Abstract
A comparative analysis of Euroscepticism explores what it means in two nations and what is then articulated in specific newspapers. The theoretical terrain, Italy’s and Britain’s post-war relationships with the European Union, the countries’ media structures and the specific context of Il Giornale (owned by Silvio Berlusconi’s family) in Italy and The Times in the United Kingdom (owned by Rupert Murdoch) are mapped out. Some 21 interviews were conducted with relevant journalists and politicians (including reporters covering Europe for the aforementioned) offering further context. A critical discourse analysis of news stories and commentaries then spans the last decade. Although there is some Euroscepticism in Il Giornale, it has historically been localised, yet now seems to be growing in intensity. In The Times, however, the Euroscepticism conveyed is more pervasive and deeper. Its fact-based news can actually be very persuasive – ironically more akin to the commentary-laden news of Il Giornale – as the debate looms ahead of the planned 2017 UK referendum on European Union membership.
Introduction
Europe appears to be atomising in the face of the euro crisis, and tensions between various nations and how they see the post-war project are apparent. So how Euroscepticism manifests itself in newspapers’ discursive construction of Europe is pertinent. The European Commission (EC) in its White Paper on European Communication Policy noted that when Europe appears on the agenda at all, it is seen by most citizens from a national perspective (EC, 2006: 4).
Fossum and Schlesinger (2007: 279) note the continuing importance of diverse histories shaping collective identities. Yet that diversity is linked to the continuing vitality of Europe’s dominant political framework: the nation state (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007: 279). For instance, English law split in the Middle Ages from the codified Roman and Napoleonic traditions – understood in mainland Europe (Davies, 1997: 173).
Bourdieu (2005) and Benson and Neveu (2005) described the socialised subjectivity of habitus in field theory, integrated into the analysis of the study’s interviews, which in turn informed the subsequent critical discourse analysis (CDA). Habitus expresses the hypothesis that an individual’s predispositions and assumptions are the result of long-term socialisation (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 3). So, for instance, transcending political and journalistic fields, Italian interviewees had internalised European integration, to the extent that its discursive construction within nation was not always apparent.
Individuals often view the world around them through the prism of their nation. Billig (1995) and Anderson (1999) wrote of how nation has become naturalised in the press. Hallin and Mancini (2004), however, extend Billig’s (1995) and Anderson’s (1999) arguments regarding nationhood further. They offer in their comparative theoretical analysis a means of establishing how media structures have also naturalised nation and ways of media production within nation. Hallin and Mancini (2004) explore societal conventions and their contribution to the particular relationships between national politics and the press.
Wodak (2001: 65–66) argues discourses, as linguistic social practices, constitute non-discursive and discursive social practices, while being constituted by them. When newspapers are, therefore, articulating Eurosceptic sentiments in the wider national society – and when newspapers are themselves persuading further, is scrutinised.
Hard Euroscepticism can be defined as fundamental opposition to the idea of political and economic integration and expresses itself as a principled objection to the current form of integration of the European Union (EU), on the grounds that it offends deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 1–27). In contrast, soft Euroscepticism involves contingent or qualified opposition to European integration and may express itself in terms of opposition to specific policies or in terms of the defence of national interest. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) accept that these are only working definitions.
Context in CDA
The investigation challenged the naturalness of how we see Europe through the prism of nation (Van Dijk, 2001, 2005; Wodak, 2008) and what is then written in Il Giornale 1 and The Times. Wodak and Weiss (2004) argue that context is an inherent part of discourse analysis. Wodak (2008: 11) argues that investigating complex social problems is necessary, drawing on multiple theoretical approaches to analyse given contexts and relate these to texts. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) is incorporated into this CDA study (Wodak, 2001, 2004). This investigation transcends the purely linguistic dimension of discourse, by including the historical, political, sociological and psychological.
Hence, an interdisciplinary approach, including field theory (Benson and Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 2005) and comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) analysed interviews with relevant politicians and journalists in Italy and Britain. These were the last layers of context (Van Dijk, 2001, 2005) informing newspaper discourse analysis. Lemke (1995: 7) argued, when seeking patterns, commonality and relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of discourses.
Media structures
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 2), in advancing their comparative theoretical approach to media structures, argue that most of the literature is highly ethnocentric, referring only to a single country.
Hallin and Mancini (2004) believe that certain aspects of media systems are so familiar that they are not perceived at all. Comparisons force us to de-naturalise, conceptualising more clearly which parts of the media actually require more explanation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Beck (2003) suggests that a nation state outlook prevails: ‘To some extent, much of social science is a prisoner of the nation state’. (p. 454)
The tool to establish inter-relationships between nation and newspaper, post–World War II, in the specific Italian and British contexts, will be comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2000). The theory helped establish the following: (1) how and why news and comment were understood differently; (2) how and why the relationship between governments, political parties and newspapers functioned in conflicting ways; and (3) why the resulting perceptions embedded in conveying nations, the European project and various strands of Euroscepticism within those nations, were articulated and structured differently.
The Italian context
Italy’s post-war premier, Alcide de Gasperi, was one of the founding fathers of the European project. In the post-war period, Italy seems to have defined its nationhood through its Europeaness (Ginzborg, 2003: 239). It is a nation with a very different sense of self to the United Kingdom, although similarly, perhaps, with a very strong regionalism and north–south divide. The Italian political party, the Northern League, are secessionists who talk of an independent Padania, the Po valley region, and are vehemently anti-euro and anti-EU (Ginzborg, 2003: 301; Giordano, 2004: 65). This minority party held the balance of power in a series of Berlusconi-run governments for more than a decade.
In Italy, soft Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 1–27) was localised around the specific issue of the euro. Objections were raised within the Berlusconi government as the euro was introduced (‘Berlusconi calms cabinet euro row’, 2002). Trenz (2007: 103) noted Italy was sensitive to European integration at different speeds, keen to be a front-runner, concerning the EU Constitution. It is only the peripheral (yet politically pivotal) Northern League that appears to have developed a broader form of hard Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). Yet, the Northern League was pro-EU in the past (Giordano, 2004) – until its secessionist aspiration was not conceded to in Brussels.
Rosa (1992) speaks of two filoni (veins) in Italian journalism, the literary and the political. The market traditionally played a minor role. Journalist Forcella (2004) argues in his essay, Millecinquecento Lettori (1500 readers), that Italian newspapers have always focused primarily on politics, serving a well-informed, discerning, privileged elite – despite the introduction of mass circulation.
Mussolini’s brief pre–World War I journalism career is another reason for the politicised post–World War II newspaper climate in Italy. Responding to fascism reinforced political engagement (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 100).
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 27) argue that party–press parallelism is the degree to which the structure of the media system runs parallel with that of the party system. It exists in its strongest form when each news organisation is aligned with a particular party, whose views it represents in the public sphere. Il Giornale is based in Milan, a major industrial city also in the Italian north, serving both the supporters of the Northern League and Berlusconi’s People of Freedom Party (formerly Forza Italia).
Whereas the UK press has played a pioneering role in developing what Chalaby (1996: 303) called fact-centred discourse, Italians understand news very differently. Italy’s media regard facts as not speaking for themselves, commentary is valued and neutrality appears as inconsistency, naiveté or opportunism (Putnam, 1973: 81–82).
Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that in Italy, newspapers are typically identified with ideological positions and traditions of advocacy and commentary: ‘The notion of politically neutral journalism is less plausible where a wide range of competing world views contend’ (p. 61). Hence, the pastone on the front page of newspapers like Il Giornale is prevalent. A pastone front page combines a review of the major political developments of the day with comments by the journalist. Despite Italian journalism’s increased market orientation, this commentary-oriented news (a contradiction, from a British perspective) has yet to be abandoned.
Berlusconi has also dominated Italian politics for decades, having spent three terms as prime minister, leading right-leaning coalition governments. Il Giornale produced Italy’s first sensationalist headlines. Yet Il Giornale remains the voice of Silvio Berlusconi’s rightist People of Freedom Party (formerly Forza Italia).
Berlusconi told The Times on 14 January 2002 that he wanted Europe to be ‘strong, democratic, and able to speak with one voice’, but not a ‘centrally run’ super-state (Owen, 2002). He spoke of a future of ‘common European cultural values’ but not of the ‘bloated and cumbersome machine’ of ‘the Eurocentralisers’, but that it was ‘rubbish’ to call him Eurosceptic. He added,
No country is more European than Italy … If anything I am a Euro-enthusiast. I am the elected leader of a country whose European credentials are second to none. When Italians voted for me – overwhelmingly – they were voting for an Italy in Europe … states surrender pieces of their sovereignty in the interests of a greater identity. (Owen, 2002)
Ginzborg (2003: 291) argued that Berlusconi advocated a basically neo-liberal, Thatcherite economic programme. Berlusconi’s defence minister in 2002, when Italy entered the euro, was Antonio Martino, a member of Thatcher’s Eurosceptic Bruges group. As Forza Italia’s chief economist, Martino was hostile to monetary union. Martino joined with Giulio Tremonti, Forza Italia’s Economy Minister, to give the euro a cool reception. Foreign Minister, Renato Ruggiero, resigned from Berlusconi’s government as a result (‘Berlusconi calms cabinet euro row’, 2002).
Accused of Euroscepticism, Berlusconi told Corriere della Sera,
We are firmly convinced that the future of our country lies in a Europe that is stronger and knows how to speak with one voice and knows how to follow up economic integration with political integration, with a new constitution. (BBC, 2002)
The British context
Winston Churchill, in a post-war speech called for a kind of United States of Europe: ‘(the) first step is to form a Council of Europe … France and Germany must take the lead together … Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, mighty America – must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe’ (Brinkley and Hackett, 1991: 20). Britain was a founder member of the Council of Europe in 1949. Churchill worked closely with de Gasperi. In 1951, West Germany joined in an act of reconciliation, suggested by Churchill (Judt, 2005: 275). Yet, many UK newspapers evoke a one-dimensional Churchill, the war leader. This is the meta-story of a plucky Churchillian Britain (Garton-Ash, 2005: 31). Gifford (2008) argues that across the British political mainstream, degrees of Euroscepticism surface. It is part of how Britain has come to define itself (Gifford, 2008: 145). Gordon Brown as Chancellor, and then as Prime Minister, ‘re-asserted the advantages of British exceptionalism’. Gifford (2008: 145) argues there is an attempt to create a (globalised and free market) Anglo-Europe and simultaneously reveal a flawed European federalism:
British values have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal, mutual recognition not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax harmonisation, with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not a superstate. (Brown, 2003)
This could have been Thatcher in Bruges.
The UK Independence Party (UKIP) were national runners-up in the European elections, behind the Conservatives (Taylor, 2009), and some pollsters expected them to be outright winners in May 2015, which proved correct (Kellner, 2014). Gifford (2008) argues that UKIP’s withdrawal position allows Conservatives to present Euroscepticism as the British centre ground. Thatcher’s Bruges speech arguably articulated a hard Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 1–27). The strength of this attack on federalism meant that Britain’s commitment to agreed supranational objectives was cast in doubt. The speech was a riposte to the federal vision of the President of the EC, Jacques Delors. The episode created an internal split within the Conservative Party, mobilising Eurosceptics, like Thatcher, forming the Bruges Group, against pro-Europeans.
The two-party majority system often returns a one-party government with a large majority 2 (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 242). That government – and UK newspapers – often speaks to and for the nation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 242).
Morgan (1995) argues British journalists report European issues with a ‘developed sense of what will be considered acceptable first to their London editors and then to the British public’ (p. 303). Morgan (1995) argues copy can attain a ‘direct, Eurosceptic inflection where London-based editors think this is necessary’ (p. 324). Reports then sometimes lack the ‘sympathetic touch that journalists on the ground sometimes feel appropriate’ (Morgan, 1995: 324).
Weymouth and Anderson (1999) analyse Euroscepticism in British newspapers, and the perception of continental Europe as an external Other, analysing its manifestation in the British press (Weymouth and Anderson, 1999: 5, 91). They argue there can be a deliberate exaggeration of the principles, beliefs and intentions of the European Other. They cite the euro as an example. Garton-Ash (2005) argues some 22 million people in the United Kingdom – nearly three out of every four daily national newspaper readers – ‘pick up a daily dose of Euroscepticism’ (pp. 31, 271). Garton-Ash (2005) argues distinguishing between fact and opinion in these newspapers has long disappeared. Gifford (2008) argues Euroscepticism has become fundamental to constituting Britishness in the post-imperial context, despite EU membership (p. vii).
Editorial autonomy within The Times was agreed when Rupert Murdoch bought the paper in 1979. It proved ineffective (Shawcross, 1992). Murdoch insists on the political content of his media, sometimes using them to intervene in politics (Shawcross, 1992).
James Harding’s (2002) article in the Financial Times (11 June 2002) was headlined, ‘Murdoch to duel with Blair on euro’. Murdoch made it clear in the interview that his newspapers, including The Times, would be opposed to joining the euro. Murdoch argued:
‘Europe is made up of so many diverse cultures and histories that to slam it altogether with a government of French bureaucrats answerable to nobody … I cannot see anything but benefit by waiting’.
Rupert Murdoch was questioned over the possibility The Sun could back the Conservatives, at the next election (Harding, 2002). Mr Murdoch replied (BBC, 2003), ‘It’s a long way away, let’s see what the government is doing with Europe, let’s see how Mr Howard performs, how the government performs’. 3 In a television interview, he warned of the ‘great dangers’ of the new European Constitution. Murdoch added, ‘I don’t like the idea of any more abdication of our sovereignty in economic affairs or anything else’. He said, he would wait to see what was in the final EU Constitution, but that if it was anything like the draft, ‘then we’ll (his newspapers, author’s italics) oppose it’ (BBC, 2003). Murdoch’s positioning on Europe is also apparent in his recent April 2012 evidence to the Leveson Enquiry (Gaber, 2013): ‘My feeling about it, if you want to debate the Euro was that it was a great abdication of power over our affairs’. This Murdoch mantra of no abdication to Europe is often repeated (BBC, 2003).
Field and comparative theories and methodology
In unravelling a little the complexity of interaction between the various fields, the aim is to render some of the invisible struggles visible (Bourdieu, 2005). Marchetti (2005) makes the point that news is never just the product of the specific logic of the journalistic world. Marchetti (2005) argues that it is important to engage with other social spaces, in comparative research, avoiding a media-centric bias. Bourdieu (2005) also argues that an audience ratings mentality can take hold across fields, with the public’s position influencing journalists and politicians alike. Nick Clegg (2004) referred to British political cowardice in the face of press vitriol over Europe.
Interviews with various relevant actors, including, for instance, political journalists who covered Europe for The Times and Il Giornale, offered another layer of contextualisation before the actual analysis of newspaper articles in the CDA. The information they provided often corroborated the preceding presentation of these two national narratives in Europe, and how and what information was subsequently conveyed in the media. National perceptions were explored and unpacked. In the field theory analysis of interviewees, tacit presuppositions that we accept as national citizens were examined, described by Fossum and Schlesinger (2007) as doxa. Interviewees had often worked in several fields (politics and journalism typically), providing insights into the complexities and interactions between fields – and the discursive communication of Euroscepticism that resulted in various guises.
Both the field and comparative theoretical analyses undertaken were seeking to investigate the discursive construction of European integration within nation, rendering visible the ideological and cultural struggles in Britain and Italy. National habitus and its exposition in field theory were the basis for noting how national discourse was constantly modified, by changing contexts (Wodak, 2006). Negative Other presentations (of other nations and indeed Europe) were investigated. A heuristic unravelling of national habitus extricated the internalisation and socialisation of Europe within nation. Different manifestations and notions of nationalism, of the normative and the operative (Delanty and Kumar, 2006) and the hot and banal (Billig, 1995; Delanty and Kumar, 2006) deepened the analysis.
Field theory was utilised in interview analysis in a bid for a more empirical approach (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 9) in comprehending the complexities of the national public sphere (and in this study, perceptions of European integration within that sphere). Benson and Neveu (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 3) argue that an explanation of discourses should draw on structures within a field and in relation to other fields, coupled with the historical trajectories of those involved.
Bourdieu’s (2005) field approach calls for an examination of institutional logics: the simultaneous analysis of social structures and cultural forms. The second tier for analysing interview data was comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Field theory was wedded to comparative theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Analysis of the journalistic fields of Il Giornale and The Times also drew on earlier examination of the post–World War II intertwining of Italian and British politics and the press (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), as illustrated in the examples later in this article. Hallin and Mancini note key national differences, such as the role of majoritarianism in the British two-party system, with prime ministers (and indeed newspapers) speaking to and for the nation, or the role of party–press parallelism in Italy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 27).
Luciana Castellina appears twice, as both an MEP and former journalist.
Methodology: Newspaper discourse
Mautner’s (2008: 42) theories and methods were employed when analysing news discourse and commentary pieces. Argumentation theory (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) and conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Musolff, 2004) were normally used for commentaries alone. However, it was found that in more recent news stories in The Times, a lot of comment had crept in (Garton-Ash, 2005; Morgan, 1995: 324). Argumentation (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) and metaphor (Musolff, 2004) theories proved more relevant, as a result, because of how the pieces sought to persuade.
Specific categories are applied to the analysis of news. The approach taken is to scrutinise the use of specific words and phrases in the texts, as the initial building blocks of analysis. The categories address many of the issues raised in the theoretical sections and endeavour to establish the way European integration is discursively constructed within these two newspapers. The news analysis included a comprehension of relevance to the readership and the newspaper agenda. In the analysis of the language, the focus includes lexis, intensification and mitigation, referential strategies and modality. In the modality category, a link was made between the lexical and syntactic levels in analysis (Mautner, 2008).
Mautner (2008: 43) refers to the argumentative device of rapport between author and reader, achieved, for instance, by the use of rhetorical questions such as the following: does anyone believe it (the government)? As Mautner argues, this is the supposedly unifying force of common sense. This discursive strategy is built on a commonality of interest between author and reader. Rapport relates to the potential role of the newspaper itself as a political actor – in certain instances, most obviously in commentaries – but also in news stories.
Analysis of commentaries (and indeed stories that sought to persuade) utilised theories relevant to analysing persuasive language. Wodak and Reisigl (2001: 69–70) start with an analysis of persuasion. Persuasion, they argue, is a means of intentionally influencing a person so they adopt, fix or change their ways of perception.
Political metaphors typically argue to prove a contested issue and thus also legitimise a certain course of action. Musolff (2004: 32) advances a similar position to that of argumentation theory (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). There should be a valid justification for using particular premise to arrive at a certain conclusion. Musolff (2004: 33–34) argues this unconscious conceptual framework is ‘argumentation-by-metaphor’.
A series of news stories and commentaries in Il Giornale and The Times are investigated in the newspaper discourse analysis. It focuses on the introduction of the euro (1–2 January 2002), the summit agreeing the 2007 Reform Treaty (20 October 2007), the Irish Referendum rejection of the Reform Treaty (14 June 2008; Charter and Sharrock, 2008), and the rejection by Britain of new euro rules, leaving it isolated in the EU (10 December 2011; Watson, 2011). These events were selected because they were all major EU stories, affecting the whole community. In most cases, analysis initially focuses on the key news story, followed by scrutiny of the prominent related commentary (see Appendix 1).
Findings
The front page Il Giornale pastone on the Irish rejection of the Reform Treaty (14 June 2008; Charter and Sharrock, 2008) criticised Brussels bureaucracy (concurring with Berlusconi’s pronouncements, 2000, Owen, 2002). Yet, it also lamented the loss of the Europolity, akin to Trenz’s (2007: 98) findings that most European newspaper commentaries relating to the EU constitution, opted for a positive identification with the past (except Britain). The article evoked Italy’s founding fathers, painting them as also builders of Europe.
The scene is set at the start. The headline reads, Europe dies, the Europeans, nearly (Macioce, 2008). A rapport (Mautner, 2008: 43) is developed with readers, playing off a double meaning: with (political) Europe dead and Italy’s chances of progressing (in the European football champions) nearly. From the very start, political metaphors (Musolff, 2004) are at play. The language of football is continuously used to describe an arguably failing Europe. In the first line of the article, the ball silently rolls over the line as Italy loses the football match. The analogy is the Irish rejecting Europe at the polls.
Here Il Giornale populism, as a relatively speaking mass-circulation title, is apparent, with what Bourdieu (2005) described as an audience ratings mentality. The intentionality (Bakhtin, 1982) plays off is the public’s understanding of the championships – to simultaneously lament the state of the other (political) Europe.
There are competing forces engendered in the text.
Lines 29–40: 29 Europe was a dream. It was the monk Isidoro Pacensis, who described 30 “Europeans” the soldiers of Carlo Martello who stopped the Arabs. It was 31 the secular, moral and spiritual religion of Mazzini. There was Altiero 32 Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni at Ventotene. It was the 33 suicidal war and the dawn of the American century, with the will to re- 34 build, brick by brick, with the American dollars of the Marshall plan. It 35 was the redemption of the defeated, who looked ahead, turning to 36 Adenauer and De Gasperi. It was the common market as an ambassador 37 of peace, cancelling centuries of French, Prussian, Spanish, Dutch, 38 Scandinavian and also Italian soldiers fighting for a metre of land in the 39 name of their faith or country, or finding any other excuse to spit at each 40 other.
Dreams are mentioned 11 times in the 76-line article. The author, Macioce, appears to want a more effective Europolity, lamenting paucity of ambition. The EU Constitution focused principally on economics. The dream collides with the bureaucrats and bankers, mentioned directly and indirectly seven times. The positive evaluation of the dream is juxtaposed with the negative evaluation of bankers and bureaucrats. Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski (2007: 4) argued constitutionalisation was a chance to make meaning of fundamental European values and objectives. Yet, like previous treaties, it finally limited itself to the design of institutions.
The role call (Lines 31–36) can be interpreted as demonstrating Italy’s centrality to Europe, although not articulated explicitly. The need, for instance, for Italy’s earlier prime minister Romano Prodi and later Mario Monti (Feltri, 2011), to maintain Italy’s centrality (in the face of France and Germany), is a recurring theme: the topos of centrality mentioned earlier (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001).
However, Europe is also seen through the Weltanschauung of the centre-right Berlusconi coalition, the party–press parallelism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) of Il Giornale is apparent. Hence, Carlo Martello stopped the Arabs (Line 30), the contradiction of the secular and religious aspects of Italian society, in mentioning Mazzini (Line 31). Berlusconi made it clear that he wanted God in the EU Constitution (Johnson and Farrell, 2003). In the anti-immigration law, proposed by Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi (leader of the coalition secessionists, the Northern League), they claim that theirs was a ‘Christian model of society’ (Ter Wal, 2002: 162–165):
53 Europe has been communicated badly. You receive directives from desks 54 far away, from faceless people. The man on the street, sympathises with 55 Cassano (Italian national team footballer), intolerant to any type of 56 bureaucracy and the impression that the men in grey suits are trying to 57 codify their lives. They tell you when and how to milk your cow, how 58 much air you can breath, who you can choose as your neighbour. This is 59 the problem with Europe. It is boring and a nuisance. 60 It is your mortgage that goes up each time they say to increase interest 61 rates. It is to appoint people who do not count but earn a fortune. It is to 62 have as a hero a banker. It is to ask yourself where Estonia is. It is to 63 nullify all the identities for something that floats. It is the disappointment 64 of an entire generation who really believed in Europe…
Hence, you receive directives from desks far away, from faceless people (Lines 53–54), with bureaucrats in grey suits: trying to codify lives (Lines 56–57). The intensity increases with: It is to appoint people who do not count but earn a fortune. It is to have as a hero a banker (Lines 61–62). Finally, it is the disappointment of an entire generation who really believed in Europe (Lines 63–64) – but whose dreams were dashed. In terms of persuasive force, it could be argued that this continuously recurring notion of the dream being thwarted by a bureaucracy re-enforces this particular construction of reality. Italian national footballer Cassano (Line 55) is employed to good effect, as a means of persuasion, developing a rapport with the reader (Mautner, 2008: 43), the supposedly unifying force of common sense. Berlusconi himself (Owen, 2002) spoke earlier of a bloated and cumbersome European bureaucratic machine. The article arguably laments a European constitution falling short of a Europolity (Oberhuber and Krzyżanowski, 2007: 4).
In December 2011, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, refused to sign the fiscal treaty tackling the euro crisis, arguing it was not in the national interest. For the first time in a series of articles analysed, Il Giornale describes the EU as ‘politically insignificant’. The aforementioned pattern breaks. It becomes an irrelevance perhaps. Albeit ambiguous, author Vittorio Feltri, in a front page pastone on December 10, headlined: Poor Monti doesn’t count for anything, also seems to be suggesting that both the euro and the EU should be put to sleep. It is a stronger critique than anything previously analysed (Rowinski, 2010). Is this a new highpoint for Italian Euroscepticism? Is this not Il Giornale intervening as a political actor in its rapport with its (relatively speaking) mass-circulation readership? (Mautner, 2008).
Several factors mitigate. Feltri is a giant of Italian journalism. Feltri spent two spells in charge of Il Giornale. Prior to editing Il Giornale, Feltri had been the editor of L’Independente, supporter of the (anti-EU) Northern League. Yet, Il Giornale and L’Independente were also attempts to create more mass-circulation newspapers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 102). Feltri took up his first editorship of Il Giornale in 1994. In his 4-year tenure, the circulation went from 130,000 to 250,000. Despite some Euroscepticism in Berlusconi’s government (BBC, 2003), wider research found Italians broadly pro-European (Giordano, 2004).
Yet, Berlusconi (Flynn, 2012) alarmed many observers recently by musing openly about Italy quitting the euro. He told French newspaper Liberation that his remarks had been misreported. Berlusconi said some members of his party had raised the possibility – just to put pressure on Germany to relinquish its demands for Italian fiscal austerity.
Italy may be equivocating and Il Giornale, more specifically, catering for the different audiences of the (anti-EU) Northern League and Berlusconi’s People of Freedom Party (formerly Forza Italia).
Britain’s persuasive news
The Times’ more recent news coverage is more akin to the commentary-laden Italian news analysed, ahead of a possible 2017 referendum on EU membership. A lot of comment had crept in (Garton-Ash, 2005; Morgan, 1995: 324). Argumentation (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) and metaphor (Musolff, 2004) theories proved more relevant. Is Britain not the producer of what Chalaby (1996: 303) called fact-centred news discourse?
The Times piece on 14 June 2008 focused on the Irish rejection of the Reform Treaty, analysed in greater depth, like its Il Giornale counterpart.
The Reform Treaty still needed ratifying by the British parliament. Voices were calling for a referendum on this particular EU constitutional treaty. Any attempts in the news story to persuade should be explored (Musolff, 2004):
Irish voters sign death warrant for EU treaty 1 European leaders look for way round decisive rejection 2 Irish voters tore up the European Union’s blueprint for the future yesterday 3 in a dramatic and decisive rejection of the Lisbon treaty. 4 The result leaves Brussels’ plans to streamline EU power – creating a 5 president and foreign minister and reducing the influence for smaller 6 countries such as Ireland – in tatters. 7 The 53.4percent ‘no’ vote should in theory sign the death warrant of the 8 treaty which has been eight years in the making, since it requires 9 ratification by all 27 members. 10 Gordon Brown faced immediate calls to scrap British ratification. 11 But some European leaders remained determined to ignore the 12 result. Suspicions grew of a Franco-German plot to forge ahead and leave 13 Ireland behind after Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the French Europe Minister, said: 14 ‘The most important thing is that the ratification process must continue in 15 the other countries and then we shall see with the Irish what type of legal 16 arrangement could be found’. 17 Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, and President Sarkozy of France 18 seen as the architects of the treaty – issued a joint plea for the remaining 19 eight countries to complete ratification.
The article’s strapline (Line 1) should be noted. This argumentation strategy (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) then relates back to Britain: Gordon Brown faced immediate calls to scrap the British ratification (Line 10). The story does not attribute these claims. Remember Murdoch’s personal reticence (BBC, 2003) and opposition to the constitution.
The impression created by the story’s strapline can be interpreted as re-enforced by a fallacy of authority or argumentum ad verecundiam. 4 This fallacy entails backing one’s own standpoint by reference to competent authorities. The appeal to such authority is fallacious if, say, the authority is not competent or qualified. French Europe minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, is quoted in Lines 14–16. The quotation creates the impression in strapline (Line 1) that European leaders will look for a way around the rejection. The Times is supporting its standpoint, as a political actor (Mautner, 2008: 43), arguably expressed in the strapline, by reference to this competent authority: the French Europe minister. However, this appeal to authority is arguably fallacious. The French Europe Minister is only qualified to comment up to a point. Jouyet does not speak for the whole French government, which had not formulated a clear position yet. A clear response to the Irish referendum result would be finally formulated by a European summit of prime ministers and councils of ministers from all the EU members. The EC would also have a say. Immediately before the Jouyet citation, the authors of The Times article wrote: ‘Suspicions grew of a Franco-German plot to forge ahead and leave Ireland behind, after Jean-Pierre Jouyet, the French Europe minister, said, …’(Lines 12–13). This premise constructs a certain perception of the subsequent citation.
The argumentation is re-enforced by a cluster of conceptual metaphors (Musolff, 2004). The headline refers to the Irish signing the death warrant of the EU treaty. Then in the article’s introduction: Irish voters tore up the EU’s blueprint for the future (Line 2). Then the EU’s plans to reduce the influence of smaller countries, like Ireland, was left in tatters (Lines 4–6). These metaphors possibly re-affirm the perception of a French-German axis driving through integration and ignoring little Ireland.
This underdog conceptualisation may appeal to how the British sometimes see themselves (in Europe). The analogical conceptualisation continues, with Merkel, the German Chancellor, and Sarkozy, the French President, seen as the architects of the treaty (Line 18). Relating this back to an earlier reference, it is therefore their blueprint that has been torn up (Line 2).
Musolff (2004: 31) argues that analogical popular metaphors can be so powerful that they sometimes result in politicians and nations committing to specific courses of action. In 1992, a popular metaphor was the European train leaving the station without Britain.
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, deemed this misleading. Thatcher (1993) countered, ‘If the train was heading in the wrong direction (concerning European integration), Britain was better off not on board’. She warned that anyone dealing with the European Community should pay careful attention to metaphors, arguing Britain had learned the hard way by agreeing to apparently empty, vague aspirations. Britain was later deemed to have committed to political structures contrary to national interests (Thatcher, 1993: 319). It could be argued that the article is trying to persuade Brown to scrap ratification.
Where the article on the Irish rejection in Il Giornale was a lament for the loss of the dream of Europe, the article in The Times was endeavouring to demonstrate how this re-calibrated EU Constitution, should be scrapped by Britain – much as it had been rejected by Ireland. The analogical conceptualisation (Musolff, 2004) of the Franco-German alliance, trying to bully Ireland (and Britain), is pertinent. A Europe deciding through consensus on how to respond – including Britain – is not given a voice.
Two very different manifestations of Euroscepticism surface over the Irish rejection (14 June 2008; Charter and Sharrock, 2008). Il Giornale is critical of the shortcomings of the bureaucratic machine (akin with Berlusconi’s position and Murdoch’s for that matter), but in the final analysis because the machine has stifled a deeper Europolity. This again is Italy seeking centrality. Conversely, The Times article constructs a Europe as a threat to the national interest. A British articulation of the constitution having taken Europe too far (so the Irish rejected it) rather that of a Europe (in Il Giornale) not having gone far enough.
Britain rejected the Euro Summit Agreement, leaving it isolated (10 December 2011; Watson (2011) and headlined, Britain stands alone with historic rejection of EU). It can be argued that here also The Times employs a string of argumentative strategies (Musolff, 2004; Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) to persuade the readers that Prime Minister Cameron, in Churchillian fashion (Garton-Ash, 2005: 31), won, for the national interest. Britain is presented as carving its own destiny. It is a portrayal of Cameron as strong – not intransigent and outgunned (as perceived by Il Giornale’s piece).
Cameron, is on a war footing, mobilising against Europe, speaking to and for the nation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Straehle et al. (1999: 72) argue that it is not a particular word or expression that constitutes the metaphor, although the words and expressions allow us to infer its presence. Cameron’s struggle infers the presence of a battle raging. Cameron stunned the EU, triggering a response from the euro-plus group. Cameron drew a line in the sand, despite being rounded on repeatedly by French leader, Nicolas Sarkozy. Nevertheless, Cameron marked out his battlelines, saying he would fight.
Conclusion
Il Giornale presented a sometimes cautious Italy – yet one consistently seeing itself as central to Europe’s success, as articulated in the topos of centrality, developed in this study (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). Yet, Feltri’s (2011) piece attacking the EU marked a new high for Euroscepticism articulated in Italy’s newspapers, and this was from a man keen to convey public sentiment in a (relatively speaking) mass-circulation newspaper (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).
However, in Britain, The Times consistently both presented and re-enforced perceptions of the EU seen as a threat to the national interest, in its use of topoi, arguing the point (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). The need to persuade (Musolff, 2004; Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) further was demonstrated by the front page news stories on the Irish treaty rejection (2008) and Britain’s rejection of the Euro Summit Agreement (2011), in coverage more akin to the commentary-laden news of Italian pastone (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Their comparative theoretical approach clearly demonstrates how, in comparing nations in this instance, the notion of facts-based (Chalaby, 1996: 303) news coverage in Britain over Europe can be challenged and re-appraised, as the nation heads towards the 2017 referendum.
Footnotes
Appendix 1
Although relatively few commentaries are analysed in the Italian newspaper discourse, many of the news stories are pastone, hence commentary-laden in character.
There was a rationale in including an article by Scafuri and his opposite number Charter, were included. However the analysis of the Scafuri piece offered another insight. Both Scafuri’s and Riddell’s, seemed devoid of any use of persuasion. Use of metaphors and argumentation was in the main, completely lacking. This highlighted the extent to which the news stories in both newspapers, were attempting to persuade, especially in the case of the fact-based The Times, often more akin to Il Giornale’s pastone.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
Interviewees
Anthony Browne, 8 July 2004 (e-mail correspondence).
Christopher Beazley, August 2003.
David Walter, March 2004.
David Sells, March 2004.
Nick Clegg, October 2004.
Geoffrey Martin, January 2004.
David Charter, 18 February 2004.
Dr Martin Bond, 14 July 2003.
Roberto Scafuri, 27 October 2004.
Carlo Corazza, 24 October 2004.
Paola Buonadonna, January 2004.
Antonia Mochan, October 2004.
Luciana Castellina, October 2004.
Frederick Baker, October 2004.
Carla Cazaninni, October 2004.
Angus Robertson, March 2004.
Rory, Watson, October 2004.
Simon Duffin, October 2004.
Richard Corbett, October 2004.
Ian Bell and Jim Dougal, October 2004.
