that political actors and media actors follow very different agendas and employ different modi operandi. A growing number of studies on political and campaign communication have attended to the changing relationship between mass media and political actors (Mazzoleni, 1987; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009: 213). With regard to the previous discussion, we believe that media logics and party logics coexist and inform each other. Or in the words of Strömbäck and Esser (2009), “the relationships between media and politics are characterized by dynamic interactions and complex interdependencies along various levels and dimensions” (Strömbäck and Esser, 2009: 220).

Today, the media landscape is changing profoundly because of globalization, commercialization, the concentration of media corporations, the deregulation of media ownership and digitalization (see Dahlgren, 2009: 35–39). Social media platforms have specifically established themselves as the main loci for mediated communication and socialization, especially among the youth. Hence, there is little doubt that social media platforms and their mobile accesses are changing the media and communication landscape. This is something political actors are increasingly aware of and taking into account. Hence we see politicians and parties migrating to social media platforms (see Foot and Schneider, 2006; Jackson and Lilleker, 2011; Klinger, 2013; Svensson, in press).

Given this changing media and communication landscape and, analogously, the theory of media logics, we will outline the contours of a network media logic. We call it a network media logic to distinguish it from other network logics such as connective action logic, which builds on digital media but is centered on explaining how users organize and mobilize contentious politics (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). A network is a collection of links between nodes in a system (Van Dijk, 2006: 24) that operates fluidly and flexibly (Bruns, 2008: 1). In Castells’ (2000) work on the network society, the network is an intersectional concept for overcoming boundaries between society and technology. He describes the tendency to organize processes and functions as networks; hence, the network has become the social morphology of society, influencing everything from production processes to individual experiences, power and culture (Castells, 2000: 519). Similarly Van Dijk (2006: 23) argues that networks are becoming the nervous system of our society and we can expect this to influence our entire social and personal lives. The network thus seems the right concept to use when labeling a new media logic.

The general format structuring social media practices cannot be understood without attending to Web 2.0 developments. Web 2.0 comprises online user participation architecture and encompasses social software that enables many-to-many publication (Bakir, 2010: 2–3). Social media as a term denominating only one particular type of media is contested though, since it implies that traditional mass media would not encompass social dimensions (Münker, 2009: 9–14). While some authors claim that computer networks are inherently social because they link people and organizations (Wellman, 2001a), others underline user-generated content by arguing that a website can only be defined as social if users can contribute to the content on that site, have the possibility to control their information, and the design is interactive and usable (O’Reilly, 2005). We understand social media as online platforms where users can generate content, organize and access information in databases, inform and be informed by a network of selected others, which also becomes the general framework for presenting and interpreting information. These social media platforms are characterized (next to other – for example, technological – features we cannot discuss here) by practices of constant updating (Livingstone, 2008; Svensson, 2012), speed (Van Dijk, 2006: 14–15) and connectivity (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Manovich, 2001: 2019).

Network vs mass media logic

Social media platforms are characterized by a different, though overlapping, logic from that of traditional mass media, with regard to the inherent communication norms and practices related to media production, distribution and usage. Therefore in this section, we will contrast media production, distribution and usage on social media platforms with traditional mass media (such as the press, radio, TV). Referring to these categories offers us a comparison with traditional mass media from which we can identify differences and thus outline the contours of a network media logic. We concede that there may be other characteristics that could be contrasted (for example with regard to technological aspects, such as algorithms). We chose three sub-dimensions – production, distribution and media usage – because we find them particularly illustrative (see Table 1)

Table 1.

Mass media logic and network media logic.

	Mass Media Logic	Network Media Logic
Production	Expensive information selection and content generation by professional journalists according to news values	Inexpensive information selection and content generation by (lay) users according to their individual preferences and attention maximizing
Distribution	Content selected by expert/professional gatekeepers – based on established news values – distributed to a paying fixed audience of subscribers	Users are like intermediaries, distributing popular content, sometimes like a chain letter, within networks of like-minded others
Media Usage	Location bound mass audience with limited selective exposure oriented towards passive consumption of information, based on professional selection.	Interest-bound and like-minded peer networks with highly selective exposure oriented towards interaction through practices of updating

Logic of production

Social media platforms have changed the way news and information are produced. They have introduced a new logic of production. The idea of a media logic is connected to the way media actors produce information. As Altheide (2004) states, “media logic refers to the assumptions and processes for constructing messages within a particular medium” (Altheide 2004: 294). This is most obvious on the level of the actors and the convergence of the content producer and content consumer roles, which means that on social media platforms, the logics of production and media usage are intertwined. There are several attributions to this development (“produsage”), some of which take into account the permeation of traditional mass media logic and network media logic (“interactive journalism”, “citizen journalism”). However, they all indicate that an increasing part of the information that citizens consume through mediated channels is the result of amateur activity, by those who may have authentic knowledge and information access, but lack expertise and resources (Farrell and Drezner, 2008: 27). Social media platforms enable such lay participation and the making of news that comes from outside the mass media. So where mass media logic is based on professional content production, network media logic is based on amateur production and so-called “produsage” (Bruns, 2008). But mass media logic and network media logic do sometimes overlap in the production process. Journalist bloggers tend to “normalize” blogs by “sticking to their traditional gatekeeper role” (Singer, 2005: 192), while at the same time moving away from non-partisan presentation of information. Hermida (2010) has pointed out that “there are indications that journalism norms are bending as professional practices adapt to social media tools such as micro-blogging” (Hermida, 2010: 300) and refers to (micro-)blogging as “ambient journalism” (Hermida, 2010). This changing and bending of norms and practices is what happens when different media logics intertwine, overlap and inform each other: professional journalists take their norms and practices to blogs and social media platforms, while the inherent production logic of networked media on their part penetrates professional news organizations. This overlapping may not be free of conflict, as norms and practices can collide – Hermida and Thurman (2008) diagnose what they call a clash of cultures in their study of British newspaper websites and their integration of user-generated content.

Media logic also refers to styles (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 10) or storytelling techniques that the media use (Strömbäck, 2008: 233). Wall (2005) has shown that narrative styles, approaches to audience and story forms differ decidedly between traditional journalism and blog journalism and “when compared with traditional journalism, blogs do suggest a changed form of news” (Wall, 2005: 161). This leads to the question of news/information selection. It has been well established that journalists employ similar criteria to distinguish “newsworthy” information from less relevant material (following so-called news values). Conversely, the logic behind posting on social media platforms is instead guided by authors’ selection of information that is of personal interest to them, by their reflexive individualization and by the anticipation of maximal attention. Information selection on social media platforms differs from that on mass media that already have a mass audience (so-called pull- vs push-media). Maier (2010) has empirically shown that news content spread on social media platforms and on blogs is “sharply distinct” from news topics in traditional media and on news websites (Maier, 2010: 558). While he found a strong correlation of coverage by traditional news media and news websites, social media and blogs diverged from mass media both in the stories covered and their news frames. Social media platforms enable immediate, more horizontal and interactive, highly personalized communication generated by laypeople instead of professionals (journalists). Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have argued that this is due to users’ willingness to share and labor collectively and for free; open source software and applications are examples of such work. This tendency hints at the formation of a network media logic where content is selected reflexively with regards to individualization and attention-maximizing rather than with regards to professional codes and journalistic news values.

Given the possibility to individually store and produce content on social media platforms, the network media logic of production is indicative of more individualized forms of media content production compared to mass media where professionals judge what constitutes worthy information or not. This has the consequence that traditional mass media and social media platforms differ decisively regarding their financial cost of production. The trade-off between audience size and economic costs diverges strongly on social media platforms (Beckman and Marks, 2009). Providing information on social media platforms is inexpensive and can – at least in network societies – be achieved with ordinary consumer tools that do not require specialist knowledge or professional equipment. Social media platforms are so inexpensive that the commercial logic of mass media is reversed. For example, while some popular bloggers earn a little from advertising, the ad content usually reflects the bloggers’ and readers’ interests, not the other way around, because bloggers do not depend on advertisement revenue or money from corporations (Woodly, 2008: 118).

Logic of distribution

Social media platforms have also changed the way information is disseminated, which introduces a new logic of distribution. It is no longer only professionals, such as journalists or other central gatekeepers, who can filter, edit and forward information to their recipients, but users themselves forming nodes in information networks. This can also be measured empirically. Bandari et al. (2012) have developed criteria to forecast the popularity of news on Twitter, and found that traditionally prominent news sources differ from news sources that are popular on social media platforms.

Distribution on social media platforms is built on the logic of virality, which can be defined as “network-enhanced word of mouth” or “the process which gives any information item the maximum exposure, relative to the potential audience, over a short duration, distributed by many nodes” (Nahon et al., 2011: 1). In this context, Montgomery (2001) offers an interesting metaphorical definition of viral marketing as “a type of marketing that infects its customers with an advertising message, which passes from one customer to the next like a rampant flu virus” (Montgomery, 2001: 93). Gaining relevant resonance within social media platforms and subsequent resonance within mass media thus depends on the ability to publish information that users will forward within their networks, comment on and recommend to other users. If information posted on social media platforms does not have the specific viral quality that provokes users to spread it around, it will not reach beyond a very limited circle of supporters – or, in Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) words, “people must show each other how they can appropriate, shape, and share themes” (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 8). While professionals working for traditional mass media usually know that their publications will reach a certain number of subscribers or viewers/listeners (with very precise estimates of this number), the same publications have to first be found on social media platforms and thereafter distributed by and among networks of peers and like-minded users. Thus, information is no longer simply delivered from the sender to the recipient, but has to be distributed from user to user, like a chain letter. Therefore we cannot talk about “audiences” or subscribers in the traditional sense on social media platforms, but instead we talk about users participating in networks of like-minded others. Like-mindedness is of course a relative concept, and while not all individuals are like-minded on social media platforms, networks of friends and connections at least tend to be more like-minded than subscribers to mass media texts (Campbell and Kwak, 2011; Van Dijk, 2006).

Distribution of content is asymmetric on social media platforms. Only very little information or few posts receive attention, most remain unnoticed. Virality is here tightly interconnected with popularity in the sense that social media platforms enhance the domination of popular content. This is in stark contrast to traditional mass media, where experts (such as journalists) make the choices they present to a mass audience – for example, which books to read, movies to watch and what news to put on the agenda. This means that on social media platforms popularity among like-minded users, not professional gatekeepers, decides whether information is relevant and passed on (i.e. goes viral) or not.

As yet it does not seem possible to deliberately create virality, but online intermediaries, such as highly frequented blogs, can stimulate it. According to Nahon et al. (2011), swift dissemination is facilitated if so-called elite and top general-bloggers provide sufficient relevance for a viral start. Bloggers are intermediaries rather than gatekeepers, because they cannot decide whether a piece of information will be published or not, but they provide orientation in an environment of informative abundance. Bloggers and blogs do not derive their importance from the number of readers, but from their readers’ demographics. Although blogs have far fewer readers than traditional mass media, some of them are very influential due to their networked structure and high readership of journalists and political elites – who are nevertheless likely to reframe the information they gather from such blogs (Farrell and Drezner, 2008). Distribution on social media platforms thus depends on popular online intermediaries who serve as catalysts rather than on the professional gatekeepers of mass media.

The network media logic of distribution occasionally penetrates the realm of traditional mass media. Examples are articles on online portals being ranked in most-emailed lists; news selections increasingly focusing on audience metrics – i.e. estimations of the online traffic they will generate; and journalists being evaluated (and soon maybe even paid) by the number of clicks their articles generate (Anderson, 2011). On the other hand, there are formats in the online realm that resemble traditional media, such as elite press portals.

Furthermore, the network media logic of distribution has altered the media market’s business models. While traditional media delivering information unilaterally to their audience are based on users paying for a product, the distribution logic of sharing content on social media platforms has led to new economic models. One example is freemiums, in which basic services are free but premium features come at a cost. Other examples include social media monitoring as well as personalized retargeting, which are services that follow customers of a commercial website who do not complete their purchase, in order to drive them back to the site (Kietzmann et al., 2012: 109). This relates also to business models built around the participatory culture of social media platforms (“wikinomics”, see Van Dijk and Nieborg, 2009). Advertisement models are increasingly based on social media monitoring, on data mining and the targeting of fragmented online “niche” audiences, while traditional mass media employ a catch-all model, targeting mass audiences by means of rating data.

Logic of media usage/audience

Social media platforms enable high levels of selective exposure and have fragmented audiences, thereby creating a new logic of media usage. Social media platforms make it easier for the like-minded to socialize from their home environments and over great distances because digital technology facilitates geographically spread niche networks based on interest rather than location. So where mass media consumption to a larger extent is bound to geographically defined communities, social media platforms are bound to communities of peers and like-minded others. This has consequences for media audiences. While traditional mass media are directed at mass audiences and the general public, social media platforms may reach a large number of self-selected people, but not the general public. This is because communication in mass media and on social media platforms takes place on different levels: “one has to take these levels of offline and online publics into account: one cannot compare mass-oriented print media with blogs or discussion boards, as they are situated on different structural levels” (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2012: 146). Castells (2008) has similarly referred to mass self-communication, “that is, networks of communication that relate many-to-many in the sending and receiving of messages in a multimodal form of communication that bypasses mass media and often escapes government control” (Castells, 2008: 90) that restructure the public sphere.

In 1978, Rosengren had already indicated that citizens were dependent on mass-mediated information, to the degree that “the public is defenseless, because it lacks independent data from outside the media” (quoted in Fritz and Altheide, 1987: 476). With the emergence of user-generated content on social media platforms, this problem has been replaced by another – the abundance of external information and the problem of attributing relevance to such information. Users today have to navigate within this abundance, to select what is relevant – which is why content-sharing and suggestions from contacts within social networks are influential. The network of peers and like-minded others on social media platforms informs users about the variety of choices, but above all about what they have chosen and done in similar situations (Manovich, 2001: 35). Hence, when connecting to peers and like-minded others on social media platforms, users indirectly tailor what information they will hear about. In other words, users construct and organize their social realities through networks. Networks of peers and the tailored information on streaming towards users on social media platforms are increasingly influencing media consumption. News feeds of selected others’ likes, dislikes and behaviors enable users to anticipate their future needs and wants based on others’, as well as their own, aggregated past choices (Hands, 2011: 128). This discussion can also be linked to earlier studies on personal influence and herd behavior (e.g. Banerjee, 1992). Economists have shown that consumers will follow the choices and recommendations of others, even if they themselves have better and contrasting information. This is different from consuming information and constructing our reality out of professional expert (journalist) choices.

Updating becomes an emphasized behavior when using social media platforms. Users have to be constantly updated in order not to miss out on something, since online information spreads fast. Szabo and Huberman (2010) demonstrate that the viral quality of an information item is derived at an early stage (in one case two hours after the upload). Hence, although social media platforms prolong the lifespans of information – through organized databases of content that users can revisit – information does not gain attention slowly online, since users continuously scan and update their online social networks. Such updating practices are different from the more passive information consumption at fixed times in fixed channels of mass media.

Delineating mass media logic and network media logic

Network media logic is not replacing mass media logic. The core argument here is that social media platforms follow other “rules of the game” than traditional mass media, particularly in the three dimensions of content production, information distribution and media use. This does not mean that mass media logic is becoming obsolete or marginal. The reason for this is quite simple: the majority of relevant information still comes from journalistic content production, is distributed via established mass media and is used by individuals with routinized media menus.

Furthermore, both logics are not static, but dynamic and evolving. This can be best illustrated with the changes in norms and practices that govern traditional mass media. Commercialization and the commercial rationale of maximizing audiences have increasingly impacted the production and distribution of content in private media companies and also public service outlets (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 2008). Landerer (2013) has taken up these developments and argued that instead of discussing media logic and political logic as counterparts in mediatization studies, it made more sense to refer to normative logic and market logic. He underlined that “media companies are mainly driven by two competing logics – audience-oriented commercial logic and normatively oriented public logic” (Landerer, 2013: 245) and thereby helped the concept to evolve further from the simple idea that all different media would fit under one umbrella logic. On the other hand, this does not mean that each new communication channel operates under its own special media logic, as Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) have made clear that “the norms that govern the media overall are often more important than what distinguishes one form of media from another” (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011: 33).

In increasingly hybrid media systems, mass media and network media logic tend to overlap and intertwine. As Chadwick (2013: 207) has convincingly argued, media systems in western mass democracies have become hybrid media systems, and accordingly power in political communication is relational. Connecting to this, mass media logic and network media logic should not be understood as dichotomous concepts that are mutually exclusive. “The hybrid media system is based upon conflict and competition between older and newer media logics but it also features important pockets of interdependence among these logics” (Chadwick, 2013: 207). And although we can distinguish between different logics at work in different types of media – because they have to be separate to be in conflict and competition with each other – media convergence makes it impossible to sort media types according to their logic (such as newspapers working exclusively on mass media logic, or content in online networks always being produced according to network media logic). Mass media and network media logic rather overlap and intertwine. In the dimension of content production this can be observed in Facebook groups of political parties, where a relevant part of posts consists of sharing journalistic content from newspapers, radio or other traditional media (Klinger, 2013; Svensson, in press). On the other hand, Twitter has become an important source for journalists, who use it to monitor actors and institutions of interest (Broersma and Graham, 2012).

With regard to information distribution, traditional mass media also incorporate in their online portals elements of virality, lists of most-popular and algorithmic-based content. The boundaries between journalists and non-journalists become blurred, with journalists tweeting and writing blogs outside of their work schedule and professional portals (Lasorsa et al., 2012), or using Twitter as a reporting tool (Vis, 2013). On the other hand, viral distribution of information on social media platforms can be boosted by mass media coverage. Nahon and Hemsley (2013) have shown that network gatekeepers have a crucial influence on what goes viral, and that such network gatekeepers are challenging traditional gatekeepers, such as mass media. However, while network gatekeepers (e.g. online platforms such as Facebook) may challenge mass media’s monopoly on gatekeeping, journalistic mass media are still attributed with relevance and get mass attention.

Regarding the third dimension, media use and audience, both logics also overlap and intertwine. Especially younger cohorts increasingly view television programs online, as TV outlets use online video platforms and their own websites to promote content. While it is not clear whether online viewing may substitute for watching classic television, the amount of time spent with online videos (many of them produced by traditional public service TV stations and studios) is increasing (Waldfogel, 2009). However, watching TV or YouTube does not exactly mean the same on an individual level: “while people watch videos on YouTube for some of the same reasons identified in studies of television viewing, there is a distinctly social aspect to YouTube use that reflects its social networking characteristics” (Haridakis and Hanson, 2009: 317).

To conclude: content in social media platforms is not always user-generated, but often involves references to mass media. Traditional mass media also attempt to master viral distribution as a basis for (among other things) new business models. Media users have diversified their media diets and navigate in hybrid media systems. But the overlapping does not make media logics undistinguishable, because of the very different modi operandi in both realms that we have discussed above. It is the task of empirical studies to distinguish and measure the extent of mass media and network media logic in specific cases.

Conclusion

In this article, we have argued that social media platforms operate with a logic that differs from that of traditional mass media. By discussing the differences between traditional mass media and social media platforms, we have carved out the central elements of this network media logic. So what implications do social media platforms have for political communication? How are political institutions incorporating network media logic and how is this logic shaping politics and political communication?

While we have not studied the full consequences of a network media logic yet, one implication we can already discern is the increasing importance of the network. On social media platforms, the network is part of the content displayed. Facebook, for example, is used by campaigning politicians to link to opinion pieces, televised debates and to other party members (Svensson, in press). Similarly, knowing how to network has become a fundamental resource in connected societies (Wellman, 2001b). Seeking to gain maximum attention, politicians attempt to establish and maintain as many linkages and relationships as possible. The network media logic thus stipulates that it is not enough for politicians to, for instance, maintain a profile on Facebook, they also need to befriend as many other users as possible in order to get attention for themselves, the party and their messages. An important consequence of network media logic is that political communication on social media platforms cannot be directed at mass audiences since there are no mass audiences. Therefore, being connected to many others is important, because it signals popularity.

Another implication is the necessity to go viral. Berger and Milkman (2010) found a strong link between evoking emotions and going viral, and that users share positive rather than negative content (in contrast to the mass media). Similarly, Hansen et al. (2011: 41) have concluded that one should provide friends with “sweet-talk” while serving bad news to the (mass) public. Wu et al. (2011) have also shown that rapidly fading information on Twitter (< 24 hours) is significantly related to negative content, while positive content shows longer lifespans. For political actors, this means that, contrary to traditional mass media, communication strategies on social media platforms are increasingly differentiated and have more positive, personalized and emotional content.

In the article we have also pointed to the role of prominent blogs (top general or elite bloggers, Nahon et al., 2011), which may give political information sufficient visibility to start viral distribution. This means that not only journalists, but also bloggers have become increasingly important addressees for politicians. However, to date there is very little academic literature on the relationships between politicians and bloggers. As intermediaries, bloggers may employ the same selection criteria as journalists, but they do not have a mass audience in mind. Research on “imagined audiences” (Litt, 2012) has demonstrated that the “characteristics of social media platforms have altered the size, composition, boundaries, accessibility, and cue availability of our communication partners… making it nearly impossible to determine the actual audience” (Litt, 2012: 312). Marwick and boyd (2010) have similarly contrasted an old broadcast audience with a networked audience that authors on social media platforms have in mind: “While the broadcast audience is a faceless mass, the networked audience is unidentified but contains familiar faces; it is both potentially public and personal” (Marwick and boyd, 2010: 129).

Furthermore, the network logic of distribution is not only about viral and connected spread of information. Social media platforms do allow for real-time responses, but also extend the lifespan of linked information. Terblanche (2011) has shown that political cartoons are available for much longer as well as being more potent. This information longevity calls for long-term communication strategies, as information about a political actor is indefinitely retrievable.

With this article we hope to have illustrated how the theory of media logics – adapted to the online realm of social media platforms through outlining the contours of a network media logic – is useful when aiming to discuss, analyze and understand how political communication is changing, without resorting to either technological determinism or assuming their neutrality. While there are many examples of social media platforms opening up new arenas of political participation, they are not necessarily better or more democratic than traditional mass media, but they are different in their formats and hence logic.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. Both authors have contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Author biographies

Ulrike Klinger is Senior Research and Teaching Associate at the Institute for Mass Communication and Media Research (IPMZ) at the University of Zurich. Her research focuses on two main areas – online political communication and media governance.

Jakob Svensson is holding a position of associate professor in Media and Communication Studies at Uppsala University. Dr Svensson directs the MA program in Digital Media and Society. His research focuses on two main areas – political participation on digital media platforms and mobile communication in developing regions.

References

Altheide

(2004) Media logic and political communication. Political Communication 21(3): 293–296.

Altheide

Snow

(1979) Media Logic. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.

Anderson

(2011) Between creative and quantified audiences: Web metrics and changing patterns of newswork in local US newsrooms. Journalism: Theory, Practice, Criticism 12(5): 550–566.

Asp

(1986) Mäktiga massmedier: Studier om politisk opinionsbildning [Powerful Mass Media: Studies of Political Opinion Formation]. Stockholm: Akademilitteratur.

Bakir

(2010) Sousveillance, Media and Strategic Political Communication: Iraq, USA, UK. New York: Continuum.

Bandari

Asur

Huberman

(2012) The pulse of news in social media: Forecasting popularity. In: Proceedings of the sixth international AAAI conference on weblogs and social media (Arxiv preprint arXiv), Dublin 4–7 June, vol. 1202, pp. 26–33.

Banerjee

(1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 797–817.

Bardoel

d’Haenens

(2008) Reinventing public service broadcasting in Europe: Prospects, promises and problems. Media, Culture & Society 30(3): 337–355.

Beckman

Marks

(2009) ‘I need to communicate with many people’: The low cost opportunities given by blogging. Romanian Journal of Journalism and Communication/Revista Romana de Jurnalism si Comunicare 4(3): 64–68.

10.

Bennett

Segerberg

(2012) The logic of connective action. Information, Communication & Society 15(5): 739–768.

11.

Berger

Milkman

(2010) Social transmission, emotion, and the virality of online content. Wharton research paper. Available at: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~kmilkman/Virality.pdf (accessed 4 November 2012).

12.

Broersma

Graham

(2012) Social media as beat: tweets as a news source during the 2010 British and Dutch elections. Journalism Practice 6(3): 403–419.

13.

Bruns

(2008) Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage. New York: Peter Lang.

14.

Campbell

Kwak

(2011) Political involvement in ‘Mobilized’ society: The interactive relationships among mobile communication, network characteristics, and political participation. Journal of Communication 61(6): 1005–1024.

15.

Castells

(2000) Informationsåldern. Ekonomi, samhälle och kultur. Band 1. Nätverkssamhällets framväxt [The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume 1, The Rise of the Network Society]. 2nd ed. Göteborg: Daidalos.

16.

Castells

(2008) The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1): 78–93.

17.

Chadwick

(2013) The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

18.

Couldry

(2008) Mediatization or mediation? Alternative understandings of the emergent space of digital storytelling. New Media & Society 10(3): 373–391.

19.

Dahlgren

(2009) Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication, and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

20.

Farrell

Drezner

(2008) The power and politics of blogs. Public Choice 134(1–2): 15–30.

21.

Feenberg

(2010) Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Modernity. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

22.

Foot

Schneider

(2006) Web Campaigning. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

23.

Fritz

Altheide

(1987) The mass media and the social construction of the missing children problem. Sociological Quarterly 28(4): 473–492.

24.

Gerhards

Schäfer

(2012) Is the Internet a better public sphere? Comparing old and new media in the USA and Germany. New Media & Society 12(1): 143–160.

25.

Hands

(2011) @ Is for Activism: Dissent, Resistance and Rebellion in a Digital Culture. New York: Pluto Press.

26.

Hansen

Arvidsson

Nielsen

. (2011) Good friends, bad news: Affect and virality in Twitter. In: Park

Young

Lee

(eds) Future Information Technology, Communications in Computer and Information Sciences, vol. 185. Berlin: Springer Verlag, pp.34–42.

27.

Haridakis

Hanson

(2009) Social interaction and co-viewing with YouTube: Blending mass communication reception and social connection. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 53(2): 317–335.

28.

Hermida

(2010) Twittering the news: The emergence of ambient journalism. Journalism Practice 4(3): 297–308.

29.

Hermida

Thurman

(2008) A clash of cultures: The integration of user-generated content within professional journalistic frameworks at British newspaper websites. Journalism Practice 2(3): 343–356.

30.

Hjarvard

(2008) The mediatization of society: A theory of the media as agents of social and cultural change. Nordicom Review 29(2): 105–134.

31.

Jackson

Lilleker

(2011) Microblogging, constituency service and impression management: UK MPs and the use of Twitter. Journal of Legislative Studies 17(1): 86–105.

32.

Kepplinger

(2002) Mediatization of politics: Theory and data. Journal of Communication 52(4): 972–986.

33.

Kietzmann

Silvestre

McCarthy

. (2012) Unpacking the social media phenomenon: Towards a research agenda. Journal of Public Affairs 12(2): 109–119.

34.

Klinger

(2013) Mastering the art of social media: Swiss parties, the 2011 national election and digital challenges. Information, Communication & Society 16(5): 717–736.

35.

Krotz

(2009) Mediatization: A concept with which to grasp media and social change. In: Lundby

(ed.) Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang, pp.21–40.

36.

Landerer

(2013) Rethinking the logics: A conceptual framework for the mediatization of politics. Communication Theory 23: 239–258.

37.

Lasorsa

Lewis

Holton

(2012) Normalizing Twitter: Journalism practice in an emerging communication space. Journalism Studies 13(1): 19–36.

38.

Lilleker

Koc-Michalska

Schweitzer

. (2011) Informing, engaging, mobilizing or interacting: Searching for a European model of web campaigning. European Journal of Communication 26(3): 195–213.

39.

Litt

(2012) Knock, knock. Who’s there? The imagined audience. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 56(3): 330–345.

40.

Livingstone

(2008) Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: Teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. New Media & Society 10(3): 393–411.

41.

Livingstone

(2009) Foreword: Coming to terms with ‘mediatization’. In: Lundby

(ed.) Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang, pp.ix–xi.

42.

Loveland

Popescu

(2011) Democracy on the web. Information, Communication & Society 14(5): 684–703.

43.

Lundby

(2009) Media logic: Looking for social interaction. In: Lundby

(ed.) Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang, pp.101–119.

44.

Maier

(2010) All the news fit to post? Comparing news content on the web to newspapers, television, and radio. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 87(3/4): 548–562.

45.

Manovich

(2001) The Language of New Media. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

46.

Marwick

boyd

(2010) I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse and the imagined audience. New Media & Society 13(1): 114–133.

47.

Mazzoleni

(1987) Media logic and party logic in campaign coverage: The Italian general election of 1983. European Journal of Communication 2(1): 81–103.

48.

Miller

(2011) Understanding Digital Culture. London: SAGE.

49.

Montgomery

(2001) Applying Qunatitiave Marketing Techniques to the Internet. Interfaces 31(2): 90–108.

50.

Münker

(2009) Emergenz digitaler Öffentlichkeiten. Die Sozialen Medien im Web 2.0 [The Emergence of Digital Publics: Social Media in the Web 2.0]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

51.

Nahon

Hemsley

(2013) Going Viral. Cambridge: Polity.

52.

Nahon

Hemsley

Walker

. (2011) Fifteen minutes of fame: The power of blogs in the lifecycle of viral political information. Policy & Internet 3(1): 6–33.

53.

O’Reilly

(2005) What is Web 2.0: Design patterns and business models for the next generation of software. Available at: http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html (accessed 15 February 2013).

54.

Singer

(2005) The political j-blogger ‘Normalizing’ a new media form to fit old norms and practices. Journalism 6(2): 173–198.

55.

Street

(1997) Remote control? Politics, technology and ‘Electronic Democracy’. European Journal of Communication 12(1): 27–42.

56.

Strommer-Galley

(2000) On-line interaction and why candidates avoid it. Journal of Communication 50(4): 111–132.

57.

Strömbäck

Dimitrova

(2011) Mediatization and media interventionism: A comparative analysis of Sweden and the United States. International Journal of Press/Politics 16(1): 30–49.

58.

Strömbäck

(2008) Four Phases of Mediatization. An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics. International Journal of Press/Politics 13(3): 228–246.

59.

Strömbäck

Esser

(2009) Shaping politics: Mediatization and media interventionism. In: Lundby

(ed.) Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 205–223.

60.

Svensson

(2012) Social media and the disciplining of visibility: Activist participation and relations of power in network societies. European Journal of e-Practice 16: 16–28.

61.

Svensson

(in press) The mediatization of campaign organizations: Social media practices in the Nina Larsson campaign. In: Pallas

Strannegård

(eds) Organizations and the Media: Organizing in a Mediatized World, Chapter 14. New York: Routledge.

62.

Szabo

Huberman

(2010) Predicting the popularity of online content. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) 53(8): 80–88.

63.

Terblanche

(2011) You cannot run or hide from social media – ask a politician. Journal of Public Affairs 11(3): 156–167.

64.

Van Dijk

(2006) The Network Society. 2nd ed. London: SAGE.

65.

Van Dijk

Nieborg

(2009) Wikinomics and its discontents: A critical analysis of Web 2.0 business manifestos. New Media & Society 11(5): 855–874.

66.

Vis

(2013) Twitter as a reporting tool for breaking news: Journalists tweeting the 2011 UK riots. Digital Journalism 1(1): 27–47.

67.

Waldfogel

(2009) Lost on the web: Does web distribution stimulate or depress television viewing? Information Economics and Policy 21(2): 158–168.

68.

Wall

(2005) ‘Blogs of War’: Weblogs as news. Journalism 6(2): 153–172.

69.

Wellman

(2001a) Computer networks as social networks. Science 293: 2031–2034.

70.

Wellman

(2001b) Physical place and cyberplace: The rise of personalized networking. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(2): 227–252.

71.

Woodly

(2008) New competencies in democratic communication? Blogs, agenda setting and political participation. Public Choice 134(1–2): 109–123.

72.

Hofman

Mason

. (2011) Who says what to whom on Twitter. In: Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World Wide Web, Hyderabad, 28 March − 1 April, pp. 705–714. ACM.