Abstract
Various polls and surveys seem to indicate that a substantial proportion of the Canadian public desires harsher penalties for crime. While various explanations have been offered for this punitiveness, emotional reactions to crime have been under-researched. The present research draws on a Canadian data set to test the hypothesis that the emotions of fear and particularly anger about crime are significant predictors of punitive attitudes once crime victimization, economic insecurity, internal attributions of crime causation and other variables are controlled for. This research also examines the possible indirect effects of economic insecurity, victimization and internal attributions of crime causation on punitiveness through their impact on fear and anger. The multiple regression results support the role of emotions, particularly anger, in explaining punitive attitudes. While indirect effects of victimization and economic insecurity were insignificant, 14 per cent of the effect of internal attributions was through anger.
Introduction
Most of the research literature that has attempted to explain the public’s attitudes to punishment for crime has focused upon cognitive and demographic variables such as gender, religion, age, attributions of crime causation and political conservatism (Johnson, 2009). The potential role of emotions in explaining such punitiveness has been relatively neglected in this body of research. While fear of crime has been an apparent exception, its role has often been interpreted instrumentally: support for more severe punishment as a means to lower the crime rate or chances of victimization in response to fear and/or concern about crime (Tyler and Weber, 1982). However, this assigns an overly rational role to fear in relation to punitiveness since fear can also be regarded as an emotional reaction of anxiety attributable to such influences as media exaggeration of crime news, political exploitation of criminal justice issues and/or victimization experiences (Ouimet and Coyle, 1991; Sheley, 1985; Sprott and Doob, 1997). Although there is some research demonstrating the role of emotion in influencing policy attitudes (Gault and Sabini, 2000), Indermaur and Hough (2002) have argued for more attention to the emotional dimension of criminal justice attitude formation. The possible impact of emotions other than fear on criminal justice attitudes has rarely been investigated, even though anger directed toward criminals may be a motivating force leading to greater punitiveness or a desire for more severe penalties. Johnson (2009) has recently reported a significant effect of anger on punitive attitudes while controlling for a number of other predictors. In discussing his findings, Johnson calls for more research attention to the role that anger plays in public support for punitive policies, including the sources of anger and to what it is related.
The present research utilizes data from a Canadian sample to test hypotheses concerning the impact of anger and fear on punitive attitudes in a multivariate analysis. We hypothesize that fear and anger will have positive direct effects on punitive attitudes controlling for other predictors; and that anger will have a stronger effect than fear. We also hypothesize that the experience of crime victimization will have little or no direct positive effect on punitive attitudes when other variables are controlled, although we will explore its possible indirect effects through fear and anger about crime. Similarly, while we expect little or no direct positive effect of economic insecurity on punitive attitudes with other variables controlled, we will explore its possible indirect effects through fear and particularly anger. Finally, we hypothesize that controlling for other variables, individuals who attribute the causes of crime to the internal dispositions of offenders will exhibit greater punitiveness. We use brief crime scenarios that include two types of crime and first time versus repeat offenders to measure fear and anger about crime. We also examine some potential predictors of these emotions, such as the experience of victimization, economic insecurities and an internal attributional style.
Theoretical framework and literature review
Emotions
In their introduction to a special issue of the journal Theoretical Criminology on the relationship between human emotions and crime, punishment and social control, De Haan and Loader (2002) state that, although emotions remain a somewhat peripheral topic within theoretical criminology, it is hard to see how the analysis of crime and justice can adequately proceed without some serious attention being paid to the place of emotions in social life. They claim that while conventional accounts assume that emotions like anger and hatred are repressed in the operations of criminal law, emotions are an important structuring dynamic of criminal justice and punishment. Of course, Durkheim (1964 [1893]: 98) viewed the origins and functions of the criminal law in terms of emotion since he argued that: ‘Every offence calls forth an emotional reaction, more or less violent, which turns against the offender.’ Others (e.g. Freiberg, 2001; Garland, 1990; Sutton, 1997) have claimed that criminal justice policy must address not only the instrumental/rational but also some of the deeper emotional or affective dimensions of crime and its place in society. Karstedt (2002) has noted the growing emotionalization of public discourse about crime and criminal justice, fuelled in part by a media focus upon the most recent and heinous offence and by politicians eager to compete with each other to address the emotional needs of the public. Criminal justice policy is seen as a means for voicing the sorrow, rage, anger and feelings of vengeance of crime victims by harsh sanctions imposed on the offender. Karstedt (2002) argues that this has developed in a social context of individual autonomy and self-representation which includes an open display of emotions which act as singular and authentic expressions of the autonomy and identity of the individual.
Fear of crime
Some previous research attempting to explain punitive attitudes has focused on the role of fear of or worry about crime (Beckett and Sasson, 2004; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Fear of crime has been defined as an emotional response of dread or anxiety about crime or symbols that a person associates with crime (Ferraro, 1995). People support punishing rule breakers because they are afraid that they, their families, or others in the community will become victims of crime (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997). Fear of victimization may motivate an individual to look to the courts for safety through increased penalties for offenders (Sprott and Doob, 1997). This perspective suggests, then, that in their desire to protect themselves and their communities from the threat of crime, people respond to personal fears when responding to rule breakers.
Garland (2000, 2001), as part of his work on the culture of control within high crime societies, seems to adopt a version of this perspective. He claims that crime has become a prominent, much more routine fact of life for both the urban middle classes and suburbanites. The professional middle classes’ increasing fear of crime is fuelled, then, by changes (increases) in the frequency and distribution of crime, along with other social changes occurring over the same time period. As a result, substantial sections of the public became more punitive in their attitudes to crime, criminals and criminal justice policies: Members of the public increasingly express their fear, their aggravation at having to alter their lifestyles and incur expenses, their dissatisfaction with the system that failed them. The daily tribulations of minor crime and disorder easily slides into a concern with ‘crime as such’, which in turn connotes violent predatory crime. The trauma of powerlessness in the face of fear prompts the demand for action. (Garland, 2000: 368)
In contrast to these results, Stinchcombe et al. (1980) and Taylor et al. (1979) find only a slight effect of fear on support for the death penalty; while other research concludes that fear does not lead to greater punitiveness (Baron and Hartnagel, 1996; Brillon, 1988; Ouimet and Coyle, 1991; Secret and Johnson, 1989). For example, Sprott’s (1999) Canadian study fails to find a relationship between fear and judgements about the harshness of adult court sentencing. According to Tyler and Boeckmann (1997), public punitiveness is not a function of fear of crime or grievances against the courts; rather fear reflects symbolic concerns regarding declining moral and social consensus, as well as underlying social values which have a direct effect on the public’s punitiveness. They claim that crime-related concerns are the least important factor in predicting punitive attitudes. Cullen et al.’s (2000) review concludes that fear of crime does not appear to drive public calls for harsher punishment while Beckett (1997) argues that the assumption that anxiety about crime drives support for punitive policies is problematic since those who are less afraid typically express the most support for ‘get tough’ policies; that is, rural white men as opposed to women and blacks.
Anger about crime
Although rarely investigated, emotions other than fear, such as anger and resentment, may also affect attitudes towards punishment (Lerner et al., 1998). Durkheim long ago argued that the shock of norm violation produces emotions of anger and indignation along with the desire for revenge (Garland, 1990). Some authors claim that anger is the emotion most clearly linked to concerns and values about justice and fair treatment (Karstedt, 2002), although it is far from clear how anger about crime is aroused in those who have not been a victim and who have no personal experience of crime (Farrall, 2001). Lerner et al. (1998) state that anger is the principal emotion associated with justice judgements; and that it leads people to rely on stereotypes and easily processed rather than effort-demanding cues. Alternatively, the endemic insecurity inherent in a competitive and mobile society – the ‘fear of falling’ (Ehrenreich, 1989) – may create latent anxieties which, according to Scheingold (1991), eventually produce a good deal of anger and result in a search for scapegoats against whom anger is discharged and through whom the illusion of control is maintained. Thus, crime can be a symbolic substitute for feelings about other forms of incivility or unusual behaviour (Gaubatz, 1994). Gaubatz’s (1994) analysis of the views of a small sample of Americans who display a consensus on tough sentences found that when they felt overwhelmed by social problems, their anger would spill over on to criminals, in which case they would fall back to simple solutions such as the effectiveness of severe punishment.
There is some psychological research suggesting that anger-primed participants subsequently made more punitive attributions than neutral-emotion-primed participants (Averill, 1983; Keltner et al., 1993; Quigley and Tedeschi, 1996). Lerner et al. (1998) used participants’ responses to vignettes describing a harm resulting from negligence by a worker to measure punitiveness and reported that those exposed to the anger prime made more punitive attributions than did participants exposed to the neutral-emotion prime; and that the effect of anger was mediated by attributions of blame among accountable but not anonymous participants. In a series of studies Gault and Sabini (2000) provide evidence that state anger (i.e. current emotional mood or contextual reaction) predicts support for punitive actions while trait anger (a relatively stable individual characteristic) is not a significant predictor of policy preferences. However, Feather et al. (2001) report that when residents of Adelaide, Australia responded to several hypothetical scenarios, anger did not emerge as a significant predictor of either rehabilitation or punishment preferences.
Yet using nationally representative survey data from the United States, Johnson (2009) finds that anger about crime is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes, controlling for other factors such as fear of crime, causal attributions for criminal behaviour, and other variables; while Ditton et al. (1999a) report that Scottish survey respondents seem to be more angry about the threat of criminal victimization for four offence types than afraid of it.
Additional predictors
Victimization, even for a violent crime, does not appear to be a significant predictor of punitive attitudes (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986; Ouimet and Coyle, 1991; Rich and Sampson, 1990; Tufts and Roberts, 2001). For example, only 9 per cent of self-reported victims of violent crimes in the 1998 British Crime Survey favour the incarceration of their offender (Roberts, 2002). Further, Van Dijk and Steinmetz (1988) report that personal experience of crime and perceived risk of crime are not related to support for more repressive policies, although those who felt more threatened or were victims did favour extra government spending on crime control.
However, victimization may be indirectly related to punitiveness through its effects on emotions about crime. Hale’s (1996) review of the literature found some evidence of a positive relationship between victimization and fear of crime. Crime victimization may result in increased levels of fear of and/or anger about crime (Chadee et al., 2009; DuBow et al., 1979; Farrall et al., 2009; Gordon and Riger, 1989; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Warr, 1984; Warr and Stafford, 1983). Ditton et al. (1999a) indicate that victims are more likely than non-victims to be angry and afraid. The 2009 Canadian victimization survey (Perreault and Brennan, 2010) found that overall, eight in 10 victims reported that the crime incident had affected them emotionally, with anger the most common reaction. Other evidence suggests that anger is a response to actual victimization (Ditton et al., 1999b; Maguire, 1980; Mawby and Walklate, 1997). Langworthy and Whitehead (1986) report an indirect effect of victimization on punitive attitudes through fear of crime.
Costelloe et al. (2009) claim that the potential for a link between economic insecurity and punitiveness is widely recognized, although the precise rationale for such a relationship is variably described. The frustration-aggression hypothesis postulates that frustrations resulting from adverse economic conditions produce aggressive impulses that are then directed at vulnerable targets even when they bear no actual or perceived responsibility for economic decline (Hovland and Sears, 1940). This process – called ‘scapegoating’ – is alleged to occur when the hostile impulses resulting from blocked goal-directed behaviour cannot be directed towards the source of the frustration since there may be no human agent, or the agent may be unknown or too powerful to attack. Such hostility may be displaced onto some substitute target that is more accessible or less able to strike back (Simpson and Yinger, 1958). Those with the least economic security are the most likely to be hostile to out groups (Levine and Campbell, 1972). Economic dislocation, unemployment and deprivation may contribute to punitive attitudes towards criminals since they serve as convenient scapegoats during times of economic distress. Similar suggestions have been made by Chancer and Donovan (1996) and Greenberg (1999).
Scheingold (1991) has argued that insecurity is generally experienced as inherent in a competitive and mobile society. This ‘fear of falling’ (Ehrenreich, 1989) creates latent anxieties which eventually produce a good deal of anger and result in a search for scapegoats against whom to discharge this anger and through whom to maintain the illusion of control (Scheingold, 1991). This suggests that economic insecurity may be related indirectly to punitiveness through its impact upon emotions, particularly anger about crime. As Chancer and Donovan (1996: 52) note, criminals provide an opportunity for ‘the channeling of anxious insecurities into rage’.
Only a few studies have investigated the relationship between economic insecurity and punitiveness at the individual level with most reporting no relationship (Johnson, 2001; Useem et al., 2003; Van Dijk, 1981). Even so, Hogan et al. (2005) do find a relationship among non-whites with one particular measure of insecurity. Similarly, while Costelloe et al. (2009) also report no overall relationship, they do note a significant positive relationship among white males, particularly those with lower levels of education and income. However, we are unaware of any research examining the possible indirect effects of economic insecurity through such emotions as anger or fear.
Attribution theory assumes that human beings seek to make sense of their world by attributing people’s actions to internal/dispositional or external/situational causes (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986). Different approaches to crime control, in turn, are based upon different explanations for criminality (Flanagan, 1987; Hawkins, 1981; Vold, 1958). How individuals explain or attribute the causes of crime influences their preferred policies to respond to crime. Internal/dispositional attributions imply that the actor is more blameworthy or responsible for their conduct and thus deserving of more severe punishment (Shaver, 1975).
Ample research evidence supports the influence of causal attributions on punitive attitudes (Carroll and Payne, 1977; Cullen et al., 1985; Davis et al., 1993; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Hawkins, 1981; Johnson, 2006; Young, 1991), including Johnson’s (2009) study of the effect of emotions on punitiveness. Since respondents who attribute criminal behaviour to individual dispositions or failings prefer harsher punishments, we will include internal attributions of crime as a predictor. Having an internal attribution style may also contribute to greater fear and/or anger about crime. Individuals who believe criminals are evil predators who choose to victimize others may also express greater fear of crime and anger towards such perpetrators. An internal attributional style may therefore have both direct and indirect effects on punitiveness.
Control variables
We will also control for political conservatism since prior research has frequently found it to be a significant predictor of punitiveness (Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Costelloe et al., 2009; Johnson, 2001, 2006; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Johnson (2009) also reports a significant effect of political conservatism while controlling for other predictors.
Four socio-demographic background variables – gender, age, income and education – often found to be related to punitiveness are also included as controls. Males are expected to be somewhat more punitive than females (Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Hough et al., 1988; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986; Rossi and Berk, 1997; Stinchcombe et al., 1980), although there is some evidence that this may vary with specific offences and measures of punitiveness (Applegate et al., 2002; Tufts, 2000; Useem et al., 2003). Females, however, tend to be more fearful of crime (Chadee et al., 2009; Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987; Liska et al., 1988; Warr, 1984). Age is predicted to be positively related to punitiveness (Brillon, 1988; Cullen et al., 1985; Hough et al., 1988; Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986; Rich and Sampson, 1990), although again there is some evidence that when presented with hypothetical crime scenarios younger Canadians are more supportive of prison sentences when compared to older Canadians (Tufts, 2000). While levels of fear of crime are thought to be higher among older individuals, the research evidence is inconsistent (Chadee and Ditton, 2003; Ferraro and LaGrange, 1992). Education is expected to relate negatively to punitive attitudes (Brillon, 1988; Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Hogan et al., 1997; Hough et al., 1988; Rich and Sampson, 1990; Rossi and Berk, 1997; Tufts, 2000; Walker et al., 1988), while income should positively associate with punitiveness (Johnson, 2009), although the evidence is inconsistent (Applegate et al., 1996; Blumstein and Cohen, 1980).
Hypotheses
The emotions perspective predicts positive direct effects of fear of and anger about crime on punitive attitudes, after controlling for other variables. Individuals who are more fearful of and angry about crime should exhibit more punitive attitudes towards criminals. However, given the weaker evidence for a direct effect of fear, we expect anger to be a stronger predictor of punitive attitudes.
The research literature suggests that once other variables are controlled for, the experience of crime victimization will have little or no direct effect on attitudes towards punishment for crime. However, the experience of victimization may have indirect effects that increase the degree of punitiveness espoused by these individuals through its effect on their emotions of fear and anger about crime. Victimization may result in greater fear of and anger about crime which in turn result in greater punitiveness.
In light of previous research, we expect at best only a small positive relationship between the degree of economic insecurity experienced by individuals and their punitive attitudes, once other variables are controlled for. However, we will explore the possible indirect impact on punitiveness of such insecurity through the emotions of fear and, particularly, anger since economic insecurity may lead to more fear of and anger about crime.
Finally, we expect respondents who make internal attributions of the causes of crime to also exhibit greater punitiveness. We will also examine a possible indirect effect of an internal attributional style on punitiveness through the emotions of fear of and anger about crime.
Methods
Data
Data for this study were obtained from a survey conducted by the Population Research Laboratory (PRL) at the University of Alberta between 22 March and 6 June 2005 using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) facilities. 1 A random digit dialling approach was used to ensure that respondents had an equal chance of being contacted regardless of whether or not their household was listed in the telephone directory. The provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and the Atlantic provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island were sampled. Sample sizes proportional to each were established (British Columbia: 19%, Alberta: 14%, Ontario: 56%, and Atlantic area: 11% respectively); these provincial quotas were further stratified by gender to obtain an equal proportion of females and males in each area. Respondents were eligible for participation if they were at least 18 years of age and their quota group was not full. The average interview length was approximately 28 minutes. The overall response rate for the study was 38 per cent calculated by dividing the number of completed interviews (N = 1006) by the number of completes plus refusals (1410), plus incompletes (27) plus language or communication barrier (174) (total N = 2617).
The final sample size was 1006 with approximately equal representation of males and females at 502 and 504 respectively. The average age of respondents was 48 years. Approximately 28 per cent of respondents between the ages of 25 and 64 years reported having a high school education or less while 30 per cent reported the completion of at least one university degree. Median gross family income for the sample ranged between $60,000–$64,999 per year, with approximately 25 per cent of respondents declaring a gross household income of greater than $100,000 and 7 per cent living in a home with less than $18,000 per year of annual income. Although we are not attempting to generalize findings to the Canadian population but rather testing relationships among variables, this sample is older, has more education and a higher income compared to the 2001 Canadian census, probably due to the presence of the provinces of Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia in the sample.
Measures
There has been controversy regarding the measurement of public attitudes to punishment (Roberts and Stalans, 1997; Roberts et al., 2003). Those arguing that the public favours a punitive response to crime usually cite national telephone polls that ask only one or two questions about crime policy (e.g. whether the courts are harsh enough). But a general survey question concerning harshness of sentencing is more likely to tap into stereotypical images of criminals and distort punishment preferences (Roberts and Stalans, 1997; Stalans, 2002). We employed a scale of punitiveness developed by Chiricos et al. (2004) which we modified slightly to fit the Canadian context. It was composed of seven items referring to ways of dealing with crime in Canada (i.e. make sentences more severe for all crime; use the death penalty for some murderers; make prisoners work on chain gangs; take away TV and recreation privileges from prisoners; use more mandatory minimum sentencing laws; lock up more juvenile offenders; send repeat juvenile offenders to adult courts) to which respondents were asked to indicate on a 10-point scale their degree of support. A measure of punitiveness was created by adding together the responses to the seven items and dividing by seven. Our version of this punitiveness scale had an alpha reliability of .844.
Zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for all study variables
p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
The background variables of age, gender (female = 1), education (total years of schooling) and household income were measured in standard ways. Ten items were included as potential measures of emotional reactions to crime. Four crime scenarios (a house break in/theft; and a simple assault, each with a first offender and then with a repeat offender) were listed and respondents were asked to rate the degree (not at all to very much on a 10-point scale) to which each situation would make them fearful. The same four scenarios and procedure were used again, this time asking respondents to rate the degree to which each situation would make them angry. Given the ambiguities in the literature regarding conceptualization and measurement of fear (Farrall et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2000), as well as the view by some (Hough, 2004) that fear and worry are distinct concepts, we decided to include a second anxiety indicator, worry about victimization, to tap more directly into feelings of fear that people experience in their actual lives (Beckett and Sasson, 2004). Respondents were asked to agree or disagree on a five-point scale to two items: ‘I worry about being robbed or assaulted in my own neighbourhood at night’; and ‘I worry that a thief will break into my home while I am at home.’
These 10 items were factor analysed with a principal components analysis and varimax rotation. Three factors corresponding to the emotions of fear, anger and worry were extracted. Therefore we constructed one index for each. Respondent ratings of the degree to which each scenario would make them fearful were added together and divided by four for their total fear score (a = .902). The same procedure was used for the anger index (a = .905). The mean scores indicate respondents reacted with more anger (8.17) than fear (6.68); and the distribution of anger scores is quite skewed towards the higher values. Both means are above the mid-point, indicating a significant amount of both fear and anger expressed in response to these crime scenarios. In fact, the modal response for both is 10, the maximum value, with 30 per cent of respondents reporting this score on anger (10% for fear). Finally, the two worry items were added together and divided by two to form an index with an alpha value of .836. A mean value of 2.16 suggests that the respondents did not worry to a large degree about being victimized by these offences (36% had the lowest score of 1 and only 15% were at 4 or higher).
Respondents were also asked if they had ever been a victim of a crime (yes = 1), to which 59 per cent indicated they had been a crime victim at some point. We also asked those who reported a victimization to indicate the type of crime involved which was coded as either property or violent crime.
Economic insecurity was measured by asking respondents to reply on a five-point scale of strongly disagree to strongly agree to the statement: ‘Right now I am satisfied with how much money I have to live on.’ In total 35 per cent disagreed, 19 per cent strongly. Political conservatism was assessed using a five-point strongly disagree to strongly agree scale to the statement: ‘Politically, I consider myself to be conservative.’ Thirty-six per cent strongly disagreed or disagreed while 42 per cent agreed or strongly agreed.
A factor analysis of the following four potential internal attribution items was conducted: ‘Crime is a choice – a person’s social circumstances aren’t to blame’; ‘Most criminals commit crimes because they know they can get away with it’; ‘Most criminals know full well what they are doing when they break the law’; ‘Most people who violate the law do so because they know that crime pays in Canada these days.’ The first item was dropped due to a low factor loading score (.393); the remaining three items were combined into an internal attribution index with an alpha reliability value of .66. 2
Results
The data were analysed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Multicollinearity does not appear to be a significant problem. Except for the correlation between anger and fear of crime (.573), no bivariate correlations among predictors exceeded .346 (gender and fear); with the exception of anger and fear (.609 and .549 respectively) tolerance levels were all above .727; and the largest variance inflation factor score was 1.8 (fear). Given the relationship between anger and fear, they along with worry about crime were initially entered in separate regression equations to examine their unique relationships with punitiveness.
Regression of punitive attitudes on emotions and control variables
p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
As an alternative to the measure of fear, we substituted the worry about crime measure in equation four. Internal attributions and political conservatism are still the strongest predictors, followed by worry with a Beta coefficient of .171. Respondents who expressed greater worry about crime were also more likely to score higher on punitive attitudes. The remaining statistically significant predictors are similar to the anger and fear equations except that higher household income is associated with greater punitiveness (Beta = .068), as are women (Beta = .060).
In order to compare the relative impact of the three measures of emotion about crime, we entered all three into equation five along with the other predictors. Anger and worry about crime both remain significant predictors of punitiveness; however fear does not. The latter result may be partially related to the correlation between anger and fear. The remaining predictors follow the same pattern as in previous equations: internal attributions of the causes of crime and political conservatism are both associated with greater punitiveness while age and education have a negative relationship with punitive attitudes. However, neither victimization nor economic insecurity are significant predictors in any of the equations. The R2adj values indicate that slightly more than 40 per cent of the variation in punitive attitudes is explained in each of these several equations. To check the stability of these results we ran an OLS regression with a backward elimination procedure with no change in the results.
Since a large number of cases had missing data on the income variable, we re-ran equation five without income and substituted a different measure of economic insecurity (‘Would you say that you [and your family] are better off or worse off or just the same financially than you were a year ago?’); the results were largely unchanged. We also re-ran the regressions first substituting violent victimization, then property victimization and finally victimization of family or friends for the general victimization measure but again results did not change substantively. Finally, we examined the possible effect of type of offence and offender by substituting each of the eight individual anger and fear items in turn for the composite anger and fear measures in eight regressions. Overall, the results did not change substantively, although the size of the coefficients for the eight emotion measures did vary. Anger remained a stronger predictor of punitive attitudes than fear for each offence and offender; but the effect of anger was greatest for a repeat break and enter offender (.242), followed by first offender break and enter (.190), repeat assault (.165) and weakest for a first offender in assault (.119). The comparable coefficients for fear were .156, .144, .108 and .095, respectively. It appears, then, that the offence of break and enter results in the strongest emotional effect on punitive attitudes, particularly with respect to anger; and that this effect is somewhat intensified with a repeat offender.
We were also interested in examining the effects of victimization, economic insecurity and an internal attributional style on the emotions of anger, fear and worry, as well as some potential indirect effects on punitive attitudes. We calculated reduced-form OLS regression equations, beginning with the equation containing the exogenous variables and then equations adding one emotion (Alwin and Hauser, 1975). Older respondents reported less anger (−.073, p < .05) and females more (.196, p < .001); while the politically conservative (.076, p < .05) and particularly those with higher internal attribution scores (.264, p < .001) exhibited more anger about crime, controlling for the other variables. Victimization and economic insecurity were not significant predictors of anger. While most of the effect of age on punitiveness is direct, 20 per cent of its effect was indirect through anger. Fourteen per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, of the effect of internal attributions and political conservatism was mediated by anger.
When we substituted fear of crime for anger, female respondents (.302, p < .001), those with less income (−.081, p < .05), the politically conservative (.081, p < .05) and those with higher internal attribution scores (.105, p < .01) were more fearful of crime, controlling for the other variables. However, neither victimization nor economic insecurity were significant predictors of fear of crime. The indirect effects through fear were much smaller than was the case for anger. Only 6 per cent of the effect of internal attributions on punitive attitudes was mediated by fear, and only 2 per cent mediated by political conservatism.
Turning to worry, females (.141, p < .001), those with less income (−.184, p < .001) and respondents with higher internal attribution scores (.142, p < .001) worried more about crime controlling for the other variables. But again, neither victimization nor economic insecurity was a significant predictor of worry about crime. While 33 per cent of the effect of gender and 18 per cent of that of age on punitive attitudes was indirect through worry, only 6 per cent of the impact of internal attributions and 5 per cent of political conservatism was mediated by worry about crime.
Conclusions
These results indicate the importance of emotions in influencing people’s attitudes towards punishment for crime. The emotions of fear and anger were predicted to have positive direct effects on punitive attitudes, with anger predicted to have the stronger effect. Controlling for the other variables, anger about crime did indeed have a significant direct effect: respondents who reported greater anger about the crime scenarios were also more punitive in their attitudes towards crime. This significant effect was maintained when fear and worry about crime were added to the regression equation. In contrast, while fear was a significant predictor of punitive attitudes in the absence of the other emotions, it dropped to insignificance when they were added to the equation. However, worry as an alternative measure of anxiety about crime remained as a significant predictor of punitiveness. Respondents who worried more about crime were also more punitive; controlling for the other variables. Consistent with previous research, experience with crime as a victim did not directly affect punitive attitudes. It also failed to have any indirect effects through the three emotions about crime. Economic insecurity similarly failed to show either direct or indirect effects through emotions on punitive attitudes.
In contrast, an internal attributional style was the strongest overall predictor of punitive attitudes; and it was also a significant predictor of each of the three measures of emotions about crime. Respondents who regard criminals as rational actors who choose to engage in crime are much more likely to express punitive attitudes in responding to crime. How individuals have conceptualized the reasons for crime appears to be a more important variable explaining punitive attitudes than emotions about crime. But those who exhibited these internal attributions were also angrier about crime, more fearful of it and worried more about crime. Although the majority of internal attribution’s effect on punitive attitudes was direct, it did have some additional small indirect effects through each of the three emotions (14% via anger; 6% via both fear and worry). Overall, most of the effects on punitive attitudes were direct and unmediated by other variables. Generally, then, the hypothesized predictions received support, particularly concerning the effects of emotions on punitive attitudes as well as the impact of an internal attributional style.
The stronger effect of anger on punitive attitudes compared to fear and worry and its positive effect when the latter emotions were present in equation five adds weight to the claims of those who regard anger as the emotion most associated with issues of crime and justice (Karstedt, 2002; Lerner et al., 1998). It also is consistent with Ditton et al.’s (1999a) finding that their survey respondents were more angry than afraid of crime. Anger’s positive effect on punitiveness may reflect an emotional reaction that is connected to a desire for retribution for crime where severe punishment is believed to be deserved by the person responsible. This is consistent with our finding that respondents who were more likely to endorse internal or dispositional attributions as the causes of crime were also more likely to express anger at crime and criminals. Anger’s relationship to punitiveness, then, may in turn be a result of the desire for a particular purpose of sentencing that is connected to underlying beliefs about the causes of crime.
Although the effect of fear of crime on punitive attitudes was moderately strong in equation three (.145), it was weaker than that for anger (.206) and for worry about crime (.171); and the effect of fear disappeared in equation five when all three emotions were entered. This result is not that surprising given the inconsistent evidence in previous research concerning the impact of fear on punitiveness (Chiricos et al., 2004; Cullen et al., 2000). It is also consistent with the finding that while a third of Canadian crime victims reported being angry as a result and slightly more than a fifth said they were upset, confused or frustrated, only 10 per cent reported being afraid (Perreault and Brennan, 2010). In addition, the measures of all three emotions are correlated (see Table 1); indeed, the correlation between anger and fear (.573) is the strongest among the entire set of predictor and control variables. This is probably due in part to the similar measurement of fear and anger about crime. Their collinearity and the stronger relationship of anger with punitiveness contribute to attenuating the effect of fear on punitiveness in equation five when anger and worry are controlled.
Worry about crime, though weaker in its impact on punitive attitudes than anger, had a significant positive relationship with punitiveness even when the other emotions were included in equation five. Our measure of worry invited respondents to think of two specific potential crime situations they could encounter. As such, this measure probably focused respondents’ attention on their vulnerability to victimization which in turn may have heightened their expression of some desire for revenge or retribution through increased punitiveness. Our measure of fear, on the other hand, was somewhat more hypothetical; and this combined with its collinearity with both anger and worry may have contributed to its attenuated relationship with punitiveness.
Although the terms ‘fear’ and ‘worry’ about crime are often used synonymously in the research literature, Hough (2004) claims that fear and worry are qualitatively different concepts. He argues that ‘fear of crime’ is a misleading label for a diffuse set of concepts, ranging from the mental event of fear in the immediate anticipation of victimization to such mental processes as unease, anxiety, worry and concern about crime. Worry may be more akin to distress or concern than the dread or trepidation associated with fear. It is doubtful that such conceptualization of fear of crime can be captured by the typical survey research measures. More conceptual and empirical attention to these distinctions should be a priority.
These results suggest that the emotional aspects of punitiveness should receive much more research attention. While there is a fairly substantial literature on the fear of crime, empirical research focusing upon such other emotions as anger and resentment and their relationships with reactions to crime and punishment is only beginning to be explored. The present study was limited in its measurement of anger to only two types of crime and offenders. Additional research should examine a broader range of crime types and offender characteristics to gauge the effects of anger on punitiveness under a variety of circumstances. For example, anger may be a more pronounced emotional reaction to sex offenders than to shoplifters. Further, while crime victimization and economic insecurity do not seem to increase these emotional reactions to crime, females, the politically conservative and those who attribute crime to internal dispositions or motivations of offenders were positively related to all three emotions. Future research should continue to attempt to delineate the sources of anger and the other emotional reactions to crime.
Our research suggests that the emotions of fear, worry and anger about crime are related. Additional research examining these emotional reactions with a broader range of measures is called for. However, their relationship may also result in part from some common sources. For example, these emotional responses may be related to the use of stereotypes (Lerner et al., 1998) and the role of the mass media in forming attitudes and reactions to crime. Finally, the relative importance of state versus trait anger and other emotions in predicting punitiveness needs further investigation.
Measurement of some important concepts remains an issue for further development. Clearly, how fear of crime is conceptualized and measured has significant implications. There is by now a sizeable literature on this subject (see Farrall et al., 2009). Given the conflicting research results concerning the effect of fear of crime on punitive attitudes, further attention to this topic is necessary.
Certain emotional reactions about crime and ideas about the causes of crime appear to be important variables galvanizing people to demand more punitive responses to crime. This suggests that a combination of elements – a strongly held belief that crime is the result of the decisions of individuals along with a greater degree of anger about crime and/or criminals and worry about potential victimization – may be particularly potent forces leading to punitive attitudes. Those interested in attempting to influence public opinion regarding sentencing of convicted offenders and related criminal justice issues may therefore need to focus their efforts on both the causal beliefs and the associated emotions regarding crime and criminals.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This article is a revised version of a paper presented to the European Society of Criminology, August 2006. The authors are listed alphabetically. We acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the Population Research Laboratory, University of Alberta for their data collection and preparation. The financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through a research grant to TF Hartnagel is gratefully acknowledged.
