Abstract
The term imagination and its derivatives often serve as points of departures, yet a concise understanding of imagination in anthropology is lacking. In this paper, we argue for a contextualized anthropological approach to imagination; a complex notion which has been used to describe the human capacity to mentally (re)create that what is not materially present; the creative process of imagining; and the individual and social products of such a process. We address terminological particularities, conceptual differences, and related concepts in addition to discussing the importance of methods and the poetic imagination. In doing so, we consolidate and elaborate on previous analytical and conceptual works to provide a more explicit middle-range theory of imagination from an anthropological perspective. While we propose understanding imagination as a guiding action in situations of uncertainty or ignorance and emphasize focusing on everyday processes and practices, our discussions provide a framework to discuss and compare empirically grounded findings regarding imagination.
Introduction
“Imagination,” “imaginaries,” the “imagined”: the individual mental capacity to envision, but more so the processes, products, and projections of individually and collectively imagining are in vogue in the social sciences. The abundance of publications that rely on varying conceptualizations of these terms suggest they are plausible analytical tools and their applicability for scholarly inquiry has not gone unnoticed (see McLean, 2007; Sneath et al., 2009; Stankiewicz, 2016; Strauss, 2006). An extensive review of imagination theorizations and methodological challenges that locates itself within the discipline of anthropology is, however, still missing. Quite aware that this article cannot fully close that gap, it is our intention to synthesize conflicting paradigms of research on imagination which we find to be pivotal to current and future research. This comparative yet consolidative approach helps us identify potential relationships between various concepts connected to imagination. In doing so, we provide a framework in which our contribution to imagination theory from an anthropological perspective can be situated and understood, but perhaps more importantly, which can be used as a basis for further elaborative contributions in this dynamic field. Thus, we conceive of our contribution as a middle-range theory (Merton, 1968) and one part of the theory building process in which empirical work and ongoing engagement with other theories are intertwined. With this in mind, we begin with two acknowledgements: First, there have been previous explorations of the topic of imagination from the vantage point of anthropology (Harris and Rapport, 2015; Sneath et al., 2009; Strauss, 2006; Wunenburger, 2008) yet these works’ narrow focus on one particular school of thought limits their ability to provide an extensive overview. Secondly, we too admit that our discussion is limited. It is rooted primarily in Western thought and we thus problematize the incompleteness this affords. It is our hope that this paper not only increases the accessibility and scope of imagination research in anthropology but also ignites growing engagement, translation, and/or visibility from non-Western theorists and beyond European languages.
Empirically researching, reflecting on and theorizing imagination requires a clear understanding of what exactly the subject matter is. The first section is intended to help in identifying which aspects of imagination are being researched, which vocabulary most suits the item of analysis, and which characteristics are important to consider through the process of investigation and theorization. In the second section, we outline methods used in the study of others’ imaginations and address practical questions of reflecting on the anthropologists’ own poetic imagination.
Although some scholars elaborate directly on previous research, many focus in on one aspect of imagination and ignore wider implications leading to a disjointed and at times contradictory account of imagination more generally. The developing contexts of scientific rationality, positivism, and the scientific study of society background these almost isolationist theoretical and methodological considerations. Likewise, such discussions take place in the wake of the postmodern and ontological turns in the social sciences, the implications of which we also briefly address. The history of theorizing imagination is not linear, straightforward, or easy to diachronically organize. Despite these challenges, we identify recurrent topics in existing, multi-disciplinary literature, while also pointing to neglected aspects and promising fields for future inquiry. Our discussions should act as a foundation and not as exhaustive literature overviews.
We draw inspiration from Daniel Stankiewicz’ (2016: 797) critical comments that anthropologists pay little “attention to the nuanced distinctions between ‘imagination,’ ‘imaginaries,’ ‘to imagine,’ ‘the imaginaire,’ and so forth” and agree that these terms are often used incautiously. We believe that his criticism is justified but as a consequence, we argue that engagement with these concepts should not be abandoned, but rather refined and intensified. We argue that the development of an adequate theory of imagination in anthropology necessitates both sections we provide in this paper: a historically informed analysis, particularly regarding concepts which contribute to imagination theory and a critical reflection of the methods needed to capture others’ imaginings including a discussion of the role of the anthropologists’ own imagination. On the basis of this, in the section “Towards a theory of imagination” we propose two interconnected theoretical elaborations and close the paper with some concluding remarks.
Terminology
The words and phrases used to describe complex concepts like imagination develop over time and in relation to the language-specific availability of contrasting, supplementary, or modified terms (i.e. with prefixes, suffixes, or adjoining adjectives). It is precisely within these terminological and conceptual differences that we start to understand the diversity, particularities, and intricacies of research on imagination. Like many broad overviews of imagination in various disciplines, we locate the terminological beginnings with Plato and Aristotle (Brann, 1991; Cocking, 1991; Hepfer, 2012; Huber, 2004; Kamper, 1981; Sepper, 2013; see also Bundy, 1927). Both write of phantasia, the Greek word which was later translated into the Latin imaginatio (see Bundy, 1927: 258), forming the roots of prominent terms in many European languages. Many scholars indeed use nuanced vocabulary in their descriptions of the imagination and its products, according to conceptual, semantic, disciplinary, national, and linguistic backgrounds. The diversity of terms may cause confusion or difficulties in reaching a common ground of understanding, particularly when discussing imagination across languages. In addition, some scholars appropriate common words and re-define them to refer to specific components of imagination/fantasy. A good example is Lacan's (1966: 111–112) use of the words Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary.
Particularly into the 21st century, we see that the social practices imperative to the creation of collective imaginings—imaginaries—have gained center stage in the social sciences (Adams et al., 2015; Salazar, 2020: 3). Along with this development, termini which were employed in earlier works such as fantasy, phantasm, and illusion have taken a backseat and are nowadays largely assigned to the uncontrolled (and sometimes unwanted) products and processes of the human capacity to envision that what is not there.
While they may not explicitly state such a delineation, many scholars seem to address a threefold division of the field, which we summarize as:
The human capacity to (re-)create something which is not materially present, oftentimes described as imagination The active process of creating, most frequently described with the adjective imaginative or the verb imagining The individual and/or social products of such a creative process, usually referred to as images or the imagined. We locate imaginaries in this category as a special form of shared, pseudo-institutionalized sets of norms or values within a society which emerge over time from the creative, collective process of imagining
In this paper, we use the words imagination, imagining, and imaginings (individual) or imaginaries (collective) according to this trisection and imagination as an umbrella term to describe research which addresses any of the three delineations as clear demarcations are not always visible. For this reason, we also avoid a singular, narrow definition of imagination which may exclude important historical or methodological considerations.
Dualities
Juxtaposing conceptualizations have been used to better understand humans’ ability to imagine. The dyadic pairs discussed below often expose normative perceptions, conceptions, and even theorizations of the time. No later than the 21st century we see attempts to differentiate some of these dualities, at times by offering a third or additional options. Recognizing and understanding the long history surrounding these debates, we, as anthropologists, can position ourselves and our emerging contributions to imagination theory in an extensive historical trajectory and in relation to these central dualities. Innovative and evaluative thought concerning these conceptual markers of imagination, particularly those validated through empirical research, would contribute to an unequivocal theory of imagination.
Positive/negative
The general notion of imagination as either positive or negative is evident throughout history with such a divide already visible in early philosophic studies. Plato and Aristotle ascertain that phantasia can mediate between the senses and thought processes (see Bundy, 1927: 258) and Aristotle delineates two types of fantasy: one merely reflects and reproduces perception, thus finding its place within the field of memory while the other type describes productive, self-generated images. A similar dual character was also recognized by Byzantine philosophers who identified phantasia as an ambivalent mental faculty which propels intellect and thought, yet can also produce errors and illusions (see Huber, 2004: 174).
Struggling with these oppositional characteristics continued through the European Middle Ages, leading to, as Bundy (1927: 177) claims, two outstanding and often intertwining philosophical tendencies. He describes one, stemming from Plato, which concentrated on mystical mental facilities and the other, derived from Aristotle's work on sense-experiences, linking the empirical and sensational (Bundy, 1927: 265–266). Although medieval thinkers like Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Dante tried to synthesize this duality (Hepfer, 2012: 25–26), throughout the Middle Ages imagination was mostly seen as a negative phenomenon which, due to its unreliable, deceptive, and corrupting abilities, needed to be controlled (Huber, 2004: 179). This negative outlook altered only when Enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schiller, and Johann Gottfried Herder related imagination to human freedom. Thus, toward the end of the 18th century, a distinction between a positively valued imagination and a negatively assessed fantasy had been established (Huber, 2004: 180; see also Kamper, 1981: 102–103).
Although this stark divide is not as evident in 21st century anthropological studies, it can latently play a role when imagination is associated with other characteristics like creativity, aspiration, courage, hope (positive attributes), or skepticism, a disconnect from reality, idealization, exoticism, and eroticism (negatively charged attributes). We sense that today's scholars who engage with the issue of imagination often have a rather favorable outlook and pronounce the potentials and merits of imagining, for instance for processes of political and cultural change (Haiven, 2014; Haiven and Khasnabish, 2014). The long history of a negative evaluation of imagination on the other hand is largely ignored.
Productive/reproductive
As indicated above, Greek philosophers clearly delineate the nature of imagination into productive or reproductive. They differentiate between an imagination that creates independently and an imagination which reproduces elements the senses have previously captured. The productive imagination is characterized by the capability to create ex nihilo, to be part of the conscious mind, and is linked to mental powers including visions or dreams. Contrarily, the reproductive mind is primarily unconscious and linked to memory storage as well as the empirical or sensational experience (see Lennon, 2015: 15–16). These characteristics remain quite constant until around and after the Enlightenment period where thinkers begin to discuss the limitations of productive and reproductive tendencies. Over the next 200 years, we see a spectrum of influences on and/or autonomy of imagination's productive and reproductive capabilities. We illustrate briefly such thinking with reference to Bachelard, Sartre, and Castoriadis, who demonstrate various points along this spectrum.
Bachelard (1938, 1942, 1943, 1948) describes the creative potential and productive nature of the imagination in its capability to produce and deform images: it does not merely (re)form images provided by perception (see Kaplan, 1972: 3). Despite this productive, creative mind, Bachelard does not believe in the full autonomy of the imagination and asserts the formation of imaginings which occurs in (and is constrained by) deep psychic structures. For Sartre ([1972] 2012), immediate knowledge, and therefore the imagination itself, while productive is limited: he emphasizes that every observed object has endless connections to further objects and is consequently to an extent reproductive. For this reason, completely new knowledge could never be created exclusively in the imagination due to its internal reference to previous knowledge. Castoriadis (1975) also sees the imagination's productive quality but argues more strongly that it has a social and collective relevance, inseparable from specific historical moments and is consequently limited by other extraneous factors and thus contains a higher reproductive, or at least constrained, nature (see also Ricoeur, 1993).
Naturally not all scholars explicitly discuss the imagination along the spectrum of the productive to reproductive, but the lens from which imagination is discussed can be situated somewhere along this spectrum, often unintentionally or normatively. As anthropologists, we must interrogate how we approach this dichotomy and how it influences our research (results).
Reality (truth)/fantasy
Drawing again from early Greek philosophers’ descriptions, we recognize the ascription of thought and intellectual processes to reality (sometimes also truth) and the fallible and illusionary to fantasy. These normative characteristics and at times rigid and uncompromising categories are, with time, further specified or questioned altogether. We see this, for example, in Plato linking imagination and judgement (see Huber, 2004: 166–167), through Aristotle or Freud's establishment of subcategories of fantasy (see Huber, 2004: 167–168 and Freud, 1908, respectively); in Žižek's (1997) seven signs of false interpretations of fantasy and how they influence one's view on reality or Ingold's (2013) interrogation of imagination itself.
We want to emphasize that scholars who locate themselves in postmodern philosophical traditions or the ontological turn in anthropology often take a particular interest in these categories for their theories of imagination. Kearney (1988) and his thoughts on the abolishment of truth; Baudrillard's (1983) discussions on hyperreality; Crapanzano's (2004) horizon of reality along with Ingold's (2013) integration of non-human actors and Holbraad and Pedersen's (2017) discussion of Severi provide examples of these two traditions, respectively. Scholars interested in imagination who locate their works within these traditions or who are concerned with communication and interaction between humans and non-human actors may see value in revisiting previous debates about the roles of reality and fantasy and their connections to these topics.
Furthermore, debates in Literature Studies can provide interesting examples of fantasy's connections to imagination from which we can learn. Fantasy is dealt with primarily as a generic category in the context of the novel where the intra-textual dimensions of fantasy and the fantastic are analyzed and compared (for a few select examples, see: Dath, 2019; Morse, 1987; Smid, 2017; Vax, 1963). Less common, however, are extra-textual studies about fantasy in the history of literature or an author's fantastical, imaginative motivations (Dath, 2019; Durst, 2001; Rabkin, 1976). Some of these authors indeed address what they call the function of fantastic literature and art while providing psychological and sociological arguments discussing, for instance, if such literature is a means of escapism (from reality) or critique (of reality). It is important to note, however, their interest remains with the impact or effects of the work itself and not in contributing to a general theory of imagination.
Consciousness/unconsciousness
Imagination has been considered a consciously controlled or unconscious and uncontrolled faculty of the human mind, particularly by psychologists from the 20th century onwards. Freud asserts, for example, that the imagination often works unconsciously and with the same mechanisms as dream formation (see Huber, 2004: 195). In accordance with his theory of repression, Freud is convinced that the unconscious products of the imagination have either been formed in the unconscious mind or, more commonly, were once conscious imaginings and daydreams which have been deliberately forgotten and repressed to the sphere of the subconscious. The concept of unconscious imagining was taken up further by psychoanalysts to develop therapeutic approaches (see Krucker, 1987, Meyer-Prentice, 2018: 34–35). In contrast to Freud who assumes an irreconcilable opposition between fantasy and reality and has a rather wary outlook on imagination, Lacan (1949) considers imaginings (phantasms) as constitutive for the subject and their relation to the world. Although the unconscious imagination was primarily discussed by psychologists, we believe that anthropologists can benefit from their ideas nevertheless, particularly when bringing into focus the collective and cultural dimensions of the unconscious (compare with Erdheim, 1984, 1988; Strehle, 2019).
Individual/collective
Early philosophers and psychologists considered imagination as the actions of a single (male) subject; in short, an individual and (self-)reflective ability. We have identified indications of external, collective influences with Freud's brief commentary in 1908 on how the social categories of age and gender impact the individual imagination. Through the 20th and 21st centuries, many more scholars (see below for select examples) center the interplay between the individual and the collective imagination in their theorizations.
Some scholars approach this dichotomy by putting the focus on the individual's imagination: the potential that symbolic forms and imaginative activities have for universal capacities or cultural processes (Cassirer, 1923, 1925, 1929) or more generally, in questioning its autonomy in the collective experience as Bachelard and Durand do (Bachelard 1938, 1942, 1943, 1948; see also Durand, 1960, 1964; Kaplan, 1972). Anthropologists’ increasing interest in the individual has more recently shifted individual capacities to imagine, including creativity, into the spotlight. Crapanzano (2004), for example, forefronts the process of imagining and how this relates to humans’ experiences in their surroundings rather than being concerned with the product of the imagination (compare with Hastrup, 2007).
Others approach the topic from the collective imagination, theorizing how and in which ways the collective has an influence on the individual's imagination. Castoriadis (1975), for example, focuses on collective endeavors as necessary for an individual to imagine. Žižek (1989), on the other hand, centers the stabilization of the collective status quo and thus the collective reality or ideological constructions as supported by individual capacities to imagine. Other scholars concentrate less directly on imagination per se, but focus on collective processes which necessarily impact individuals and thus their imaginings or their capability to imagine; these scholars implicitly or explicitly are referring to imaginaries.
A significant shift in perspective from individual imagining to collective imaginaries was heralded by the work of political scientist Benedict Anderson, who developed the concept of the imagined community (Anderson, [1983] 2006; Axel, 2003). Imagined is not defined from a philosophical, sociological, or psychological perspective, but is used as an adjective to describe a type of community that is beyond the scope where all members know each other and thus they must create an affinity to other members in their minds. Expanding on Anderson's considerations of shared imagining, philosopher Charles Taylor (2004: 23) introduced the idea of the social imaginary, which he defines as the “the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings.” This social imaginary is “not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends” (Taylor, 2004: 55). Even though neither Anderson nor Taylor developed a comprehensive theory of imagination nor engaged with existing studies on imagination, both concepts proved to be very influential in anthropology (Freeman, 2019; Rohrer, 2014). We agree with Stankiewicz’ concern (2016) that the social imaginary could be used as a hollow concept in place of other diluted terminology such as “culture” or “cultural belief” (compare to Strauss, 2006: 322). However, instead of rejecting these concepts altogether, we suggest paying more attention to the genesis, practices, sociocultural embedding, and fragmentations of social imaginaries.
Further studies bridge the individual/collective dichotomy through the topics of agency and structure, addressing the potential uses of the individual imagination to navigate collective structures. Hastrup (2007) does so most explicitly in relation to agency; Appadurai (1996: 31) sees imagination as a link between individual sites of agency and wider, collective possibilities; Gammeltoft (2014) through the interlocking of personal aspirations with state powers; Thompson (2018) on the impacts of telling fictional stories as fact regarding specific cultural phenomena; and within the edited collection by Larsson and Johnsdotter (2015) dealing with the investigation of sexual fantasies. Augé (1997) discusses the interconnectedness of the individual and collective imagination, with a particular focus on fiction's role within these processes.
In regards to this conceptual marker of imagination, we emphasize the unequivocal connection and reciprocal influences between individual and collective imaginations, yet we caution against maintaining the assumed (and generally normative) divide between them. We see room here to develop empirical-based research which examines the interplay and the in-between of these categories. Political scientist Bottici (2014) suggests to speak of the imaginal—a term introduced by philosopher Corbin (1979)—in order to overcome the agency/structure divide and to omit the individual connotation of the term imagination and the collective connotation of the term imaginary (see also Fleury, 2006); perhaps this could be a place to start.
Related concepts
While the “Dualities” discussed above point to fundamental, yet varying, conceptual approaches to the topic of imagination, the following seven broad concepts point to potential relationships with and to imagination. Through our cross-disciplinary and comparative reading of research on imagination, we have identified these concepts to be of particular interest for the formation of a theory of imagination from an anthropological perspective. We briefly describe the concepts, noting scholars working in this area, some of which have already made explicit relational, empirically-based generalizations. We also comment on areas open to further evaluation and research. In the section “Towards a theory of imagination,” we expand on the usefulness of these concepts when taken in consideration with the other parts of this paper.
Social categories
Although Freud and many of his successors conceptualized imagination from a male perspective and primarily with a male subject in mind, a brief remark in Freud's work (1908) perceiving women's imaginings to be different from those from men or children invites analysis of the processes and products of imagination in relation to social categories. We see this as an initial attempt to break loose from seeing imaginings as individual perspectives uninhibited by the social categories in which the individual is embedded. Thus, what is implied in Freud's observation is a recognition of the influence of social categories on individual imaginings while at the same time implying the existence of shared and collective imaginaries. Indeed, the recognition of social imaginaries has been long since established, nevertheless we believe that an emphasis on the differences in individual imaginings and social imaginaries depending on the vantage point from which they are thought and (re-)produced has not yet been sufficiently researched. Whereas anthropological scholars have tried to identify universal features of (products of) the imagination (Crapanzano, 2004; Durand, 1960; Preston, 1991), relations between social categories and individual imaginings have been given less attention.
Cultural and historical contexts
We observe that individual imaginings and collective imaginaries differ significantly across cultural contexts and historical periods. For anthropologists, it may be taken for granted that the cultural context is of importance. However, we notice that although social imaginaries are described in detail in a series of ethnographies pronouncing their cultural contexts, an analysis of the genesis and with it, the historicity, of specific imaginaries is often neglected. Castoriadis’ (1975) work, however, provides an important reminder to recognize the significance of such historical moments. Including both diachronic and cultural perspectives would be a welcome addition to the field.
Spatiality and topographies
In their attempt at finding common features of individual imaginings, some scholars approach the relationship between social, cultural, or historical influences and space explicitly, such as Preston (1991) describing the topographic aspects of imagining or Crapanzano's (2004) use of a horizon metaphor to describe the hinterland or l’arrière-pays of our imaginative capabilities. Others approach spatiality more implicitly as they ground their analyses in specific national or socio-political contexts (Anderson, [1983] 2006; Çinar and Bender, 2007; García Canclini, 1999; Salazar, 2010). These studies additionally recognize that spatial influences extend beyond the mere question of where the imagining takes place: such processes are connected through wider political, economic, or other global factors. Some more recent studies point to the relevance of actually existing but distant, remote, or unknown places which take a central role in collective imaginaries and serve, for instance, as anchor points of individual or collective longing (see Frawley, 2007; Whitaker, 2015). Particularly anthropologists who work on mobilities and immobilities must pay special attention to the spatial aspects of imagination (see Salazar, 2020).
Temporality
Freud (1908) addressed the concept of time by connecting past imaginings with the present imagination and into an imagined future. We believe that this temporal directionality of imagination has been implicitly recognized in a variety of works but has been explored often only unidirectionally: either as an ethnographic description of projections of the future (Appadurai, 2013; Beckert, 2016) or as an imaginative coping with past memories (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2015). Particularly in the fields of Anthropologies of the Future (Bryant and Knight 2019; Salazar et al. 2017) and Design Anthropology (Murphy 2020; Smith et al. 2016), the projective energy of imagination and the collaborative modes of imagining have been addressed.
While focusing on either the past or future is not in itself problematic, we question the assumption that most temporal considerations are undisputedly based on a linear time model grounded in Western principles. For that reason, we ask how imagination relates to time in contexts where a different consciousness of time is prevalent, for instance, when time is conceptualized as circular. In addition to the importance of cultural differences in subjective and collective conceptions of time, however, we also draw attention to the fact that imaginaries undergo realignments or ruptures when temporal horizons are radically altered by external factors. We think here of disasters, war, genocide, pandemics, and other catastrophes. We want to underline, however, that not only current events can alter imagination. Dawning futures, for instance under the impact of climate change or re-evaluations of earlier experiences such as colonialism, slavery, or forced migration may lead to changes of imagination. We see openings here for fruitful, interdisciplinary research which elaborates on the relation between time and imagination.
The unknown, non-knowledge, and ignorance
Unknown pasts, unknowable futures, or even remote and unfamiliar places can play a role in imaginings and imaginaries. These “unknowns” highlight the specific role of non-knowledge or ignorance when it comes to imagination. Although many works implicitly touch upon this relation, it is only recently that anthropologists combine perspectives on non-knowledge and imagination (Freeman, 2019; compare with Mjaaland, 2017, 9–10). Precursors in Literature Studies, such as Iser (1972, 1991), who theorized the empty spaces in a narrative (Leerstellen) which force the reader to use their imagination, may serve as inspiration in further exploring how imagination can take over when one reaches the limits of knowledge.
Self-other relations, ethics and morals
Starting from the unknowability of the future, Moore (2011) and Appadurai (2013) underline the importance of what people imagine the future will be like. They argue that these imaginative futures shape and alter behavior in the present-day. Both scholars show an interest in the future possibilities of human societies and Moore (2011: 18) suggests that such possibilities primarily come into being “through a refiguring of self-other relations,” emphasizing “that key to this process of reconfiguration is fantasy.” She uses the concept of an ethical imagination to frame “the way in which technologies of the self, forms of subjectification and imagined relations with others lead to novel ways of approaching social transformation” (Moore, 2011: 15). Moore's concept seems to echo Kearney's proposal of an ethical imagination from 1988, in addition to notions of a moral imagination developed by philosophers of moral pragmatism (see Fesmire, 2003; Johnson, 1985, 1987, 1993; Kekes, 2006; Lederach, 2005; Nussbaum, 1990; Tierney, 1994), despite making no reference to these scholars. Although this may be interpreted as a short-coming, we believe that Moore's emphasis on the role of imagination in self-other relations as well as for ethical and moral positionings can serve as a starting point for further anthropological studies, particularly those who forefront interpersonal relationships (compare with Rapport, 2019).
Ontological boundaries
There is no doubt that imagination is perceived and conceptualized in existing literature predominantly as a human capacity. The extent to which this capability also resides in other “actants” and other entities has not yet been sufficiently explored. We see Severi's work as a step in moving beyond the focus on purely human capacities and interactions. In concentrating on the role of objects for social memory, he illustrates not only how social imaginaries can be inscribed into works of art and other objects, but also how these items spark the human imagination (Severi, 2007, 2018). We believe that further and stronger connections between theories of imagination and the concepts of actor-network theory; the field of human-nonhuman-animal studies; and the inspirations which the so-called ontological turn provide, may open promising areas for future research.
Methods and poetic imagination
We are convinced that the cultivation of a solid theory of imagination necessitates consideration of the aforementioned terminologies, dualities, and related concepts in connection with discussions of methods and the role of anthropologists’ own imagination in the processes of research, analysis, and writing. It goes without saying that the major part of mental processes of imagination leaves no direct palpable trace for others. Even for the imaginer, a struggle exists first in finding an adequate mode of representation of these inner creations and second, in the transfer of these imaginings into other mediums. Despite these difficulties, narration, poetry, song, music, sculpture, photographic images, and other media are used in an attempt to convert such imaginings.
Methods
Approaching other peoples’ imagination is a difficult endeavor and some anthropologists suggest that “we currently do not possess any precise scientific methods to know with certainty what people imagine” (Salazar, 2020: 2; compare with Schäuble, 2016). Perhaps not astonishingly then, few anthropologists have engaged actively with the question of how to methodologically access the imagination of other people. While acknowledging that the inner workings of someone else's mind cannot be fully understood or represented, we believe it is imperative to concretely discuss how researching imagination is and has been approached. We see differing trends and tactics depending on what exactly is being investigated: the imagination as an individual process and mental capacity or the products of imagination (the imagined, imaginings, imaginaries). Researching humans’ mental capabilities to imagine, including the processes involved in those capabilities, typically draws heavily on the fields of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Cognitive Science, often relying on schemata or topographies. Researching the products and representations of imagination lends itself to wider study, including social, cultural, economic, or political implications of such imaginings. Some studies blur these categorizations and attempt to make connections between the inner workings of one's mind and the wider repercussions of imagining.
We have observed in both cases that the visual sense and visual representations of imaginings have been given precedence even though not all human societies necessarily put an emphasis on the image (Kramer, 2001). The attention given to visual representations, however, is also the reason why important ethnographic and theoretical work typically stems from Visual Anthropology and only recently new approaches which go beyond the visual are emerging (Pink, 2009; Schäuble, 2016: 2). The olfactory, soundscapes, the tactile, or taste sensations, have been largely ignored despite them being formative for mental creations. We believe a heightened awareness of this narrow perspective is necessary and encourage consideration of different modes of representation and the inclusion of other senses for theorizations concerning individual imaginings, whether image-based or not.
Ordering the mind's functions has taken different forms and has been informed by available research methods and scientific tools of the time. The brevity of this article does not allow us to go into detail regarding neuroscientific works on brain processing and imagining, nevertheless we would like to mention examples of structural ordering which have influenced anthropological theories of imagination. We highlight philosopher and anthropologist Durand (1960) as being among the first anthropologists who explicitly refers to imagination though such a conceptual framework. He draws on Jungian archetypes and subsequent work by Bachelard to deliver a “comprehensive inventory” and ordering system for the human imaginary (see Chambers, 2001: 102). Although Durand proposes an anthropology of imagination, his arguments and outputs appear to be more influential in Literature Studies and Narratology than in Anthropology (Chambers, 2001: 109; see also Iranzo, 2001: 8). Furthermore, his work is more known and appreciated in regions where translations of his major books were made available early on (Spain, Latin America, Italy), highlighting the importance of works in translation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that more recent anthropologists praise James Preston as initiator of a “topography of the imaginative” (Collins, 2015: 99–100; Rapport, 2015: 5–6). Although Preston's (1991) venture for a comparative classification of the imaginary directly mirrors Durand's proposition, Durand is left unmentioned. Drawing instead on Bachelard, Preston (1991: 76) argues that techniques inspired by Depth Psychology prove feasible to access other people's imagination and that imagination is not “too subjective” as some social scientists may fear (Preston, 1991: 101). On the contrary, he points out that cross-cultural studies reveal a series of commonalities which help in the identification of specific properties of imagination. Hence, Preston proposes a dialogical approach to an interlocutor's inner imaginative world while emphasizing that the results should be compared in cross-cultural studies. Both Preston and Durand assert that imagination is structured by specific (visual) patterns and should not be misunderstood as an individual and subjective experience, but rather highlight the commonalities of collective human imaginings. As mentioned previously, Augé's work (1997) addressing structure and agency through relationships between individual and collective imaginations and their interplay with fictional products echoes this sentiment.
Anthropologically approaching the products of imagination—whether past or current imaginings or social imaginaries— remains a difficult endeavor. Schäuble's 2013 workshop Mining imagination: Ethnographic approaches beyond knowledge production and the resulting collection of papers, however, sought to “elicit and communicate unarticulated experiences and concealed understandings of the world” (Schäuble 2016: 1). In doing so, workshop participants approached imagination from a multitude of angles including through various media, hoping to reveal glimpses of the imagination, or at least more insights than what a text alone could do. Irving (2016), for example, instructed interlocutors to record their so-called thoughtspace while they walked the streets, which resulted in continuous streams of their inner dialogue including memories and imaginings. Other authors documented the experiences of people who visited an augmented reality exhibition and were confronted with a virtual, fictitious environment which stimulated their own imagination (Kaplan and Shiff 2016).
We find this collection to be a good starting point to, in Schäuble's words, mine imagination, through diverse ethnographic research practices; both in documenting people's engagement with a specific imaginative setting or instructing them to express their own imagination through the production of specific media or artefacts. A combination of both approaches is proposed by Murphy (2020) in the field of Design Anthropology. He observes and documents how individuals who have been given a task of design and planning begin with individual envisioning but through collective, conversational interaction ultimately implement a collaborative imagination. He thus emphasizes imagining as social action. We suggest considering such social processes of collaborative imagination not only in the context of assigned goals and tasks, but in a wide variety of social situations. These imaginaries are then seen in relation to and embedded within the sociocultural world as collective dispositions and frames as reference, not as person-centered or systematic studies of individual minds. Documenting them in everyday situations is then possible with quite conventional ethnographic methods.
Given the difficulties of “mining” imagination, it is understandable that anthropologists focus primarily on representations of said individual and collective imaginings. We believe that this tendency, however, neglects imaginings and imaginaries that do not find direct representative expression. To overcome this tendency, it is helpful and inspiring to look to Design Anthropology and Multisensory Anthropology, which consider collective interactions while moving beyond visual dimensions of imagination. Furthermore, we stress the importance of long-term, on-the-ground fieldwork which integrates the researcher into the researched collectives as a catalyst for accessing products of imagination. For that reason, we will also address the researcher's imagination in the following section.
Poetic imagination
Instead of exploring other peoples’ imagination, it appears to be an easier task to represent one's own ethnographic imagination: we speak in this case of the poetic imagination. Many anthropologists have been inspired to seriously consider how their poetic imagination is part of the writing process and consequently how to responsibly handle the power of representing others (see Behar and Gordon, 1996; Clifford and Marcus, 1986). To do so, some anthropologists have placed emphasis on rhetorical components of ethnographic writing while others have concerned themselves with structural properties of ethnographic texts; we believe both can be interpreted as efforts to expose aspects of the author's own imaginings.
Atkinson (1990), for instance, makes transparent how anthropologists make use of literary and rhetorical conventions to deliver their arguments, convincing their readers of the authenticity of their accounts. His illustration of how “the factual” is elaborately crafted in ethnographies serves as a point of departure to reflect and consider alternative writing strategies. Brady's (1991) edited anthology, the works by Boudreault-Fournier (2020), Jackson (1986), and Stoller (1999), as well as the collection by Pandian and McLean (2017) provide examples of such alternative forms of anthropological expression in which the poetic and artful aspects of science are explored. We welcome spaces and projects that showcase anthropologists’ exploration of their own imaginings through creative works, whether academic journals with poetic components (ex. Anthropology and Humanism), creative blogs with ethnographic foundations, or (ethno-)fictions as point of entry into this subject matter.
Before the writing process can even begin, however, anthropologists must reflect on their own imaginings of the researched “Other.” This implies the necessity of the researcher to contend with preconceived representations: before heading into the field, during the research process, and again in the process of interpreting the gathered data before writing. Despite this very important consideration, we have found relatively little explicitly written on the phenomenon of imagination and its role in these processes, and therefore highlight two examples.
First, Elliott and Culhane's anthology (2017) provides a repertoire of ideas to explore the sensual, creative, poetic, and artistic ways of doing ethnography; exploring the anthropologist's imaginative capacities during the research process (see also Stoller, 2015). In addition, Elliott and Culhane's website, the Centre for Imaginative Ethnography, provides a list of resources to help make the application of their ideas possible (see imaginative-ethnography.com). Imaginative practices are understood here predominantly as a creative methodology with a strong focus on sensual anthropology and not as critical reflections on imagination in anthropological processes in general. Nevertheless, this collection is an important step toward anthropologists reflecting on their own imaginings during fieldwork and beyond.
Secondly, we would like to note the theoretical work and reflection done by anthropologists whose fieldwork takes place at or close to home; thus complicating the distinction between “researcher” and “researched.” While their discussions typically do not use the term imagination, these reflections speak to sophisticated conceptual thought processes, even imaginings, that accompany fieldwork and positionality (see for example, Neale Hurston, 1935; Simpson, 2014; Willis, 2000). The explicit link between imagination theory and one's own poetic imagination is critically underdeveloped and leaves many openings for further elaborations.
Towards a theory of imagination
To avoid misunderstandings about our perspectives on theory building, we want to emphasize that we do not depart from a scientific understanding of theory in our argumentation for imagination. We do not advocate for imagination as “another way of knowing” and refrain its idealization. Although imagination is a mental activity which cannot be directly observed, we believe that imagination can be understood as a delimited aspect of social phenomena which can be “mined” with the help of scientific methods and which leads to a better understanding of the characteristics of human life. Through the consolidation and elaboration of previous analytical and conceptual works, we seek to provide a middle-range theory of imagination from an anthropological perspective.
In advocating for such theoretical engagement with imagination in anthropology, we present two explicit interconnected theoretical contributions. They are not focused on universal archetypes of imagination or cognitive structures, but have collective imaginaries, created in specific occurrences through concrete individual and collective processes and practices at their core. We argue that these processes and practices are not primarily located in centers of creativity and innovation or in cultural production sites but are created in everyday situations.
Our first proposition is that imagination (imagining, imaginings, the imagined) is a social practice whose modalities and forms as well as its historical, local, social, and cultural embeddedness can be fathomed and analyzed by anthropologists. Instead of exploring concrete social practices, many scholars have preferred to focus on the products of these processes: individual imaginings and collective imaginaries. We agree these imaginings, including future projections, can guide anthropologists’ actions but are convinced that the conditions and social practices which bring them into being must be analyzed; only then can their relevance and potency be understood. We are convinced that the importance imagination has on one's actions is particularly salient in situations of uncertainty and ignorance. Drawing on Iser's Leerstellen (1972, 1991) as well as contemporary works by Freeman (2019) and Mjaaland (2017), we highlight that unknowns in everyday situations propel imagination. We therefore see potential to link imagination theory and anthropological works on ignorance (for example, Dilley and Kirsch, 2017). In contrast to approaches from the Anthropology of Design or Anthropology of Futures, however, our approach does not only emphasize unknowable future projections or possibilities, but points out that imagination is also directed to the past or can be used to evaluate the present. Thus, imagination is not necessarily to be only understood as a driver of change or social transformation, but can also provide for the stabilization of social conditions. We draw connections here to Pfaller (2021), who emphasizes that imagination can also be negatively charged and rejected imaginaries may be essential for society.
Secondly, we emphasize how anthropologists’ own imaginations are important in their actions: as researchers, interpreters, and evaluating persons who are deeply involved in their research contexts. This is particularly important when considering our first point that imagination can lead to action. To reflect on the poetic imagination and the overall role of the anthropologist, it is first necessary to develop a consciousness of the feasible techniques and methodological limits needed in order to reach strong statements and assessments regarding the imagination. We welcome the various attempts to expand the methodological palette and continuous experimentation with multisensory and artistic approaches. We also appreciate the efforts of anthropologists to initiate their own imaginative processes in collaboration with research participants and other actors. However, we are also convinced that quite ordinary ethnographic methods can be used to gain important insights into the social practices, cultural framing, genesis, and impact of imaginings and imaginaries. Therefore, we see this contribution as complementary to, and supportive of, theories of action or agency in which imagination has been acknowledged but not comprehensively elaborated (compare with Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). As we consider the connection between non-knowledge and imagining to be particularly relevant, we advocate for the inclusion and integration of dimensions of ignorance, including anthropologists’ lack of knowledge or preconceived notions, into such reflections.
Working towards a middle-range theory of imagination in anthropology requires, we argue, a balance of terminological precision, clear positionality regarding often normative conceptual characteristics of imagination, clear relationships to and with related concepts, and a self-reflective methodological awareness. We emphasize empirical research and ongoing engagement with other concepts and therefore recognize that imagination theory in anthropology will be continually in flux. Based on different fieldwork experiences, new theoretical elaborations concerning the specific relationships to particular concepts will be elaborated on in innovative and exciting ways. The conceptual characteristics, related concepts, and poetic and methodological reflections we identified provide a framework for new additions, elaborations, and comparisons to such a theory of imagination.
Conclusion
Browsing the programs of anthropological conferences and workshops, it is evident that imagination resonates strongly within the discipline. It is used not only in the fields of Visual or Cognitive Anthropology, but is used in analyses for diverse fields of interest such as migration, tourism, political movements, or other “everyday” cultural phenomena. Oftentimes, however, conference organizers or authors are not explicitly distinguishing between the imagination as a mental faculty; imaginings as individual products of the imagination; imaginaries as societal and cultural dispositions; or other intricate features of the whole process of imagining. Nor are they interacting with terminological particularities, conceptual intricacies or related concepts. Terms like Anderson's imagined communities are often used as references but not starting points that oblige deeper analysis into why, how, and in which ways imagination (or the products thereof) come into being, are (re)produced, or are transformed over time and place. We believe this could be due, as suggested throughout the article, to different national disciplinary traditions, language and translation barriers, and the lack of a comprehensive overview of imagination research.
Overall in works dealing with the imagination, we see that there is still a strong focus on extraordinary and artistic expressions of imagination and predominant attention to visual representations. Furthermore, we believe that the influence of specific social categories on imagination as well as particular cultural forms of imagining have not been sufficiently addressed in available literature. We feel that there remains a tendency to value the imagination of creative elites, intellectuals, as well as middle class and dissident groups, while at the same time ordinary peoples’ everyday practices of imagination are neglected, disdained, or exoticized. We believe that this underlying ascription or prioritization of creativity and mental capacity to only very specific actors is problematic and based on a lack of attention to social class, the material and economic aspects of imagination, in addition to aspects of the commercialization of imagination. When discussing imagination, imaginings, or imaginaries in relation to related concepts, it can be a basis for further debates about structure and agency; globalization and increasing medialization; uncertainties of human futures; and on the relation to objects and other entities.
While other scholars demean imagination as a fashionable but hollow concept, we believe that imagination is one key to better understanding human behavior, particularly when imagination is seen to influence actions in the presence of non-knowledge and is situated at the confluence of complex historically, culturally, and collectively informed everyday practices. These contributions could lay the foundations for further study to the intersections with, for example, innovation, suspicion, or doubt. In that case, we suggest considering imagination outside of spectacular expressions in the media, art, conspiracy theories, or religious contexts and instead encourage addressing questions of how imaginations relate to self-assurance, to identity politics, to moral and ethical positioning; and we encourage exploring imaginations’ roles in the interpretation of political, economic, and social contexts; leading us to ask where such imagining could serve in developing additional conceptions of reality and (non-)knowledge.
Imagination theory from an anthropological perspective, we argue, necessitates all aspects of this article: attention to specific terminology and characteristics describing imagination; analyses in relation to associated concepts, particularly but not limited to those we have identified; and a self-reflective methodological consideration of how imagination should be researched and written about, including how a researcher deals with their own imagination. This foundation for a theory of imagination allows for elaborations connected to specific concepts. Our theoretical contribution here, beyond the framework itself, is to state that imagination is crucial for decision making and acting on those decisions; particularly in specific situations of ignorance and uncertainty. In this case, imagination is not to be understood as merely an individual thought process, but embedded in the very cultural, social, and historical processes which influence the imagination. While we emphasize the relationship between the unknown, the imagination, and everyday actions, we recognize that there is much research to be done and many perspectives that are missing, particularly from outside of western academia.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Michelle Thompson's current research, of which imagination theory constitutes a small part, is funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG).
