Who is who in fact-checked conspiracy theories? Disseminators,sources,and the struggle for authority in polarized environments

Abstract

Despite the growing scholarship concerning mis- and disinformation, research has yet to assess how journalism tackles conspiracy theories in settings where news organizations and media professionals have their authority questioned. Against this background, our article poses two research questions: RQ1) Who are the actors mainstream fact-checkers cover when addressing conspiracy theories? RQ2) To what extent does the focus on such actors delegitimize those who challenge news organizations or compete with them for the audience? Using content analysis as our key methodological strategy, we consider 197 fact-checks published between 2018 and 2021 by the Projeto Comprova, a Brazilian initiative currently comprising professionals from 41 media organizations. We found that the most discussed topics were those mobilizing polarized groups, namely, the Covid-19 pandemic and election fraud allegations. The then-President Bolsonaro and his supporters were often cited as disseminators of such plots. In turn, Facebook is pointed out as a thriving environment for the circulation of conspiratorial narratives. The results also reveal the prominence of mainstream news outlets as sources to ground the “factual” information sustained in the fact-checks. More interestingly, our data suggest that fact-checkers have favored specific news values when addressing conspiracy theories. To strengthen our investigation, we use interviews with four professionals contributing to the Comprova to illustrate how the project has brought together rival companies interested in delegitimizing “alternative” sources of information.

Keywords

Conspiracy theories content analysis disinformation fact-checking global south journalism polarization social media

Introduction

The spread of conspiracy theories in polarized settings such as Brazil (Lugo-Ocando, 2020; Fontes and Marques, 2022) has involved even government officials interested in disseminating deceitful content to criticize opponents (Oliveira et al., 2022). If the influence of such “theories” had been underestimated in past decades (Keeley, 1999), the increasing use of social media and the weaponization of false information now require multiple disciplinary perspectives to explain the topic (Douglas et al., 2019; Shahsavari et al., 2020).

Conspiracy theories refer to a kind of misinformation interested in disclosing the responsibility of “hidden” agents for certain events (Uscinski et al., 2016). However, notwithstanding the growing scholarship concerning mis- and disinformation (Humprecht et al., 2020; Jang et al., 2019; Vraga and Bode, 2020), research has yet to assess how journalism tackles conspiracy theories. Accordingly, this article poses two research questions: RQ1) Who are the actors mainstream fact-checkers cover when addressing conspiracy theories? RQ2) To what extent does the focus on such actors delegitimize those who challenge news organizations or compete with them for the audience? By investigating how fact-checkers refer to the actors who share, are mentioned, or serve as sources for journalism to cover such narratives, we aim to understand how the media participate in the dispute for public trust (Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2016) in environments where their authority is questioned (Hanitzsch and Vos, 2017).

We study the Projeto Comprova—an initiative that currently brings together journalists from 41 Brazilian news organizations (https://projetocomprova.com.br). The project, supported by Google and Facebook,¹ published 514 fact-checks between August 2018 and March 2021. Using content analysis, we investigate 197 Comprova’s texts referring to at least one of the three elements featuring conspiracy theories (Hameleers, 2021): narratives that (1) are attributed to evil forces, (2) depict political events as a “good versus evil” struggle, or (3) consider that mainstream interpretations hide power discrepancies. To complement our findings, the article considers four interviews with reporters working for the Comprova to understand their perceptions about issues such as checked topics, news values, and production routines.

The Comprova is particularly relevant in a polarized society where politicians have sponsored conspiracy theories to question journalism’s credibility (Marques, 2023). Bringing together rival companies may be motivated by an interest in exploring niche markets (Çomlekci, 2022) or reinforcing the field’s authority. Besides supporting the de-westernization of Communication Research (Oliveira et al., 2021; Marques and Miola, 2021) and expanding the research about such narratives (Dias and Sippitt, 2020), we built a codebook that offers an original framework for further studies by favoring a cross-cultural perspective.

Although the results are not generalizable, we found that conspiracy theories were one of the leading Projeto Comprova’s spotlights. The emphasis on fact-checking narratives disseminated by non-mainstream media stems from the fact that these “alternative” actors compete with traditional journalism. That is, the struggle for epistemic authority has become one of the criteria of newsworthiness considered by journalism professionals. Finding that mainstream organizations are teaming up to counter such “theories” is another exciting result of this study.

Conspiracy theories

Even though conspiracy theories have circulated at least since the early Middle Ages, the topic has recently received increased attention (Mancosu and Vegetti, 2020; Uscinski, 2018). According to Hameleers (2021), narratives associated with conspiracy theories generally (1) refer to the power of hidden evil forces, (2) embody a Manichean struggle of “good” versus “evil,” and (3) consider that dominant interpretations cover up the “truth.” Mahl et al. (2022, p.17) conceptualize conspiracy theories as “alternative explanations that refer to secret machinations,” while Harambam and Aupers (2015) claim that such narratives oversimplify complex phenomena to gain more visibility. Konkes and Lester (2017), in turn, contend that conspiracy theories claim that the “elites” act on behalf of vested interests rather than the public interest.

Since conspiracy theories may influence individual opinions on issues including climate change (Jolley and Douglas, 2014), political participation (Connolly et al., 2019; Douglas et al., 2019), and public health (Stecula and Pickup, 2021; Douglas, 2021; Sunstein and Vermule, 2009), they have become a central problem in some information settings. Indeed, conspiracy theories find their niche when people distrust their governments and feel dissatisfied with mundane, small-scale explanations for significant events (Craft et al., 2017; Stempel, et al., 2007). The Covid-19 pandemic has been particularly opportune for circulating conspiratorial narratives (Bruns et al., 2020; Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2020)—and even a few political leaders have endorsed such plots (Uscinski et al., 2020; Oliveira et al., 2022).

In addition, social media “give conspiracy theorists the opportunity to cross-reference and mutually support their claims” (Mahl et al., 2021: p.2), serving as a pivotal environment for the proliferation of such narratives (Brandtzaeg et al., 2016; Freelon et al., 2020; Mancosu and Vegetti, 2020; Rossini et al., 2021). One example is the dissemination of videos showing empty hospitals during the Covid-19 pandemic to allegedly “demonstrate” that the health crisis was not as severe as reported by official authorities and the media (Gruzd and Mai, 2020). In response, social media managers claim they have promoted content moderation and de-platformed users who spread disinformation (Rogers, 2020), besides forming partnerships with fact-checking agencies (Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2020).

While some governments have considered the above actions insufficient to thwart the problem (Timmer, 2019), others have weaponized conspiracy theories to strengthen populist discourses (Oliveira et al., 2022). According to Kaltwasser (2021), even after coming to power, populist leaders need to keep the impression that they keep fighting the establishment—and this is where conspiracy theories can be helpful. Furthermore, trust in populist leaders is often associated with belief in conspiracies (Stecula and Pickup, 2021), which reinforces the relevance of studying polarized political environments (Marques, 2023; Fontes and Marques, 2022).

Journalism and fact-checking

To reinforce its authority, mainstream journalism has taken advantage of fact-checks as a niche product (Graves, 2018; Lowrey, 2017). Factors external (e.g., the friction with political leaders) and internal (the competition with web-native organizations that best serve partisan interests) to the field push news organizations to react when they feel their prestige threatened (Vos and Moore, 2020).

The spread of conspiracy theories has also pressured news organizations, leading the media to reconsider verification techniques and face ethical dilemmas (Konkes and Lester, 2017; Waisbord, 2018). For example, should journalists refute conspiracy theories or just ignore them? Against this backdrop, mainstream fact-checking initiatives have sought to debunk mis- and disinformation (Fridkin et al., 2015; Garrett et al., 2013) and, at the same time, reinforce the legitimacy of the press amid a scenario of information disorder (Graves, 2017; Wardle, 2018; Amazeen, 2020; Stecula and Pickup, 2021; Vargo et al., 2018).

Notwithstanding, some individuals continue to endorse conspiracy theories even after accessing content contradicting the information they believe in (Bruns et al., 2020; Craft et al., 2017; Mancosu and Vegetti, 2020; Stecula and Pickup, 2021). Part of the public’s distrust in the work of fact-checkers (Jang et al., 2019; Brandtzaeg and Folstad, 2017; Humprecht et al., 2020; Lyons et al., 2020) stems from the criteria used to select specific agendas (Marres, 2018; Uscinski and Butler, 2013) and the alleged posture of fact-checkers as arbiters of truth (Robertson, 2020). Despite such resistance, fact-checking initiatives have served to institutionalize the fight against mis- and disinformation (Bélair-Gagnon et al., 2022).

Informational disorder in the Brazilian landscape

The heightened use of social media to spread political messages marked the Brazilian elections in 2018 (Mitchelstein et al., 2020; Marques, 2023). During the second electoral round between Fernando Haddad and Jair Bolsonaro, Haddad’s alleged proposal to create a “gay kit” for six-year-olds was among the most shared fake news.² Considering this problem, the Brazilian Congress implemented its own fact-checking services and established a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission in 2019 to investigate digital crimes against the democratic order.³ The Superior Electoral Court—the main target of conspiracy theories about the security of our electronic voting machines⁴—has also issued legal demands to withheld social media accounts disseminating “false information.”⁵

The Projeto Comprova (https://projetocomprova.com.br) has been sponsored by mainstream journalism amid this dispute for public opinion. The Folha de S. Paulo said the Comprova aimed “to identify, check, and contest rumors, manipulations, and fake news about the [2018] elections.”⁶ The partnership among different media organizations (currently, the Comprova includes journalists from 41 news companies⁷) had the support of corporations such as Google and Facebook—which have also sided with the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).⁸ The organizations participating in the Projeto Comprova have diverse audiences and ideological identities, operating on different platforms (Lelo, 2022). For example, O Estado de S. Paulo is a century-old quality paper with meaningful influence on the country’s elites. In turn, the web-native Nexo Jornal was founded in 2015, and, even relying on reduced professional staff, it has become a reference media outlet. Such news organizations have developed a spirit of collaboration as a result of the challenges that dis- and misinformation (including conspiracy theories) imposes on the field (Cueva Chacón and Saldaña, 2021; Salaverría and de-Lima-Santos, 2021).

Nevertheless, the criticisms against the Projeto Comprova and other fact-checking experiences accuse them of seeking to control the truth, besides being funded by platforms profiting from the circulation of false rumors (Carvalho et al., 2020). In addition, Brazilian fact-checkers have been harshly blamed for favoring a left-wing bias in their coverage.⁹ To summarize, if a highly polarized political environment undermines societies' resistance to mis- and disinformation (Craft et al., 2017; Humprecht et al., 2020), a low level of trust in institutions such as universities, scientific systems, and journalistic organizations destabilizes the authority of our shared knowledge (Vos and Thomas, 2018).

In this sense, while Bolsonaro has repeatedly criticized the media,¹⁰ journalistic coverage has sought to respond to threats of delegitimization in different ways (Fontes and Marques, 2022). There is, then, a fierce dispute between the legacy media and politically or economically oriented actors for “the truth.” With this in mind, we pose two research questions:

RQ1) Who are the actors mainstream fact-checkers cover when addressing conspiracy theories?

RQ2) To what extent does the focus on such actors delegitimize those who challenge news organizations or compete with them for the audience?

Methods

The Projeto Comprova encompassed four stages from beginning to date. The first one took place between August and October 2018; the second lasted from July to December 2019; the third period included March, April, May, to June 2020; and the last stage fact-checked information from June 2020 to March 2021. A total amount of 514 texts were published throughout these four phases. The time frames comprised events such as elections, congressional investigations into the dissemination of fake news, the release of former President Lula from prison, the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, and street demonstrations against and favorable to Bolsonaro.

We carried out a two-step filtering process to analyze specifically texts focusing on conspiracy theories. First, we searched for the following keywords (and their respective variations) on the Comprova website: “Control*,” “Secret*,” “Acredit*” [Believe*], “Discurso” [Discourse], “Fraude” [Fraud], “Teoria” [Theory], “Conspir*,” “Desacredit*” [Disbelie*], “Trama” [Plot], “Rumor,” “Lenda” [Legend], “Complô” [Conspiracy], “Paranoia,” “Superstição [Superstition],” and “Conluio” [Collusion]. The list of terms stems from works concerning conspiracy narratives discussed in the literature review section. We found 320 fact-checks mentioning at least one of these words. The second step involved the work of three previously trained researchers who read such pieces and narrowed them down to fact-checks addressing narratives directly associated with plots that (1) are attributed to evil forces, (2) interpret political events as a “good versus evil” struggle, or (3) consider that mainstream interpretations cover up power discrepancies (Hameleers, 2021). We thus reached 197 fact-checks that fit at least one of the three core elements of the concept.

To answer our research questions, we developed a codebook based on the literature and supported by a previous exploratory examination of the fact-checks (Table 1).

Table 1.

Analytical variables, categories, and subcategories.

Variable	Categories
A) Themes	1) COVID-19 PANDEMIC
	1.1) vaccines;
	1.2) mask use;
	1.3) controversies about medical treatment;
	1.4) social distancing;
	1.5) origin of the disease;
	1.6) number of infections and/or number of deaths;
	1.7) other.
	2) POLITICS
	2.1) Election fraud (e.g., tampering with voting machines);
	2.2) rumors about the personal lives of politicians;
	2.3) attacks toward political agents;
	2.4) attacks on institutions (e.g., the Legislative power);
	2.5) public policies (in areas such as education, environment, and infrastructure);
	2.6) political ideologies;
	2.7) other.
	3) NATURAL SCIENCES AND NATURAL PHENOMENA (explanations about supernatural events or related to environmental issues).
	4) CUSTOMS AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (conspiracy theories related to gender, ethnicity, sexual and reproductive rights);
	5) OTHER.
B) Who disseminates conspiracy theories according to the fact-check	1) In-office politicians (when the fact-check was published);
	2) Out-of-office politicians (when the fact-check was published);
	3) Members of the Judiciary;
	4) Members of the armed forces;
	5) Non-mainstream media companies;
	6) Digital influencers (individuals, groups, pages, or channels with an impact on social media);
	7) Users namely identified by the fact-check but who are not publicly known figures;
	8) Anonymous or unidentified users;
	9) Other.
C) Which agents allegedly benefit from the plot	1) Political agents (when mentioning their names);
	2) National government;
	3) Foreign governments or countries;
	4) State and/or municipal governments;
	5) Members of the Judiciary;
	6) Political parties;
	7) Businesspersons and companies (e.g., pharmaceutical companies);
	8) Non-governmental organizations or social movements;
	9) Scientists and experts;
	10) Unidentified actors (the fact-check does not specify the agents taking advantage);
	11) Other.
D) Sources used in the fact-check	1) State or government agencies;
	2) The political field (parties and other politicians);
	3) The civil society (e.g., scientists, experts, NGOs);
	4) Journalistic sources (interviews with media professionals or references to mainstream media content);
	5) Search engines for verifying and comparing images/videos/audio;
	6) The agent who is mentioned in the narrative;
	7) Other.
E) Platform used for disseminating conspiracy theories according to the fact-check	1) WhatsApp;
	2) Telegram;
	3) Facebook;
	4) Instagram;
	5) Twitter;
	6) YouTube;
	7) TikTok;
	8) Gab;
	9) Parler;
	10) 8kun;
	11) 4chan;
	12) BitChute;
	13) Reddit;
	14) Mainstream news organizations' websites;
	15) Non-mainstream news organizations' websites;
	16) Unidentified;
	17) Other.
F) Which organizations participated in the fact-checking	1) Mainstream news organizations;
	1.1) A Gazeta;
	1.2) AFP;
	1.3) Band TV;
	1.4) Band news;
	1.5) Canal Futura;
	1.6) Correio (Bahia);
	1.7) Correio de Carajás;
	1.8) Correio do Estado;
	1.9) Correio do Povo;
	1.10) Diário do Nordeste;
	1.11) Estado de Minas;
	1.12) Exame;
	1.13) Folha de S. Paulo;
	1.14) Gaúcha ZH;
	1.15) Gazeta do Sul;
	1.16) Jornal do Commercio;
	1.17) Metro brasil;
	1.18) Nexo Jornal;
	1.19) NSC Comunicação;
	1.20) O Estado de S. Paulo;
	1.21) O popular;
	1.22) O Povo;
	1.23) Poder360;
	1.24) Rádio Bandeirantes;
	1.25) Rádio BandNews FM;
	1.26) Revista Piauí;
	1.27) SBT;
	1.28) UOL;
	2) Journalistic organizations devoted to specific communities or issues:
	2.1) Marco Zero Conteúdo;
	2.2) Agência Mural de Jornalismo das Periferias;
	2.3) Bereia;
	2.4) Rádio Noroeste;
	2.5) Amazônia Real;
	2.6) Coletivo Niara;
	2.7) Alma Preta;
	2.8) Favela em Pauta;
	3) No mention of any organization participating in the coverage;
	4) Other.

Three coders with prior experience in content analysis worked on the codebook application process. At least two coders separately assessed each fact-check. They then compared the results and discussed the remaining disparities until reaching a consensus. The same fact-check could register two or more subcategories, allowing for more thorough data analysis.

To investigate the Projeto Comprova’s production routines and understand the extent to which the initiative also seeks to delegitimize those information actors challenging news organizations, we use four interviews carried out with Comprova’s reporters. Such interviews are part of the work of scholars linked to our research group (Fontes et al., 2019). Two of the authors of this article were part of the team responsible for using a semi-structured script in the meetings at stake. The testimonials do not mean to represent the whole set of professionals collaborating with Comprova. Our intention is mainly to illustrate some of their practices when it comes to how the fact-checks are performed and how their agenda is defined. The interviewees' names will not be revealed to comply with their requests. Nevertheless, we can say that the reporters are three men and one woman who worked directly in the production of Comprova fact-checks. All professionals are under 40 years old and work in print media or TV stations. Each interview lasted, on average, 40 minutes. The following topic displays excerpts from fact-checks and presents some of the statements collected during the interviews.

Results

Figure 1 displays the number of fact-checks published by Comprova and mentioning conspiracy theories. Between September and October 2018, the project emphasized plots and rumors regarding that year’s presidential elections. Nonetheless, Comprova started paying closer attention to such narratives after April 2020. More precisely, 22 fact-checks discussed mis- and disinformation concerning the Covid-19 pandemic in May of that year. Other 25 texts were published in November 2020, when Brazil held municipal elections.

Figure 1.

Comprova fact-checks addressing conspiracy theories.

In Tables 2 –7, “N” is the number of fact-checks classified in each category/subcategory, while the column “%” shows the proportion of these fact-checks within the 197 texts comprising the corpus. Table 2 lists the most recurrent topics in the conspiracy theories checked by Comprova. Most of the stories mentioned Covid-19-related issues¹¹: 25% of the fact-checks address controversies about treatments against the disease; 21% deal with vaccines; 13% throw into question the number of cases or deaths; 11% dispute the effectiveness of social distancing; 8% refers to the use of masks; 4% discuss the origin of the disease; 6% mention other pandemic-related topics (for instance, “population control” allegations¹²).

Table 2.

Main topics of the fact-checked conspiracy theories.

Themes	N	%
Covid-19 pandemic—vaccines	41	21
Covid-19 pandemic—Mask use	16	8
Covid-19 pandemic—controversies about medical treatment	50	25
Covid-19 pandemic—social distancing	21	11
Covid-19 pandemic origin of the disease	8	4
Covid-19 pandemic—number of infections/deaths	25	13
Covid-19 pandemic—other	11	6
Politics—election fraud	30	15
Politics—rumors about the personal lives of politicians	3	2
Politics—Attacks toward political agents	3	2
Politics—Attacks on institutions	3	2
Politics—public policies	7	4
Politics—political ideologies	5	3
Politics–Other	2	1
Natural sciences and other phenomena	10	5
Customs and social Behavior	2	1
Other	1	1

Table 3.

Agents responsible for disseminating conspiracy theories.

Agents	N	%
Anonymous or unidentified	83	42
Digital influencers	72	37
Non-mainstream media companies	43	22
In-office politicians	30	15
Users namely identified but not publicly known	30	15
Out-of-office politicians	18	9
Members of the Judiciary	1	1
Other	7	4

Table 4.

Agents identified as benefiting from the conspiracy.

Agents	N	%
Unidentified actors	127	64
Political agents	15	8
Foreign governments or countries	11	6
State and/or municipal governments	10	5
Businesspersons and companies	9	5
Non-governmental organizations or social movements	7	4
Members of the Judiciary	4	2
Political parties	3	2
Scientists and experts	3	2
Other	12	6

Table 5.

Sources cited in the fact-checks.

Sources	N	%
State or g/Government agencies	174	88
The civil society	144	73
Journalistic sources	126	64
The agent who is mentioned in the narrative	54	27
Search engines	18	9
The political field	4	2
Other	14	7

Table 6.

Platforms used to spread conspiracy theories.

Platforms	N	%
Facebook	137	70
Twitter	88	45
YouTube	50	25
Non-mainstream news organizations' websites	36	18
WhatsApp	24	12
Instagram	20	10
Reddit	1	1
Telegram	1	1
Other	6	3

Table 7.

News Organizations participating in the fact-checks.

News organizations	N	%
O Estado de S. Paulo	61	31
Jornal do Commercio	45	23
Folha de S. Paulo	41	21
Rádio BandNews FM	29	15
UOL	29	15
Nexo brasil	23	12
GaúchaZH	21	11
SBT	21	11
A Gazeta	19	10
Poder360	15	8
Correio (Bahia)	15	8
Marco Zero Conteúdo	13	7
NSC Comunicação	12	6
Rádio Noroeste	11	6
Coletivo Niara	11	6
AFP	10	5
Agência Mural de Jornalismo das Periferias	10	5
O Povo	9	5
Revista Piauí	9	5
Amazônia Real	9	5
Alma Preta	8	4
Favela em Pauta	8	4
Bereia	7	4
O popular	4	2
Diário do Nordeste	4	2
Exame	3	2
Band TV	3	2
Gazeta do Sul	3	2
Correio do Estado	2	1
Estado de Minas	2	1
Correio do Povo	1	1
BandNews	1	1
No mention of any organization participating in the coverage;	11	6
Other	4	2

Conspiracy theories about medical treatments for Covid-19 persistently mentioned hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, and ivermectin. The fact-check published on 05/14/2020¹³ investigates the information that patients recovered after the use of chloroquine. A report dated 06/08/2020¹⁴ claimed that Brazil would have “almost doubled” the number of cured Covid-19 patients after adopting chloroquine-based treatments. Plus, conspiracy theories concerning vaccines peaked amid the pandemic (Uscinski et al., 2020). That is why at the height of the coronavirus crisis in Brazil, fact-checkers underscored that “disinformation related to Covid-19 […] is even more dangerous, as it puts the health of the population at risk” (08/26/2020¹⁵).

Accusations of electoral fraud were found in 15% of the fact-checks. Electronic voting machines were the main target in this case. Even though there has been no proven fraud incident to date, the narratives underscored the impossibility of auditing or recounting votes (11/13/2020¹⁶). During the 2018 Presidential race, Comprova had already tried to debunk information that votes for Jair Bolsonaro appeared as null on machines' screens.¹⁷

Ten fact-checks (5% of the total) referred to “Natural sciences and natural phenomena.” During the controversy involving presidents Jair Bolsonaro and Emmanuel Macron concerning the fires in the Amazon,¹⁸ conspiracy theories pointed to non-governmental organizations as agents working against the public interest. One such fact-check was titled “Misleading publication associates, with no evidence, NGOs operating in the Amazon to the exploitation of mineral wealth” (08/26/2019¹⁹).

It is worth mentioning that Comprova reporters sustained that their agenda is directly influenced by stories that go viral on social media. As interviewee A said, “The first filter was: is this content going viral on social media? We should not give oxygen to rumors that weren’t going viral.” Interviewee B reinforces the argument: “We used to consider ‘this topic has been shared by more than 300,000 users on Twitter and Facebook’. As our editor said, 'there’s no way to ignore it.'” In brief, going viral is one of the newsworthiness criteria adopted by the fact-checkers in the case we investigate.

Table 3 presents which agents the Projeto Comprova flagged as responsible for disseminating conspiracy theories. Generally speaking, the fact-checks attributed the dissemination of such narratives to unidentified individuals (42% of the texts). This is what Comprova did in a piece published on 06/26/2020. When covering rumors about the then mayor of São Paulo, Bruno Covas,²⁰ the Comprova claimed that anonymous users had distributed conspiratorial narratives using nicknames to avoid being tracked.

A significant number of articles blamed digital influencers (37%), non-mainstream media companies (22%), in-office politicians (15%), and out-of-office politicians (9%) for disseminating conspiracy theories. The high incidence of the so-called “influencers” reinforces the argument that virality on social media became one of the key selection criteria used to build fact-checkers' agendas. As the story published on 02/09/2021 states, “the Comprova investigates dubious content related to information about the new Coronavirus pandemic, especially those with a wide reach on social media.”²¹ As for politicians identified as disseminators, we highlight the fact-check published on 8/18/2020:²² “congressman [Daniel Silveira] has published conspiracy narratives regarding the pandemic […] and championed the use of drugs without proven efficacy, such as ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine.” This finding is particularly relevant because the scholarly literature has shown that when media personalities or political leaders share conspiracy theories, individuals sympathetic to these actors are more prone to endorse such ideas (Uscinski et al., 2020).

By debunking influencers and “alternative” channels, the legacy media reaffirms itself as the primary reliable source—including when confronting information from political actors. Six fact-checks directly identified then-President Bolsonaro as responsible for spreading conspiracy theories.²³ However, 124 of the 197 texts under study mentioned the president’s name, generally associating him with such narratives. For example, a fact-check published on 10/28/2020 emphasizes that Bolsonaro “has repeatedly stated that 70% of Brazilians should become infected with Covid-19.” In addition, an article published on 08/23/2018 verified a rumor which originally stated that “they [Bolsonaro’s adversaries] are doing everything to prevent Bolsonaro’s victory [including tampering with voting machines]” in the coming elections.²⁴ Moreover, while part of the literature advocates the relevance of official sources to combat conspiracy theories (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009), one of the agents identified by Comprova as a central disseminator of mis- and disinformation is the Brazilian Ministry of Health itself—which reiterated the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine as late as January 2021.²⁵

The journalists working for Comprova denied any political bias in selecting the stories they covered. For Interviewee A, “fake news related to Bolsonaro, or shared by people who support him, was much more conspicuous. They reached more people. That was our first news criterion.” Interviewee C points to balance as one of her goals, even though during the electoral campaigns she covered, “there was much more material involving Bolsonaro.”

According to Table 4, most fact-checked narratives (64%) do not single out the agents benefiting from the alleged conspiracy. However, 8% of the articles identify specific political actors as taking advantage of such plots. This is relevant since references to politicians in conspiratorial narratives may mobilize social media users and shape negative images of opposing leaders. Two stories can be mentioned to illustrate this argument: “It is false that Lula has sold soil from the Amazon to a Norwegian company” (02/09/2019²⁶); “The mayor of São Paulo did not prohibit hydroxychloroquine nor used azithromycin when he was diagnosed with Covid-19” (06/26/2020²⁷).

Other agents allegedly benefiting from the conspiracies are foreign governments (especially China), branded as “evil forces” in 6% of the fact-checks. One example is the fact-check titled “Accusation that China contaminated masks with coronaviruses was made up,” published on 04/14/2020.²⁸ State or municipal governments are mentioned in 5% of the cases; businesspersons or corporations (mainly pharmaceutical companies) were also blamed in 5% of the checks; NGOs and social movements were cited in 4% of the texts.

Table 5, in turn, displays the sources used by Comprova to debunk conspiracy theories. Most of the fact-checks are based on data from official state institutions (88%), civil society organizations (73%), and other journalistic sources (64%). One example is the fact-check titled “It is false that Covid tests are manipulated and that the pandemic is a hoax”²⁹ (09/05/2020). This single piece uses data provided by the Ministry of Health, an interview performed by the Comprova team with an expert, and an excerpt from a news report published in The Atlantic. In several circumstances, fact-checkers used mainstream media materials to reinforce the field’s legitimacy. As the story published in June 2020 states, “An article in the newspaper O Globo [a Brazilian mainstream media corporation], published this Sunday, shows that the Giro de Notícias channel is one of the outlets known for spreading fake news.”³⁰ Other fact-checks address information published by leading organizations, but that circulated on “alternative” platforms after being edited to become out of context.³¹

In 27% of the fact-checks, the Comprova interviewed the agents responsible for spreading conspiracy theories. For instance, journalists went after a doctor who shared that hospitals would receive R$18,000 for each death registered as caused by Covid-19.³² “When questioned about the publication, [the doctor] claimed he did not know the origin of the video nor the identity of the man speaking in the recording.” Nevertheless, many sources sustained their positions even after being challenged with counterarguments.³³ Indeed, on several occasions, the journalists' goal seemed to be to underplay or directly confront those responsible for spreading conspiracy theories.³⁴

Table 6 details the platforms most used to disseminate conspiracy theories. Facebook was cited in 70% of the fact-checks. Twitter (45%) appears in second place, ahead of YouTube (25%). According to the Comprova, non-mainstream websites were also crucial in amplifying conspiratorial narratives (18%). To illustrate, one of the texts highlighted that a video posted on Facebook amassed about 2.6 million views before being deleted (“Doctor died from Covid-19 and not from adverse effects of the Oxford vaccine—11/11/2020³⁵).

None of the fact-checks cited platforms considered supposedly more permissive toward extremist discourse, such as 4chan, Gab, and BitChute (Freelon et al., 2020). This is probably due to the Comprova’s emphasis on covering media environments with a broader reach.³⁶

Table 7 details which partner organizations contributed to fact-checking conspiracy theories. The newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo (OESP) took part in 31% of the stories. The Jornal do Commercio (23%) and the Folha de S. Paulo (21%) also stood out. Another relevant finding refers to how the Comprova fostered cooperation among news companies, as the verifications usually resulted from teamwork among three or more media outlets. An example is the article “Indigenous lands in Rondônia were not sold to an Irish company” (10/01/2019³⁷), a partnership involving the Jornal do Commercio, Folha de S. Paulo, Revista Piauí, and UOL. Indeed, the project’s guidelines state that fact-checks are published only after at least three participants agree on the judgment about the information.³⁸

The journalists interviewed reaffirmed the collaborative approach of the initiative. As Interviewee B said, “Sharing a finding with a person you don’t know well [in reference to other reporters in the project] could be a bit odd. However, [I noticed that] everyone was very professional and focused on working hard. So, the collaboration went well, despite us not knowing each other previosuly.”

Partnerships among news organizations have also attracted increased visibility to fact-checks as articles are usually published both on the Comprova channels and on the websites of the media outlets. Such is the case of the text “It is false that Sarto’s [a candidate who was running for office in 2020] canvassers transported a tampered voting machine.”³⁹ Originally published on 11/29/2020, the fact-check was replicated by the Jornal do Commercio,⁴⁰ O Estado de S. Paulo,⁴¹ O Povo,⁴² and Marco Zero.⁴³

Discussion and conclusions

This article posed two research questions: Who are the actors that mainstream fact-checkers cover when they address conspiracy theories? To what extent does the focus on such actors delegitimize those questioning news organizations or competing with them for the audience? The results revealed that conspiracy theories were one of the leading focuses of the Comprova’s coverage. By highlighting plots related to significant events such as the Covid-19 pandemic and alleged electoral frauds, fact-checkers share criteria of newsworthiness traditionally adopted by the legacy media. Nonetheless, at the same time, they have also considered elements such as a topic’s circulation on social media in their practices.

According to the fact-checks, the most prolific agents in disseminating conspiracy theories are digital influencers and non-mainstream media outlets. This finding is consistent with prior research demonstrating the relevance of “alternative” information channels for amplifying conspiracy theories (Papakyriakopoulos et al., 2020). At the same time, the Comprova’s preference for fact-checking narratives disseminated by such actors might stem from their competition with traditional journalism—that is, a strategy to disqualify competitors while strengthening their own credibility. A recent legal battle between the Revista Oeste and the Aos Fatos fact-checking agency illustrates this dispute for legitimacy in the Brazilian setting.⁴⁴ In that case, the Judiciary found the fact-checkers guilty of taking for themselves “the monopoly of the truth as if any other report in a different sense were genuinely false.” To sum up, our study illustrates how the struggle for authority before public opinion has become one of the criteria of newsworthiness in fact-checking.

Furthermore, if the proliferation of conspiracy theories often revolves around the secrets of government agents (Goldberg, 2001), the problem worsens when official authorities weaponize such narratives to reap political benefits (Gruzd and Mai, 2020; Humprecht et al., 2020; Vargo et al., 2018). While in the United States, former President Donald Trump played a significant role in spreading conspiracy theories about the Covid-19 pandemic (Uscinski et al., 2020), our findings show that the Comprova’s fact-checks associated Bolsonaro with the dissemination of such plots. Accordingly, mainstream journalism in Brazil has even questioned the reliability of some data provided by the government, accusing authorities of issuing misleading information or withholding data.⁴⁵

Conspiracy theories are particularly useful to populist leaders because these politicians support the idea that powerful forces are preventing the government from performing well (Mudde, 2004; Mazzoleni, 2008; Kaltwasser, 2021). Part of the conspiracy theories examined in our investigation attacked leaders opposing Bolsonaro.⁴⁶ It is worth noting that a few fact-checks focused on conspiracy narratives disseminated by opponents of Bolsonaro. Four of the 124 texts mentioning the then-President denied rumors harming him. The fact-check “It is false that an auction will give away half of Brazil’s oil”⁴⁷ barely mentions that such information was broadcast on left-wing websites. Therefore, the data suggest that the Comprova may be politically biased to reinforce editorial stances defended by the news organizations taking part in the project, even though the interviewees categorically denied doing so.

The results also reveal that most of the Comprova’s publications do not identify the actor potentially benefiting from the conspiracy plots—making the scenario more speculative and enigmatic. Nevertheless, several conspiracy theories presented social movements and non-governmental organizations as “agents of evil,” as Bolsonaro does when he refers to NGOs.⁴⁸

Facebook was the most frequently cited platform in the Comprova’s fact-checks. The texts did not mention Gab, Parler, and others, though these settings are more permissive when it comes to extremist discourses (Freelon et al., 2020). Curiously, Facebook’s participation as one of the sponsors of the Projeto Comprova was never discussed in the fact-checks. The extent to which social media enable (and profit from) the circulation of false information was not a topic of interest. Even though Facebook argues that it is taking steps to combat mis- and disinformation, conspiracy channels on the platform are growing in popularity (Jackson et al., 2021).

The data also suggest that collaboration is an underlying logic behind the Comprova’s activities, in tandem with similar experiences in other media environments (Connolly et al., 2019; Douglas et al., 2019; Jolley and Douglas, 2014; Stecula and Pickup, 2021). Two historically competing newspapers—O Estado de S. Paulo and Folha de S. Paulo—teamed up to confront agents who sought to undermine journalistic authority. At the same time, we cannot downplay the commercial interests of the organizations participating in the Comprova. That is, the fact-checks ultimately reinforce the entire journalistic field’s discourse by emphasizing the expertise of the media coverage (Lewis and Usher, 2014; Nettlefold and Pecl, 2022). The collaborative approach suggests a change in the coexistence among competing journalistic companies.

In addition, the 77 fact-checks published during the project’s second wave (from July to December 2019) resulted in at least 520 articles published by the partner organizations.⁴⁹ Including media collectives such as the Favela em Pauta (which provides journalistic coverage from vulnerable communities⁵⁰) also reflects the collaborative framework developed in Latin America (Salaverría and de-Lima-Santos, 2021). Thus, in addition to explaining to the public why a particular rumor is not to be believed, the Comprova’s fact-checks suggest to the reader which products and companies can be trusted. Indeed, several materials previously published in different news organizations were used in more than half of the stories we analyzed. Curiously, the Comprova’s coverage never questioned the legitimacy of using other media companies as primary sources. That is, the project does not address the effects of media distrust in mainstream journalism (Newman et al., 2022).

As discussed in previous investigations, professional and organizational contexts reveal particular ways to apply news values (Boukes and Vliegenthart, 2020; Rosen et al., 2016). In this vein, examining elements such as the actors addressed in the fact-checks and the sources journalists employ becomes essential to understand the field’s strategies to reinforce its authority in a highly competitive scenario.

As with any study, this work has limitations. Since the fact-checks focused on the coverage of conspiracy theories in Brazil, we cannot generalize our findings to other media settings. Nonetheless, the codebook we developed may assist in advancing comparative investigations to understand the characteristics of fact-checking in variegated professional, cultural, and organizational contexts. Future studies must consider the additional particularities concerning fact-checkers' routines, such as their gatekeeping role. Moreover, if previous studies have shown that individuals with higher educational levels grant less credibility to conspiracy theories (Konkes and Lester, 2017; Stempel et al., 2007), to what extent have fact-checkers focused their efforts only on the public consuming quality papers, failing to address an audience antagonistic to mainstream media? This uncharted territory remains to be thoroughly assessed.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. We are also grateful to Giulia Fontes for allowing us to use part of the interviews she collected in partnership with Paulo Ferracioli and Andressa Kniess. Dr Marques expresses his deepest gratitude to the Michigan State University’s School of Journalism, especially Dr Tim P. Vos, for the research opportunities in East Lansing. He also acknowledges the English teachers working for the VETP (MSU) and the Friendship House: Larry Woods, JoAnn Woods, Mary Hennessey, Karen Carpenter, Steven Stowe, Tom Almer, Dan Winter, Jen Garmon, Tim Miank, Paul Schleusener, and Marion Schleusener.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

This research was funded by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (310724/2020-1 and 406504/2022-9) and by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (001 and 88887.478242/2020-00).

Orcid iDs

Francisco Paulo Jamil Marques

Paulo Ferracioli

Andressa Butture Kniess

Naiza Comel

Notes

Author biographies

Francisco Paulo Jamil Marques. Associate Professor at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. Visiting Scholar at Michigan State University (School of Journalism, 2021–2022). Recent publications: “Populism and critical incidents in Journalism: Has Bolsonaro disrupted the mainstream press in Brazil?” (The International Journal of Press/Politics, 2023); “Defending democracy or amplifying populism? Journalistic coverage, Twitter, and users' engagement in Bolsonaro’s Brazil” (Journalism, 2022); “The watchdog role of fact-checkers in different media systems” (Digital Journalism, 2022); “Towards an Inclusive Agenda of Open Science for Communication Research” (Journal of Communication, 2021); “De-Westernizing Media Parallelism: How Editorial Interests Unfold During Impeachment Crises” (Journalism Studies, 2021); “Key concepts, dilemmas, and trends in Political Communication: A literature review considering the Brazilian landscape” (Annals of the International Communication Association, 2021).

Paulo Ferracioli. PhD in Political Science (Federal University of Paraná, Brazil). He is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Universidade do Estado de São Paulo, Brazil, and works for the Research Group on Media, Politics, and Technology (PONTE). His interests focus on Political Journalism, Transparency, and Comparative Research. Recent publications: “Journalism as an agent of public transparency in Brazil: The news coverage on the Access to Information Law” (OBS*, 2020) and “Police Case or Public Health Issue? Printed Journalism Frames on Crack Use in São Paulo” (Brazilian Journalism Research, 2017).

Naiza Comel. PhD candidate in Communication at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. CAPES research fellow. She works for the Research Group on Media, Politics, and Technology (PONTE/UFPR). Her interests focus on Digital Transparency, Public Communication, and Political Journalism.

Andressa Butture Kniess. PhD candidate in Political Science at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. CAPES research fellow. She works for the Research Group on Media, Politics, and Technology (PONTE/UFPR). Her interests focus on Public Transparency, E-Democracy, Public Communication, Political Journalism, and Elections. Recent publications: “The watchdog role of fact-checkers in different media systems” (Digital Journalism, 2022); “What do State Institutions Say? Twitter as a Public Communication Tool During the Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff” (Brazilian Political Science Review, 2019).

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