Online news media and propaganda influence on radicalized individuals: Findings from interviews with Islamist prisoners and former Islamists

Rejection of non-Muslims

Several interviewees stated that their radicalization had begun with the consumption of online propaganda videos depicting famous Islamist preachers. According to our participants’ and consistent with prior content analyses of Islamist propaganda (e.g. Payne, 2009), these videos were typically characterized by harsh criticisms of “Western lifestyles.” Participants recalled preachers discussing common problems faced by Muslim adolescents in Western countries, especially discrimination and prejudice. Moreover, such “anti-Western” propaganda videos blamed the “materialistic Western lifestyle” for the alleged lack of spirituality in the West and intolerance toward Muslims. Against this background, preachers were perceived as requesting that adherents withdraw from non-Muslim society—“inferior unbelievers”—and affiliate themselves more strongly with the Muslim community. In return, the preachers promised that adherents would feel a greater sense of belonging, security, and purpose in life. Consumption of such videos initially led participants to feel stronger interest in Islam and a need for additional information. Former al Qaida propagandist S5 noted that the first propaganda videos he watched felt like an “enlightenment” and like he had finally found “the ultimate truth”; similarly, S1 stated that he felt like he “was in love” with some preachers. At the same time, such videos also caused our participants to have more negative feelings toward non-Muslims. S2 made clear that his consumption of propaganda videos triggered several feelings simultaneously:

There are several things playing a role in parallel, and on the one hand, this is a sense of responsibility for the Ummah [community], such as a pseudo sense of justice, [. . .] thus loyalty to the Muslims and a dislike of non-Muslims.

Radicalizing individuals were also influenced by preachers who emphasized the “immoral behavior” of Western societies. This propaganda sought to strengthen the argument that Muslims should avoid any contact with non-Muslims and to incite contempt for the “unbelievers.” For example, P23 stated that he knew from preachers he had seen on the Internet that people living in Western societies “have no honor, no tradition, no dignity.” He added that “When I see what you are doing there—homosexuality, having sex with anybody—you do not have any values, you are just sick.”

Our participants’ ultimate rejections of non-Muslims were also fostered by their consumption of online news media reports forwarded by leading Islamist propagandists via social media. In particular, such news reports dealt with the activities of right-wing populists and extremists in a sensational way; the propagandists wanted to “suggest that the majority of society is hostile to Islam” (S5). S7, a former preacher, explained that “Of course, you pick up such media reports to show that ‘Look, you cannot live in Germany as a Muslim anymore. Soon, the headscarf will be forbidden, your wife will not be allowed to veil herself.’” Many of our interviewed prisoners also made clear that they learned from the media that “everybody hates Muslims” and that they believed this to be true. Consequently, they began to experience feelings of sadness and an emotional hatred toward non-Muslims. Interestingly, propagandists focused on left-leaning media outlets, such as the high-quality weekly German newspaper “Die Zeit,” when searching for news reports on right-wing populists and extremists. Former propagandist S5 explained that

We have followed the left-leaning media closely. When I look at “Die Zeit,” there are reports on this great “right-wing populism in Europe.” The threat caused by right-wing populists is extremely dramatized. And that plays strongly into the hands of the scene, which is of course exactly the opposite of what the more left-leaning journalists want to achieve. [. . .] Of course, it’s good for Islamists, because it confirms the victimhood of the scene.

The interplay among these different media influences usually culminated in participants’ social withdrawal into an exclusively Muslim environment in which radicalizing individuals changed their lifestyles. Prisoner P1, for example, made clear that he had learned from preachers that music and alcohol were forbidden and that only the “inferior unbelievers” consumed them. Thereafter, he stopped visiting bars and instead spent time studying Islam with his “brothers and sisters” in the mosque. Former propagandist S5 noted that the consumption of media content alleging the hostility and inferiority of non-Muslims could even lead some individuals to quit their jobs in order to avoid receiving orders from “inferior” non-Muslims.

Rejection of Western politics

Participants stated that as Islam became increasingly important in their lives, they started to receive propaganda that instructed them in how to behave as a “good Muslim.” S4 noted that “It starts with simple things like praying, fasting for Ramadan. In other words, quite normal Islamic topics that are presented by Islamist protagonists.” During this period, they also started to internalize Islamic rules, such as timetables for praying. According to the former propagandists in our study, accustoming individuals to Islamic rituals served to groom them for subsequent exposure to propaganda arguments that Islam was “no private religion for home,” but should also be considered a political guide. S1 explained that

On YouTube, I saw a video clip of a highly respected preacher from Saudi Arabia who said, “[. . .] The second surety of the Qur’an states that interest rates are prohibited. But is interest not a question of economic policy? Yes, but at the same time also a question of religiosity.” And thus there is no difference between economic policy and religiosity. And then it goes on like this.

Exposure to this type of propaganda contributed to individuals’ emerging convictions that politics and religion should not be considered separate but were instead “one system” (S7). S1 noted that such holistic theological arguments also groomed adherents for later exposure to propaganda that endorsed Sharia law, and some of our interviewees agreed that consumption of this type of propaganda contributed to their convictions that Western democracies’ laws were incompatible with Islam and that Sharia law was superior.

Radicalizing individuals were also exposed to news media reports that did not clearly separate Islam from terrorism, and this contributed to our interviewees’ convictions that Western countries and Western media were “waging a war against Islam” (P19).

Interestingly, the former propagandists reported that when searching for exploitable, negative, undifferentiated media coverage of Islam, they focused on reports published in right-leaning tabloid media, such as the daily German newspaper “Bild” or the daily Austrian newspaper “Kronen Zeitung.” The former Islamist S2 explained that “You always take Sat 1 and RTLII [German commercial TV outlets] and the ‘Bild’ newspaper as representations of all the media and then you just feel discriminated against and excluded.”

This also simultaneously strengthened Islamists’ negative attitudes and emotions, such as hate, toward Western media and administrations. In particular, reports that portrayed Salafi Politicos, a non-violent branch of Islamists, as violent were found to contribute to their further radicalization. Former Politicos S2 and S4 both independently described a specific example from their hometown, a large city in the biggest state of Germany. The local Politico group had wanted to open an Islamic school, and this was intensively reported on by a local tabloid, whose coverage was perceived as “a real hate report” (S4). S2 recalled that

It was a very inflammatory media coverage from the tabloid media, and there was also a nice TV show about the Islamic school where they said “Here, children are to be made terrorists.” [. . .] And that made the mood in the scene rise even higher.

The local Politicos were also convinced that the media was infiltrated by the state and that it sought to discredit Islam; they thus perceived the negative media coverage as “an attack from all sides” (S1). S4 noted that this perception resulted further in a “rather militant attitude and strong hatred toward the state” and that some members of the group even started to “defend themselves violently against the state,” thus leaving the Politico scene for a Jihadist one. Former al Qaida member S5 reported similar experiences and made clear that media reports portraying non-violent Politicos as terrorists could in some cases initiate violent radicalization: “I have often experienced that Politicos, who were actually harmless, who only wanted to live strictly religiously, but were constantly portrayed as Jihadists, then in the end really also became Jihadists.”

Interestingly, our interviews also found that some types of news media reports had the potential to contribute to deradicalization by sowing doubts about the coherence of Islamist ideologies. According to the interviewed scene-leavers, investigative reports on double moral standards or conflicts within the Islamist scene could weaken individuals’ feelings of identification with the scene. Former propagandist S7 also noted that media coverage that clearly distinguished between Islam and Islamism could damage radicalizing individuals’ perceptions of a global enemy that claimed that all Western governments and media condemned Islam in its entirety:

What’s taking the ground off them is if you [as a journalist] could make clear that you’re not against Islam. [. . .] If they have the feeling that this is not against Islam, but against the people who use violence [. . .] then it would certainly not be so polarizing.

Our interviewed scene-leavers also noted that, since these types of media reports could potentially deradicalize individuals, radical leaders instructed lower level members to avoid unsupervised consumption of mainstream news media. Consistent with this, most of our interviewed prisoners also stated that they preferred to avoid any news media that they perceived to be hostile. In this way, propagandists were able to almost fully control the news media consumption of basic members, who were thus were mainly exposed to carefully selected, easily exploitable reports that leaders forwarded to them via social media.

Willingness to use violence

Our Jihadist interviewees told us that their willingness to use violence against “unbelievers” mainly resulted from their desire to help alleviate the suffering of their “brothers and sisters in faith.” Prior to developing this belief, many of our Jihadist participants were exposed to online propaganda videos showing how Muslims in war zones suffered from attacks carried out by Western countries. In particular, atrocity propaganda showing the portrayal of hurt or dead women and children evoked strong feelings of sadness and compassion for the Muslim victims, which often led to hatred and anger toward the “Western aggressors.” Such portrayals of Muslim victims and the corresponding propaganda calling out Muslims’ duty to fight side by side with their “siblings in faith” contributed to some of our interviewees’ willingness to join terrorist groups in the Middle East. This was illustrated by a detained returnee from ISIS, who discussed his reasons for traveling to Syria:

On the Internet, I have seen terrible violent crimes of the Syrian army. They stabbed students to death, took stones from a site and smashed their heads with them. Then, of course, you think as a Muslim: “Why does the whole world just watch and nobody does anything?” I used to think: “I’ll go and see what I can do. And be it in battle, then I will fight, though I have no idea of fighting.” (P32)

In a similar vein, another returnee recalled that “I went there because I wanted to help, but really because of the kids. You may not have seen the videos I saw. But many children suffer down there.” Within the emotional breeding ground created by such “victim propaganda,” carefully selected online news media reports on war zones in Muslim countries had a similar influence, especially when they portrayed hurt or dead Muslim children. Former Islamist S4 explained that

If you look at the pictures from Syria in the mass media, the bombings of Aleppo or Homs and so on—of course, one sees these pictures and gets a feeling of hatred against this injustice and then one wants to move in this direction and do something about it.

As expressed by our interviewed Jihadists, another motivation for their willingness to fight was a hope of finding a place where Muslims did not face discrimination. For example, P30, a young Chechen prisoner who had fought for ISIS, stated that

I can’t go back to Chechnya. I’m a refugee here. There they will torture me to death and my family, too. Here I am insulted as a terrorist. I’m not wanted anywhere. I don’t know where in the world to go. It’s like a big prison for me. I am homeless now.

He was also convinced that the Islamic State would be like the “Muslim paradise” he had seen in propaganda videos dealing with the Caliphate:

The videos said “Everything here is so beautiful, you can also live Islam freely, you are not discriminated against. Come here, it’s not just war here, you don’t just have to fight, you can live here. You can do something good, the people here are poor” and so on.

However, while “victim propaganda” and propaganda promising a better life in the “Caliphate” were mentioned by most of our Jihadist interviewees as factors influencing their decisions to fight in terrorist groups such as ISIS, the influence of propaganda depicting brutal violence was more varied. Three different groups could be broadly distinguished based on their varying affinities for violence. Some scene-leavers mentioned a relatively small number of radicalized individuals who were fascinated by the exhibition of violence. These individuals were perceived to be in search of adventure and adrenaline rushes: “This extreme brutality, of course, attracts a certain percentage of young people. But those are the ones who are rather psychopaths” (S4). Former al Qaida member S7 added that some adolescents were attracted by propaganda suggesting that ISIS would essentially offer them the opportunity to “play Counterstrike in real life” and to “keep sex slaves.”

However, when we asked our participants to describe their personal feelings about the influence of propaganda that brutally depicted violence, most recalled that they had initially felt emotionally shocked, “disgusted,” and “sick” when they first saw such videos. After repeated exposure, however, the shock usually faded:

For example, I watched an execution video. At first, I had to overcome my feelings, but if you look at it more often, you can get used to it. But at first, it was repulsive to me, too. And then you think to yourself: “He’s an enemy, he deserves it, he deserves more.” Then you educate yourself that this is a good thing. (S7)

Our interviews also pointed to a third group of Islamists who continued to experience negative emotions when watching violent propaganda. Some reported that they still felt disgusted by and condemned such acts of brutal violence. P13, for example, reported that the brutality he had seen in ISIS propaganda videos had prevented him from fighting for that group:

Most of all, I was afraid when I saw these videos. Because when these people meet me and I don’t pray and fast or I wear modern clothes and I don’t belong to ISIS, I am the first one to be slaughtered.

Similar to our participants’ reactions to propaganda depicting violence, exposure to media reports about the cruelty of Jihadist groups also caused a range of different responses among our Jihadist interviewees. According to S4, media reports on the brutality of ISIS, for example, attracted primarily a rather small group of foreign fighters in search of adventure. However, P9, a Politico, was convinced that numerous media reports on “all the deviant brutality” had scared off many potential recruits and had thus reduced the group’s success. Other interviewees similarly stated that media reports on the Islamic State influenced their decision to not travel to Syria. For example, P20 made clear that he was scared off when he heard that women were raped in the Islamic State, while P21 recalled experiencing doubts when he saw media reports showing that “Muslims who are supposed to believe strictly start murdering, raping, enslaving people.”

Readiness to commit suicide

Jihadist interviewees stated that their willingness to sacrifice their lives for the Muslim Ummah resulted not only from their desire to help their fellow Muslims but also from their deep conviction that dying as a “martyr” would be painless and would bring them directly to paradise. The ISIS returnees stated that in Syria and Iraq, they were frequently exposed to online propaganda videos highlighting the “afterlife,” and former Jihadist S5 described their content:

It is said: “This life is the prison of the believer and the paradise of the unbeliever. The afterlife is different then—it belongs to us and when the others die, they will be punished for all eternities and we will laugh at them and chill in paradise, enjoy paradise.”

After consuming such propaganda, many Jihadist recruits lost their fear of dying as a “martyr” and even looked forward to death. They developed a concrete image of paradise as it was depicted in propaganda:

They [recruits] think there’s sexual orgies in paradise with virgins, they think it will be like a in a hip-hop videoclip. Anything forbidden here will be allowed there. There’ll be music, sex orgies, alcohol, intoxication. Everything that people do not enjoy here is lived out in paradise. (S5)

Several other participants also unscored that Jihadist soldiers were not afraid of dying: “You see it every day, they’re not afraid to die. [. . .] They don’t give a shit. They look into the barrel of the other weapon and they see paradise” (P28). S6, a returnee from Syria who had decided to die as a suicide bomber there, recalled that his main motivation for his wish to die fighting was that “I wanted my sins to be forgiven. Suicide bombers are spared hell, they go straight to heaven, and they don’t have any pain when they die.” He also provided further insight about the circumstances of such propaganda exposure. Designated ISIS suicide bombers were brought to a luxurious villa in which they were exposed to propaganda dealing with the afterlife, as well as to detailed instructions about how to perpetrate their planned attacks. S5 recalled that the instructional videos had distracted him from his fears of dying. In addition, he and the others being groomed as suicide bombers were exposed to videos showing the attacks of comrades:

When we were together, we got to watch videos of our comrades that already died and caused a big disaster—we saw huge explosions. They were like idols, we wanted to be as fearless as they were in the videos.

In addition to the influence of propaganda depicting terrorists, news reports of terrorist attacks also motivated radicalized individuals to imitate them. When terrorists were extensively portrayed in news reports, they were perceived as idols by radicalized Jihadists (S5). Especially in the case of terrorist attacks that were easy to imitate, media reports’ intensive focus on the person who had committed the attack could provide the final impetus for a radicalized individual to commit a terrorist attack. However, the news media’s impact in such situations ultimately depended on radicalized individuals’ prior consumption of propaganda that had already lowered their inhibitions against violence. Instructional propaganda, in particular, led to feelings of self-efficacy:

They told in such detail how to commit attacks with the simplest means. You take the car and then you grind sharp objects and speed through the pedestrian zone [. . .] You can use normal things you get everywhere. For example, bombs that can’t blow up a building, but that can kill ten people or something in the crowd at the train station and injure hundreds. (S5)

However, as with our cognitively radicalized interviewees, our interviewed Jihadists also indicated that some news media could have a deradicalizing influence. In particular, the portrayal of women and children as victims of terror evoked feelings of compassion and sadness. For example, P27 believed strongly that people in Western countries deserved death due to their support for the “Western war against Islam”; however, he also stated that “Little children do not deserve death [. . .] With children and women, you have to make a difference. When you fight, you fight man against man and you must not drag your wife and children into war.” With regard to fears that their own families could be among the victims of unpredictable violence, some participants even made clear that they grieved and prayed for children who died in terrorist attacks. Accordingly, former Jihadist S7 was convinced that media reports portraying hurt or dead women and children as victims of terrorist attacks would

discourage a few people who have a heart and are still responsive. You always think every one of them is a monster, but that’s not true. There are people who really believe in that, but are good people in normal life. [. . .] I thought I was good and would help millions of people in other countries who are oppressed. That was my thought.

In contrast, media coverage of hurt or dead men as victims of terrorist attacks evoked feelings of pride and happiness among Islamists; such reports could suggest “that it [terrorist attacks] really hurts the enemy” (S7), which, in turn, could motivate potential copycats. Another example of media coverage that incentivized radicalized Islamists to use violence was given by S5, a former leading al Qaida propagandist in Germany, who reflected on the influence of media coverage that ridiculed Islamists. He recalled that

a journalist always called us “armchair Jihadists,” and the term was often repeated. And, of course, that provoked us, because we did not feel taken seriously. I thought “Ok, now we’re showing that we’re not ‘armchair Jihadists’, but that we’re true Jihadists, and then we’ll see who an armchair Jihadist is.” And that’s extremely dangerous. I don’t want to say that if I’d done anything, it would have been the journalist’s fault, but of course, it pushes you in that direction.