Abstract
When it comes to political opposites, right-wing authoritarianism and radical progressivism are worlds apart. Yet, two recently published books provide important insights into the ideological underpinnings and media strategies of both movements. Published in 2016, Natalie Fenton’s book Digital Political Radical uses Horkheimer’s foundational aspects of critical theory to construct an empirical analysis of concepts like power and politics, and interrogate the difference between “being political” and the “politics of being.” In doing so, she urges readers to address the social, economic, and cultural inequalities that result from power imbalances. Fenton’s call to action is exactly what Fuchs claims we need to stop the rise of authoritarian capitalism around the globe documented in his book Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of Trump and Twitter. Providing a birds-eye view of how right-wing authoritarianism utilizes digital media platforms, Fuchs demonstrates how “Trumpology” is changing US capitalism how concepts outlined by Fenton might prove useful from halting a resurgence of fascism.
Despite the fact that “radical” has come to signify right-wing conservative politics, Fenton uses the phrase to refer to progressive politics, specifically movements that seek “democratic gains over global capitalism” (p. 9). Relying on a vast literature review, Fenton outlines both the promises and pitfalls of integrating digital media into radical political endeavors. The speed and space of digital media can alert people to radical political endeavors and allow protestors from disparate places to respond rapidly to local events. Diversity and horizontality provide a platform for historically marginalized voices, while connectivity and participation celebrate the ease by which digital media facilitates expression. As a result, diverse citizens from around the world utilize the Internet to amplify their protests and increase participation.
Nonetheless, Fenton argues that we cannot simply venerate horizontality, difference, and individuality. Those who already hold power can capitalize on the same dimensions, surveilling, and censoring political dissent with astonishing speed. Connectivity can empower social movements but simultaneously disempower radical groups by making them a target for authoritarian regimes. Popular sentiment assumes limitless diversity online, but “Having a voice in a space this is occupied by millions of other voices does not guarantee you will be heard, particularly if you are lacking resources and struggling to keep up with the tyranny of new technology” (p. 50). More importantly, a focus on social media deflects attention away from the extensive networks of human beings necessary to enact organizational change. The benefits of a digitally mediated world are bound to the implicit assumption that institutions will respond to political demands in a practical way. Yet, “such a leap of faith is hard to reconcile with the enduring realities of poverty and inequality” (p. 31)—specifically when one considers the limitations of public sphere theory—the prevailing ideology of political participation.
Using digital media to fulfill the Habermasian ideal fails to acknowledge the extent to which contemporary structures of democracy may actually be part of the problem. Specifically, Fenton notes “the limitations of public sphere theory which regards the political subject as a rational individual and the political system as a rational process that functions on the basis of consensus” (p. 81, emphasis mine). This pluralistic inevitably leads to policies that conform to the will of the majority and fail to account for existing hierarchies of power. One important power structure often overlooked, according to Fenton, is the dependent relationship between mainstream media and elected officials. Politicians use media to influence election results and media routinely access elite definitions of reality which legitimize inequality. New technology claims to serve as a way for citizens to communicate with government, but Fenton points out that most large tech companies operate in the same way. The opportunity for political participation through deliberative and interactive spaces denies the deep political histories and socio-economic contexts in which certain politics have risen. Radical groups must consider the way in which elite and corporate power is often occurring behind the scenes, before lauding “media” as the solution for inequality.
Idealizing a pluralistic public sphere also obfuscates whether citizen demands are actually considered (or implemented) by political leaders. Equating pluralism with communicative freedom fails to account for the fact that most counter-public spheres are antagonistic to the dominant political system. Therefore, Fenton writes that radical politics must consider the ways in which anarchy, individuality, and disagreement can lead to genuine democratic emancipation rather than appeal for a Habermasian notion of rational consensus. Fenton elucidates that since representational politics grants a disproportionate amount of power to a small number of elected officials, they must homogenize unique situations in order to represent the majority interests of their constituents. Nonetheless, Fenton contends, collective action can be productive and should not be pitted against individual needs. Instead of framing action against structure, Fenton urges radical groups to consider how any end point might have multiple possibilities and different routes to achieve the ends. Only by appreciating the dynamic relationship between individual and collective, autonomy and solidarity, does Fenton believe that a counter-hegemonic force can thrive.
Fenton applies a similar Foucaultian analysis to “being political” and the “politics of being.” Currently, we separate being political (e.g. a rational activity like voting) from the politics of being (e.g. the subjective experience of participating in those political acts). Instead of continuing with that logic, Fenton calls on readers to walk away from centrifugal tendencies of dealing with either “structure” or “agency.” Rather, she describes, we must “repoliticize the economy and resocialize the political” to attain a deeper and broader understanding that “being political is constantly performative and embodies a politics of being—an activity that converts identity through practice and display” (p. 134). In an effort to put theory into action, Fenton outlines her arguments with an empirical analysis of two case studies: Syriza (The Collation of the Radical Left in Greece) and Podemos (a leftist political party in Spain also committed to austerity measures). She outlines that while the Internet was used in both cases to mobilize and involve a large number of people very quickly, subsequent policies crafted were not the result of Internet participation on its own. Both cases relied on contemporary solidarity to recognize and assert their differences through contention. By respecting differences, they were able to deal with the basic problems that all people were facing on a daily basis (e.g. lack of housing, electricity and access to food) and in doing so were able to repoliticize the economy as the means to gain traction for radical politics. By galvanizing the common needs that are often left unmet by mainstream liberal democratic theory, Fenton demonstrates how Syriza and Podemos were able to build a bridge between being political and the politics of being.
Too often, Fenton argues, we put our hopes in technology without ever dealing with the social and political change required to deal with global problems of inequality, poverty, and ecological crises. Even if the Internet can foster new forms of political activism (via reach, diversity, and access), the network itself will not guarantee liberty because social media platforms embody a capitalist ethos. They are built to enhance rather than disrupt neoliberal logics by emphasizing users to focus on individualism over social/collective political engagement. Interestingly, Fuchs applies these same ideas to demonstrate how right-wing authoritarianism thrives on platforms like Twitter. Drawing on examples such as “America First,” the spread of Hindu nationalism in India, Internet censorship in Turkey, the mass executions of drug users in the Philippines, a raising wave of anti-immigration sentiment (e.g. BREXIT, advertising campaigns, “head rag tax”), Fuchs describes how far-right demagogues (e.g. Trump, Modi, Erdogan, La Pen, Duterte, and Farage) use social media to communicate authoritarian messaging.
In order to effectively make this argument, Fuchs opens his book by providing a much-needed review of central terms, including ideology, nationalism, fascism, and capitalism. While Fuchs asserts that theories of what constitutes “ideology” generally disagree, he clarifies his use of the term to represent the thoughts, beliefs, practices, institutions, and systems that justify one group’s or individual’s power over another. Based on this definition of ideology, Fuchs argues that nationalism is an ideology rooted in an “Us/Them” dichotomy, and that this ideological framework relies on racism/xenophobia, political fetishism, and militarism in order to construct both inner (migrants, minorities) and outer (other nations, foreign groups) enemies. Nationalism is effective because it distracts attention away from the class conflicts necessary for capitalism to survive. Fuchs builds on his definitions, detailing how dimensions of nationalism are then infused within Right-Wing Authoritarianism which embodies: the belief in the importance of strong authorities and leaders; a reliance on a nationalistic friend/enemy scheme where out-groups are dangerous; ideologies rooted in traditional gender roles which necessitate militaristic defense. Fuchs is also careful to delineate the differences between nationalism and fascism. In making this distinction, Fuchs argues that Trump is not simply the “new Hitler,” but rather an authoritarian capitalist with an apologetic attitude toward right-wing extremists who support his Presidency. Nonetheless, Fuchs argues that it would be naïve to assume that the success of fascism is isolated to Germany or Italy. Rather, he stresses the extent to which fascism operates with emotional, unconscious and irrational elements and is bound up with capitalist logic.
Using this working definition of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Fuchs urges readers to consider how Right-Wing Authoritarianism is embedded into “the state”—which he defines as institutions/organizations that create and enforce collective decisions that all members of society are regulated to obey (p. 72). Considering that the state revolves around the relationship between political systems, economic systems, inter and intra-state relations, and that a capitalist state is organized around capitalist interests, Fuchs argues that we must be particularly mindful of the way in which a Right-Wing Authoritarian leader (e.g. Donald Trump) could shift the United States from a capitalist society to a fascist one.
By way of demonstrating his point, he begins with an analysis of Trump supporters and how collective anxieties can fuel the rise of authoritarian politics. These crises, Fuchs demonstrates, are shaped by neoliberal capitalism and the commodification of everything; an increase in capital export and deindustrialization in the form of international competition and transnational corporations; social alienation intensified by neoliberal governmentality (e.g. the bank bailouts); political alienation from the election system exemplified by low voter turnout and low trust in politicians; the rise of institutionalized anxiety through the practice of persecutory anxiety (blaming refugees and immigrants on the problems that evoke institutional fears). By analyzing Trump’s positions and appointees in areas such as labor, healthcare, the environment, climate change, taxation, and international trade, Fuchs clearly articulates how Trump promotes a billionaire’s vision of capitalism in the interest of furthering his own financial agenda. He argues that this vision is changing US capitalism in myriad ways. Trump’s focus on factions of capital that benefit the billionaire class (biotech, real estate, construction, entertainment, resource extraction) have a direct influence on state power. His economic policies also feature low taxes for US corporations and protectionism that limits export and promotes privatization. Trump also stands for law-and-order politics that feature constant attacks on international enemies (e.g. Mexico and China) to distract from internal class conflict within the US between labor and capital. Often, this scapegoating is met with foreign policy that is highly polarizing and increases the threat of nuclear war.
Fuchs analysis is alarming when one considers that the only difference between fascism and right-wing authoritarianism is that fascists opt for violence and destruction of their perceived enemies in an effort to maintain their closed and rigid “we-idenity.” And the commonalities Fuchs identifies between fascist ideologies and those that Trump espouses (preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, collaboration with traditional elites, a sense of crises, victimization discourse, nationalism, and an authoritarian leadership ideology) gives cause for concern. Especially since Fuchs’ criteria for judging if capitalism has turned into authoritarian or fascist capitalism are present in his notion of “Trumpology”—what Fuchs describes as Trumps general view of the world (p. 166). Fuchs breaks Tumpology into four elements: possessive hyper-individualism (the individual as owner), an ideology of hard labor (the poor are poor because they don’t work as hard), an ideology of leadership predicated on the belief that the United States requires a strong leader who runs the country like a business in order for it to succeed, and social Darwinism (only the strong can survive and survival requires crushing enemies).
Fuchs also painfully points out the role media play in amplifying Trumpology. “In the world of the capitalist spectacle,” Fuchs writes, “the capitalist media need Trump just like Trump needs the media” (p. 183). Thus, Fuchs outlines, how mass media’s capitalist model gives Trumpology the public visibility it needs for survival—since Trump is good for ratings and clicks, Trump gets the coverage he needs to maximize his platform. In addition to traditional media outlets, Fuchs also demonstrates how Twitter is the perfect platform for promoting authoritarian thought given its reliance on psychological foundations that spur the masses by appealing to their feelings and beliefs. He supports this claim through empirical evidence, analyzing a total of 1815 Tweets gathered between the start of the Republican National Convention (18 July 2016) through Trump’s first day in office (21 January 2017). Using deductive methods and critical discourse analysis, he tests the prevalence of authoritarianism in Trump’s Tweets—confirming that Trump relies on authoritarian concepts (e.g. language like MAGA, Build the Wall, or calling opponents losers) to galvanize his supporters.
Both Fuchs and Fenton collide on an important issue—in order for radical political agendas to stop the spread of right-wing authoritarianism, they must do more than just resist. Instead, Fenton and Fuchs call for “radical” political participation that promotes the social, environmental, and technological commons while interrogating existing systems of power. An important part of this also considers how media corporations are entangled in hegemonic control. If radical political groups care to succeed, they must develop a model for harnessing civic participation that goes beyond the Habermasian notion of civil society or become overly reliant on narrative that insists that technology is the only conduit for change.
While the goal of circumventing right-wing authoritarianism is indeed important, and both authors do an implacable job of supporting how we can combine the politics of being into being political, they also miss a critical element in the success of radical progressive groups. They both identify how media conglomerates are part of the problem and Fuchs identifies how some authoritarian leaders/groups have utilized social media to advocate for their causes. However, neither author considers how the capitalistic agenda that drives the development of platforms like YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and Google remain important tools for groups who organize around a neoliberal agenda. Those who espouse free-market liberalism (e.g. PragerU, Ben Shapiro, Dave Rubin, Candace Owens) will continue to freely disseminate their ideas and profit from digital distribution. While both Fenton and Fuchs establish how a reliance on “new technology” alone cannot support the kind of infrastructural change radical groups desire, neither take into consideration how groups who match corporations’ ideological visions of capitalism will continue to permeate the digital landscape. Despite Fenton and Fuchs important goals for radical change, the ability of progressive groups to reach audiences given the mismatch between radical goals and capitalist ends is a daunting reality that neither begin to tackle.
Nonetheless, both books provide critical insights on a broken political system. By outlining the ways in which our reliance on existing tropes might impede the success of radical change, both Fenton and Fuchs provide new ways of seeing the world. These works would be well suited for undergraduate or graduate courses in media studies, sociology, political science, or communication. In addition to academic audiences, the subjects these books delve into would resonate with a wider audience dissatisfied with existing power dynamics and interested in participating in movements that foster real political change.