‘You don’t respect me,but I’m worthy of respect’. Paramilitaries’ prison experience and conflict transformation in Colombia

Abstract

Through the case study of demobilised paramilitaries in Colombia, this article seeks to discuss how former combatants’ identities and perspectives are shaped by specific prison conditions, as well as the consequences of these vis-à-vis the fulfilment of transitional justice’s general goals of the reintegration of ex-combatants and peace-building. Former combatants incarcerated in facilities lacking minimum human rights standards, where State authority and legitimacy are weak, and where the precariousness of rehabilitation and re-entry programmes is manifest, have little opportunity of peacefully reintegrating into their communities and society. Under such conditions, ex-combatants adopt a discourse of resistance, which increases the risks of reoffending and rejoining illegal armed groups after release. This is not only counterproductive for peace-building and social reconciliation but it can also lead to the resumption of the armed conflict.

Keywords

Colombia conflict transformation Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration ex-combatants human rights imprisonment paramilitaries prisoner re-entry rehabilitation programmes transitional justice

Introduction

On 25 November 2003, 885 combatants, members of the Cacique Nutibara regiment, handed in their weapons in Medellin and demobilised as a first step towards reintegrating into society and deescalating the Colombian armed conflict.¹ The Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito, the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC – (the umbrella organisation that unified right-wing paramilitary groups) had been signed a few months before, on 15 July 2003, and paved the way for the dismantling of paramilitary structures in Colombia. Nearly 31,671 paramilitary combatants demobilised (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2015: 33).

For most of the demobilised paramilitaries, the path from war to reconciliation was to be guided by the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) policy, designed by the Colombian government. Some of them, nonetheless, would not reintegrate so straightforwardly into society, as the seriousness of the crimes they committed demanded a different institutional response. Before reintegrating into civil society, ex-combatants accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity had to do prison time. According to the Justice and Peace Act,² they would have to spend from five to eight years in prison, as they had to serve a pena alternativa (reduced sentence) in one of the Colombian supermax facilities, in exchange for their contribution to truth and victims’ reparations.

Between 2006 and 2013, 1066 former members of illegal armed groups who were already held in Colombian prisons submitted to the Justice and Peace Jurisdiction in order to obtain reduced sentences – they represented 21.4% of ex-combatants under the Justice and Peace Jurisdiction, who became known as Postulados (petitioners).³ The majority of them (88.5%) belonged to the AUC (Ariza and Iturralde, 2016: 416; Contraloría General de la República, 2016). Many of the paramilitaries already imprisoned were tagged as common criminals, with no legal recognition of their status.⁴ Slowly but steadily, paramilitary prisoners demanded government recognition as ex-combatants in order to submit to the special jurisdiction. Thus, being accepted in this jurisdiction not only implied penal benefits, but also a change of status – from common prisoners to ex-combatants.

This article seeks to analytically describe the Postulados discourses on prison experience and their relation with the promise of reintegration. We will discuss how former combatants’ identities and perspectives are shaped by specific prison conditions, as well as the consequences of these vis-à-vis the fulfilment of transitional justice’s (TJ) general goals of the reintegration of ex-combatants and peace-building.

We will argue that former combatants incarcerated in facilities lacking minimum human rights standards, where State authority and legitimacy are weak, and where the precariousness of rehabilitation and re-entry programmes is manifest, have little opportunity of peacefully reintegrating into their communities and society. Also, under such conditions, the risks of reoffending and rejoining illegal armed groups after release increase. This is not only counterproductive for peace-building and social reconciliation but it can also lead to the resumption of the armed conflict.

We will also discuss how, under such conditions, imprisoned paramilitaries adopt a discourse of resistance (McEvoy et al., 2004), which has a negative impact on their trust in the promise of reintegration. Imprisoned ex-paramilitaries do not talk about the war they left behind and the wrongs they did to their victims (even though they recognise them) as often as they talk about the suffering and deprivation that actual prison conditions subject them to. Consequently, they tend to focus on their prisoner identity rather than on their ex-combatants’ status. This also creates fractures within the paramilitary structure and limits the possibilities of ex-combatants to contribute to reconciliation as political and social actors, as well as to peacefully reintegrate.

Even though the resistance discourse is relevant to contest prison conditions, it nevertheless leaves on the background the pressing question of reconciliation with the victims and social reintegration. It also weakens the ex-combatants’ self-image of a collective actor with the capacity and willingness to contribute to justice, truth, reparation and reconciliation. Finally, the resistance discourse further weakens the paramilitaries trust on the State, for they feel it has not fulfilled its promises.

In order to develop our argument, this article is organised as follows. In the first part, we will briefly discuss the TJ and DDR literature that deal with the problem of punishment, which, with a few but significant exceptions, tend to ignore the actual conditions in which it is applied, and, therefore, its impact on TJ and reintegration processes. In the second part, we will sketch out some of the most salient features of the Colombian penitentiary system. This will be useful to make sense of the actual context in which more than a thousand imprisoned ex-combatants are to be rehabilitated and partake in a broader transitional and restorative justice process. In the third part, we will discuss the findings of our interviews with Postulados, after six months of fieldwork carried out in the Metropolitan Penitentiary and Prison Complex of Bogotá (La Picota). We will conclude with some reflections on the impact of imprisonment of ex-combatants in the achievement of DDR and TJ goals.

TJ and DDR literature, and their blind spot towards imprisoned ex-combatants

The issue of dealing with history and past atrocities is the core concern of TJ (Minow, 1998). A strand of the broad-ranging literature on the features and challenges of TJ has focused on analysing the tension between retribution and the political need for peace and reconciliation which calls for less punishment in order to achieve peace through negotiation. Also, victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation play a key role in balancing such tension (Blatz, 2006; De Greiff, 2006; O’Kelly, 2009; Posner and Vermeule, 2003; Quinn, 2009).

Despite the diversity of positions regarding the treatment of ex-combatants responsible for serious crimes, which range from blanket amnesties to harsh punishment, there is a significant gap in the study of the role that prisons (as the main form of punishment) may play within TJ. This leaves key questions unanswered: how to relate rehabilitation and reintegration, as supposed aims of punishment in correctional facilities, with TJ goals and dynamics? What should the role of prisons be during transitional times? In such a context, what should happen – and what should be avoided – during the execution of punishment in the midst of a correctional system with serious institutional and legitimacy problems?

Such pressing questions about the role of prisons in transitional settings are seldom addressed by the specialised literature, since it tends to focus on the dilemma of doing or not doing prison time – as well as the intensity of punishment, when this is the chosen option. What happens while an ex-combatant is doing prison time is usually of little interest. This gap hinders the understanding of the role and impact of imprisonment in transitional settings, as well as the development of more fitting policies that actually contribute to achieving the broad and complex goal of peace-building, which cannot afford to ignore what happens to ex-combatants, including those who go to prison.

The same could be said about the DDR literature. According to Theidon (2015), most DDR perspectives tend to focus on ‘dismantling the machinery of war’, but they do not ‘consider how to move beyond demobilizing combatants to facilitating social reconstruction and coexistence’ (p. 323). And, as McEvoy and Shirlow (2009) show, DDR literature places little emphasis on the particular needs, experiences and also abilities of ex-combatants released from prison (p. 35).

Reintegration entails a complex, multidimensional process involving subjective transformations and interventions in the wider social and political context in order to help ‘former combatants return to civil society as non-combatants’ (Edloe, 2007: 4). When former combatants serve prison time during transitional times, their process of reintegration and participation in peace-building is quite a challenge, as they also must face the hardships and obstacles that imprisonment entails in order to navigate a successful re-entry to society. If reintegration of ex-combatants in transitional processes is hard enough per se, adding imprisonment to the equation, particularly when the prison system is precarious and overstretched (like in the Colombian case), makes it even harder.

Recent literature has started bridging the gap between TJ and DDR studies through the study of ex-combatant imprisoned experiences and their impact on re-entry, reintegration and reconciliation in transitional societies. Some of the topics that have been explored are the importance of leadership and moral agency of former prisoners and combatants in the process of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009); how politically motivated prisoners in South Africa and Northern Ireland can draw on their collective solidarity and social legitimacy to smooth re-entry (Rolston and Artz, 2014); the post-prison experiences of ex-combatant former prisoners and their families, and how they moved from a resistant to a transitional characterisation of incarceration and its consequences in Northern Ireland (McEvoy et al., 2004).

These studies also seek to assess how ex-combatants’ and former prisoners’ experiences –which also include their time in prison – may contribute to social stabilisation and peace-building through the development of longer term conflict transformation and shared grass roots socio-economic issues. Thus, former combatants/former prisoners have a significant role to play in the planning and implementation of various components of the DDR process (Dwyer, 2012: 285).

The political and social conditions during the transitional period also play a key role. In the Northern Ireland case, ex-combatants’ imprisonment was not a consequence of transitional agreements demanding punishment. Rather, former combatants (both Loyalist and Republican) were released from prison as a result of peace agreements (McEvoy et al., 2004: 646); something similar happened in South Africa (Rolston and Artz, 2014). Meanwhile, in the Colombian case, imprisonment (at least of those responsible for the most serious crimes) is merged with the transitional process or even a precondition of it. As a result of the peace agreement, demobilised paramilitary leaders and soldiers suspected or responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity went to prison. There, they joined many of their members, already sentenced or awaiting trial.

Another significant difference between cases like those of Northern Ireland and South Africa, on the one hand, and the Colombian one, on the other, is the particularities of their respective armed conflicts. Although it is evident that there are significant differences between the Northern Ireland and South Africa peace agreements, they have in common that they put an end to an armed fight between the State and all the different armed factions. In Colombia, the peace agreement with the AUC demobilised one of the deadliest armed actors, but the war continued between the State and the leftist guerrillas – FARC and ELN (with around 10,000 armed men), while disgruntled paramilitaries, together with organised crime, formed new illegal armed groups, which became known as Bandas Criminales – BACRIM. They emerged after the paramilitaries’ demobilisation and, to a great degree, have replaced them in terms of territorial control, counterinsurgent struggle and also the drug business, in which paramilitary groups were heavily involved.⁵

The security of ex-combatants and their relatives is one of the greatest concerns in every DDR process. They fear the vengeance and retaliation from their victims, enemies and even their former allies, once they return to their communities. This sole factor has the potential of derailing a DDR process. In Colombia, the ex-combatants’ fears, especially the paramilitaries, are substantial, for their traditional enemies are still armed and fighting.⁶ Thus, the risk of recidivism of ex-combatants increases. For different reasons (among them fear, coercion and mistrust), they may re-join illegal armed groups or organised crime.⁷

Regarding ex-combatants’ recidivism, in Colombia, even though the subject has been studied (Nussio, 2009; Nussio and Kaplan, 2018), the data and studies available only refer to ex-combatants that demobilised without going to prison. In any case, the available studies of the Colombian and other cases do discuss the factors that may lead to, or inhibit, ex-combatants’ recidivism. Based on the idea that ex-combatants’ decision-making is shaped by a mix of driving and restraining forces, the analysis of Nussio and Kaplan (2018) suggested the demobilised paramilitaries are 50% more likely to return to illegal activities than guerrilla ex-combatants. It also showed that

ex-combatants in general are more likely to reoffend if they had strong personal motives for initially joining an armed group (53 percent more likely) or spent more time in such groups (4 percent more likely for each year in such groups), do not have children (40 percent more likely), are in the vicinity of reemergent criminal bands (158 percent more likely), and did not complete high school during their time in the reintegration program (35 percent more likely). (p. 66)

The previous outline shows that, despite the differences between contexts, the case studies of different transitional societies (like Northern Ireland, South Africa and Colombia) are relevant for a better understanding of imprisonment in transitional societies, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it pinpoints the need for ‘expanding the “R” phase of DDR’ (Dwyer, 2012: 295), thus including in reintegration the study of previous imprisonment experience of former combatants, which allows for filling the gap created by ‘the lack of discussion on the combatants/former prisoners in the DDR literature and the apparent disconnect in dealing with the combatants/former prisoners in studies dealing with conflict transformation and criminology’ (p. 275).

On the other hand, this perspective is useful for bridging the gap between prison studies of a criminological vein and TJ and DDR discussions on punishment and reintegration, as well as for fostering comparative studies on these topics. In the following pages, we will discuss the case of Postulados in Colombia to highlight the relevance and potentialities of this kind of analysis.

Prison conditions in Colombia and their impact on ex-combatants’ perspectives of reconciliation and reintegration

The Metropolitan Penitentiary and Prison Complex (COMEB) of Bogotá, better known as La Picota, is located at kilometre 5 on the road to Usme, on the outskirts of the southeast side of Bogotá. This supermax prison complex is a mixture of old and brand-new facilities. There is La Picota penitentiary, one of the oldest and most well-known penitentiaries in Colombia, whose main building once was a convent. And then there are the modern, new buildings known as ERON – for their Spanish acronym – in prison jargon (National Level Reclusion Establishment), erected few years ago as a symbol of the new penitentiary ethos, following the United States’ model (Dardel, 2015). These vast and austere grey buildings, surrounded by barbed wire, strike a stark contrast with the mountains crowded with humble houses that surround the complex. La Picota is truly a prison-city, with a capacity for 5810 inmates, and actually houses 8429, 83% of whom are convicted (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (INPEC), 2018). This facility suffers from an overwhelming overcrowding of 45.1% and has a poor record on prisoners’ human rights compliance, following the trend of Latin American prisons (Ariza, 2011a).

La Picota is a magnifying glass of the problems and changes that the Colombian prison system has undergone during the last three decades. Despite its flaws and high financial costs, imprisonment still remains the state’s main tool for confronting the crime problem. The number of inmates held in Colombian prisons has gone up from 51,276 in 2002 to 118,573 in 2017 – a 131% increase in 15 years. The imprisonment rate has more than doubled, from 115 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants in 1998 to 249 in 2016 (INPEC, 2018; Iturralde, 2016). There are not enough resources or personnel to adequately provide the services required for an ever-increasing population that overflows the system’s capacity (Ariza and Iturralde, 2018).

Under these conditions, rehabilitation is an unreachable goal since the coverage and quality of the educational and work programmes is deficient – almost half of the prison population has no access to rehabilitation programmes (Ariza and Iturralde, 2018; Iturralde, 2016). Re-entry programmes simply do not exist, and the lack of trustworthy, available information regarding recidivism rates (which the Colombian Bureau of Prisons – INPEC for its Spanish acronym – estimates at 15%) hinders any rigorous discussion around imprisonment and recidivism (Shlosberg et al., 2018: 1082; Tobón, 2017). Retribution and incapacitation of offenders, as well as the modernisation of prison facilities, seem to be the guiding principles of penal policy in Colombia (Comisión Asesora de Política Criminal, 2012).

Violence, informality, discrimination and gross human rights violations are central characteristics of a penitentiary system legally entrusted with the – implausible – task of rehabilitating and reintegrating individuals who have committed crimes. This task is even more daunting when it comes to the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants convicted for the atrocities they committed during war times. Thus, a violent and inefficient institution is in charge of bringing peace and social reconciliation to a deeply conflicted society.

Imprisoned paramilitaries in Colombia. The inhabitants of R Sur

We carried out a research project, from November 2013 to March 2014, to describe and interpret Postulados’ narratives on imprisonment and their perspectives regarding their imminent reintegration to society, victims and their lives after release from prison. In order to do so, we adopted a qualitative perspective. The objective of this methodological approach was to gather direct testimonies from Postulados so as to disclose their views on rehabilitation, prison experience and expectations regarding re-entry.

The research developed a case study of two groups of prisoners held in cell-blocks R3 and R4 of La Picota. R3 is the cell-block of the paramilitary ringleaders who submitted to the Justice and Peace Jurisdiction, and their trusted cohorts. Meanwhile, R4 houses the lowest ranks of Postulados of the Justice and Peace Jurisdiction, or those who have been exiled from R3 for disciplinary reasons or for ruffling the feathers of their superiors. We took a sample of 84 inmates (48 from R3 and 36 from R4), which corresponded to 46.66% of the Postulados imprisoned in La Picota. We carried out semi-structured interviews; we also formed focus groups and workshops on human rights in each cell-block with groups of 15–30 people.

The semi-structured questions of the interviews and the focus groups, as well as the analysis of Postulados’ life stories, were grouped into five variables, which are explained in Table 1.

Table 1.

Classification of the information.


Variables	Description
1. Victims	Perceptions, beliefs and feelings with respect to victims.
2. Support networks	Perceptions, beliefs and feelings regarding the circles of support (family or friends) on which Postulados can count.
3. Penitentiary treatment	Perspectives regarding Postulados’ situation and the penitentiary system treatment (study, work and teaching programmes).
4. State	Perceptions and feelings regarding the State, particularly with respect to compliance with peace agreements and carrying out the penitentiary treatment that should prepare Postulados to reintegrate into civil life.
5. Post-penitentiary plans	Postulados’ projections regarding their life after their jail terms, the resources they have to put their life projects into motion and their relationship with the civil population, particularly with the part that has been victim to their acts.

Based on these variables, we will discuss some of the narratives and discourses that stood out most frequently among the Postulados of R3 and R4.

Victims and victimisers. Discussion of our findings

Prison conditions as a frame of reference for Postulados’ discourses

One of the most evident findings of our research was that most of the Postulados interviewed declared that they were eager, and also anxious, to develop the activities required to seek forgiveness or to work in benefit of the victims. But such discourses rapidly turned into a series of grievances against prison conditions and the State’s false promises. Under this line of argument, the Postulados’ willingness to approach their victims is thwarted by prison conditions. Most of the prisoners complained about the lack of a proper environment to have at least a chance to meet with the victims, and thought that it was necessary to create permanent spaces – beyond the legal setting of criminal courts – that could contribute to enabling the search for forgiveness and reconciliation.⁸ This idea was repeated in the responses of different interviewees; for instance:

We need to be in direct contact with the victims, even if we are imprisoned. Not only in court because that is where all the anger comes out from remembering the facts. I would propose letters; that we could speak seriously with the victims through the letters we write to them and that those should be legally accepted as one way of contributing to the truth. I heard the example of a blog called “Getting forgiveness” from a Postulado. This is an option.⁹

Postulados also mentioned the importance of carrying out activities that could have direct effects on the welfare of the population affected by the conflict, but these responses rapidly turned into a request for improving the prison infrastructure. The Postulados’ discourse on reconciliation and forgiveness turns into anger towards prison conditions and staff:

The idea of working for the victims becomes a farce since there is no real commitment from INPEC’s officials to support our work initiatives. Here in the cell-block you are at the mercy of what the guards or INPEC personnel promise, and nothing happens if they don’t keep their promises. They have promised us workshops on meeting victims, but we’ve never heard anything about that. And look at the deplorable state of the cell-block infrastructure –who would want to come here, to this prison, so we can ask them for forgiveness?¹⁰

Former high-ranking paramilitary officials held in cell-block R3, where the conditions of confinement are far better, do complain about prison conditions as well but focused on the lack of effective programmes to support transitional discourses on reconciliation and reintegration.¹¹ Others insisted on the importance of allowing them to develop some kind of social work activity benefitting the victims, or an economic enterprise, the earnings of which would go to a reparations fund.¹² For these Postulados, the main problem is not the unwillingness of ex-combatants to recognise their war crimes, but rather the lack of effective treatment programmes through which penitentiary authorities could create proper settings for victims and victimisers to come together and have a real shot at forgiveness, truth and reconciliation.

The transformation of Postulados’ identities

The much-criticised rehabilitative ideal entrusts prison systems with the task of transforming deviant subjects into law-abiding citizens (Garland, 2001: 52–63; Lynch, 2000). Also, sociological accounts of the institutionalisation effects on subjectivity depict the negative process of ‘mortification of the self’ (Goffman, 1961) and the cultural transformation through which inmates abandon the societal symbolic universe to adopt prison subculture values and practices, which could lead to recidivism (Clemmer, 1958; Shlosberg et al., 2018). Thus, both normative perspectives on rehabilitation and sociological analysis of the effects of imprisonment on subjectivity concur on the transformative process – though with very different outcomes – that incarceration entails. We would like to refer to a different, yet related, process that results from imprisonment: the transformation of inmates’ identities from perpetrators of gross human rights violations to the State’s victims. Inhuman prison conditions, as well as the growing importance of human rights discourses for coping with and resisting imprisonment (Ariza and Ángel , 2015; Garcés et al., 2013), have set the stage for former combatants’ self-definition as victims of the state’s punitive power.

We were puzzled by the way in which the majority of Postulados, both in R3 and R4, constructed their relationship with the victims through their narratives, since they do not primarily recognise themselves as victimisers but rather as victims. They do this through the recollection of how they got involved in the armed conflict and the way they experienced it. Thus, many of the ex-combatants, especially the rank and file of the paramilitary groups, defined themselves above all else as victims of the armed conflict since they or their families had been wronged by the guerrillas who became their enemies. One of the Postulados expressed this idea:

I was a farmer before joining the group. I worked the land, had animals; I helped my parents. We were poor, but it wasn’t such a bad life. But everything changed when the FARC arrived. They say they fight for the people, but they take the few things we have to survive. And they call that a revolution? They said I was an informant, that I passed information to the army. I had a death sentence on my head. I had no choice but to join the group. And let me ask you: where was the State to protect us and support us? Where’s the State now?¹³

This kind of life experience and perception regarding the State is common among Postulados and is reinforced through imprisonment. Many of the Postulados claimed that they did not receive the support they needed, which they were promised, to confront their victims (especially psychological counselling); that they were not being trained or prepared to find a way of supporting themselves and their families once they were released; that they were isolated from their families, either because they were far away or because visits were too restricted; that their families had no support from the State, while the demobilised paramilitaries, and their families, who did not go to prison and entered the government DDR programme did have such benefits. Therefore, Postulados felt ill-treated and discriminated. They assume the identity of prisoners and resort to a resistance discourse, claiming that the government has not kept its promises and that they cannot trust it.

The dreadful prison conditions and the lack of rehabilitation programmes that take into account the ex-combatants needs, skills, experience and life projects are a lost opportunity to make ex-combatants’ prison experience a phase that may contribute to peace-building. As McEvoy et al. (2004) have argued, regarding the Northern Ireland experience (p. 647), adequate State, society and community support have the potential to ease the ex-combatants’ move from a resistant to a transitional characterisation of imprisonment and its consequences, which would facilitate and encourage a more critical and reflective attitude towards prison, violence and other experiences related to the armed conflict. But without such support there is a serious risk that ex-prisoners and their families will have to deal with the continued social, political and civic exclusion that result from their conflict-related criminal convictions. Similarly, the case of Postulados in Colombia shows that such a process is inhibited by the continued structural exclusion of prisoners.

The Postulados interviewed acknowledged the wrongs they did to their victims and their willingness to ask for their forgiveness, and also that they could contribute to peace-building, for they have experienced war. Thus, many of them claimed that they had the knowledge and skills to persuade young people from joining illegal armed groups, for they knew first-hand the horrors of war:

I would be willing to give talks to persuade young people from entering the conflict. The State should take advantage of our experience and take us to different places to explain, especially to young people, why entering the war makes no sense. Here in prison we have made peace we the FARC and we should be able to talk about this, so that people will know that it is pointless to keep killing each other. If the State guarantees my security, when I leave prison I would like to share my experience of reconciliation, especially in those places where the war is still alive. It is essential that we are able to come forward and face what we did, and that society accepts us if it wants to overcome violence. We can share our experience and help to build peace. That’s what I think.¹⁴

The appalling prison conditions and the lack of adequate rehabilitation programmes for ex-combatants reveal the scarce interest of the Colombian State, not simply to fulfil the rehabilitation promise of prison, but, more importantly, to making it an integral part of DDR processes. This is a serious flaw, for instead of addressing complex challenges with the right tools, it makes them more daunting. Instead of integrating willing key players in peace-building, the State is fostering the conditions that could lead them to reoffend, and also to revive the armed conflict.

This short-sightedness fails to recognise that former prisoners and combatants may act as agents and leaders in the process of conflict transformation (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009). Many ex-combatants and former prisoners accumulate different types of leadership (political, military and communal), with the potential of making them moral agents in conflict transformation and peace-building, rather than as obstacles which must be managed and excluded (p. 31).

The support of rehabilitation programmes is essential to transform negative leadership, which during war contributed to the commission of serious crimes on a massive scale, into positive leadership, where the strengths and skills of ex-combatants may contribute to their own reintegration, as well as to the well-being of their families and community (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009: 37; Ward and Maruna, 2007). This may also contribute to improve the self-image of ex-combatants, who will feel that they are being treated with dignity and respect, as subjects rather than objects. Also, supporting social capital related factors and processes (e.g. employment, family relations, social networks) of ex-combatants is an effective form of promoting desistance from crime (Farrall, 2004; McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009: 38).

Support networks and life after prison

Imprisonment entails an array of invisible punishments inflicted both on inmates, their families, existing social networks and communities. The literature on prison re-entry has emphasised the importance of families and social support networks (Visher and Travis, 2011, 2003), as well as community attitudes towards prisoners’ re-entry, for a successful process of social reintegration (Mbuba, 2012).

On this issue, the Postulados expressed their worries regarding the stability of their family ties and the safety of their loved ones. Furthermore, there is a sense of unease and fear among Postulados about not being able to provide support for their families. The difficulties in fulfilling their family roles make the feeling of victimisation as a consequence of imprisonment more intense. In the words of a Postulado:

I must put distance between myself and my family to protect them. In fact, my wife asked me not to contact them again so neighbours won’t know they are in touch with me, a paramilitary soldier. Day by day I realise I cannot count on her support and I really don’t know about my children.¹⁵

The Postulados all seem to agree that they do not have any socio-economic support from the State to provide for their families, and they believe that this will probably remain the same after their release. They argue that the lack of ongoing programmes for protection and support for their families places them in a difficult spot when faced with the possibility of returning to illegal groups or of retaliation by their victims or enemies who are currently free. It also puts their children at risk, for Postulados fear that they may follow in their footsteps and resort to crime as means of survival:

It is very difficult for us to be able to show them that we are not as bad as they say (there is exaggeration and gossip). This is even worse because we have no way of providing economic support. It is really difficult to maintain the relationship. We need opportunities to develop some kind of work, even inside the jail, in such a way that we can earn some income so we can support our family. At least we could buy some groceries now and then and support our children so they don’t resort to crime to survive. I know, because they have contacted me and told me, that my children are trying to survive by engaging in shady jobs, and the last thing I want for them is to repeat what I did.¹⁶

Less uncertainty is expressed by those stating that they have family ties or friends that offer them support. Nevertheless, the fear of loss of or abandonment by family, and the fear of retaliation by their enemies, linger on the Postulados’ minds:

The friends and family that one has on the outside are sometimes the only source of motivation for reintegration. In fact, once you are put away in jail, even though this is hard to say, your friends stick around longer than your own wife. Maintaining contact with the outside world, even if it’s through a phone call, is fundamental to not letting yourself fall emotionally and not letting thoughts of anger and hatred get into your head. I can’t go back to where my family is because they will kill me. They have already sent me threatening letters.¹⁷

There is a generalised sense of uncertainty among Postulados regarding the possibilities of starting a new life project once released. Many of those interviewed do not have a clear vision of their future; they do not believe that it is possible to achieve a peaceful reintegration into society and start a new life project in a context in which they will be labelled, in the best of cases, as ex-combatants:

To begin a new life after jail, I, and many here, would have to move to a place where no one knows who we are. Places that are far from where our activities took place. I fear, we all fear, that outside there are many people with the intention of seeking retaliation against us. If you ask me today, I simply have no idea what my life will be like when I leave here; under these conditions and after having served time in jail, who will trust you?¹⁸

Ex-combatants’ perceptions regarding the state and prison treatment

The feelings of fear, insecurity and uncertainty of Postulados are connected with the low levels of legitimacy and trust of State Institutions. There is a generalised perception among Postulados regarding the lack of support from the State, and particularly from INPEC, the institution governing prisons. The general viewpoint of ex-combatant prisoners is that the staff in charge of the design and implementation of the core components of penitentiary treatment does not have the skills or the time needed to undertake such responsibilities. Many Postulados in R4 doubted the staff’s ability to perform rehabilitation activities and to treat them fairly, particularly vis-à-vis the more the privileged inmates of cell-block R3:

Training INPEC’s employees is necessary. They don’t seem to have any real intention of contributing to the rehabilitation of the inmates. They treat us as though we were not people; they ignore our requests and sometimes take months, if not years, to respond to our most basic requests, like medical treatment. They don’t have the infrastructure or the resources to move forward on educational activities. The way they treat us is excessively arbitrary. For example, some inmates from R3 have access to computers and we don’t.¹⁹

Postulados think that INPEC mistreats them and shows no respect for the status they previously had as members of an armed group; they contend that prison is characterised by corruption and discrimination, so they are forced to use their own resources for accomplishing the goals of rehabilitation and reintegration. As prison staff avoid being present in the cell-blocks, former paramilitary leaders fill this governmental vacuum. They appeal to their rank and command, and supply goods and services for their men as long as they respect the chain of command.

However, privilege and discrimination, key features of the prison experience, also undermine the loyalty of some of the rank and file paramilitary ex-combatants towards their leaders. The significant differences in prison conditions and the disciplinary regime between cell-block R3, where the paramilitary leaders and their henchmen are held, and R4, where foot soldiers are confined, breed tensions and nonconformity. The Postulados of R4 feel, on the one hand, that they have been betrayed by their former leaders, and, on the other, that INPEC discriminates against them because they are poor and powerless, just as they were before they joined the paramilitaries.

This is another key example of how the State’s precariousness and lack of interest in creating the basic conditions and implementing appropriate rehabilitative programmes misses the chance to foster the kind of leadership and collective action that could help to the reintegration of ex-combatants and their contribution to peace-building. Left to their own devices, paramilitary leaders in prison tend to resort to their authority through intimidation and violence. And those who are subjected to it and who face more intensely the deprivations of prison (i.e. the Postulados of R4) tend to break ranks with their organisation and to develop low self-esteem and feelings of loneliness, resentment and despair. Thus, the potential of positive leadership, individual and collective moral agency latent in imprisoned ex-combatants is lost, while the risks of recidivism increase. As a Postulados in R4 stated:

Those of us in R4 barely receive anything. To be sincere, we are going to leave here with more hatred and resentment towards the state and society. They break their promises every day. INPEC treats us in a discriminatory manner compared the rich and powerful inmates of R3. In that cell-block, since they have money, INPEC allows them to do different activities. They let them use the farm, they schedule football tournaments and bazaars. While in R4, the guards only come to do shake-downs searching for cell-phones and drugs. And this goes on and on every month. They don’t realise who we are and what we are capable of if they keep pushing us. And our bosses do nothing about it. INPEC only supports those who have the money to pay them.²⁰

Some reflections on the penitentiary regime and treatment during transitional times

The penitentiary regime and treatment of the ex-combatants confined in La Picota, despite their supposedly special status, is in reality a continuation of ordinary imprisonment dynamics. These are characterised by the precariousness of prison infrastructure and services, as well as the carelessness of the State, with the only – and significant – exception of the privileges awarded to powerful groups that take advantage of their economic, social and political capital, both inside and outside of prison.

Imprisonment in such dire conditions has several effects on ex-combatants: it transforms their identities, from victimisers into victims of the system, weakening the sense of guilt or responsibility that they have towards their victims, and thus the chances of restorative justice and reconciliation; it inhibits positive forms of leadership, as well as individual and collective moral agency, present among ex-combatants, while stimulating negative forms of leadership and collective organisation; it also breeds low self-esteem and feelings of insecurity, mistrust, resentment and hopelessness. This goes against the goals of TJ and DDR processes since it does not help to restore the social fabric and to peace-building. Quite the contrary, it triggers new sources of discontent among ex-combatants, increases the risk of reoffending and rejoining illegal armed groups, which could lead to the reactivation of the armed confrontation. It also dilapidates the potentialities of ex-combatants’ experience and skills, key factors to secure a peaceful re-entry process, to their benefit, as well as that of their families and communities.

A more realistic version of the rehabilitation model needs to be linked to the aims of TJ and DDR processes in such a way as to assure that the time spent in prison by ex-combatants may be useful for achieving such aims or at least bringing them closer. Despite its inherent pains, the imprisonment experience may contribute to reinforce positive forms of leadership and moral agency among ex-combatants. The change from a resistant to a transitional characterisation of incarceration and its consequences is more likely to bring benefits to ex-combatants, but also to their families, communities and society (McEvoy et al., 2004: 647).

Such a transitional view of incarceration may also foster mechanisms and procedures of restorative justice that could allow victimisers to serve their sentences by participating in restitution programmes where the damage caused to the victims is repaired and the social fabric is re-established. In the process, ex-combatants will be treated as subjects worthy of respect and responsibility, rather than objects of exclusion and stigmatisation, which may also encourage dynamics of social reconciliation.

Footnotes

Notes

Libardo José Ariza and Manual Iturralde are Associate Professors and Co-Directors of the Prisons Group (a legal clinic) of the Law Department at Universidad de los Andes. Their research and academic interests focus on criminology, sociology of punishment, sociology of law, criminal law and constitutional law.

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