Abstract
On 1 January 2019, following a presidential order confirming its adoption by the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Soil Pollution and Control 2019 (SPC) was introduced into law. Succinctly, the SPC was enacted to deal with the vast amount of soil pollution that currently exists in China. This article’s central thesis is that, following a comparative analysis of the regulatory regimes in the USA and UK, the law creates environment-related risks for lenders. In particular, the article is concerned with the risk of lender liability, that is, where the lender itself is made directly liable for the costs of soil pollution remediation. In light of the USA and UK regimes, risk management advice is provided for obviating any prospective lender liability that may be forthcoming from the SPC. As with the regulations in other countries, it appears that the degree of ‘control’ that lenders exercise over their clients must be limited to mitigate the possible transference of any direct liability under the PRC’s principles of property rights law.
Keywords
Introduction
In the last few years of the Anthropocene, various attempts have been made by state actors to resolve environmental issues through the establishment of specific regulatory frameworks. 1 Such frameworks have been enforced to, inter alia, ensure the compliance of responsible parties together with reducing any environment-related risks that may exist. But this period of increased codification has also had a bearing upon lenders, and this is specifically so for secured creditors. 2 Over the last 30 years, lenders have responded to environment-related risks through the incorporation of specific environmental due diligence into their traditional risk management structures. 3 A most recent example of a regulation that should be viewed as a risk for lenders is the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Soil Pollution and Control 2019 (hereafter, ‘SPC’). 4 This law forms the focus of this article’s analysis, and a comparison is made between the SPC on the one hand and the more well-established polluted land regimes from the USA and UK on the other.
Broadly speaking, this article is concerned with the global regulation of, to use the British terminology, ‘contaminated land’ and its impact on lending institutions. However, its specific focus is on establishing how the new Chinese law may affect national and foreign lenders operating in the PRC. Many activities can cause soil pollution, and the width of the problem is well put by Tromans and Turrall-Clarke: Contamination of land may arise from a wide variety of activities. One category is the intentional deposit of material on land, whether as a means of disposing of that material, or in connection with development or construction activities. Examples of this are landfill sites, tips, lagoons for industrial effluent, deposits of dredgings, “made ground” and filled dock basins, and the deposit of sewage sludge or other materials on agricultural land. Another category is contamination arising incidentally in the course of industrial activity.
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The critical issue for a lender, in environmental matters, is the extent to which it will be liable for the costs of cleaning-up the land which is found to be contaminated.
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While examples could have been easily drawn from several other regimes (e.g. those of Germany, the Netherlands or Canada), 15 the USA and UK were chosen for two reasons. First, CERLCA represents the pioneering example of a regulatory framework that was specifically designed to identify and remediate polluted land. 16 And because this regime has been around for some three decades, it serves the article well as a linchpin to apply to the analysis of the newly adopted SPC. Second, the regulations in the USA and UK should be seen as two sides of the same coin, and an analysis of them provides a well-rounded picture for discovering the possible risks that may emanate from the SPC. Case law dealing with CERCLA has shown how the USA has, in the past, taken a litigious approach to land remediation. On the other side of that same coin, the UK’s approach has been far less direct. 17 In fact, not one case of lender liability has ever been found under Part IIA. 18 That does not mean, however, that Part IIA is wholly incapable of invoking lender liability if the circumstances were right, 19 that is, where a lender has too much control over borrowers or is a ‘mortgagee-in-possession’. 20
The following section looks specifically at the Chinese banking structure, together with the securitisation of loans under PRC property law principles. The article then sets out the SPC regime and thereafter goes on to examine the comparable USA and UK frameworks. The final section assesses lender liability and provides risk management guidance.
The PRC’s banking structure and the securitisation of loans
Simply put, the structure of banking in China is made up of both national banks and foreign lenders. 21 Foreign institutions are permitted to enter the PRC, 22 but the established state-owned banks have nevertheless retained their dominance in the financial market. 23 Attempts to increase the foreign banks’ access to the market have been largely frustrated by, inter alia, the foreign banks’ lack of local knowledge, 24 the USA-China trade war 25 and national respect for the ‘big four’ state-owned banks. 26
‘Property’ is an ‘inviolable right’ in China, granted to individuals under the PRC Constitution
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and defined at Article 2 of the Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007 (‘Property Law 2007’) as: the exclusive right enjoyed by the obligation to directly control specific properties including ownership, usufructuary and security right in property rights.
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In the PRC, all land is owned by the state. Individuals or entities can hold land use rights (usually for a limited term). They can also hold ownership of the building on the land.
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The making of loans by foreign lenders to an onshore entity constitutes a foreign debt. Different rules apply depending on the length of the term of the debt.
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PRC approach: Soil Pollution and Control Law 2019
The SPC concerns ‘the prevention and control of soil pollution’
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of ‘agricultural land’
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and ‘construction land’.
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The law was promulgated on 1 January 2019 following a presidential order confirming its adoption by the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress of the PRC.
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The date of its introduction is codified by Article 99 of the same law.
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In an explanation of the reasons for the SPC, on 22 June 2017, it was held that: Soil is one of the basic elements that constitute an ecosystem, the material basis on which human beings depend, and an indispensable resource for human society. Prevention and control of soil pollution is directly related to the quality and safety of agricultural products, the health of the people and the sustainable development of the economy and society. The problem of soil pollution is also concerned by the whole society with the problems of air and water pollution.
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Land use right holders are engaged in land development and utilization activities. Enterprises, institutions and other production and business operators engaged in production and business activities shall take effective measures to prevent and reduce soil pollution and take responsibility for the soil pollution caused.
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By virtue of Article 5 the ‘local people’s governments’ are responsible for administering the law at various levels in their individual areas 51 and must incorporate the prevention and control of soil pollution into their national economic and social development plans. 52 This is an example of state delegation and, as such, the local people’s governments can initiate strategies that are more stringent than that of the national standard. 53 For lenders, this is problematic because it may mean having to understand the individual approaches that are used in the administrative areas where their borrowers are based.
The part of the SPC that applies to ‘prevention and protection’
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shows a heightened responsibility for different projects and industries under the new regime. This may be problematic for lenders because they may have the added burden of undertaking increased due diligence before lending to certain borrowers. An example can be seen in Article 18 which states that Environmental Impact Assessment is now needed for all types of construction projects.
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Moreover, the SPC’s approach to ‘risk management and repair’ is one based on risk assessment
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and survey reports on soil pollution status.
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Therefore, the relevant departments of the local governments have the right: to require responsible persons of the soil pollution and land use rights holders to take such measures such as removing pollution sources and preventing the spread of pollution according to actual conditions.
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The State encourages financial institutions to increase credit supply for soil pollution risk control and rehabilitation projects. The State encourages financial institutions to conduct soil pollution surveys when handling land rights mortgage business.
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The local governments will ‘impose disciplinary sanctions on directly responsible persons and other directly responsible personnel’. 63 Liability is allocated by the local ecological department. 64 Unlike some regimes, there is no exemption clause for lenders in the SPC. The law states that where the responsible person cannot be found, the land-use right holder is liable. In the situation where the land is ownerless, the government is thereby responsible for the remediation. 65
This section has set out the SPC law briefly and uses the lenders’ position as a lens for analysis. In the following two sections, a comparative analysis of the USA and UK is adopted to show the potential risks that may emerge from the new regime, with lender liability particularly assessed.
USA approach: CERCLA 1980
Following a series of environmental disasters in the 1970s (e.g. the Love Canal Site), 66 the USA Government endeavoured to create a regulatory regime for dealing with abandoned, hazardous waste sites. 67 The result was CERCLA 1980, as amended. 68 This section looks at how CERCLA generated instances of lender liability in the 1980s and 1990s. It is noteworthy that the CERLA regime is somewhat similar to the SPC because both use large trust funds to enforce control and protection measures. 69
The ‘Superfund’ regime
CERCLA is colloquially known as the ‘Superfund’, ipso facto, because the regulation initially relied on a large trust fund to carry out remediation works. 70 The trust fund was replenished annually by way of an industrial levy on the chemical and petroleum industries. 71 This raised total revenue of US$1.6 billion within a 5-year period, 72 and much more thereafter. 73 The fund was to be used by the federal authority – the USA Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 74 – where a site was left abandoned. 75 Tromans and Turrall-Clarke, referencing the case of EPA v Sequa Corp (In the Matter of Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc), 76 suggested that the purpose of setting the levy was deemed necessary to shift ‘the cost of cleaning up environmental harm from the taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the disposal of wastes that caused the harm’. 77 But this may also have been because of the very considerable remediation expenses associated with CERCLA sites, which, at that time, was based at an average of US$25 million. 78 On 30 September 1994, Congress chose not to re-authorise the tax provision that allowed revenues to be collected and funding has since been supplemented by the USA Congress’ annual appropriations. 79
However interesting the above account is, it is necessary to clarify that this article’s central thesis is that CERCLA places the primary liability for remediation costs on those responsible for the contamination. Thus, it was not the Superfund levy which presented the risk to lenders but the manner in which liability was to be allocated, viz on the basis of strict liability where responsible parties were unidentifiable. With respect to CERLCA, Jarvis and Fordham believe that: The US provides the furthest developed illustration of primary lender liability. American lenders have found themselves responsible for clean-up costs arising from the polluting activities of their borrowers.
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The secured creditor exemption 93
Before looking at the secured creditor exemption in detail, it is important to note that foreclosure is not the only danger point for lenders. If a mortgage or other security interest is seen as an interest in the land, the lender can be seen as an ‘owner’ even without foreclosing. There are three types of situations in which lender liability could attach by: simply holding an interest in the property to secure debt; entering into ‘workout’ agreements to prevent foreclosure, which could affect the management of hazardous materials; and foreclosing and becoming the actual owner of the property, at least temporarily.
To limit liability under CERCLA, the secured creditor exemption was drafted into the law by Congress,
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but this has proved somewhat problematic. The exemption provided an exclusion for an ‘owner or operator’ where it was the case that:
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without participating in the management of a vessel or a facility, a person holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
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In the case of United States v Mirabile, 98 the court was presented with the issue as to whether a lender that forecloses a facility should be seen as ‘participating in the management’ of that facility and liable. By foreclosing the property, the bank had become a ‘mortgagee in possession’. It submitted that it was merely following its normal procedure upon a borrower’s insolvency. 99 Fortuitously for the lender, the court ruled that a bank that ‘merely foreclosed on the property after all operations had ceased and thereafter took prudent and routine steps to secure the property’ could not reasonably be held as a potentially responsible party. 100
The secured creditor exemption was next interpreted in United States v Fleet Factors Corp (1988), known as ‘Fleet I’.
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By way of a collateral clause contained in a factoring arrangement, Fleet Factors had acquired a secured interest in a borrower paint works.
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The USEPA discovered 700 drums, each containing 55 gallons of toxic substances.
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Fleet was allocated with the remediation liability. In the court of first instance, Fleet was found liable;
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but the decision was reversed on appeal in United States v Fleet Factors Corp (1990) or ‘Fleet II’.
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There the court held that liability will attach to a secured creditor: if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.
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The above case law shows that the SPC provides a new risk for lenders around the globe. It demonstrates that the judicial interpretation of the law can enfranchise the authorities to indirectly allocate remediation liability with to private companies, including lenders and their clients.
UK approach: Part IIA of the EPA 1990
In the 1990s, there arose a very public demand for a UK regulatory regime for identifying and remediating historic land affected by contamination. 113 In 1995, Part IIA was inserted into the EPA 1990 114 and the regime commenced in England and Wales in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
Before the enactment of Part IIA, contaminated land was dealt with under the common law, for example, nuisance. 115 An early Environment Agency (EA) report into the state of contaminated land in the UK estimated that some 100,000 sites might have been affected. 116 However, a later EA report in 2009 set the figure for contamination at 325,000 sites, equating to around 300,000 hectares. 117 The UK’s legacy of contamination is relatively modest in comparison to China. 118 For instance, figures suggest that 20 per cent of China’s 133 million hectares of farmland is heavily contaminated. 119
The enactment of Part IIA placed UK lenders in a position of great uncertainty. At this time, lenders feared the extent to which Part IIA liability would affect their lending activities. 120 Additionally, the creation of Part IIA also presented an issue for foreign lenders with commercial clients based in the UK. It leads to the invocation of risk management strategies to mitigate the potential environment-related risks.
The structure of Part IIA
The contaminated land regime is ‘tiered’,
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being made up of Part IIA of the EPA 1990,
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the regulations,
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Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs statutory guidance
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and scientific and technical advice.
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The regulatory framework delegates local authorities (‘enforcing authorities’) with the power to fulfil its objectives.
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Much can be gauged about the structure by the definition given to ‘contaminated land’: any land which appears to the local authority in whose area it is situated to be in such condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land, that: significant harm is being caused or there is a significant possibility of such harm being caused; or pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely to be, caused; and in determining whether any land appears to be such land, a local authority shall…act in accordance with the guidance issued by the Secretary of State…with respect to the manner in which that determination is to be made.
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This definition shows that the local authorities are responsible, notwithstanding ‘special sites’, 128 for inspecting their areas ‘from time to time’ 129 and for allocating liability to appropriate persons. The use of the local authorities is similar to the local people governments in the PRC. Also indicated are the types of ‘harm’ 130 that may lead an enforcing authority to identify contaminated land. Lenders must have knowledge of this to protect their lending interests, and this is particularly so when taking security.
Unlike CERCLA, there is no Superfund upon which the authorities can draw upon in a case where liable parties (‘appropriate persons’)
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cannot be identified. Worryingly, the enforcing authorities often lack the necessary financial provision and technical expertise to fulfil their statutory duties, which has led some to question Part IIA’s suitability.
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Moreover, it is evident that the technical and financial gaps have widened during the austerity years.
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Tromans and Turrall-Clarke have spoken about the ‘resource implications’ plaguing the contaminated land regime:
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There can be few local authorities who will not be concerned about the potentially major costs of instigating and maintaining a programme of inspection of its area for contaminated land.
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Where a ‘contaminant linkage’ (contaminant–pathway–receptor)
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is identified and the land is determined as contaminated land under Part IIA, local authorities have a statutory duty to serve a ‘remediation notice’ onto each person who is an appropriate person.
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Liability is thereafter allocated under s 78F
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to the appropriate person(s).
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By s 78F(2) and (3), liability may be allocated to a person who ‘caused’ or ‘knowingly permitted’ the contamination:
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any person, or any of the persons, who caused or knowingly permitted the substances, or any of the substances, by reason of which the contaminated land in question is such land to be in, on or under that land is an appropriate person.
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Thus, it appears that Part IIA liability could attach to a lender that has too much control over a borrower’s business affairs.
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This was also seen in the above discussion with respect to the ‘participates in the management’ analysis under CERLCA. With the introduction of the SPC, lenders should use their experience and understanding of CERCLA and Part IIA to a positive advantage. Avoiding too much ‘control’ over borrowers with suspect land appears an essential requisite in reducing liability. The second type of Part IIA liability concerns owning or occupying land: If no person has, after reasonable inquiry, been found who is by virtue of subsection (2) above an appropriate person to bear responsibility for the things which are to be done by way of remediation, the owner or occupier for the time being of the contaminated land in question is an appropriate person.
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a person (other than a mortgagee not in possession) who, whether in his own right or as a trustee for any other person, is entitled to receive the rack rent of the land, or, where the land is not let at a rack rent, would be so entitled if it were so let.
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A comment on liability and risk management
Risks have always existed in lending. Lord Polonius famously advised his son in Shakespeare’s Hamlet that: Neither a borrower nor a lender be; For loan oft loses both itself and friend, And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
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Identifying the risks
In his exegesis of ‘lending and taking security in China’, Zhang pontificates that environmental liability is a risk for lenders operating in the PRC, namely: If a lender becomes the owner of the land use right on enforcement of the mortgage, it becomes responsible for pollution of the land even if it is not the actual polluter. However, the lender can claim compensation from the previous owner of the land use right (the actual polluter).
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A holder of a secured interest has priority in a case where there is a default event.
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The rights of secured interests are detailed in the Property Law. In respect to liens, for example, Article 230 states: If a debtor defaults in his debts, the creditor shall be entitled to retain the property under legal possession and to the priority of having the debt paid with the money converted from the property or proceeds from sale or auction of the property.
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It is also necessary to state that a broader array of risks exist under the SPC. Although this is less of concern when it comes to land pollution, there can be ‘market risks’ which describes the situation where an environmental event impacts the value of a lender’s security portfolio following, among other things, a client’s initial public offering (IPO). 166 Additionally, remediation costs are capable of increasing the likelihood of a default event, resulting in credit risk. 167 Further to this, the depreciation of land value by pollution may impact the lender’s security. 168 There is also the potential reputational risk that may be incurred through being associated with polluted land. 169 As with lender liability, the risks discussed in this paragraph can be reduced by the employment of environmental risk management. That being said, a detailed discussion of such due diligence techniques falls outside the purview of this article, which deals with lender liability.
Managing the risks
Lenders can reduce the risk of SPC liability by adopting effective environmental risk management strategies. Following the introduction of the USA and UK regimes, national and foreign lenders began to exercise environmental due diligence as part of their day-to-day commercial lending practices. 170 While it is likely that some foreign lenders will be accustomed to dealing with environment-related risks, it is less certain the extent to which the PRC national banks are au fait with such initiatives. Although bordering on being trite advice, a lender that does not have an environmental risk management strategy in place for the SPC should implement one with immediate effect.
When dealing with environment-related risks in loan finance, it is now common for external environmental professionals to be commissioned by lenders to undertake ‘environmental audits’ into properties. 171 This can help a lender make an informed choice as to whether it should provide loan finance in the first instance or whether it should enforce its security interests in the property to repay outstanding debt. 172 The same should be adopted in consequence of the SPC, as it places greater pressure on lenders to engage with external professionals. 173 As the lenders do not have the technical experience to conduct surveys, reliance will have to be placed on the expertise of environmental consultants. 174
Another form of due diligence that should be used is the careful drafting of the loan documentation and any later workout agreements. To limit the likelihood of liability, clauses may be inserted into the documentation as a means of risk mitigation. 175 For instance, an exemption clause may be included in the agreement to declare that the lender acknowledges that it is not the land use right holder and only has a security interest in the property. 176 In so doing, the lender may be able to nullify the degree of control that is necessary to incur SPC liability. The USA and UK regimes have shown that reducing control over clients and polluted properties is crucial, and the same is true under the SPC. Particular attention must also be paid to the drafting of workout agreements following a pollution event. As with the loan documentation, careful drafting must be deployed in workout agreements to reduce control and thus bar the possible transference of liability.
Conclusion
This article has provided an overview of the new regime that is enforced by the SPC which came into force on 1 January 2019. It has analysed the regime in the light of the existing regulatory frameworks of the USA and UK. Where the PRC’s regulation bears some resemblance with the above regimes, the article has discussed the impact that it may have on lenders.
The discussion on CERCLA showed that lender liability for remediation costs is more than academic and that the judicial interpretation of statutory provisions may not be wholly favourable to financial institutions. Upon assessing the PRC’s property rights law, it is apparent that liability for remediation costs is a possibility for a lender that enforces its security.
Part IIA was incorporated into the article’s analysis because it represents the other side of the coin to CERCLA. Ultimately, Part IIA’s approach to land remediation has not been as direct and the regime has been plagued with resourcing issues. However, that does not mean that environmental risks are not present under the UK regime, and it has been shown how too much control over property or a client’s business affairs may lead to remediation liability for lenders.
To sum up, while China’s regime creates a new liability threat for lenders and their borrowers, financial institutions have had to contend with the creation of similar regulatory risks for the past three decades. This article suggests, therefore, that so long as good risk management techniques are deployed, lenders operating in the PRC’s financial market need not fear lender liability for soil remediation. In retrospect, the avoidance of too much control is a corollary for limiting lender liability. Enforcing security interests and controlling customers via loan, security and workout documentation must be carefully considered. The extent of the litigation that springs from the SPC will have to be viewed by the future application of the law – only time will tell the impact it will have on lenders.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
