Changing media representations of enemy leaders: A comparison between the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Ireland conflicts

Abstract

In times of conflict, the media tend to create a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which emphasizes the justice of ‘our’ side and the viciousness of ‘the enemy’. In this way, the media not only reflect an existing political reality but also contribute to its construction. But do the media also work in the opposite direction and may contribute to the advancement of peace processes through complex and multi-dimensional coverage of the enemy? The present study examines whether and how mass media change the images of enemy leaders during peace accords compared to violent pre-agreement periods. For this purpose, an analytical framework of seven parameters was developed, analyzing the media coverage of rival leaders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat) and the conflict in Northern Ireland (David Trimble and Gerry Adams). The findings indicate that the media portrayal of the leaders has changed significantly on three out of four sides: the Irish-Unionist, the Irish-Nationalist, and the Palestinian. The conclusion is that positive change in media representations of enemy leaders may accelerate emerging peace processes and improve the social climate toward them.

Keywords

Enemy images enemy leaders Good Friday agreement media representations Oslo agreement

Introduction

The relationship between media and conflicts raises a great deal of interest and has been extensively examined. The main conclusion of these studies is that reporting conflicts often maintains and escalates them, framing ‘us’ as ‘good’ and the national enemy as a dehumanized Other (Bahador, 2015; Thussu and Freedman, 2003). Can the media also play the opposite role and contribute to conflict alleviation by neglecting the binary ‘we’ vs ‘them’ framework? This question is the focus of the current study.

There are findings indicating that complex coverage of conflicts can promote peacebuilding processes (Cottle, 2006; Lynch, 2015; Spencer, 2005), but studies that examined how mass media frame enemy leaders while they become partners for peace are scarce. The few studies in the field have mainly focused on one conflict scene only. In addition, they have examined relatively limited periods of time rather than longitudinal changes (e.g. Lelourec, 2009; Mandelzis, 2003).

The present study seeks to fill these empirical gaps by examining media representation of enemy leaders in two conflict scenes – the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Ireland’s – and over a long period of time, which includes both violent confrontations and peace accords. Specifically, the study compares the media representations of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin during the first Intifada (December 1987–August 1993), and during the peace accords that led to the signing of the Oslo Agreement (September 1993), and those of Gerry Adams and David Trimble during parts of the Troubles (January 1995–February 1998) and during the peace accords that led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (April 1998; from now on, the GFA).

In order to analyze these representations, an analytical framework was formed, consisting of seven parameters. Some of them have been noted in previous studies (e.g. Bahador, 2015; Ottosen, 1995); yet, no conceptually unified framework has been proposed to allow a reliable comparison between different images of enemy leaders over time and place.

The article will begin with a theoretical review of the role played by media, and especially media representations of ‘the enemy’ and its leaders. The peace processes in the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Ireland’s conflicts will be briefly reviewed in order to provide background for the case studies. The methodological section will explain the sampling, coding, and analysis of the data. The findings will describe the media representations of Arafat, Rabin, Adams, and Trimble during violent pre-agreement periods and during peace talks. Finally, the discussion will provide possible explanations for these findings and discuss the theoretical benefits of the study as well as its limitations.

Media coverage of conflicts

The rise of ethno-national conflicts around the world during the 1990s (e.g. the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Algiers) has aroused considerable scholarly interest regarding their causes and implications (Gilboa et al., 2016). The spread of these conflicts had also increased research interest in the role played by mass media in their development. Based on the assumption that the media are central agents for constructing collective identities (Billig, 1995), especially in times of conflict, numerous studies have examined how conflicts are ‘framed’ (Cottle, 2006; Thussu and Freedman, 2003).

Most of them have come to the same conclusion: mass media usually cover conflicts in a binary manner using frames of ‘we’ and ‘they’, ‘moral’ and ‘criminals’, ‘civilized’ and ‘barbaric’ (Bratic, 2008: 489). By so doing, mass media become willing accomplices in wartime propaganda and may even play a role in instigating conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

This pattern of framing has been termed ‘War Journalism’: a limited coverage, which mainly emphasizes power, struggle, and violence between the opposing sides (Benn, 2015). Each action of one side is framed as victory or loss for the other, and the journalistic narrative focuses on the immediate and visible implications of the conflict (Kempf, 2017). One of the main subjects for constructing this narrative is the national enemy, which undergoes ‘enmification’ processes by mass media, that is, is being framed by negative stereotypes (Bahador, 2015: 123).

Media representations of national enemies and their leaders

The process of enmification is a psychodynamic mechanism whose main purpose is to protect the ego of the individual or the group members (Oppenheimer, 2006: 270). Enmification may also aim at political purposes such as constructing and strengthening national ideologies (Lynch, 2015). During conflict times, mass media tend to serve these goals using several techniques:

Stereotyping: Labeling the enemy with stereotypical and negative features, such as irrationality and aggressiveness (Bahador, 2015).

Dehumanization and demonization: Many of the negative characteristics attributed to the enemy deprive him from his humanity and relate him to Satanic features (Steuter and Wills, 2009).

Cultural and moral differentiation: The media tend to emphasize the moral differences between the enemy and ‘our’ nation (Bahador, 2015).

Accusation: The enemy is often portrayed as a threat to the nation’s existence (Musa and Ferguson, 2013). Any interaction with him is framed as having negative consequences (Ottosen, 1995).

Exaggeration: Intensifying the damage caused by the enemy’s actions, while, on the contrary, underestimating his positive steps (Musa and Ferguson, 2013).

Blurring the personal identity of the enemy group’s members and treating them as a faceless mass (Musa and Ferguson, 2013).

The use of these techniques by mass media have been found in a wide array of conflict scenes worldwide. In Northern Ireland, for example, media coverage during ‘the troubles’ had generally characterized the activities of paramilitary groups as evil, psychopathic, and irrational (Cooke, 2003: 77–78). Similarly, demonization of the Palestinians was very common in the Israeli media during the first Intifada, and they were often portrayed as threatening and inhuman (Liebes and Kampf, 2009: 439).

One of the most prominent representatives of the enemy is the group leader, who is viewed as an exemplar for the group’s values and behavior (Balmas, 2017). Studies examining media representations of enemy leaders show that they are portrayed in a negative manner, and that their delegitimization reduces the public’s willingness to compromise (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009). But what happens when peace talks are held between the parties? Is the enemy’s stereotypical framing maintained or changed?

Media coverage of peace processes

Studies examining the media coverage of peace processes can be divided into two types. The first is the research of ‘Peace Journalism’, that is, the normative stance of journalists and media practitioners to reduce conflicts via ‘win-win’ orientation of coverage (Lynch, 2015). The second is studies that seek to expose variables that affect media coverage of conflicts.

Peace Journalism emerged as a counter-reaction to the War Journalism patterns described above. The genre calls on the press to abandon the dichotomous perception of ‘us’ vs ‘them’, assuming that a general win-win orientation may de-escalate the conflict (Benn, 2015).

In recent years, there has also been a proliferation of studies that seek to explain (and not just describe) the journalistic choices to frame conflicts in either war-oriented or peace-oriented pattern (Hackett, 2006). These studies take into account the extensive socio-political context in which the media operate and seek to explain how it translates into media choices.

Wolfsfeld (2004), for example, argues that the constructive and destructive roles played by mass media during peace processes are shaped by five factors: news values, elite consensus, the number and severity of crises that occur during the process, the level of media sensationalism, and the extent of ‘shared media’ among the parties (pp. 31–42). All of these factors feed into a politics–media–politics (PMP) cycle, in which ‘changes in the political environment lead to changes in media performance that often lead to further changes in the political environment’ (p. 31).

According to this approach, news media are much more likely to react to changes in the political environment rather than to initiate them (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013: 120). However, they might also have a significant impact on political outcomes. In other words, while the media rarely act as a sole agent of change, they often serve as a prominent factor in complex social systems that induce change (Bratic, 2008: 493).

However, despite efforts to contextualize the way mass media might support peace processes, there are almost no studies that have systematically examined how enemy images change during periods of peace talks (Armoudian, 2015). The number of studies focusing on enemy leaders is even lower. The few studies in the field point to a certain change they are having, but their conclusions are not clear-cut. Lelourec (2009), for example, found that the negative media representations of the Sinn Fein (SF) leaders in the British press changed only slightly after the signing of the GFA. On the contrary, Mandelzis (2003) found that the Israeli press dramatically increased the extent of Arafat’s coverage in the period following the signing of the Oslo Agreement and changed his image from villain to a brave leader. As previous findings were mixed, we ask,

RQ1: Does the media portrayal of enemy leaders change during periods of peace accords compared to violent pre-agreement periods?

The present study seeks to contribute to the study of media and peace by comparing enemy representations in two different conflict scenes. The case studies chosen for this purpose are the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the conflict in Northern Ireland. Following is a brief historical background of the two conflicts, focusing on the peace processes around which the second research question is based, and on the rationale for their selection as case studies.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Oslo agreement

The roots of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict lie at the end of the 19th century, with the establishment of the Zionist movement, which called for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (Shafir, 1996). In November 1947, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly voted to partition the land of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, but the resolution was rejected by the Arab leadership. Fighting broke out between the two communities, which turned into an all-out war after 15 May 1948, when the State of Israel was declared by the Jewish leadership and the Arab states surrounding Israel joined the battle (Kelman, 2007). An armistice agreement was signed in July 1949, and its lines became the official borders of the State of Israel. In 1967, another war broke out between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. The Six-day War, in which Israel won and occupied the West Bank and Gaza, radically changed the 1949 map (Tessler, 2009). Immediately after the war, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, declaring the two parts of the city as Israel’s capital. The rest of the West Bank and Gaza remained under occupation, and the population was governed by military rule (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998).

Since the 1970s, several attempts have been made to resolve the conflict through political contacts (Even, 2013). From late 1992 to August 1993, discreet contacts were held between Israeli academics and official PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) officials. In August 1993, the parties formulated a Declaration of Principles designed to lay the basis for resolving the conflict. In the last-minute talks, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and the political agreement named the Oslo Agreement was signed at the White House on 13 September 1993 (Lavie, 2014).

Because of the secrecy of the contacts, the agreement was received by the publics in both sides in surprise and demanded that they quickly overcome the gap between the leaders’ popular image as arch-enemies and their new images as partners for peace. In his capacity as defense minister during the first Intifada, Rabin ordered to suppress the uprising by force (Even, 2013). In addition, he served as chief of staff during the Six-day War. Hence, in the eyes of the Palestinians, he symbolized a significant enemy. Yasser Arafat was also perceived in the Israeli collective identity as an arch-enemy, based on his involvement in terrorist activities against Israeli targets during his membership in the PLO (Sasley, 2010).

In parallel with the contacts between the sides, deadly terrorist attacks have taken place in Israel and aroused strong opposition to the peace process within parts of the Israeli public (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). The resistance reached a climax on 4 November 1995, when Rabin was shot dead by a Jewish assassin during a peace rally in Tel Aviv. The assassination had political implications for the continuation of contacts between Israel and the Palestinians, which so far have not been able to mature into a lasting peace agreement (Lavie, 2014).

The Northern Ireland conflict and the GFA

The Northern Ireland conflict is rooted in the late 16th century when Britain resettled thousands of Protestant immigrants in the north of the country. The current incarnation of the conflict began in 1920, when Ireland was divided into two parts under the Government of Ireland Act: A 26-county free state in the South and a six-county state in the north that remained under British control (Tonge, 2013). From 1922 until 1972, Northern Ireland functioned as a self-governing region of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Party formed the government for all of these years (English, 2003).

During the sixties, parallel to non-violent civil rights movement, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) harshened its violent guerrilla warfare against what they defined as illegitimate, oppressive occupation by the British government (Armoudian, 2015: 4). Their general aim was to disengage from British patronage and join the united Ireland, while the Unionists sought to remain part of the United Kingdom (O’Leary and McGarry, 2016).

Violent clashes with the state police in a civil rights march in 1968 marked the beginning of the Troubles – a period of bloody clashes between nationalists and unionist paramilitary groups that lasted three decades and claimed over 3600 victims (O’Leary and McGarry, 2016). From the unionist point of view, the IRA violent struggle was considered as terrorism, and both IRA and its political wing SF (led by Gerry Adams) were blamed for the region’s ‘troubles’ (Cottle, 1997). A significant change was felt only in the 1990s after John Major, then the British prime minister, launched a series of secret talks with representatives of the SF. In 1994, a ceasefire was declared. A few weeks after his election as head of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in September 1995, David Trimble began negotiations with representatives of the SF, and became the first leader of the Ulster Unionists to negotiate with the party. During this period, many nationalists have accused Trimble of being a bigot who does not really want to treat the nationalists as equals (Miller, 2014: 53).

The talks, in which the British and Irish governments and eight political parties/groupings from Northern Ireland took part, finally led to the signing of the GFA in 1998, which was approved by a referendum conducted in both Northern and Southern Ireland (Tonge, 2013). The agreement defined a new form of autonomy in Northern Ireland, although keeping Northern Ireland as part of Britain. It also contained provisions on decommissioning, policing, human rights, and the status of prisoners (Fraser, 2000). A joint local government was established by both sides, but it was dissolved in February 2000 after the IRA refused to disarm from its weapons. A stable joint government was established only in 2007, after covert and overt contacts between the parties (Tonge, 2013).

Summary: The rational for choosing the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Ireland conflicts as case studies

The above indicates that although the two conflicts are not identical, there are several significant similarities between them. Both conflicts share an ethno/religious basis, a partition of land and segregation of the opposing communities. Both conflicts knew bloody periods, including terror attacks and military actions that claimed civilian casualties. In both conflicts, peace talks were held simultaneously with these periods, and even culminated in peace agreements. Some of the leaders who signed the peace agreements in both conflicts were also those who took an active part – to some extent or another – in violent actions against the rival nation.

Nevertheless, in the Northern Ireland conflict, the GFA poured the foundations for a stable joint government a decade later. In Israel, however, the Oslo Agreement did not succeed in leading to a sustainable peace.

Based on these similarities in the nature of the two conflicts and the differences in the dynamic of their peace processes, they were chosen as case studies for examining the role played by the media in legitimizing enemy leaders as partners for peace. Since there are no previous studies comparing the change in media framing of enemy leaders in different conflict scenes, we ask,

RQ2: Are there differences between the media portrayals of enemy leaders in different conflict scenes during periods of peace accords or violent pre-agreement periods?

Methodology

In order to answer the research questions, a quantitative content analysis of 461 news items was carried out. The analysis encompassed two main periods in each conflict scene: (1) a period of violent confrontations prior to the signing of a peace agreement and (2) a period of peace talks, including the signing of the agreement and subsequent weeks.

Sampling

In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the media coverage of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin was analyzed between 1987 and 1993, from the outbreak of the first Intifada (9 December 1987) to the signing of the Oslo Agreement (13 September 1993).

For the entire timespan of the study, a systematic random sampling of news items was conducted on the basis of the following ratio: 1–5 days of the first month, 6–10 of the following month, and so on. Maintaining this ratio ensured a valid representation of the media coverage of the leaders throughout the study period. However, in cases of major events that didn’t appear randomly in the sample (e.g. the week in which Oslo agreement was signed), all news items surrounding the event were intentionally added to the sample. It goes without saying that all sampled items were analyzed.

A total of 217 items were analyzed: 102 from the first Intifada and 115 from Oslo accords and Oslo Agreement.

The period of analysis in the Northern Irish arena was the years 1995–1998 in which violent confrontations between Nationalists and Unionists took place as part of the Troubles, and at the same time, political contacts were held between the parties (beginning in February 1998), which finally led to the signing of the GFA. The year 1995 was chosen as a starting point for data collection since online access to the full texts from the Irish press was available from this year only.

Since the research period was significantly shorter than in the Israeli–Palestinian case, all the news items containing the leaders’ names David Trimble and Gerry Adams were collected. After removing the irrelevant items, 244 items were left for analysis: 105 from the Troubles period and 139 from the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the GFA.

The analyzed newspapers

In almost each of the parties (Israeli, Palestinian, and Irish-Unionist), two newspapers were analyzed in order to compare between the media environments as much as possible. In the Northern Ireland conflict, where both sides often share the same media (Wolfsfeld, 2004), the research corpus included newspapers which are ideologically identified with one of the rival sides. In addition, since the major newspapers in Ireland are not considered sensational (Wolfsfeld, 2004), the research corpus also included the Israeli daily Haaretz, which is defined as a ‘quality’ newspaper (Limor and Mann, 1997), and the Palestinian daily Al-Quds, which avoids garish headlines and images (Jamal, 2000). A total of seven newspapers were analyzed:

The pro-Unionist newspapers:

Belfast Telegraph – the most widely circulated daily in Ireland during the research period (Rolston and Miller, 1996). During that period, the newspaper held a Unionist orientation but expressed other voices as well (Vincent, 1997).

Newsletter – during the research period expressed a moderate Unionist orientation and was considered a supporter of Trimble and the UUP (Vincent, 1997).

The pro-Nationalist newspapers:

3. Irish Independent – one of the most popular dailies in Ireland during the research period and politically sympathetic to the nationalist point of view (Rolston and Miller, 1996).

The Israeli newspapers:

4. Yedioth Aharonoth – a popular tabloid, with the largest readership in the country during the research period (Nir and Roeh, 1992).

5. Haaretz – A quality newspaper, catering to a highly educated audience mainly read by the elites (Nir and Roeh, 1992). Both newspapers enjoy relatively high press freedom, which characterize the Israeli press since the 1960s. Since this period, security issues that for many years were taboo for critical coverage began to receive journalistic treatment similar to social, political, and economic issues (Limor and Mann, 1999: 47).

The Palestinian newspapers:

6. Al-Fajr – one of the most popular Palestinian national newspapers until its closing in 1993. The ownership of the newspaper was private, but since its beginning, it presented a clear line of identification with PLO positions, directly influenced by the organization’s members (Nossek and Rinnawi, 2003).

7. Al-Quds – the oldest and most influential Palestinian daily. Published in the eastern parts of Jerusalem and supports the Palestinian Authority mainstream leadership (Jamal, 2000).

Data gathering

All news items from the Irish press were accessed through Lexis-Nexis search engine. Items from the Israeli and Palestinian newspapers were collected from Israeli archives. The news items from the Israeli and Irish press were analyzed by the author who is fluent in Hebrew and English. The news items from the Palestinian press were translated into Hebrew by three Israeli research assistants, graduate students who speak fluent Arabic and Hebrew (one of whom was an Israeli–Arab). To verify the reliability of their translations, they were given 20 identical items, which were then examined by the researcher. All of these items showed differences in linguistic nuances, but not in a way that influenced the content of the translation.

Measures

As described in the theoretical section, there are a number of key mechanisms used by the media to frame the enemy: stereotyping, dehumanization and demonization, accusation, exaggeration, inclusion, and cultural and moral differentiation. Since these mechanisms deal with an enemy entity in general, they have been ‘translated’ in this study into three broad categories and seven subcategories specifically suited to the representation of enemy leaders:

Personality (‘translation’ of the mechanisms of stereotyping and dehumanization/demonization): To what extent has the leader been framed as cruel, unreliable, and stubborn.

Willingness for peace (‘translation’ of the mechanisms of accusation and exaggeration): To what extent has the leader been framed as exacerbating the conflict/promoting peace.

Legitimacy (‘translation’ of the mechanism of cultural and moral differentiation): To what extent was the leader’s version of the events expressed.

Coding and reliability

All variables were ordinal, where 1 was the lowest rank and 5 was the highest rank.

Personality: 1 = Very cruel, 5 = Not cruel at all; 1 = Not reliable at all, 5 = Very reliable; 1 = Very stubborn, 5 = Not stubborn at all.

Willingness for peace: 1 = Not promoting peace at all, 5 = Promotes peace to a very large extent; 1 = Responsible exclusively for the escalation of the conflict, 5 = Responsible exclusively for the promotion of peace.

Legitimacy: 1 = Total disregard of the enemy leader’s version, 5 = Giving exclusive expression to the enemy leader’s version; 1 = Lack of support to the enemy leader’s version/acts, 5 = Great support to the enemy leader’s version/acts.

The coding was done by the author and by a research assistant, a graduate student who had previously experienced content analysis. The coding process was done in two stages: First, 10 random items from each newspaper (a total of 70 items – about 15% of the items analyzed in the study) were encoded. The inter-coder reliability at this stage was medium, hence coding procedures were sharpened. After that, all items were coded by the author and the research assistant. Inter-coder reliability was assessed again by computing Krippendorff’s alpha statistic with the results ranging from .74 for ‘personality’, .79 for ‘willingness for peace’, and .89 for ‘legitimacy’.

Results

The changing representations of enemy leaders after they sign peace agreements

An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate whether there were significant differences between the media representations of Arafat, Rabin, Adams, and Trimble during violent pre-agreement and peace agreement signing periods, as demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1.

Media representations of enemy leaders during violent pre-agreement and peace agreement signing periods.

		Violent pre-agreement period			Peace agreement signing periods			t
		M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Israeli press	Personality	2.48	0.69	61	2.58	1.13	62	−0.62
	Willingness for peace	2.25	0.75	65	2.5	0.81	72	−1.82
	Legitimacy	2.98	1.36	68	2.72	1.23	72	1.17
Palestinian press	Personality	1.72	0.75	18	3.27	1.15	35	−5.9***
	Willingness for peace	1.76	0.91	25	3.4	1.19	42	−5.93***
	Legitimacy	2.81	0.99	22	3.16	1.29	42	−2.21
Irish pro-Unionist press	Personality	1.74	0.73	19	2.69	1.19	21	−3.08**
	Willingness for peace	1.7	0.82	28	3.04	1.3	45	−5.4**
	Legitimacy	2.27	1.01	60	2.9	1.00	82	−3.63***
Irish pro-Nationalist press	Personality	1.5	0.61	20	2.81	1.13	22	−4.7***
	Willingness for peace	1.83	0.72	26	3.57	1.33	41	−6.95***
	Legitimacy	2.51	1.08	39	3.18	1.14	52	−2.83**

p < .01; ***p < .001.

The findings indicate that during peace talks, which led to the signing of peace agreements, there were significant changes in the media representations of three leaders out of the four examined in the study: Yitzhak Rabin, Gerry Adams, and David Trimble. In the Northern Ireland’s arena, the change was reflected in all examined parameters: personality, willingness to peace, and legitimacy.

A significant change was found in the representation of Gerry Adams’ personality in the pro-Unionist press during the negotiations leading to the GFA and after he signed the agreement (M = 2.69, SD = 1.19) compared to a violent pre-agreement period (M = 1.74, SD = 0.73; t(df) = –3.08, p < .01). There were also significant differences in framing Adams’ willingness for peace during a violent pre-agreement period (M = 1.7, SD = .82) compared to peace agreement signing periods (M = 3.04, SD = 1.3; t(df) = –5.4, p < .01), and in the degree of legitimacy that he received during a violent pre-agreement period (M = 2.27, SD = 1.01), compared to peace agreement signing periods (M = 2.9, SD = 1.00; t(df) = –3.63, p < .001). For example, after an explosive truck exploded in Manchester and injured more than 200 people, the Belfast Telegraph reported that ‘Mr. Adams continues to claim that Sinn Fein is not the IRA […] but very few listen’ (18 June 1996, p. 7). In contrast, after the GFA was signed, the newspaper argued that Adams ‘led his movement towards peaceful politics’ and that he ‘rewarded for his efforts’ (16 April 1998, p. 6).

Similarly, there was a significant change in the representation of David Trimble’s personality in the pro-Nationalist press during the negotiations leading to the GFA and after he signed the agreement (M = 2.81, SD = 1.13) compared to a violent pre-agreement period (M = 1.5, SD = .61; t(df) = –4.7, p < .001). During the Troubles, Trimble was often described as a stubborn person who ‘endangers the entire peace process’ (Irish Independent, 15 June 1995, p. 5). After signing the GFA, Trimble was consistently framed as a hero who ‘showed courage and boldness ‘(Irish Independent, 20 April 1998, p. 8).

There were also significant differences in framing Trimble’s willingness for peace during a violent pre-agreement period (M = 1.83, SD = .72) compared to peace agreement signing periods (M = 3.57, SD = 1.33; t(df) = –6.95, p < .001), and in the degree of legitimacy that he received during a violent pre-agreement period (M = 2.51, SD = 1.08) compared to peace agreement signing periods (M = 3.18, SD = 1.14; t(df) = –2.83, p < .01).

On the Palestinian side, a significant change was found in two parameters out of three: personality and willingness for peace. There was a significant change in the representation of Yitzhak Rabin’s personality after he signed the Oslo Agreement (M = 3.27, SD = 1.15) compared to a violent pre-agreement period (M = 1.72, SD = .75; t(df) = –5.9, p < .001). In addition, a significant difference was found in framing Rabin’s willingness for peace during a violent pre-agreement period in which he was described as ‘driving an iron fist against the Palestinians’ (Al-Quds, 18 December 1992, p. 4) (M = 1.76, SD = .91) compared to peace agreement signing periods (M = 3.4, SD = 1.19; t(df) = –5.93, p < .001), in which the Palestinian press provided a more complex image of him and claimed that, in addition to his tough policy toward the Palestinians, Rabin also ‘kept continuing his quest for peace’ (Al-Quds, 11 September 1993, p. 12).

The Israeli side was the only one in which there were no significant changes in any of the parameters examined, and the image of Yasser Arafat remained similar after he signed the Oslo Agreement. However, Arafat received a more positive coverage in the Israeli press during a violent pre-agreement period compared to Rabin, Trimble, and Adams in parallel periods. For example, the headline of an editorial in Haaretz on the day Arafat delivered a speech at a special UN General Assembly meeting in Geneva was ‘listen to the opponent’s words’ (Haaretz, 13 December 1988, p. 13), that is, his claims were presented as worthy of consideration despite his definition as an opponent. This representation was not found among any of the other newspapers examined during violent pre-agreement periods, as will be clarified below.

Differences between media representations of enemy leaders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the conflict in Northern Ireland

In order to examine whether there are differences between the framing of the enemy leaders in Israel and Northern Ireland, a t test was conducted for independent samples. The test compared the representation of Yasser Arafat in the Israeli press to the representation of Gerry Adams in the pro-Unionist press, and the representation of Yitzhak Rabin in the Palestinian press to the representation of David Trimble in the pro-Nationalist press in the two examined periods. The findings are demonstrated in Table 2.

Table 2.

Differences between the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Northern Ireland conflict in the coverage of enemy leaders.

Period	Variable	Israeli press			Irish pro-Unionist press			t	Palestinian press			Irish pro-Nationalist press			t
Period	Variable	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Violent pre-agreement period	Personality	2.48	0.69	61	1.74	0.73	19	4.04**	1.72	0.75	18	1.5	0.61	20	1.0
	Willingness for peace	2.25	0.75	65	1.7	0.82	28	3.18**	1.76	0.91	25	1.83	0.72	26	−0.29
	Legitimacy	2.98	1.36	68	2.28	1.01	60	3.33**	2.81	0.99	22	2.51	1.08	39	1.09
Peace agreement signing period	Personality	2.58	1.13	62	2.69	1.19	21	−0.37	3.27	1.15	35	2.81	1.13	22	1.46
	Willingness for peace	2.5	0.81	72	3.04	1.3	45	−2.5**	3.4	1.19	42	3.57	1.33	41	−0.6
	Legitimacy	2.72	1.23	72	2.9	1	82	−0.95	3.16	1.29	42	3.18	1.14	52	1.12

p < .01.

The findings indicate significant differences between the coverage of Yasser Arafat in the Israeli press compared to that of Gerry Adams in the pro-Unionist Irish press both during a violent pre-agreement period and during peace agreement signing period. No significant differences were found between the Palestinian press and the pro-Nationalist Irish press in either of the two periods.

During the first Intifada, Arafat’s image in the Israeli press was significantly more positive than the image of Adams in the pro-Unionist Irish press during the Troubles. The differences between the sides were found in all three parameters examined: leader’s personality (M = 2.48, SD = .69, in the Israeli press compared to M = 1.74, SD = .73, in the pro-Unionist press; t(df) = 4.04), his willingness for peace (M = 2.25, SD = .75, in the Israeli press compared to M = 1.7, SD = .82, in the pro-Unionist press; t(df) = 3.18, p < .01), and legitimacy (M = 2.98, SD = 1.3, in the Israeli press compared to M = 2.28, SD = 1.01, in the pro-Unionist press; t(df) = 3.33, p < .01).

During peace talks and after signing the Oslo Agreement and the GFA, a significance difference between the Israeli and the pro-Unionist Irish press was found in one parameter only – willingness for peace. During the peace talks that led to the signing of the GFA, David Trimble was framed as significantly more committed to peace (M = 3.04, SD = 1.3) than Yitzhak Rabin in the Palestinian press during Oslo accords and after he signed the agreement (M = 2.5, SD = .81; t(df) = –2.5, p < .01).

Significant differences in the framing of enemy leaders were also found within the same conflict and not only between the various conflicts. However, these differences were found in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict only, as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3.

Differences in the coverage of enemy leaders between the rival sides in the conflicts (the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Irelands).

Period	Variable	Israeli press			Irish pro-Unionist press			t	Palestinian press			Palestinian press			t
Period	Variable	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	t
Violent pre-agreement period	Personality	2.48	0.69	61	1.72	0.75	18	4.01**	1.5	0.6	20	1.73	0.73	19	−1.1
	Willingness for peace	2.25	0.76	65	1.76	0.91	25	2.61**	1.83	0.72	26	1.7	0.82	28	0.62
	Legitimacy	2.98	1.36	68	2.81	0.99	22	0.51	2.51	1.08	39	2.27	1.02	60	1.1
Peace agreement signing period	Personality	2.58	1.14	62	3.27	1.15	35	2.85**	2.81	1.13	22	2.69	1.19	21	0.36
	Willingness for peace	2.5	0.81	72	3.4	1.19	42	−4.4***	3.57	1.33	41	3.04	1.3	45	1.86
	Legitimacy	2.72	1.23	72	3.16	1.29	42	−3.04**	3.18	1.14	52	2.9	1	82	1.52

p < .01 ; ***p < .001.

The findings indicate that both during violent pre-agreement periods and during peace agreement signing periods, there were significant differences between Arafat’s coverage in the Israeli press and Rabin’s coverage in the Palestinian press. Such differences weren’t found in the Northern Ireland’s arena.

During the first Intifada, significant differences between the Israeli and Palestinian press were found in two parameters: the leader’s personality and his willingness for peace. During this period, Rabin’s personality was framed in the Palestinian media (M = 1.72, SD = .75) as more negative than that of Arafat in the Israeli press (M = 2.48, SD = .69; t(df) = 4.01, p < .01). Rabin was also framed as less committed to peace (M = 1.76, SD = .91) than Arafat (M = 2.25, SD = .76; t(df) = 2.61, p < .01).

After the signing of the Oslo agreement, the trend was reversed, and Rabin’s representation in the Palestinian press was significantly more positive than the representation of Arafat in the Israeli press. This trend was reflected in all examined parameters: personality (M = 3.27, SD = 1.15, in the Palestinian press compared to M = 2.58, SD = 1.14, in the Israeli press; t(df) = 2.85, p < .01), willingness for peace (M = 3.4, SD = 1.19, in the Palestinian press compared to M = 2.5, SD = 0.81 in the Israeli press; t(df) = –4.4, p < .001), and legitimacy (M = 3.16, SD = 1.29, in the Palestinian press compared to M = 2.72, SD = 1.23, in the Israeli press; t(df) = –3.04, p < .01).

Discussion and conclusion

The present study examined whether and how mass media change the images of enemy leaders during periods of peace accords and peace agreements compared to violent pre-agreement periods. For this purpose, an analytical framework of seven parameters was developed, analyzing the media coverage of the rival leaders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The findings indicate that the media portrayal of the leaders has changed significantly on three out of four sides: the Irish-Unionist, the Irish-Nationalist, and the Palestinian. The Israeli side was the only one in which there was no significant change in any of the parameters measured. However, Arafat’s image was significantly less negative than that of Adams, Trimble, and Rabin during violent pre-agreement periods.

Given the fact that the GFA finally led to a significant reduction in the Northern Ireland conflict, in contrast to the Oslo Agreement, and given the significant role of mass media in constructing socio-political reality (Billig, 1995), these findings illustrate the potential impact of media portrayal of enemy leaders on the promotion of peace processes. In other words, the findings indicate that positive change in media representations of enemies (such as political leaders) may accelerate emerging peace processes and improve the social climate toward them.

It should be emphasized that this conclusion does not imply a causal relationship between the two. In addition, in Northern Ireland, where the peace process has led to more peaceful results than in Israel, it took 7 years until the IRA promised complete decommissioning of all its weapons, and 9 years to the establishment of a stable joint government. Therefore, the length of the ‘effect’ of the media representations found in the study is limited, and should be attributed to specific changes rather than to general trends. However, the fact that the leaders’ representations in the Northern Ireland’s arena have changed in all examined parameters, while on the Israeli–Palestinian arena they have changed to lesser degrees, indicates that a positive change in media representations of enemy leaders may support and strengthen peace processes – at least during their formation. According to the ‘peace journalism’ approach, a ‘win-win’ orientation of mass media may contribute to conflicts alleviation (Benn, 2015). The current study indicates that this orientation can be applied to the coverage of enemy leaders as well.

Specifically, the findings suggest that the media can change the stereotypical image of enemy leaders and portray them more positively. These images can be achieved by reference to personal and political traits of the leaders and may be of benefit to the advancement of the political contacts between the parties. In other words, as well as mass media can use framing mechanisms for delegitimizing the enemy and its leaders (Armoudian, 2015; Bahador, 2015), they can use alternative mechanisms (e.g. giving expression to the enemy leader’s version of events or recognizing his or her contribution to the conflict escalation) for legitimizing and even encouraging the enemy’s actions, thus positively affecting the peace process.

The broader question that emerges from these findings concerns the differences between the Northern Ireland’s and the Israeli–Palestinian arenas, and especially the Israeli side within it. Why was the Israeli press the only one that did not change the image of the enemy leader after he signed a peace agreement? Further to the literature that seeks to contextualize the functioning of mass media during peace processes (Wolfsfeld, 2004), I would like to suggest several explanations.

First, it is possible that the two main differences found between the Israeli–Palestinian arena and the Northern Ireland’s arena (Arafat’s more favorable image during the first Intifada compared with Trimble, Adams, and Rabin, and his being the only leader whose media representation had not changed significantly after he signed a peace agreement) are linked to each other. In other words, the more favorable framing of Arafat during the first Intifada may have blocked the possibility of further improvement of his representation. Maybe in the eyes of the Israeli media, there was a limit to the positive attitude that it could express toward an enemy leader without inciting the public opinion.

Second, the static nature of Arafat’s media representation after signing the Oslo Agreement may also be related to the nature of the agreement, and specifically to the surprise it was for the Israeli public and media (Lavie, 2014). Perhaps the surprising agreement created for the Israeli press a difficult gap to bridge between Arafat’s widespread image in the Israeli public as a demon (Mandelzis, 2003) and his new image as a partner for peace. This is accompanied by the fact that the agreement was controversial from its beginning (Wolfsfeld, 2011).

In the Northern Ireland’s arena, not only were the contacts that preceded the GFA known, the agreement was even brought to a referendum and approved by a majority of 71.2 percent in Northern Ireland and 94.39 percent in Southern Ireland (Tonge, 2013). Indeed, the signing of the agreement aroused significant animosity toward it on both sides (Bratic, 2008). However, massive persuasive efforts led both sides to overcome the doubts and support the agreement.

In addition, throughout the peace process, SF had substantially altered its political rhetoric, which might have made it easier for the pro-Unionist media to legitimize Adams as a partner for peace. In a recent interview-based study with Northern Ireland’s journalists, they affirmed this explanation by arguing that the shift in the paramilitaries’ rhetoric ‘was a big change’ (Armoudian, 2018: 364). This change was also followed with ongoing meetings between the rival sides, which expressed confidence in the process. According to one of the interviewees, ‘If the Prime Minister can sit down with Gerry Adams, there’s no reason why the media should not’ (p. 365). It is worth noting that in contrast to this situation, Rabin avoided from direct contacts with Arafat in Oslo and flinched from shaking his hand, a fact that was known to the Israeli news reporters (Haaretz, 12 September 1993, p. B1). The question of why Arafat was treated less negatively than the other leaders during a violent pre-agreement period requires a separate explanation. The reason may be related to his political status during the first intifada, which was contested because the hostilities against Israel were mainly fought by local activists (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). Another explanation might lie in the relatively low number of Israeli victims during the First Intifada (Liebes and Kempf, 2009).

All of the explanations listed above deserve careful examination. It should also be noted that despite the attempt to reduce the differences between the analyzed media environments, the parallel between them cannot be fully congruent. For example, the large linguistic and cultural gap between Israelis and Palestinians (which is also reflected in their separate news media) doesn’t exist in the Northern Ireland’s arena (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 175). In addition, The Irish Independent is based in Dublin which was not part of the conflict – as opposed to the two unionist newspapers.

Future studies could use additional research methods such as interviews or qualitative content analysis in order to examine the applicability of these explanations. The research corpus can also be expanded by including additional leaders from the same conflicts (e.g. Ariel Sharon or rev. Ian Paisley) or from parallel conflicts (e.g. the Balkan or Cyprus). Either way, the findings of this study point to the dual potential of media coverage of enemy leaders on the development of peace processes and emphasize the need to include them as research subjects by media researchers.

Footnotes

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author biography

Hila Lowenstein-Barkai is a Faculty Member in the School of Communication in Ariel University, Israel. Her research focuses on media events, online political behavior, and media framing.

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