Abstract
This article examines the struggles, actions, and challenges of the journalist organizers at two Florida legacy newspapers – the Lakeland Ledger and the Sarasota Herald-Tribune – who unionized in 2016 with the NewsGuild – Communication Workers of America. In-depth interviews with journalists from both papers suggest that unionizing can help to counter the effects of media concentration, corporate practices, and the resulting changes in organizational structure and their impact on the working conditions of reporters.
It is well documented that the current US commercial media system – including the news media – is concentrated, which affects the types of news readers and viewers receive (e.g. Bagdikian, 2004; Bettig and Hall, 2012; Hardy, 2014; Herman and Chomsky, 2002; McChesney, 2004; Rohlinger and Proffitt, 2017). Those who own and control the commercial media set the local and national agendas, have the power to hire and fire editors and journalists, and most often focus on profit for shareholders or investors rather than quality news and increased investment in resources and salaries for those creating the news. In the last few decades, particularly post-Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the web, mergers and acquisitions have led to increased media industry consolidation, including newspapers. For example, Pew Research Center’s (2016) State of the News Media 2016 report explained that there were just seven publicly traded newspaper companies, down from nine in 2014, representing about 25 percent of the nation’s newspapers.
Concurrently, newspapers are losing money due to consumers and advertisers moving online. Smith (2016: para. 1) reported that ‘Newspapers have settled on a strategy to stop withering away: feast on one another for survival’ (para. 2). For example, in 2016, ‘the [newspaper] industry saw the most deals for the largest amount of money since the 2008 financial crisis, with 70 daily newspapers being sold for a combined $827 million’, with more deals to come (para. 3).
Concentration of ownership affects the working conditions of those who report the news. According to Pew Research Center’s (2018) analysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), in 2017, the number of newspaper reporters, editors, photographers, and videographers decreased 15 percent from 2014 and a whopping 45 percent since 2004. As the number of journalists decreases – most often due to layoffs, buyouts, and attrition – the amount of work needed to get the newspaper out every day or every week has not changed. In fact, workloads have increased due to the addition of social media and video demands. Fewer people are doing more for less. 1 While those journalists who are left do the best that they can under tough conditions, quality and localism suffer with fewer people writing and editing and more services being centralized, resulting in less local control of the final product. Management, on the contrary, wants efficiencies and flexibility, including the power to hire and fire at will and the increased use of freelancers and part-timers, who are paid less, usually without benefits, and less likely to organize due to their precarity (Cohen, 2016; Mosco and McKercher, 2008).
What is relatively new, however, is who is purchasing newspapers. By 2018, private equity firms and hedge funds subsidiaries such as Alden Global, which owned 60 daily newspapers, Fortress, which owns nearly 150 newspapers, and Chatham Asset Management LLC, which is one of the largest shareholders and bondholders in McClatchy Co., are considered the new newspaper moguls, replacing family, small chain, and independent owners by buying newspapers across the nation (Smith, 2018).
With the increase in consolidation and role of private equity and hedge funds in the newspaper business post-2008’s recession and the resulting deteriorating conditions in newsrooms, we are seeing a trend toward unionization, even in newsrooms that once seemed inconceivable such as the Los Angeles Times (see Mohajer, 2017). Online news sites are not immune to the problems affecting the legacy press, including layoffs and low salaries. Digital outlets Vox, ThinkProgress, Vice, HuffPost, The Intercept, Salon, Thrillist, MTV News, Slate, the satirical site the Onion, and the now defunct Gawker have organized. When news sites Gothamist and DNAinfo organized in fall 2017, their owner closed the sites in what some have called retaliation, a move that serves as a threat to all workers but seemingly has not worked as a tactic as journalists continue to organize (Sedacca, 2017).
Using critical political economy of media as a theoretical framework, this article examines the struggles, actions, and challenges of the journalists who organized at two Florida legacy newspapers owned by Fortress Investment’s GateHouse Media – the Lakeland Ledger and the Sarasota Herald-Tribune – who unionized in 2016 with the NewsGuild – Communication Workers of America (CWA). These are the first newspapers to organize in Florida, which is especially notable as Florida is a Right to Work state, meaning workers in unionized organizations do not have to pay dues to receive the benefits the union negotiates. While the unionization of journalists is not a new phenomenon – the NewsGuild was founded in 1933 to protect journalists and their profession – the current unionization movement is important to examine, especially at a time when private-sector union membership has declined by about a third since 1983 (Dunn and Walker, 2016) and attacks on unions from state and national leaders, anti-union organizations bankrolled by corporations such as the National Right to Work Foundation and the Center for Union Facts, and the courts attempt to cripple unions. The purpose of this article is twofold: through in-depth interviews with the journalists who organized at the Lakeland Ledger and the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, I explore both the problems encountered by the journalists working for GateHouse that led to union organizing and the unionization process itself as a lesson for other newsrooms considering organizing to counter the effects of consolidation and private equity discussed here. I begin with a discussion of the political economy of media, and then examine GateHouse Media, its business practices, and its purchase of the two newspapers. Finally, I turn to the interviews with journalists who were instrumental in the union efforts, exploring the problems they faced that led to unionization and why they organized.
The political economy of journalism
As Mosco (2009: 2) defined it, ‘political economy is the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication resources’. Those who study the political economy of media focus on the interrelationships between wealth, power, and knowledge creators and distributors, including effects on structure and content. They explore those who own the media and how corporate structure, advertisers, and other supporters of the commercial media system, and regulations – or lack thereof – affect production, content, and audiences. This is particularly important when we consider the role of journalism in a democratic society. As McChesney (2004: 57) argued, Democratic theory posits that society needs journalism to perform three main duties: to act as a rigorous watchdog of the powerful and those who wish to be powerful; to ferret out truth from lies; and to present a wide range of informed positions on key issues.
Croteau and Hoynes (2001: 151) explained that media workers and the characteristics of the public interest – diversity, innovation, substance, and independence – are affected by the constraints of the corporate system, leading to content that is largely ‘homogenized, imitative, trivial, and constrained’. When so few own the media, and their primary purpose is to increase profits for shareholders and investors, the democratic role of journalism often takes a back seat to market forces.
As Mosco (2014: 365) explained, as political economy scholarship tends to focus on production, text, and audiences, one blind spot has been labor – those creating and distributing the messages consumed by audiences and working under a particular production structure. He noted, ‘In an era characterized by declining labor union penetration, increasing corporate concentration, and the rise of global conglomerates that feed into – and are fed by – the spread of new communication and information technology, knowledge workers have begun to explore new ways to increase labor’s power’, including converged labor unions like the NewsGuild-CWA that can pool resources and together increase their political and economic power. Reasons for the decline in unionism by the 1980s, including in the communication industries, include ‘technological change, increasing corporate power, the rise of neoliberal governments, and problems internal to trade unions and the labor movement’ (Mosco and McKercher, 2008: 2). However, it appears that unionization is on the rise in the news industry due to the results of several of these factors: as a response to the effects of the Internet as a major technological change, corporate power that has led to increased labor precarity and flexibility, and neoliberal policies that allow for increased concentration and consolidation.
It is important to note that while print newspaper circulation has decreased, digital circulation is holding steady or, for some newspapers, increasing, while average monthly unique visitors for the top 50 papers by circulation in 2016 increased by 21 percent from the year before (Pew Research Center, 2018), demonstrating that newspapers are still very much alive and remain profitable investments in an approximately US$30 billion industry (Barthel, 2017). As such, private equity firms and hedge funds have found newspapers to be key acquisitions. One of the problems with this, however, is that while public corporations’ focus on providing profits to shareholders affects media structure and content as noted above, private equity firms and hedge funds exacerbate the issues associated with corporate media. For private equity and hedge fund owners, journalism is just one of many unrelated properties, numbers are the bottom line, efficiencies are paramount, and only short-term interests matter. As Bettig (2009: 24) wrote, The primary strategies of PE managers involve serious cost-cutting, including eliminating jobs and selling off unprofitable assets while squeezing out as much profit as they can from what is left. After turning ‘distressed’ companies around the PE firms sell them wholesale to other buyers yielding proceeds much higher than the initial costs of the buyout. In other cases, they sell the company back to the public – not in the socialist sense, but rather through stock markets. As the cost cutting and sell-offs occur, private equity managers pay themselves large fees, waiting for what Henwood calls ‘the magic’ to kick in.
It is under this structure that the Lakeland Ledger and Sarasota Herald-Tribune journalists found themselves.
The case of GateHouse media
As of October 2018, GateHouse media owned 674 publications across 37 states, including 145 dailies, making it the largest publisher of daily newspapers by number of daily publications in the United States. Its parent company is publicly traded New Media Investment Group, Inc., which is managed by Fortress Investment Group, LLC, a private equity firm that focuses on ‘buyout, recapitalization, and turnaround situations’, investing in ‘financial services, particularly loan servicing and consumer finance, real estate, transportation and energy/infrastructure, gaming, real estate, leisure, media and telecommunications, healthcare and senior living’ as well as ‘energy, power generation equipment’s [sic], consumer discretionary, healthcare facilities, and independent power and renewable electricity procedures’ (Fortress Investment, 2018). In the 12 months ending September 2017, New Media Investment Group’s revenue was US$1.28 billion (New Media Investment Group, Inc., 2018).
Before it was GateHouse media, it was Liberty Group Publishing, ‘a chain of more than 200 mostly community papers’ that was ‘scooped up’ by Fortress in 2005 (Starkman, 2014: para. 14). As reported by Starkman (2014: para. 15), the deal followed the classic private equity formula for slow-growing but still profitable industries: Add huge debt and pay investors a dividend using the cash flow. It didn’t work out. GateHouse ended in bankruptcy court within three years, the victim of unraveling newspaper finances and its own debt load, among other things.
After shedding debt, ‘a newly reformed entity still controlled by Fortress began to buy up newspapers, even while it was still in bankruptcy’; this led to the creation of ‘a new public company, New Media, better known by its GateHouse unit’ (para. 16).
GateHouse has been, as Eckelbecker (2018: para. 8) reported, ‘snapping up’ newspapers since emerging from bankruptcy. For example, it was announced in February 2018 that it planned to acquire Holden Landmark Corp.’s nine websites and six print newspapers for an undisclosed price (Eckelbecker, 2018). It purchased the independent, family-owned Register-Guard media company in January 2018 for an undisclosed price, and in fall 2017, it purchased 79 Morris Publishing Group newspapers, including the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, for US$120 million (The Register-Guard, 2018). In 2017, it purchased the newspaper division of Dix Communication, including five dailies and 18 weekly publications, for US$21.2 million (Dix, 2017).
In early 2015, GateHouse acquired Halifax Media’s 36 newspapers for US$280 million, including the Sarasota Herald-Tribune and the Lakeland Ledger. In total, from 2013 to 2017, GateHouse spent US$874 million on small and midsize newspaper purchases across the country (Navera, 2017). At the same time the company was spending tens or hundreds of millions of dollars on acquisitions, it was raising executive pay exponentially (Harris, 2016) while cutting costs at the local level, including laying off journalists. As Navera (2017: para. 16) reported, ‘[T]hese acquisitions have entailed downsizing as papers streamline into a bigger media group’.
Starkman (2014: para. 27) noted that GateHouse has targeted papers ‘that have undermanaged the online opportunity’. When New Media Investment Group, Inc./GateHouse bought Halifax Media Group in early 2015, GateHouse Media CEO Kirk Davis announced, We view the transaction as transformational for us … These are wonderful properties that will vastly expand our audience and provide us with an opportunity to launch a full suite of digital marketing opportunities throughout the entire Southeast. (Swisher, 2015: para. 1)
However, what GateHouse is really targeting is family-owned newspapers and smaller chains that feel pressure to sell to larger chains that present offers that they cannot refuse in such a consolidated market (Doctor, 2017). One might wonder why a company would purchase additional papers when they are losing ad revenue; the reality is newspapers are still profitable – ‘from higher single digits to 25% or more among the chains’ (Doctor, 2017: para. 20) – they just may not be as profitable as they once were. Consolidation in the newspaper industry ‘is almost always accompanied by cost cutting – part of the logic of these deals is to do just that’ (Starkman, 2014: para 28). According to Doctor (2017: para. 11), GateHouse ‘has perfected the megacluster, profit-squeezing discipline’, that is, consolidating and centralizing production and resources of a large group of local dailies over a wide geographic region to exploit efficiencies by cutting costs.
The Herald-Tribune and the Ledger were part of the sale of Halifax, which had purchased the Regional Media Group in 2011 from the New York Times Company for US$143 million in cash, to GateHouse (Vega, 2011). The two papers had become family in 1982, when the Lindsay family sold the Herald-Tribune to the New York Times Company for US$86 million (About us, n.d.). Thirty plus years later, under the ownership of GateHouse, both papers would unionize with the NewsGuild-CWA.
Interviews with leaders in the unionization efforts in Florida
In December 2017, I interviewed five journalists who served as organizers for the Sarasota Herald-Tribune unionization effort; I interviewed two journalists by phone and three journalists in person in Sarasota, Florida. I also interviewed the president of the CWA local that covers both papers in December 2017. In January 2018, I interviewed four journalists who served as organizers at the Lakeland Ledger, two by phone and two in person in Lakeland, Florida. Each interviewee signed a consent form, and each interview lasted approximately 45 to 90 minutes. Two of the 10 interviewees preferred that their names not be used.
Lakeland Ledger
In August 2016, the Lakeland Ledger became the first newspaper in modern memory to organize in Florida, and the vote was an overwhelming 22-3 (Journalists, 2016). The Ledger and the Sarasota Herald-Tribune joined 14 other GateHouse papers that had unionized with the NewsGuild-CWA. Since GateHouse’s acquisition of the Ledger the year before, layoffs hit at least 21 newsroom employees, and at least six positions were left unfilled and eventually eliminated (Florida NewsGuild, 2016). According to the journalists who led the organizing efforts at the Ledger, the devastating layoffs, a hiring freeze, and stagnant wages for almost a decade were some of the key reasons for unionizing, but the primary catalyst was having a voice in decision making and the direction of the paper. With the purchase of the paper by Halifax and then GateHouse, it was clear that the people making decisions were not journalists; rather, number-crunching became the incentive for newsroom decisions and outcomes at the expense of the resources needed to cover an area as large as Polk County, which several journalists noted is the size of the state of Delaware at approximately 2010 square miles.
As Gary White, a 15-year veteran at the paper, stated, the layoffs and unfilled positions when people left largely due to retirements, to dissatisfaction with work conditions, or to move on to different industries led to increased workloads with remaining journalists doubling, tripling, or quadrupling the number of beats and/or cities they were responsible for in addition to unofficial beats – that is, if a journalist writes a story on a particular issue, such as tourism, that person would be asked to consistently cover that issue as well. Furthermore, considering the size of the county that the paper serves, it is impossible to cover the areas that once were covered when the newsroom was at capacity. White noted that at its peak in 1999, there were about 100 people on staff; that number dwindled to 25. With so few journalists, the newspaper’s focus turned to the biggest city in the county – Lakeland, home to about 100,000 people. John Chambliss, who has been with the paper off and on for 18 years, noted that the Ledger previously had four bureaus to cover the county. What remains is the Lakeland newsroom and the Winter Haven bureau – which at one time had at least four journalists and now has only one. Chambliss stated that the bureau model was an effective way to cover the large county, but the bureaus began to close right before the New York Times Company sold the paper to Halifax.
With concentration of ownership and the focus on profit-maximization, cutting bureaus makes sense as overhead and salaries can be eliminated as cost-cutting measures. What is not considered is the effects on readers who are now marginalized. As Chambliss and Mary Sue (Suzie) Schottelkotte, a journalist at the paper for 34 years, noted, much is missed with so few journalists; this results in what they called ‘drive-by journalism’. 2 That is, reporters who once had time to delve deeper into topics and issues now had to cover multiple beats and meet quotas at the expense of the time needed to investigate important stories. White noted that city and county officials, law enforcement, and others would call to ask if the paper could cover a story, and the editors sometimes had to say no because there simply was not enough staff. As of our interview in January 2018, Chambliss was covering both the county and the city, which is arduous for one person to do. He pointed out that this situation was ‘outrageous’, especially when one considers how much power, money, and influence are involved at the local government level. It is increasingly difficult to serve as a watchdog when one journalist is spread so thin. As Schottelkotte stated regarding journalism today, ‘Someone has to keep an eye on local government, to hold them accountable and to hold their feet to the fire. There has to be a watchdog group with the credibility to monitor the actions of elected officials’. But with so few journalists available to cover those in power, that role is even more challenging.
This is particularly frustrating for the journalists at the Ledger, especially because the paper had won the 2014 Newspaper of the Year award. According to Chambliss, at that time, the Ledger still had an investigative team and a core of reporters. Just a few years later, according to Sara Drumm, who had worked at the paper for 3 years before leaving to pursue a new career, the newsroom that was once bursting at the seams was decimated, and the news staff now shares space with the advertising department.
GateHouse also cut costs by centralizing copyediting and design in its Austin, Texas, office, which, according to White, led to the disappearance of 12 to 15 local jobs. While centralizing these production practices may help GateHouse save money, it has serious ramifications at the local level according to the journalists interviewed as readers have noticed a decline in quality. They reported that people in Austin are not familiar with the area or the local culture, so it is easier to put forth inaccurate headlines and other copyediting errors that affect the credibility of the local paper. Add to this the lack of accountability when mistakes are made due to centralized production. Readers point out these errors that could have been avoided if copyediting and design were still done at the local level.
When asked why they organized, the common theme was the reporters did not feel like they had power or options. According to White, it was not until someone from another unionized GateHouse paper called them, explaining the importance of organizing and offering his help, that they decided to move forward with organizing. He does not think they would have taken the step to unionize without that call. Journalists had talked about organizing in the past, but it seemed impossible in Florida – a Right to Work state in the South. The organizers had meetings with the newsroom staff and representatives from the union, who were available to answer questions, explain the process and what to expect after unionizing, and help counter the anti-union arguments the management would inevitably use. From these discussions, as all of the interviewees noted, it was clear that with a union, they would have some say in what happens at the paper. As it was, the newsroom morale had been quite low for some time. But the newsroom was cohesive in its support for organizing, and as such was able to keep the organizing efforts quiet until the cards were collected so as not to raise the ire of management. 3 As such, management was taken by surprise. Once the campaign became public, the anti-union missives began.
According to White, it was obvious that the anti-union sentiments were coming from corporate headquarters. The company sent a representative from GateHouse for its anti-union push. The publisher who was once largely absent started showing up frequently to talk them out of unionizing, arguing that unionizing would cost the company a lot of money, which would come out of the budget. He and other human resource (HR) representatives also argued that the union would not be able to get them anything, that the staff would lose money because they would have to pay dues, and that if the journalists went through with organizing, they would be blackballed, unable to work anywhere else. However, according to White, the reporters knew that nothing good would happen otherwise if they continued to rely on the status quo; it was clear by the publisher’s words and actions that he had no intention to make any changes. As Drumm pointed out, as the vote approached, each journalist was called into a private meeting with the editor, who tried to convince him or her not to support the union. People were nervous about what the editors and publisher would think and hoped that they would understand that the decision to unionize was not personal; rather, the problem was GateHouse. Schottelkotte noted that despite that nervousness and fear of what would happen if they lost the election, it was not difficult to convince people that a union was necessary: ‘“What do we have to lose” was the prevailing thought’. Furthermore, they knew that ‘solidarity had to start right now’ to effect change. White said that ‘no one had experience with unions, but they knew they had to do something’. And though Drumm knew she was leaving the paper, she felt that it was her responsibility to make things better for those who came after her.
The organizers saw positive changes after the election. White noted that newsroom morale changed since organizing, as the staff became more in tune with one another and talked to each other more and more often, which helped to increase their optimism about the future and improved working conditions. Chambliss pointed out that journalists at the Ledger have a stronger voice now that they have a union. He noted that the union allows for stability, gives employees a voice that they did not have before, and empowers them to call meetings with management to express their concerns, which they did not feel comfortable doing before, certainly not as individuals. He posited that the newsroom now has a little more leverage and more power, and Schottelkotte agreed, noting that at the end of the day, the unity of the members of the union newsroom and the negotiations with management will make the newspaper stronger.
Sarasota Herald-Tribune
Unlike the Ledger, the vote to unionize at the Herald-Tribune was much closer as the journalists voted 22-16 in favor of joining the NewsGuild-CWA. The paper had at least 16 layoffs in the previous year, and employees had not had a raise in 9 years (Voting, 2016). Like the Ledger journalists, the Herald-Tribune reporters made it clear that the choice to unionize was about GateHouse corporate practices, not local management. This is especially so as each journalist interviewed noted that he or she had a ‘great’ executive editor before they unionized; the journalists respected him, knew that the problems with their working conditions were corporate issues, not local issues, and did not want him to take unionizing personally; however, he did. As did the publisher, who said he was ‘very disappointed’ with the decision to organize because, as he stated, ‘I firmly believe local journalism is going to continue to need a more creative, flexible and nimble atmosphere to be successful in the future’ (Hare, 2016: para. 7). While this may sound efficient from a corporate standpoint, this is a typical anti-union statement that really means that management wants all employees to be at will – that is, able to be fired without just cause – and work more for less.
Like the Lakeland paper, the Herald-Tribune saw rounds of layoffs, but unlike the Ledger, the layoffs seemed to be random while Lakeland’s layoffs appeared to be based on seniority with those there the least amount of time laid off first (and in one division, the person with the least seniority had been there 20 or so years according to Gary White). Also like Lakeland, the centralization of design and copyediting introduced many problems at the local level. As one Sarasota reporter stated, the lack of local knowledge – such as information about politicians and maps – led to accuracy problems, which led to more frustration and more complexities. With the centralization of design, the paper no longer looked unique, ‘and loyal, invested readers who cared a lot about the paper’ started calling, emailing, and sending letters based on the changes and problems with accuracy based on centralized copyediting. High turnover, positions not being filled, people taking on multiple beats, and cuts to bureaus were other similarities the papers shared.
For Sarasota, the union was seen in early 2016 as a ‘counterpoint to Lakeland’, which, as noted, had been gutted and appeared to be the worst-case scenario. The nascent union effort was seen as preventive; as one reporter stated, ‘We didn’t want to wait to be hollowed out because then it would be too late’. There was some interest in the union, but there was not a consensus. Then in April 2016, the paper – which had a strong investigative team – won a Pulitzer for ‘a year-long investigative collaboration with the Tampa Bay Times detailing horrific conditions in Florida’s mental health hospitals’ (Le Coz, 2016: para. 1). This, according to several of the journalists interviewed, including Billy Cox, who started at the Sarasota paper in 2006 after 30 years at Florida Today, ‘took the steam out of unionizing’. Another reporter noted that many in the newsroom ‘thought GateHouse would protect them after that because they were seen as special’. Several journalists interviewed noted that the paper was profitable and served as a ‘shining star’ for GateHouse, supporting other, struggling outlets, which added to the thought that they would be saved from the massive layoffs at the Ledger and other GateHouse papers. A month later, the paper received more accolades from the Florida Society of News Editors for not only the Pulitzer piece but also first place awards in multiple categories, including features and arts writing, beat reporting, business stories, columns, feature page design, sports page design, and multimedia (Frobisher, 2016). According to Cox, the next day, reporters, including some award winners, were laid off: ‘It was like a virus; no one knew if they would catch the pink slip’. Another journalist explained it as such: one day everything was okay, and the next day was ‘like the Red Wedding in Game of Thrones’. As another reporter stated, if we can win awards one day and be laid off the next, ‘clearly nothing can protect us’. With that, the union organizing efforts accelerated.
Unlike the Lakeland effort, in which most of the newsroom agreed with unionizing and were able to keep things quiet, the Sarasota effort was sharply divided. It appears that the executive editor found out about the effort before all of the cards were collected and counted, and he was, according to all of the journalists interviewed, ‘furious’. The anti-union campaign was very tense and mean-spirited as journalists heard the same arguments from the anti-union handbook that the Ledger staff heard. But at Sarasota, these arguments were convincing for at least 16 staff members who voted against unionizing. It became intense to the point that two unfair labor practices (ULPs) 4 were filed based on retaliation.
The first ULP was filed on behalf of Elizabeth Johnson, an award-winning investigative journalist who had been at the paper for 4 years. According to Johnson, when she first arrived, the paper was doing ‘amazing projects’, including long-term investigative journalism, and they had the resources and support to do so. She was an integral part of the investigative team, but once the organizing effort became public and it was clear that she was one of the union organizers, she was left out of discussions and meetings and, as all of the journalists interviewed noted, was blackballed and treated with disdain by management and anti-union colleagues. The catalyst to organizing was, like Lakeland, the layoffs and the lack of raises. But what wasn’t as visible was how inconsistent the rules were across and within departments. The problem was, according to Johnson and others, that no one really knew about the discrepancies and lack of fairness until they came together to organize. One of the key takeaways for the journalists interviewed from both papers is that before discussions of unionizing, they worked like independent contractors, which benefits corporate owners, rather than as a collective unit, which benefits newsgathering and reporting in service to the public. The organizing campaign allowed them to get to know their colleagues, people they may have never talked to before, and the camaraderie was one of the best things to come out of unionizing.
Once the election campaign began, the sharp divide and anti-union sentiments perpetuated by management were largely felt by the organizers, and for Johnson and Cox, the retaliation from management invoked the ULPs, which were combined into one ULP case. Johnson was alienated from her own projects, threatened with being blackballed, berated for everything, told ‘no one cares about what you say’ in a meeting about issues related to her beat, and isolated. Cox was moved from being the senior feature writer to the education beat. Although the education beat was not his interest, he did it anyway with the thought that it would be temporary since the education reporter had just left. When new jobs were posted, none were for the education beat, and that was when he knew it was retaliation. While the combined ULP was ruled in the journalists’ favor, the retaliation took a professional and personal toll. What the retaliation also did was make it clear that those who were outspoken about the union as a voice for the newsroom would be treated poorly, and though they may not be directly related, according to the journalists interviewed, many who have left the paper since the vote were union supporters.
For the journalists interviewed, while the layoffs and lack of raises were a catalyst for change, particularly after they met with the NewsGuild and union leaders at other GateHouse papers, the main motivation was having a voice in the workplace. They wanted to be a part of the decision making and be part of the process, including negotiating benefits, raises, vacation time, severance packages, and figuring out a plan for how layoffs – if truly needed – would occur. The opportunity to have a collective voice was the overall goal. As two Sarasota journalists said, ‘We want to control our destiny’. Barbara Peters Smith, a journalist at the Herald-Tribune off and on since 1991, stated that with the union, their voices must be noticed now, and they had to be treated in a ‘more dignified, humane way’, which other journalists interviewed also noted. They wanted an end to the focus on the quarterly numbers only and the patronizing way corporate treated its workers.
Interestingly, unlike Lakeland, it appears that at the Sarasota paper, the younger journalists seem to drive the organizing campaign. This is consistent with recent reports that suggest that millennials are ‘keeping unions alive’, when ‘[h]istorically, younger workers have been less likely than older workers to be a member of a union’ (Chen, 2018: para. 2). Chen (2018: para. 4) wrote that ‘youth are increasingly driven to join unions precisely in response to economic precarity and eroding economic mobility’. This is demonstrated by the surge in graduate student and digital news outlet unionization. The flexibility that management celebrates is precisely what is driving millennials and others to counter with a collective voice.
For private equity firms and hedge fund managers, the newspaper industry is not about the watchdog role of the press or providing information citizens need to make informed political, economic, and social decisions. Rather, it is, as Peters Smith noted, a counterproductive business model: ‘Buying into a dying industry, hastening its demise by squeezing as much as possible out of it for shareholders … their interest is money, not journalism’. Private equity firms and hedge funds are generally not interested in investing in quality journalism or in the journalists who work so hard to make a difference, as it is counter to their mission of making as much money as possible before selling off the property. For the journalists interviewed, journalism is a calling, which, as Peters Smith said, ‘makes a great labor force that will just take it and take it’.
This is one reason why the journalists interviewed, including those who were retaliated against, would recommend unionizing, though some had caveats. It is not easy, many of them noted (one reporter said ‘organizing sucked’), but there does not seem to be any other options. As Cox stated, ‘You don’t have a choice. If you trust corporations to look out for your best interest, then you are naïve’. As Johnson noted based on her experiences with hostile management and anti-union colleagues, ‘If you are going to organize, be ready for life being turned upside down’. However, she notes that what they accomplished as one of only two newspapers to organize in Florida was ‘groundbreaking’, and the industry needs ‘as many people to organize as possible’. Chambliss at the Ledger said that he would recommend unionizing because ‘we feel stronger as a unit’. Lakeland’s Schottelkotte, when asked if she would recommend unionizing to other papers, said, ‘Absolutely, in a heartbeat. It’s hard, it’s scary, but … the protection is absolutely worth it’. As a Sarasota journalist noted, journalists do what they do because ‘you love it, care about it, and do it because you think it is important … If you love it, you want to protect it’. And organizing seems to be the best option right now to do so.
Conclusion
In the months since the time of the interviews with the journalists at the Lakeland Ledger and the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, the Casper, Wyoming, newspaper, The Casper Star-Tribune, owned by Lee Enterprises, a chain that owns 46 newspapers and joint interest in two additional papers, voted to form a union in February 2018. According to the Wyoming Press Association Director, ‘her organization doesn’t know of any newspaper union that has ever operated in Wyoming before’ (Hutchins, 2018: para. 1). In March 2018, the Denver Post, owned by Alden Global Capital, announced that it was laying off 30 people, which is about one-third of its newsroom staff. This is after cutting 10 positions in 2017, and more than 20 people taking buyouts or being laid off in 2016 (Sanchez, 2018). Within a day, the Chicago Tribune was hit with layoffs, though the number of people who lost their jobs was not immediately clear (Armentrout, 2018). This is in addition to more than a dozen positions eliminated 6 months before. In May 2018, the Tribune organized. And Jacksonville’s Florida Times-Union, sister paper to the Ledger and the Herald-Tribune, organized with the NewsGuild-CWA in July 2018.
As McKercher (2002) noted, concentration of ownership in newspapers is not new, nor is the profit-motivation of corporate owners or news workers organizing. However, the difference may be that the trend has accelerated exponentially with private equity firms and hedge fund owners buying up newspaper chains as the industry reels from advertisers flocking to online outlets. Gutting newsrooms rather than investing in them to increase profits for investors is exacerbating the decline of print newspapers and as such is devastating not only for the journalists who lose their jobs but also for the readers who depend on their local paper for news about their communities, the nation, and the world.
As the Ledger’s Drumm said, newspaper quality must suffer under these circumstances – not by any fault of the journalists but by the corporate practices that negatively affect journalists’ ability to do their job, a job that is essential for democracy. It is extremely difficult for journalists at corporate-owned newspapers to fulfill journalism’s democratic roles when their newsroom staff and resources have been slashed, reporters are underpaid and overworked, communities become marginalized because there are not enough journalists to cover the geographic area, and investigative news suffers as reporters are expected to meet daily quotas in terms of number of articles as well as social media posts and videos for the web. As the Herald-Tribune’s Johnson noted, ‘Corporate thinks quarterly, not long term’. If the papers do not make the numbers, cuts – usually to the workforce – occur. Johnson stated that for GateHouse, this is ‘a financial endeavor – cut to the bare bones to sell or consolidate’. But for the journalists and readers, it is not about money. It is about being informed, holding those in power accountable. Unionizing seems to be a viable way to attempt to counter the negative effects of corporate-owned newspapers by slowing down the newsroom bleeding and listening to those who are on the ground.
As the journalists interviewed noted, unionizing is not a quick fix. For some, the slow pace of the bargaining process was unexpected, and those who vote to unionize need to realize that things will not change immediately. But all of them noted that there have been changes since they unionized, and those changes are for the better, not the horror stories that management professes. However, for a small or midsize paper to bargain with a corporate entity’s team of lawyers and HR representatives, the challenge can seem daunting. As such, the national NewsGuild-CWA, in negotiations with GateHouse for a ‘first-of-its-kind’ agreement, bargained salary and health benefits for all 16 of the unionized GateHouse newspapers as announced in December 2017 (local issues would still be bargained at the local level, such as layoff procedures). The NewsGuild-CWA pointed to the power of the collective as greater than a single paper at the bargaining table (Guild Reaches, 2017). This may be a catalyst for other GateHouse newspapers, as well as other news outlets, to begin organizing – whether through established unions or other means – to counter the precarity of their jobs under private equity and hedge fund management.
As the journalists interviewed noted, while the process is difficult and can take a personal toll, particularly if there is a lack of consensus, the results are worth it, both at the interpersonal and professional levels. It is important to remember, however, that the results may not be as quick or as comprehensive as one might expect, which can be challenging after years of layoffs and lack of raises. But as all of the journalists noted, having a voice is essential to saving their newspapers, the employees, and journalism itself. Although the arguments presented here cannot be generalized to all unionization efforts, the labor movement and those who study journalism can learn from the experiences of the Florida journalists interviewed here who organized to improve their working conditions in a profession that is essential for a democratic society.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
