Abstract
This article offers an alternative approach to multicultural theories, called ‘caring multiculturalism’. It argues that, despite good intentions, multicultural theory reproduces rhetoric that constructs groups as substantive entities, which leaves little room to accommodate changing power relations. Caring multiculturalism, drawing on caring ethics, feminist critiques of multiculturalism and discursive social psychology, advocates instead the contextualisation of groups’ claims to diversity and of governments’ practices of multiculturalism. As a framework rooted in discursive psychology, caring multiculturalism sees individual and collective identities as relational, negotiated and political, and therefore non-totalising and changeable. As a feminist approach to multiculturalism, it analyses and attempts to change gendered power asymmetries embedded in intra- and intergroup relations by advocating an attentive and responsive approach to the needs and claims of minority groups and of the individuals within them. The article outlines the main tenets of caring multiculturalism with illustrations from multicultural practices in three European municipalities.
Keywords
Western Europe and North America have been regions of immigration from the global South for at least sixty years. Yet governments and their electorates continue to display a profound ambivalence about immigration, which has become increasingly politically contested. Populist mobilisation against immigration; economic considerations, as well as normative and legal commitments to migrants and refugees; new pressures and incentives to incorporate ethnic minority interests; and the socioeconomic deprivation in which some migrants live are some of the issues related to immigration that national and local governments have to deal with.
Parts of the academic community, to deal with the anxieties concerning the increasingly multi-ethnic character of contemporary societies, have advocated more, not less, multiculturalism (e.g. Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2008). Multiculturalism is generally understood as the public recognition of ethnic, national and religious minorities’ cultures and the accommodation of these groups’ needs (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). It is deemed to be fit for purpose because it couples the principles of group recognition with those of individual and group equality and respect. Multiculturalism, the argument goes, is able to value and respect diversity at the same time as it enables the development of a common civic identity which includes minorities and the majority society (Modood, 2007).
In this article, I take issue with this response and I argue that multicultural theory entails at least two shortcomings that make it unfeasible to meet the challenges related to immigration and diversity in contemporary societies. First, the substantialistic ontological premises of multiculturalism result in the rigidification of aspects of identity into misleading categorical entities such as culture, race or ethnicity. Second, as multiculturalism conceives of identities as fixed, there is little room to accommodate changing power relations as they develop over time. My argument is that an approach to difference and recognition that adopts categories of ethno-political practice as its categories of social analysis is not able to criticise, contest and possibly transform the dichotomies that hierarchise forms of difference in the first place.
As an alternative, I offer an analytical and theoretical framework for multiculturalism that draws upon feminist ethics of care, feminist critiques of multiculturalism, and discursive social psychology. This approach, called ‘caring multiculturalism’, emphasises the importance of understanding culture and identity relationally and processually. On a practical level, it advocates the importance of challenging power asymmetries by promoting cognitive and structural transformation. Caring multiculturalism wants to introduce change in the reciprocal perceptions of the majority society and minority groups and favours the development of shared visions of a society to which all groups can contribute. This is what I refer to as ‘cognitive transformation’. Caring multiculturalism also aims to promote context-sensitive structural changes through responsive, attentive and responsible policy-making. This would not only potentially challenge power inequalities between and within groups; it would also bring attention to the state’s power to introduce, organise and reproduce inequalities. While my critique of multiculturalism will in many respects be familiar to those who have followed these debates in the past decade, the novelty of caring multiculturalism is twofold. First, it explicitly draws upon feminist ethics and epistemology. Second, it tries to address cognitive and social transformation at the same time.
In the following, I discuss the main shortcomings of multicultural theory. In particular, I focus on its understanding of culture and groups and on the lack of analysis of specific power relations. Second, I set out the main characteristics of caring multiculturalism. I discuss the normative and analytic implications of adopting a relational understanding of multiculture. Drawing upon caring ethics and feminist epistemology, I turn my attention to power relations and suggest how caring multiculturalism could help address the inequalities deriving from them. The discussion will be enriched by empirical illustrations from Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Some shortcomings of multicultural theory
Multiculturalists, such as Bikku Parekh (2000, 2008) or Will Kymlicka (1995), defend the equal public recognition of minorities’ culture and argue for the development of a shared civic community which encapsulates the various minority groups living in the same territory. In this section, I argue that this theoretical body of work relies on a substantialistic ontology that leads it to understand cultures and groups as substantive entities in the world. This has normative and analytic implications as it does not enable multicultural theory to fully understand the contested and changing nature of groups. Second, I consider how scholarship on multiculturalism advocates addressing unequal power relations. I argue that the lack of contextualised understanding of, on the one hand, the claims made by minorities and, on the other, the practical implementation of integration policies by states make it difficult to suggest viable approaches that could address the challenges related to contemporary immigration and diversity.
A substantialistic understanding of cultural groups
Advocates of multiculturalism claim to embrace a constructivist understanding of social relations. Groups are conceived of as emerging from history and in some senses changeable (Parekh, 2000; Modood, 2007). Despite the supposed support for constructivism, much work on multiculturalism is informed by a substantialistic ontology. A substantialist approach takes clearly defined entities or substances as the primary units of research analysis and, only in a second step, considers the dynamic flows in which they involve themselves (Emirbayer, 1997). To understand how substantialistic ontology is embraced by multicultural theorists, we need to look at their understanding of culture and cultural groups. Culture is assumed to serve as individuals’ ‘primary foci of identification’ (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 447). It provides the means through which we identify some experiences as valuable and it makes these options meaningful to its members (Kymlicka, 1995). Hence, peoples’ bond to their culture ‘does seem to be a fact’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 90). Because belonging to a cultural group is of such importance to people, multicultural scholars argue that it is legitimate to put forward claims for the recognition of cultural differences in the public sphere and advocate the introduction of differentiated group rights (Taylor, 1994). This argument is underpinned by the assumption that people who can be described with reference to similar social categories (e.g. race or ethnicity), share similar life experiences and the same set of interests and needs.
Multicultural scholarship focuses on the relations between established, substantive, at times pre-given cultural groups. A group is defined as ‘an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 18). The externally bounded character of cultural groups is the central underpinning of multicultural theory’s line of reasoning and the point of departure of its analysis of contemporary diverse societies. For instance, a Quebecois is someone who is ‘a participant in the francophone society of Quebec’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 87), regardless of the person’s ethnic background. As pointed out by Rita Dhamoon (2006), this freezes a particular understanding of Quebecois culture and conceals important differences among the French-speaking community in Canada, in particular how migrants to Quebec are positioned in the wider Quebecois society. Little effort is put into deconstructing the meanings of groupings such as ‘migrants’ or ‘minorities’ and into analysing how, for instance, governments treat migrants differently depending on whether they consider them to be more or less integrated into mainstream society. Research on Muslims in Europe and North America constitutes an exception to this (e.g. Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). It demonstrates that this ‘group’ is subject to discourses and practices which put it at the margins of Western societies more often than other religious minorities. However, this literature tends to adopt one social category (‘Muslim’) to describe a very heterogeneous group of people. It fails to capture how ethnicity and faith intersect in positioning Muslims from particular parts of the world as potential threats to society, while others, such as Bosnians, are not perceived in the same way.
Even authors who advocate more critical understandings of multiculturalism tend to conceive of groups as externally bounded and pre-established. The work of Ayelet Shachar (2001) is a case in point. In advocating a more gender-sensitive understanding of multicultural accommodation, she uses the term ‘nomoi communities’ to refer to groups or people that ‘share an unique history and collective memory, a distinct culture, a set of social norms, customs and traditions’ (Shachar, 2001: 2). They have ‘a comprehensive worldview that extends to creating a law for the community’ and have ‘normatively and legally justifiable interests in shaping the rules that govern behavior’ (Shachar, 2001: 2, 17). Similar to Kymlicka’s ethnic group, defined as an historical community, sharing a language and a territory (1995), Shachar’s nomoi groups are relatively solid entities. Interaction takes place between the entities/groups themselves. The author does not analyse how time, space and power relations shape the nomoi groups; how the socio-political setting in which these groups exist mediates its members’ sense of identification to it; and why and under what circumstances culture is important to some individuals.
The consequences of substantialistic ontology are well illustrated by multicultural scholars’ understanding of a multicultural society. People, it is argued, belong to one culture. Moving between cultures is a ‘slow and painful process’ (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 444) and therefore seldom embarked upon. Most proponents of multiculturalism advocate the need to establish some ties that would bind different communities to a state (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Modood, 2007). As the members of all communities interact in the same economic environment and political society, they will embrace the same civic-political culture. If a state provides an environment where cultures are able to cultivate and maintain their diversity, it will create a fertile ground for the development of a shared political identity (Kymlicka, 1995). Despite the necessary interactions and exchanges between groups, cultural groups remain largely fixed and unchanged. Consequently, a multicultural common political culture is the sum of its individual parts, i.e. the cultures that inhabit it.
This understanding of group and culture has analytic implications. Multicultural theory tends to affirm the specificity of groups and supports their differentiation as a means to ameliorate inequitable social relations. This approach overlooks how culture and identity are constructed politically to achieve power (Brubaker, 2002) and cognitively to make sense of one’s position in a particular context (Billig, 1995). In other words, multicultural theory fails to grapple with the social relations and processes that give meaning to its object of study, i.e. groups. A theory of multiculturalism that does not take into consideration the specificities of a given political environment is limited in its potential to critically examine and transform multicultural policies adopted in that context. Indeed, ‘if identities are fixed, there is no room to accommodate changing power relations’ (Somers, 1994: 611). Multiculturalism runs the risk of presenting an oversimplified perspective on social relations and of providing abstract, albeit appealing, solutions to multicultural accommodation. This leads me to the second critique of multiculturalism I wish to put forward, which concerns its attempts to address asymmetric power relations.
Multiculturalism and power relations
Multicultural theory argues that the liberal state necessarily favours some understandings of morality and some values over others. Through public holidays, state symbols, governmental decisions about language etc., the state unavoidably recognises, accommodates and supports the needs and identities of particular groups (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). This means that minorities are disadvantaged and their culture is at risk of withering away under the dominance of liberal values (Kukathas, 2003). Group-differentiated rights help rectify this and ensure equality between groups by alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions. These are what Kymlicka (1995) calls ‘external protections’. If protection from the intervention of a liberal state is guaranteed, asymmetric power relations between the majority and minorities will be ameliorated because different groups will be able to live in a climate of equality (Young, 1990). The liberal state should rarely intervene in a group’s state of affairs. In as far as group members do not feel oppressed and the oppression is not the outcome of ‘occasional failures of socialization’ (Raz, 1994: 169), a cultural community ‘deserves to be respected and left alone’ (Parekh, 2000: 177). Chandran Kukathas expresses this clearly: ‘if members of a cultural community wish to continue to live by their beliefs, the outside community has no right to intervene to prevent those members acting within their rights’ (1992: 117). 1 Groups have to meet certain conditions to be eligible for group rights: they should not repress their members and individual group members must be free to choose whether or not to follow the group’s traditions (Raz, 1998; Parekh, 2000). These and similar conditions are a way for multicultural theorists to ensure that the group does not impose excessive ‘internal restrictions’ (Kymlicka, 1995) upon its members and to ameliorate intra-group power relations. To offset potential internal oppression, individuals should have the legal right to exit their cultural group. If a cultural group does not have the broad support of its members, who may decide to renounce their membership of that particular group, the community will wither. Hence, it is in the interest of the cultural group not to oppress its members. This can only be assured by an open wider society willing to protect individuals who have decided to leave their community. What underlines this understanding of how to address inter- and intra-group power relations is an idea of individuals as autonomous and self-reflective. People can rationally and voluntarily decide whether to exit their cultural group.
Multicultural theory’s approach to inter- and intra-group power relations is problematic in several respects. Firstly, its arguments are highly normative and underpinned by anecdotic and de-contextualised evidence. The lack of contextualisation of claims-making processes and of the characteristics of the socio-political environment in which these claims are made (e.g. national repertoires of citizenship; models of steering; welfare regimes; and integration policies) curtails multiculturalism’s potential to destabilise existing power asymmetries. Secondly, multicultural theory tends to overlook the significance of interrelated power relations between the state, groups and individuals. In order to challenge unequal dynamics of power, it is pivotal to question who has the power to define a group’s traditions and needs; who has the power to become the legitimate interlocutor with the state; and how the state creates, manages and reproduces the boundaries of its community. Multicultural theorists seldom discuss the issue of democratic group representation (see, however, Parekh, 2000). It seems that a state should assume that the claims made by community leaders are representative of the whole group. This not only disregards the plurality of voices within a group which are silenced through mechanisms of power and coercion. It also potentially enables the state to overlook how these claims may impact negatively on some members of a group, most often women (Okin, 1999; Shachar, 2001; Saharso, 2003; Phillips, 2007). The issue of state power is addressed by multicultural theorists. They present various remedies to protect minorities from the norms of the liberal state. Yet, the power of the state to position some groups as minorities in need of protection and others as potentially threatening elements to the status quo is seldom discussed. To overlook these and similar issues frees the state from being accountable for its role in reproducing narratives and practices which define the membership of the nation. Related to this, multicultural theory overlooks the power exercised by policy officers and politicians in the course of defining migrants’ and minority communities’ needs. The practices of multiculturalism can rely on a one-sided interpretation of needs which relies on the alleged expert-role of policy officers. This denies direct participation of the beneficiaries of these practices in defining their needs. Thirdly, the argument that a liberal state should not intervene in matters internal to a group in as far as its members are guaranteed a right to exit is problematic because it disregards the emotional and social factors that can limit their opportunities to leave their group (Saharso, 2003). Multiculturalists adopt a voluntaristic model of community affiliation, despite the fact that one’s culture is understood to be such a pivotal aspect of one’s identity, autonomy and morality.
Despite their good intentions, multiculturalists reproduce a rhetoric that constructs groups as substantive, bounded entities. This has implications for how a collective identity shared by minorities and the majority society can be developed. Furthermore, multiculturalism’s de-contextualised understanding of the implications of multicultural policies makes it complicated for them to address power asymmetries between and within groups and between groups and the state. In what follows, I elaborate a contextually-grounded approach to multiculturalism, called ‘caring multiculturalism’ that attempts to address these shortcomings.
Caring multiculturalism
‘Caring multiculturalism’ aims to address two shortcomings of multicultural theory: a substantialistic conceptualisation of culture and group, and a de-contextualised analysis of power relations (Scuzzarello, 2010). The approach is anchored in three bodies of work: feminist multiculturalism (e.g. Shachar, 2001; Phillips, 2007); caring ethics 2 (e.g. Tronto, 1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Robinson, 1999; White, 2000); and discursive social psychology (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). As a framework rooted in discursive social psychology, caring multiculturalism sees individual and collective identities as relational, processual, negotiated and political, and therefore non-totalising and changeable. As a feminist approach to multiculturalism, it analyses and attempts to change the gendered power asymmetries embedded in intra- and intergroup relations by advocating, in line with caring ethics, an attentive and responsive approach to the needs and claims of minority groups and of the individuals who are part of them.
Understanding culture and groups relationally
Caring multiculturalism, following caring ethics, adopts a relational ontology (Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Robinson, 1999). However, caring ethicists limit their idea of relationality to understanding the relations between people whose identity is created through connections and whose life is dependent on each other rather than on a contract of agreement. In order to understand the political and sociological implications of group formation, relational ontology needs to inform methodology and analysis (Pedwell, 2007, 2010). A person, a family, a community, an organisation or even an economic system are not self-contained entities that exist in themselves. They assume their meaning, significance and identity from the changing functional roles they play in relation to one another (Emirbayer, 1997). Relational ontology provides an understanding of reality which ‘takes the basic units of social analysis to be neither individual entities (agent, actor, person, firm) nor structural wholes (society, order, social structure) but the relational process of interaction between and among identities’ (Somers, 1998: 766–767).
A relational understanding of culture differs from a substantialist one. Culture, rather than being something pre-given and pre-political which provides individuals with a sense of self, is understood as ‘bundles of communications, relations, and transactions’ (Emirbayer, 1997: 300). Culture evolves out of relationships of narratives that are embodied in societal and institutional practices and that, in turn, reinforce stories about a culture. This understanding of culture is in line with discursive approaches in social psychology (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1995; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) which see culture not as residing in groups themselves, but rather as the result of narrative, symbolic and practical co-production of a network involving individuals, collectives and institutions.
Relational ontology provides the means to reconceptualise the self and the other in a non-antagonistic way and it opens up for an understanding of the processes of identity formation that can generate change. People develop a sense of who they are because there are others who recognise and confirm their individual characteristics (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Individuals do not remain fixed and unchanged throughout their interaction with others, but derive their identity from the dynamic processes that are human relations. Indeed, the other, whether real or imagined, questions the existing positions in the self and is able to introduce new ones. The point of departure of this perspective is the ontological interdependence between the self and the other(s) and its social context. For instance, when two people who identify themselves according to different social categories referring to their nationality, a Swede and an Iraqi, come into contact in Sweden, their ways of positioning themselves in broader discourses about Swedishness or Iraqness may be changed. New positions can develop out of narratives which may emphasise a hyphenated Swedish-Iraqi identity, or may redefine what it means to be a Swede or an Iraqi living in Sweden.
Caring multiculturalism does not see the formation of a collective identity as a given state of affairs. Rather, ‘[c]ollective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place’ (Melucci, 1989: 34). Thus defined, a collective identity is the outcome of interactions and dialogues among people and between people and dominant institutions and is therefore relational. Individuals are active agents and contribute to the expression of a more or less stable ‘we’ (i.e. a group) by formulating, negotiating and adjusting the goals of their actions, the means used and the environment in which they are embedded (Melucci, 1989). None of these elements can be assumed a priori. Thus, in referring to ‘Swedish’ or ‘Iraqi’ identities, I do not consider them to be a-historical and fixed. They are social categories constructed narratively, materially and symbolically whose meaning is shaped by time and space and is at the centre of contestations. Hence, caring multiculturalism does not conceive of groups as discrete and externally bounded entities that interact with each other. Rather, it sees groups as political expressions of crystallised narratives which are invoked to call a group into being (Brubaker, 2002) and to maintain boundaries which exclude some groups from the stories and practices defining the nation and its people.
The negotiations that invest the social characteristics, values and valence of a group with meaning will depend in large part on the distribution of power. For instance, community leaders may attempt to give a more durable and predictable order to the negotiations over goals and meanings in a context. They are also those who put most emphasis on unity (Melucci, 1989). They have the material and discursive power to monopolise the meaning of the definition of the social characteristics of typical group members, the core values associated with membership, and the characteristics of common out-groups who help define what the in-group is not. These narratives are frequently conveyed by metaphors of kinship and gender. As symbolic and biological reproducer of a group, women often come to symbolise its roots, its spirit, its honour and purity (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Phillips, 2007). Their personal and reproductive life becomes the focus of concern and at times control by community leaders who impose rigid interpretations of women’s culturally appropriate behaviour. In order to ensure the endurance of a particular, homogeneous interpretation of a group’s characteristics, the voices of women and other less powerful members of that group are often silenced (Shachar, 2001).
Caring multiculturalism’s focus of enquiry moves away from taking ‘culture’ or similar categories of identification as pre-given basic constituents of social life. Instead, these are conceptualised as categories of ethno-political practices used by particular individuals to call groups into being. Analytically, this means that caring multiculturalism asks ‘how do we “do” culture?’, rather than ‘what is culture?’, i.e. it thinks of ‘ethnicization, racialization and nationalization as political, social, cultural and psychological processes’ (Brubaker, 2002: 167, emphasis in original). The starting point of the analysis of intergroup relations is to inquire how certain categories are used in different spatial and temporal contexts by the state and by community leaders to legitimise power inequalities, to produce change or to make sense of certain phenomena. It analyses, in other words, human agency in relation to the context in which people operate. This is pivotal to feminist ethics and feminist analysis. To accommodate change in power relations, researchers need to examine ‘the actual, concrete conditions within moral relations that can and do occur, and [seek] to understand the nature of those moral relations’ (Robinson, 1999: 29). In other words, caring multiculturalism, drawing upon feminist epistemology (Harding, 1991; Pedwell, 2010; Robinson, 2010), focuses on how a political environment stimulates and constrains collective action, and on how the latter is gendered and racialised. It also analyses the relations between narratives and symbolic practices that give meaning to a particular group, and assesses the consequences of these constructions for disenfranchised group members. The researcher should not only examine the power relations between majority society and minority groups. If informed by caring multiculturalism, the analysis of the practices of multiculturalism should also assess state power, control and accountability. Only then will researchers be able to take on the real challenge of contesting and seeking to transform the dichotomies that create and maintain hierarchical forms of differences. Transformation should be cognitive as well as structural.
Cognitive transformation
Caring multiculturalism relies on a processual and relational understanding of identity. In the context of diverse societies, caring multiculturalism stresses the importance of introducing new, shared narratives of belonging which can challenge antagonistic group constructions rather than limiting itself to fostering a shared civic-political identity, as advocated by multicultural scholarship. Research on reconciliation in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2002; Staub, 2003) demonstrates that in order to change a conflict-laden situation, new societal goals, narratives to contest the otherness of the out-group, and stories about the in-group must be introduced. The same reasoning can be applied in the case of multicultural societies (Staub, 2007). New narratives about a society and new societal goals can challenge old boundaries between groups and create platforms for new partial commonalities, something that has important implications in the context of multiculturalism.
There are several ways in which a sense of self could be changed to be inclusive of people and groups previously perceived as outsiders. The establishment of ‘transformative dialogue’ (Gergen et al., 2001) between previously antagonistic parts is one example. It takes place when speaker and respondent recognise the perspective of the other part in its own right and, further, when they are able and willing to revise and change their initial standpoints by taking the preceding utterances of the other into account. In this sense, transformative dialogue is in line with the values of caring ethics. An ethics of care focuses on three ethical elements: attentiveness, responsibility and responsiveness. 3 Attentiveness involves identifying the specific needs of others as they arise out of concrete relationships. Responsibility entails being concerned with the actual outcomes and effects on people’s lives of certain choices and decisions (Hankivsky, 2004). Finally, responsiveness entails understanding the needs of others as well as understanding how the provided care has been received (Tronto, 1993). In line with this, transformative dialogue is attentive and responsive to the viewpoints and needs of others and it entails a degree of responsibility for each other’s identified needs and claims. Deep contact between groups is also proven to be an efficient method to challenge prejudice and possibly create a shared sense of self (Allport, 1954). However, this will only happen in as far as the interaction of individuals takes place on equal terms and if the groups in question have equal status in the situation (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). I do not advocate embracing the liberal principles of institutional impartiality. My argument is close to that of those care ethicists who see justice and care as mutually interdependent (Tronto, 1993, 2010; Held, 2008). The state has the duty to ensure equal treatment of all its citizens, thus preventing relations and favouritisms. It must also be attentive to the individual needs arising from their different positioning in society as well as the personal and political experiences of injustice. Hence, a caring state will provide the space in which dialogue can take place on equal terms by recognising power relations, and by guaranteeing pluralistic, particular tailoring of care to meet individuals’ needs (Tronto, 2010).
My research has found several examples of how European municipalities attempt to include migrants as members of their community. One way to do so is by developing discourses that recast migrants as full-fledged citizens and not as outsiders to the community (Scuzzarello, 2015). For instance, the Province of Bologna in Italy established a migrants’ consultative body in an attempt to meet the request for an institutionalised model of representation and participation of migrants (Provincia di Bologna, 2005). The decisive solution for the integration of migrants is, according to the councillor responsible for migrants’ integration, to give them political rights: I’m of the opinion that the national government should guarantee the right to vote to migrants. Obviously, I don’t have the power to change this, but I follow a path which interweaves access to services – education, health, social services in general – and that affirms the importance of political rights that provide mechanisms of political participation to foreigners […] if the issue of voting rights were settled, many problems [concerning integration] would be solved – at least formally. (interview Bo1)
Structural transformation
Changes in groups’ perceptions about one another are not enough if we are to address asymmetric power relations. It is also crucial to assess and attempt to transform social structures that position some groups and some individuals within them in the lower ranks of society. Social structures are intimately related to political ones. Hence, asymmetric power relations can only realistically be influenced if both structures are considered.
State power and intergroup relations
The nation-state plays an important role in enacting and maintaining stories, symbols and material practices which define a nation and its people (Gellner, 1983). The integrative function of nationalism is dependent on boundary-making processes which define who belongs to the nation and on what terms. Those outside are treated as aliens, whose political voice can be disregarded as that of ‘minorities’ (Kaufman, 2004; Wimmer, 2006). One way to maintain these boundaries is through naturalisation laws, welfare regimes, and specific understandings and practices of ‘integration’ of minorities and migrants. To assess the possibilities to develop policies in line with the tenets of caring multiculturalism, it is crucial to understand a state’s citizenship regime (formal criteria of inclusion and exclusion); approach to welfare (principles of redistribution); understandings of ‘integration’ (thresholds for the inclusion of migrants and minorities); and constructions of the categories of ‘migrant’ and ‘minority’ (who is positioned as such and with what consequences). For instance, Malmö Council in Sweden understands ‘integration’ as participation in the labour market. Through employment, migrants can become part of the city’s society, strengthen bridging social capital, and become assets for the city’s financial development in the global economic market. When ‘success’, as defined in this construction of integration, is not achieved migrants are instead positioned negatively as benefit-dependent; a burden to public finances; and stuck between their and the Swedish culture (Scuzzarello, 2015). The different ways of positioning migrants are clear in the Council’s construction of ‘problematic’ and ‘unproblematic’ migrant groups. Somalis, who tend to be overrepresented in unemployment statistics, are targeted as a problematic community and often described as not well integrated. By contrast, Poles and other European migrants are not considered the main recipients of integration policies and are often seen as well integrated (interview M1). This example not only shows the importance of understanding particular constructions of integration and how those define the boundaries of a community. It also illustrates that individuals with a similar life experience of emigration are positioned differently in relation to the state and the recipient society depending on how integration is defined. Because caring multiculturalism does not provide a ‘one size fits all’ model of multicultural policies, attentiveness to these issues is crucial in providing contextually sensitive, and potentially practically viable, policy proposals which could challenge asymmetric power relations.
Another expression of state power lies in the power of experts and institutions to define the problems of a community, what I call, following Nancy Fraser (1989, 2000), ‘power of needs interpretation’. In her study of public programmes for deprived youths and families, Anne White (2000) demonstrates that a formalistic and technical understanding of the beneficiaries’ problems fails to challenge the asymmetries of power between care-providers and care-takers. Rather, they are reinforced as the knowledge of some individuals is deemed to be more valuable and authoritative than the experience of others. Drawing on caring ethics, White (2000) suggests reframing what counts as valuable knowledge. A deep understanding of policy-making in a specific context is crucial. However, if policies are to achieve legitimacy, the lived experiences of those who are their potential beneficiaries are equally important. We can draw a parallel to migrant integration policies.
In Malmö there are no formal bodies that represent migrant associations within the Council. The Council instead mainly collaborates with two umbrella organisations, Malmö Ideella föreningars Paraplyorganisation (MIP) 4 and Malmö Idrottsföreningars samorganisation (MISO), 5 whose member organisations include, among others, migrant associations. The integration projects carried out by the Council together with MIP and MISO are very often designed by project managers and evaluated by the beneficiaries of the project upon termination. The project Integration i förening 6 provides an illustration of the ‘power of needs interpretation’ I am discussing. The project was launched in 2007 and is part of the Council’s orientation- and language courses for newly arrived migrants. MIP, supported by the Council and MISO, manages the project. The project is aimed at newly arrived migrants. It wants not only to provide migrants with the opportunity to improve their knowledge of the Swedish language and to make new acquaintances, but also to enable them to learn about Swedish society (MIP, 2008). ‘[M]any newly arrived [migrants] complain that they have very few contacts with Swedes and almost no opportunities to speak Swedish outside of [Swedish language] class’ (MIP, 2008). The ‘needs’ that the project wants to address – to facilitate contact between Swedes and migrants and to increase the opportunities to speak Swedish – have not been identified in dialogue with the beneficiaries of the project, i.e. newly arrived migrants. Migrant associations’ representatives have had the opportunity to discuss them with the project manager. The identified needs reflect the state’s constructions of ‘integration’, i.e. language proficiency, contact with Swedes, and employment (Scuzzarello, 2015). The needs of the targeted migrants do not necessarily correspond to those identified by the project leader. For example, one underage female refugee was matched with the local refugee association: ‘There are few Swedes who are actively involved in the association [the girl] has become a member of. Yet, [she] meets other people than her neighbours. Even if strictly speaking the association is not the best one from an integration perspective, it is very important to her’ (Lagergren and Fundberg, 2009: 54). It seems that the girl, who arrived in Sweden unaccompanied, had needs other than the ones identified by the project’s organiser, such as finding a safe haven where she could communicate in her mother tongue. If more attentiveness were put into developing the project together with its beneficiaries, its goals might have been defined differently. Such expert-based understandings of the problem (i.e. lack of integration) and its solutions (i.e. more contact and better language proficiency) leave unchallenged the division of power between the experts working within state institutions and the beneficiaries. In this, individuals identified as experts speak for migrants in the course of defining needs. This authority is commonly justified on the basis of the status of the beneficiaries as dependent: they do not know the language and they do not have an understanding of the socio-political system that exists in the recipient society. The top-down approach that characterises this and other integration projects is probably perceived by migrants as demeaning and disqualifying.
A different approach to multiculturalism informed by caring ethics that does not reinforce inequalities would recognise power and encourage a democratic pluralistic politics informed by the principles of attentiveness, responsibility and responsivity. It would have to operate within an equality paradigm. To ensure that this can happen, the state must address socioeconomic injustices rooted in the political-economic structures of society. These affect some people, e.g. some migrant groups, more than others. An adequate approach to ensure just and equal redistribution in a way that does not presume the universal accessibility of rights must begin with an analysis of legal and political practices and of the existing conceptualisation and organisation of integration work (see White and Tronto, 2004; Tronto, 2010). In addition, the state should adopt forms of participatory democracy (within the constitutional framework of each state) which allow people to voice their claims. Combining different forms of consultation (e.g. group based, neighbourhood based etc.) would enable the state to avoid establishing a dialogue with predefined groups, as this would reinforce power asymmetries within a group.
Intra-group power relations
Feminist understandings of multiculturalism have exposed gendered power relations within groups (Okin, 1999; Shachar, 2001; Phillips, 2007). In order to challenge and possibly change social structures that create and reproduce these power asymmetries, caring multiculturalism encourages researchers to analyse how narratives about culture and correlated practices are employed selectively by community leaders in a way that disadvantages certain members of the group. Leaders have the power to make some stories seemingly more authentic than others and they silence the variety of voices within a group. I call this ‘power of problem setting’. The Community Cohesion Forum established by Birmingham Council (UK) is illustrative of this. According to a senior policy officer in the Council’s Equality and Diversity Unit, the Forum, set up in 2005, [L]ooks at the whole agenda around community cohesion and broadly it looks at how we implement the community cohesion strategy it helps to develop and measure cohesion in accordance to the [Community Cohesion] strategy. In the Community Cohesion Forum we invite community groups who represent particular heritage groups. For instance the Bangladeshi multipurpose centre, we have the Pakistani community development network, Indian community development network, the Chinese. (interview Bi1)
The organisation of the Forum signals that the Council is promoting a dialogue with faith and community leaders rather than engaging with the grass roots. Another policy officer is critical of this: ‘[The Council] seems to have this high level Birmingham Community Cohesion Forum with the great and the good, chaired by the chief executive’ (interview Bi2). The problem with establishing an institutionalised dialogue with ‘the great and the good’ of Birmingham’s ethnic communities is that no space is provided for questioning the power of unelected group representatives to voice the needs of those who they claim to be representing. Young Black and minority ethnic adults interviewed in Birmingham suggest that the role of community leaders can be problematic: ‘I don’t think they [the Council] should leave it to the leaders because, obviously, half the time they don’t even know’ (b:RAP, 2002: 45). They suggest that to challenge the power of community leaders, the Council should be more attentive to the needs of the beneficiaries of community cohesion and social policies by increasing their participation in designing policy solutions, Like you are doing now, more research. Spend time with the people they are catering for. Like in schools, if they want to know what’s best for schools, spend time with them and see what’s happening. (b:RAP, 2002: 44) First go and talk to [Black and minority ethnic communities]. Hold focus groups, surveys, questionnaires. I think you need contact with people if you want to find out what’s really needed. (b:RAP, 2002: 44)
The interviewees suggest that being consulted and even involved personally is more important than using spokespeople. Not engaging the beneficiaries of certain policies, such as community cohesion policies or social policies broadly speaking, undermines the trust towards the Council and triggers a lack of legitimacy in the targeted community. If the Council relies on a few representatives to grasp the needs of a community, it risks at best treating minority communities as homogeneous. In a worst-case scenario, it could unwittingly promote the interests of a few people and maintain cleavages within groups. Both scenarios have detrimental consequences for solidarity between communities. The Community Cohesion Forum illustrates the state’s power in establishing the premises upon which dialogue between state institutions and minorities should be carried out. It also overlooks intra-group power relations. An approach to dialogue informed by caring multiculturalism would bring attention to these power relations. It would structure consultations in such ways that all potential beneficiaries of a particular policy have the opportunity to voice their interests and needs. A natural implication of this democratic practice is that not every issue discussed in consultation meetings may be equally relevant to all beneficiaries, nor will everybody have the interest or the resources to attend them. Yet, if the institutional opportunities are not in place, citizens may face difficulties in expressing their concerns regarding particular issues. Their voice would be channelled through other institutions, like established community organisations or it would be ignored.
Intra-group power relations are addressed by multicultural theory in terms of right of exit. Yet, the opportunities to exit may be restricted by the fear of adverse consequences of choosing to act against the dominant narratives of a cultural group’s traditions and mores. Furthermore, people may want to remain part of a group because they have a strong emotional commitment to it. Caring multiculturalism tries to address this by stressing the importance of attentiveness to the voices of those who may be oppressed or discriminated against, but still want to stay. The state must act responsibly and offer protection to those who want to exit. It has to exercise the right to intervene and regulate the cost of exit in line with principles of individual equality (Phillips, 2007). In doing this, caring multiculturalism departs from the conception of autonomy advocated by proponents of multiculturalism. Following a relational understanding of autonomy developed in feminist ethics (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Saharso, 2003), caring multiculturalism reframes the right of exit by adding agency and voice to the discussion. It recognises the dependence of any given individual on the surrounding network of social, economic and political relations without, however, neglecting agency. It ‘takes into account the self-understanding of the women in question and the ways in which they negotiate oppressive social conditions’ (Saharso, 2003: 201).
Conclusions
In this article, I have outlined the main characteristics of caring multiculturalism. This framework, drawing upon discursive social psychology, relational ontology and feminist ethics, seeks to provide tools of analysis which can lead to the critical examination of policies and practices aimed at particular categories of migrants and at improving their ‘integration’ in the recipient society, as defined by the state. The resulting context-sensitive examination could contribute to engendering cognitive and structural changes which could transform asymmetric relations of power between the state, groups and individuals within groups. This is made possible by caring multiculturalism’s relational and processual understanding of culture and groups, which are not taken to be predefined entities in the world. Rather, they are the product of contestations and power struggles and the result of intersecting narratives and symbolic practices whose significance changes in time and space. In this sense, caring multiculturalism is a theoretical and analytic framework which builds upon a robust inquiry into the material and symbolic elements that constitute a group’s culture. In order to change asymmetric power relations, caring multiculturalism would not take for granted that groups are homogeneous and harmonious but would rather take seriously the personal identification of the individuals with the group in question. Group-specific policies and group rights would then be guaranteed only prior to a deep scrutiny of the strategic dimensions of identity construction. Drawing upon feminist caring ethics, caring multiculturalism also criticises – and offers contextually sensitive ways to change – the power exercised by the majority society in defining the needs of minority communities. If informed by values of attentiveness, responsivity and responsibility, multicultural practices would be better equipped to include the voices of the beneficiaries of such practices, thus making them active actors in the society of residence. Throughout the article, I have sought to emphasise that to advocate attentive, responsive and responsible ways to deal with diversity in contemporary societies is not the same as trumping a caring morality over the morality of (group) rights and justice. Rather, an approach to the theory and practices of multiculturalism informed by care ethics is about using alternative ontological and epistemological lenses of relationality to show the political, gendered and racialised nature of group constructions.
Interviews
Bi1: Senior policy officer, Equality and Diversity, Birmingham Council. 20 November 2008.
Bi2: Senior policy officer, West Midlands. 11 December 2008.
Bo1: Councillor, Province of Bologna. 30 June 2008.
M1: Senior policy officer, Malmö Council. 15 April 2011.