Facing fear: The importance of engaging with fear in development literature

Abstract

Among the numerous debates and discussions of development, the element of fear is rarely given explicit consideration. In this article, I review current development literature to demonstrate the incomplete treatment of fear, as it is often implicitly incorporated via discussions of security, power, identity, social cohesiveness or resistance. In the second part of this article, I utilize the case study of post-conflict Guatemala to examine how fear shapes, and is shaped by, development at multiple, overlapping scales. By elaborating on the complex interrelations between fear and development, this case study demonstrates the importance of directly engaging with fear in development analyses, particularly in post-conflict settings.

Keywords

fear development analyses post-conflict societies Latin America

I Introduction

Development, as both a process and a project, has long been analyzed, debated and deconstructed (Blaikie, 2000; Escobar, 1995; Peet and Hartwick, 2009; Watts, 1993; Yapa, 1996 – to name but a few). In many critiques, scholars emphasize issues such as the securitization of aid, highlighting the relationship between global, geopolitical fears and development. However, in these works, discussions of the nuances and implications of the interrelations of fear and development at the local level are often limited. On the other hand, scholars who place emphasis more squarely on the intricacies of local level engagements with development, focus on power imbalances, identity, social cohesiveness and community participation. Such conceptualizations often tangentially contemplate the systemic violence that communities throughout the Global South have experienced during their histories (typically related to colonization and ethnic oppression), yet they rarely specifically address fear.

Writing more broadly on the topic of fear, Pain and Smith (2008) have recognized that there is a lack of rapprochement between analyses of fear in everyday, lived experiences with those that examine global, geopolitical fears. In this article, I argue the arena of development is a venue in which this disjuncture is most apparent. As such, in much of the development literature, the role of fear, as it shapes and is shaped by development, remains underestimated and unexplored.

As a first step in rethinking development and fear, this article begins with an overview of themes that emerge in the literature regarding global fears and geopolitical security, followed by an overview of themes that emerge in the literature regarding the interface of development interventions and local communities, with a particular focus on Latin America. These approaches are expansive and it is not the intent of this article to provide a comprehensive survey. Rather, I highlight approaches that primarily focus on development concerns at the local level in order to analyze the ways in which scholars engage with fear at the implicit (than explicit) level.

The final part of the article draws on my research in Guatemala – a long-term site of development interventions that is recovering from a 36-year civil war, with increasing levels of violent crime and high levels of poverty – to emphasize the necessity of directly engaging with fear in development analyses. I highlight key findings, primarily drawn from interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which demonstrate the fundamental and multifaceted relevance of fear to contemporary development issues. In particular, I focus on the contradictions which emerge in the narratives of various stakeholders as they discuss the causes, impacts and possibilities for reconciling fear to improve livelihoods.

II Development, security and global fears

In development literature, fear is typically discussed (albeit often tangentially) in terms of geopolitical control, security or stabilization. Scholars have described the use of ‘development’ as a form of control in the colonial era (Duffield, 2005; Stern and Öjendal, 2010), as a response to the fear of the spread of communism during the Cold War (Escobar, 1995; Rapley, 2007), and more recently as a means for promoting stability in the post-9/11 global ‘war on terror’ (Abrahamson, 2005; Beall and Fox, 2009; Duffield, 2005; O’Gorman, 2011; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Within this latter category, the problematic dovetailing of security and development has received prominent attention. Development and security are seen by many to be intrinsically linked (Beall and Fox, 2009; O’Gorman, 2011; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007: 114) argue, ‘[P]rogress in one enhances the choices of progress in another, while failure in one increases risk of failure of another.’ Under this framework, underdevelopment is seen to be ‘dangerous and conflict prone’ (ibid.: 143). In post-conflict societies in particular, there is the concern that the economic and social impacts of violence impede development, thus potentially leading to further conflict (Collier, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007; World Bank, 2011). Collier (2003: 1) describes the necessity of breaking this ‘conflict trap’, noting that ‘[W]here development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war.’

A key component underlying the logic of merging security and development is that in an increasingly interconnected world, conflict and insecurity in one part of the world can easily ‘spill over’ and destroy lives ‘on the other side of the globe’ (Abrahamson, 2005: 65). Therefore, the quelling of insecurity and conflict, via broad development efforts aimed at improving livelihoods, is viewed as exceedingly important. However, critics argue that this merger of development and security prioritizes Western security and fears, at the expense of attention towards fear within developing countries. Underdevelopment, poverty and the poor in the Global South, are seen as potentially dangerous and threatening, with threats posed by the Global North being largely ignored (Abrahamson, 2005; Duffield, 2005; O’Gorman, 2011; Sparke, 2007; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007).

While the use of fear has been effective as a legitimizing and mobilizing tool for increasingly interventionist development models, its implications for people and their livelihoods in the Global South require additional attention (Abrahamson, 2005; Duffield, 2002; Hyndman, 2007). Furthermore, critics note that the securitization of development fails to take into account the power relations (at multiple scales) inherent in dominant development paradigms, which often – in and of themselves – create both insecurity and underdevelopment (Abrahamson, 2005; Thomas, 2001). As these critiques suggest, in-depth approaches to analyze the interrelations between security and development at the local level are vital. Moreover, I argue that while fear is closely related to notions of (in)security, it maintains its own specificity, profoundly impacting (and being impacted by) engagements with both development and security in local communities.

III Latin American Legacies of Fear

While not specifically focusing on development, several scholars have analyzed the legacies of fear produced through violence and conflict in Latin America (Green, 1999; Koonings and Kruijt, 2004; Kruijt and Koonings, 1999; McIlwaine and Moser, 2007; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Scheper-Hughes, 1993; Torres Rivas, 1999 and 2001). In particular, many authors note how fear negatively impacts solidarity or the ‘social fabric’ of a community (Koonings and Kruijt, 2004; McIlwaine and Moser, 2007; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; Torres Rivas, 1999), resulting in what are frequently described as ‘cultures of fear’ or ‘societies of fear.’ Similarly, the concept of social capital has been a key analytical tool for investigating social cohesion in post-conflict societies. In general, many argue that violence and fear diminish levels of social capital (characterized by a lack of intra-community trust and cooperation), impacting development opportunities in communities (Abom, 2004; Colletta and Cullen, 2000; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). However, the specific ways in which elements such as inequality, conflict and power play out at multiple, overlapping scales are often inadequately addressed within the social capital framework (Fine, 1999).

As such, an examination of the interrelations of fear and development requires attention to the complexities of local engagements with development, without treating the ‘local’ as ‘monolithic, passive and imposed upon with no agency, resistance or negotiation on the parts of local elites, people and communities’ (O’Gorman, 2011: 117). The invaluable insights provided in the post-colonial, post-structural, feminist and critical development literatures are inherently useful, therefore, for attending to these complexities and nuances of local level engagements. While fear is not explicitly discussed, their treatments of power imbalances (often related to imperialism and colonialism), identity and community participation, provide a crucial framework for further theorizing the specific dynamics of fear and development.

Scholars argue that historical and cultural constructions of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and nationality are all ‘crucial aspects of identity that significantly shape how people think about, experience and influence development’ (Lawson, 2007: 46). The multiplicities of discrimination, denigration and exploitation of various groups are extensions of colonization and are often perpetuated (rather than reconciled) by contemporary development practices (Parpart and Marchand, 1995; Wainwright, 2008; Wright, 2004). Furthermore, authors remind us that such issues of identity and difference should be viewed as fluid, and play out across multiple and overlapping scales. They affect one’s degree of power within the development arena, profoundly shaping participation in and perception of development interventions. However, as Moser (1993) suggests, awareness that such inequalities produced through social categories has been unevenly incorporated into development planning and practice. And as Radcliffe (2005: 295) describes, ‘[T]he voices of women and racialized others are only heard sporadically in the fractured and globalizing arenas of transnational advocacy groups, multilateral development agencies and regional social movements.’

Participatory development practices are often seen as a way to challenge colonial legacies and promote local empowerment and participation. In theory, participatory development suggests a more accessible and sustainable approach to development. However, many indict participatory development for not being truly participatory (Mohan, 2007; Ribeiro, 2005; Walker et al., 2007). Ribeiro (2005: 11) argues that ‘[P]articipation and partnership become buzzwords that cannot mask the fact that everyone in the development drama knows where ultimate decision-making power is located.’ And for Walker et al. (2007: 424), the critical questions are ‘Exactly who is participating in whose project, and under what terms?’ and ‘Who invites whom to participate?’ Mohan (2007) raises additional concerns, attributing the failures of participatory development practices to a lack of awareness (on the part of project implementers) of the politics and everyday realities of community members as well as a lack of accountability of power-holders.

Lack of participation and resistance to development interventions in local communities are frequently depicted as stemming from a disjuncture between the agendas of development agencies and local community needs. Conflict arises when development actors prioritize their own goals and disregard existing power structures at the local level. As Sundberg (1998: 403) argues, this disrupts ‘the social and political fabric’ of a community. Bebbington (2000: 498), however, poses a re-conceptualization of ‘locality’ as being ‘continuously produced at the intersection of livelihood practices … local politics, institutional interventions, and the wider political economy.’ As such, he contends that considerations of the ways in which communities accommodate and negotiate within development encounters are equally as important as mechanisms of resistance.

Similarly, Katz (2004) complicates traditional descriptions of community ‘resistance’ to development. She conceptualizes community responses as ranging on a continuum from the more subtle actions of ‘resilience’ and ‘reworking,’ to the more overt responses of ‘resistance.’ She depicts each as being ‘carried out at a range of scales and by a number of differently situated actors’ and as ‘[working] off of and in response to one another’ as much as in reaction to intervention and change (ibid.: 241). In the same vein, Hart (2002: 817) calls for increased attention to ‘ongoing practices, processes and struggles’ as opposed to ‘simply reading patterns of path-dependent development off historical legacies.’ And, as Lawson (2007: 25) notes, ‘people are agents, constrained in certain ways, of course, but who nonetheless engage with development and negotiate its local forms and effects.’ Rather than viewing local communities as static and resistant to development interventions, these analyses present a much more complex and fluid approach to development thinking.

As violence and fear play a ‘foundational role’ in the ‘[F]ormation of daily lives and the cultural context for development in many societies’ (Howard et al., 2007: 721; see also Asher, 2009; Oslender, 2007), there is a need for a more direct engagement with the interrelations between fear and development in development literature. As Radcliffe (2007: 394) argues, ‘[D]evelopment thinking has to address geographies of fear urgently yet sensitively.’ She asserts that development issues must be placed ‘[F]irmly in the terrain of analysis of multiple scales, points of connection, constructed identities, and the contested – and often post-colonially violent – negotiations around its meanings and practices’ (ibid.: 394). Furthermore, the ways in which development itself can also be a form of violence must also be addressed (Howard et al., 2007; Radcliffe, 2007). As Howard et al. (2007: 715) describe, development ‘[R]uptures the cultural fabric, penetrates the colonized body, and inserts a homogenous developmental reasoning.’ Unmasking the role of fear of in the development arena allows for a more explicit engagement with the ‘[M]oral economies, political cultures, and the complex institutionality through which development treats marginalized and impoverished groups’ (Radcliffe, 2007: 395).

Drawing together literature on global fears and the securitization of development with literature which more specifically theorizes engagements with development at the local level sets the stage for a more complete consideration of the interrelations between fear and development. As the securitization of development has the potential to lead to increasingly interventionist development models, it is more important than ever to unpack how globalized fears intersect with local level fears in the midst of development encounters. In the following section, I draw on my research in Guatemala to make the case that fear is an evolving and pivotal consideration that must be incorporated into development analyses.

IV Case Study of Guatemala

In this section I discuss findings from my broader research on the relationship between fear and development in post-conflict Guatemala. I draw primarily on interviews conducted between January and December 2010 with representatives of 28 NGOs (at the local, national and international levels), six Guatemalan government entities and 12 members of the international donor community (both bilateral and multilateral partners).¹ In addition to questions regarding programme design and management, I asked if they believed that fear had an impact on development work, what they felt were the causes of fear, and how to overcome challenges posed by fear in implementing development projects.

The vast majority (41 of 46 interviews) of respondents readily identified fear as a critical element facing development initiatives in Guatemala.² A myriad of overlapping factors emerged in these discussions regarding the causes and impacts of fear in relation to development, including historical legacies of marginalization, colonization, the civil war and contemporary crime and violence. In this article, I provide an overview of some of these themes. In fleshing out the specific dynamics of how fear and development relate, several contradictions also emerged, including the promotion of increased militarization and security to overcome fear as a means of advancing development and the emphasis on participatory development techniques to generate sustainable development in communities. I highlight these contradictions to support the contention that fear is a critical element that must be incorporated into development analyses.

1 Causes of fear

In discussing the relationship between fear and development, respondents identified multiple, interrelated factors as being causal mechanisms of fear. In this section, I provide an overview of the most prominent themes which emerged in the interviews, including legacies of violence, engaño (deception or fraud) and the collection of information.

Legacies of violence

Discussions regarding the relationship between fear and development in Guatemala often centered on the historical legacies of marginalization and ethnic oppression. While some respondents related contemporary fears to colonization, the majority focused on the more recent violence of the civil war. The civil war lasted from 1960 to 1996 and resulted in 200,000 deaths and disappearances and massacres in over 600 villages, with the height of the violence occurring in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The findings of the Guatemalan Truth Commission (CEH) attribute 93 per cent of the atrocities to state actors (particularly the military), with 83 per cent of the victims being indigenous (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1999). Viewing all types of organizing activities as potentially associated with the guerilla movement, the military targeted community leaders and those involved with development initiatives (Sollis, 1995). These scars of the civil war remain in the contemporary era, with community members reluctant to assume leadership positions or to participate in development initiatives. Many respondents referred to the creation of a culture of fear, the rupture of the social fabric in indigenous communities and a pervasive fear and mistrust of the government.³

Aside from the horrific violence and mechanisms of terror that were implemented during the civil war, a key factor that emerged in interviews was the way in which the military government took over the role of development during these years. For example, the military forced many rural inhabitants to participate in development and reconstruction efforts throughout the 1980s (Schirmer, 1998). Military publications from this era showcase its commitment to development and generosity towards the victims of the war (Figure 1). However, as Stepputat (1999: 216) describes, the survivors ‘[C]ould only be ‘helped’ if they submitted themselves to the army’s rituals of reinclusion by applying for amnesty and passing through re-education camps.’ The coercive coupling of ‘development’ and ‘security’ via repressive measures established a foundation of fear upon which many base their perceptions of development in the contemporary era.

Figure 1

Source: Gobierno de Guatemala (1985).

In recent years, violence and crime have increased in Guatemala. Deaths related to drug-trafficking, organized crime, gangs and extortion continually occupy the headlines of the major national newspapers (Figures 1 and 3). Since 2008, homicides have averaged around 6,000 per year, which surpasses the death totals of any single year during the civil war (Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos 2009 and 2010). Several respondents, particularly from the international donor community, emphasized the economic impacts of contemporary violence (related to reduce foreign investment) as the most critical factor in the relationship between fear and development. For these respondents, increased security and judicial reform are essential for overcoming fears related to contemporary crime and advancing development.

Figure 2

Source: www.nuestrodiario.com

Figure 3

Source: www.prensalibre.com

Throughout 2009 and 2010, the Guatemalan government increasingly turned to the military for support in patrolling streets and combating crime (Castillo, 2010; Sandoval, 2009). For some, this remilitarization is cause for alarm. As a representative from a national NGO noted:

The civil war…left a psychological problem … for …those of us that lived it in the flesh. It is very difficult to leave behind that fear … And that has a lot to do with how communities have a negative view of the new militarization … To see soldiers in their community, on the highways – people rapidly remember …what comes back to them is what happened in the 80s …

In the 2011 presidential election the themes of improving security and development dominated the campaigns of many candidates. Retired military general Otto Pérez Molina won the election, becoming the first military figure to take power in Guatemala since the civil war. He has promised the application of a mano dura (iron fist or firm hand) approach to crime and violence.

This approach has created mixed emotions among the residents of my primary field site, Pa Sutz’.⁴ As one resident explained:

They won’t show any sympathy for criminals and this is good. Many bad people will go to jail, but at the same time, at least some of the good people will go to jail as well. It is bound to happen, and there could be social cleansing. And then what?

Social cleansing, or the clandestine, extrajudicial killing of suspected criminals, also has links to the civil war era repression of individuals seen as subversive (ODHAG, 1998). The vandalistic addition of blood dripping from the clenched fist of Pérez Molina’s campaign propaganda also reflects these concerns (Figure 1). The future implications of government promises to take a firmer stance on crime and violence (including increased militarization) as a method of promoting security and development in the country remain uncertain. However, it is clear that fear, related to contemporary violence and its impacts on development, remains a critical (and contested) factor in the lives of Guatemalans. I highlight these examples to demonstrate how the long-standing merger of development and security in Guatemala (often via repressive mechanisms), has indelibly shaped local perceptions of and engagement with development interventions. Without considering the role that fear plays in shaping these perceptions, arguments regarding the concomitancy of development and security overlook a key variable with important consequences and implications for development outcomes.

Figure 4

Source: Photo by author, July 2011.

Engaño

Local residents and development actors often used the term engaño to describe acts of deception or fraud when discussing fear and development. This relates to the prevalence of corruption and past experiences with organizations, the government, or fraudulent individuals who have deceived communities for profit. The failure of development projects to deliver results (or the perceived lack of results) is also seen as a form of engaño. As such, many interview respondents attributed fear related to development in communities to be a product of past engaño.

After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, there was an unprecedented influx of development initiatives and NGOs to rural areas of Guatemala. Some estimate the total number of NGOs in the post-accord era to be between 1500 and 2000 (Loughna and Vicente, 1997; Luján Muñoz, 2000). Some respondents argued that institutions or individuals took advantage of this influx. As a representative from a multilateral institution noted, ‘Some very good organizations and associations have emerged … but, equally, there have been initiatives that have taken advantage of this…emergence of institutions … Unfortunately, because of these few, perceptions are generalized.’

And as a national NGO representative echoed:

… [P]eople have come in and been promising the world and not coming back … Some organizations do come in under the guise of … social NGOs, but they’re simply political organizations or people that are looking to make a buck off somebody else.

Many respondents discussed their frustrations in dealing with the repercussions of corrupt or poorly managed programmes. As a one representative from a local NGO explained:

Sometimes the community thinks that the organization came and then left them … So, it is an image that institutions have been stuck with … And at the moment when there is no response … [the community members] react. They are upset. They see that you came and you scammed us [nos engañó]… then when another institution arrives, they are already very afraid.

In these responses, fears related to engaño may seem qualitatively different from fears related to legacies of violence. However, it is also essential to recognize the key linkages between these types of fear, as described by a national NGO representative: ‘This country has emerged from a base of engaño since colonial times … That type of mistrust and engaño is also … very present in development projects … Fear and engaño are very common.’ Indeed, the devastating impacts that can follow in the wake of engaño – on communities, on families and on individuals – can be very violent and painful.

Respondents envision these fears resulting from engaño as creating a barrier for subsequent development activities in communities. Such barriers are a vital part of the ways in which local residents navigate and respond to various development interventions. Furthermore, the theme of engaño is emblematic of the ways in which fear not only shapes development, but also the ways in which development shapes fear.

Collection of information

As a part of the professionalization of NGO and government development initiatives, the collection of information from participants has become common. Often this relates to community assessments and recordkeeping for increased transparency and accountability to donors. In addition to participating in surveys, project beneficiaries are routinely required to provide their identification papers and a signature. Among illiterate populations, a thumbprint is required in lieu of a signature, which is commonly the case for rural indigenous women.

Residents of Pa Sutz’ often mentioned this as one of their greatest suspicions related to development initiatives (particularly among those who were unsure of what they were committing to with their thumbprint). And development actors frequently relayed stories regarding confrontations with local residents in their attempts to collect information. Many related the fear of providing information to engaño; yet, several also associated this collection of information with the violence of the civil war. ‘We were doing an event … and … no one wanted to enter … because they didn’t want to put their name on a list,’ recalled a representative from a multilateral institution. She went on to explain, ‘[T]hey associate this … with the recent past, when people would then be recruited [by the military], or people would disappear, or other difficult situations.’ And as a government representative remarked:

Fear exists in some communities. Because of the history of their ancestors, of the civil war … if you just go and ask for information from a community, they demand to know why and who you are representing. They do not say ‘Welcome! Now, how can we help you?’ No—it isn’t like that.

Historical legacies, however, represent only one dimension of the relationship between fear and the collection of information. A representative from an international NGO recounted an issue the organization had with a survey question about immigration:

One community … they began to review the questions and at that point they stopped the conversation. They organized and said they did not want to work with us ever again. Afterwards, when we dug a little deeper, the mistrust that they were manifesting was that if they had relatives in other countries, they would be deported … there is always fear regarding what the information will be used for.

A local NGO respondent explained that many residents of Pa Sutz’ prefer to not participate in projects implemented by outside organizations at all, because, ‘[T]here is the fear that – everything that they give you – they will come to charge for it afterwards … this is why they register your name, your identification number – so that they can easily find you later.’

As these examples demonstrate, the association between fear and the collection of information by development actors is multifarious. Underlying many of these concerns is how the collection of information can also be conceptualized as surveillance. The increasingly technocratic models of tracking and following the ‘subjects’ of development can heighten fear. As with engaño, the collection of information is representative of how every day, seemingly innocuous development encounters can simultaneously shape and be shaped by fears. Such subtle encounters are perhaps the most insidious, as they are often overlooked or unnoticed as potential causes of fear. Moreover, similar to the problematic relationship between security and development, the relation between fear and the collection of information hints at the contradictory elements that emerge as development actors work towards overcoming fears through increased accountability and transparency.

2 Impacts of fear

While respondents identified a long litany of causes of fear, in discussing the specific ways in which fear impacts development, responses repeatedly focused on participation. Since the signing of the Peace Accords, many NGO and government programmes have worked to increase citizen participation in development processes (often couched in terms of empowerment and sustainable, self-management programmes). This follows a trend of development discourses regarding ‘bottom-up’, ‘participatory’ approaches. Given the prominence of ‘participation’ within these discourses, it is necessary to examine stakeholders’ various conceptualizations of fear’s impact on participation within development encounters.

Participation, power and fear

As mentioned previously, direct links between development and fear emerged during the civil war. The targeting of community leaders and others involved in organizing activities produced reluctance on the part of many to participate in development projects. Furthermore, the legacies of fear from the civil war play a role in contemporary intra-community dynamics and politics. As one international NGO respondent noted,

… They do not participate because those that are over there are from one group and I was in a different group. So, there is fear to participate … more than anything, there is fear of participating because fundamentally we are a culture that does not know forgiveness.

Another international NGO representative also referenced the challenges of reconciling past wrongs in the collective memory:

A culture of fear has remained … this is what limits the processes of organization in communities. And the leaders … aren’t strong like they once were. Or rather it is like this: if you are a leader, you don’t live long. You die. I believe that this culture has stayed very much within the collective subconscious.

Others related lack of participation to a fear of damaging precarious livelihoods. As a different international NGO respondent asserted, ‘The poorest families do not want to risk anything to participate. They want to see what happens with others first.’ A representative from a national NGO echoed this sentiment:

I sense some degree of fear, or…passivity, in terms of people actually showing initiative in doing things … Some people think … ‘Indians are lazy,’ … I do think there is a certain degree of fear in that as well, where it’s a fear to risk … what little you have, in hopes of something better without knowing that it’s going to work or not.

These responses reflect the concerns addressed in contemporary development research, particularly those concerned with power imbalances, local political dynamics and social capital. Factoring in the element of fear produces a more nuanced conceptualization of the incredibly high stakes involved for project beneficiaries as they navigate development encounters.

Empowerment and sustainability

As development actors attempt to implement participatory programmes that emphasize community empowerment, the issue of generating participation is a common challenge. Many respondents expressed their frustrations in trying to utilize participatory approaches, lamenting that fear has led to a lack of long-term vision, an inability to make decisions or diminished creativity among project beneficiaries. According to one international NGO representative:

[The people we work with] … their view is very limited …when we arrive with them and we ask that they generate some new ideas … it is very difficult. There is almost the necessity of bringing them the ideas, you know? … Because of the experiences that they’ve had for many years, of barely surviving, their vision … is very, very short.

This sentiment was also reflected by a respondent from a multilateral organization:

We aim to do participatory rural appraisals … but it is an effort to expand the vision of communities. Sometimes, what is most important to them, like a multiple purpose salon for example … there may be another potential activity that we could develop with them.

Respondents noted that this effort to ‘expand visions’ creates a particular contradiction, as described by a representative of a foreign government aid organization:

In the communities, it is a very slow process. First there is the education and the raising of awareness … and with the funding [the donor] sends the money and within a year you have to comply with everything – but it is not that simple.

And as another international NGO respondent elaborated, ‘An organization has the pressure to achieve goals … that were designed from afar. And then to condition the community so that they respond to this – it does not work … So, yes, [the communities] accept it, but … they do not appropriate [it].’

These examples reveal how representatives of organizations are working within the contradictory space of engaging in long-term efforts of eliciting community input in programme design, while simultaneously being expected to generate rapid, tangible results. In reconciling this contradiction, development actors often attribute failures to weaknesses within communities, often produced through histories of marginalization and fear. The participatory nature of programmes comes into question, as development actors compromise ideals to meet pre-specified programme goals.

To ensure the continuity of activities after official programmes have ended, a goal of development initiatives is to generate community control of programmes. For many development actors, fear presents a barrier to achieving this sustainability. As a representative from a national NGO noted, ‘[T]he first and principal impact of mistrust and fear is the challenge for social projects to have long-term significance.’ He went on to explain:

Fear and mistrust are like antibodies that do not allow projects to enter [a community]. When [projects] do enter, it is very difficult for them to establish roots – and when they do establish roots, it’s very difficult for them to generate results.

As another national NGO representative described:

All of our discourse about sustainability and empowerment – the people know how to read it … and then they repeat it. But they do not believe it. They say, when the people leave, they will leave us in peace. But we want to get something out of [the NGOs].

As participatory programmes become institutionalized and resources are channeled towards increasing participation and the sustainability of development efforts, the importance of addressing the role of fear in development cannot be overemphasized. A deeper interrogation of the impact of fear on the participatory nature of many development interventions in Guatemala demonstrates a critical need to re-think these development approaches.

V Conclusions: Contradictions and Implications

In the interviews, strategies for reconciling fear revolved around two contradictory-laden ideals: enhancing security and increasing local-level participation. The former, reflective of the popularity of the security–development paradigm, is primarily seen in the political discourses of the current administration, as well as those of international donors, as they promote various security initiatives to combat contemporary crime. They envision that a decrease in crime will promote foreign investment, thus improving development opportunities in Guatemala. However, it is essential to consider the ways in which the historical antecedents of this coupling of security and development shape contemporary reactions, particularly as they relate to increased militarization.

Among the stakeholders who focused on participation, respondents emphasized how fear diminished project beneficiaries’ commitment to programmes, hindering the long-term success of initiatives. Development actors often expressed frustration in trying to utilize participatory approaches, noting that project beneficiaries only invest the minimal amount of participation needed to receive the benefits of various initiatives. From the perspective of local residents, programmes often fail to deliver concrete, tangible results, further reinforcing fears related to engaño.

Nevertheless, in discussing strategies for reconciling fear, development actors consistently returned to participatory development discourses. Many pointed to the importance of targeting the ‘true’ needs of local residents, not imposing pre-fabricated initiatives and carrying out programmes in a transparent manner. The circular nature of this logic creates a contradictory space, resulting in frustration for all of the stakeholders involved. As with the security discourses of increased militarization, the mechanisms used to meet participatory programme objectives can also reinforce the very fears they attempt to mitigate. To assess community needs, development actors often employ surveys to collect extensive information about the communities and individuals. Attempts to monitor levels of participation frequently require the registration of participants. This recordkeeping is also a crucial part of the transparency and accountability initiatives of many development projects. As described above, development actors and local residents alike cite this collection of information as one of the greatest sources of fear.

As the contradictory elements of participatory development and security discourses demonstrate, a more explicit consideration of fear demands a re-thinking of the current approaches of development actors towards overcoming fear in the development arena. Fear alters the nature of development interactions and outcomes, just as the development interactions and outcomes continually alter the shape of fear in communities. The unrelenting, though often subtle, questioning of motives, agendas and objectives of development interventions is a vital component of how local residents negotiate with development. The failure of development practitioners to adequately respond to such questions exposes gaps in much of the contemporary development thinking. Rather than viewing fear as something that must be overcome in order to ‘open’ communities to more active participation, I argue that it is important to recognize that local residents are actively participating, particularly as they (valuably) frustrate traditional approaches to development.

Fear is a complex, yet critical, factor that must be incorporated into contemporary development analyses. Failure to specifically address and elaborate on this complex relationship normalizes fear, placing it within the realm of a historic legacy or leaving it in isolation, related to specific instances of violence. When left unexamined, fear may uncritically house the blame for a variety of programme failures, which overlooks the role of agency among local residents. A full interrogation of the ways in which fear shapes development initiatives brings these issues to the foreground as a pervasive concern with important implications.

Nevertheless, this analysis should not be construed as an attempt to essentialize or prioritize the role of fear as it relates to development. While we must examine fear as distinct from issues of power, identity and social cohesion, it can only be fully understood when examined in a holistic and contextual manner, incorporating the insights provided by the literature reviewed in this article. Cross-fertilizing critiques of the securitization of development (Abrahamson 2005; Duffield 2005), with literatures on the fluidity of local reactions to development (Bebbington 2000; Katz 2004; Lawson 2007) can provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of the ‘working environments of fear’ discussed by Howard et al. (2007) and the pervasive ‘geographies of fear’ experienced by indigenous populations throughout Latin America (Radcliffe, 2007). The complex, contradictory elements of the relationship between fear and development offer potentially productive sites of engagement for development scholars. A closer consideration of fear has the potential to offer invaluable insights into the motivations, negotiations and outcomes of development projects and processes across multiple, overlapping scales.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank several people for their ongoing support and helpful feedback on this research: Jim Biles, Dan Knudsen, Rebecca Lave, Shane Greene and Dennis Conway. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful feedback from Rob Potter and the anonymous reviewers. Thanks also go to the residents of Pa Sutz’ and the representatives from NGOs, government agencies, and multilateral organizations in Guatemala. Although I cannot specify individuals and organizations by name, I am deeply appreciative of their time and thoughts on this research.

Notes

References

Abom

2004: Social capital, NGOs, and development: A Guatemalan case study. Development in Practice 14, 342–53.

Abrahamson

2005: Blair’s Africa: The politics and securitization of fear. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 30, 55–80.

Asher

2009: Black and green: Afro-Colombians, development, and nature in the Pacific lowlands. Duke University Press.

Beall

Fox

2009: Cities and development. Routledge.

Bebbington

2000: Reencountering development: Livelihood transitions and place transformations in the Andes. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 9, 495–520.

Blaikie

2000: Development, post-, anti-, and populist: A critical review. Environment and Planning A 32, 1033–50.

Castillo

2010: Ejército patrulla calles de Huehu-etenango, en apoyo a PNC. Prensa Libre, www.prensalibre.com, last accessed on 5 December 2011.

Colletta

N.J.

Cullen

M.L.

2000: Violent conflict and the transformation of social capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. World Bank.

Collier

2003: Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. World Bank.

10.

Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH). 1999: Guatemala: Memoria del silencio (Tz’inil na’tab’al), http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish/, last accessed on 3 November 2011.

11.

Duffield

2002: Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: Aid as a relation of global liberal governance. Development and Change 35, 1049–71.

12.

Duffield

2005: Getting savages to fight barbarians: Development, security and the colonial present. Conflict, Security and Development 5, 141–59.

13.

Escobar

1995: Encountering development. Princeton University Press.

14.

Fine

1999: The developmental state is dead – long live social capital? Development and change 30, 1–19.

15.

Gobierno de Guatemala. 1985: Polos de Desarrollo y Servicios. Editorial del ejército. Colección Holandesa, CIRMA.

16.

Green

1999: Fear as a way of life: Mayan widows in rural Guatemala. Columbia University Press.

17.

Hart

2002: Geography and development: development/s beyond neoliberalism? Power, culture, political economy. Progress in Human Geography 26, 812–22.

18.

Howard

Hume

Oslender

2007: Violence, fear, and development in Latin America: A critical overview. Development in Practice 17, 713–24.

19.

Hyndman

2007: The securitization of fear in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, 361–72.

20.

Katz

2004: Growing up global: Economic restructuring and children’s everyday lives. University of Minnesota Press.

21.

Koonings

Kruijt

2004: Armed actors, organized violence and state failure in Latin America: a survey of issues and arguments. In Koonings

Kruijt

, editors, Armed actors: Organised violence and state failure in Latin America. Zed Books, 5–15.

22.

Kruijt

Koonings

1999: Introduction: Violence and fear in Latin America. In Koonings

Kruijt

, editors. Societies of fear: The legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America. Zed Books, 1–30.

23.

Lawson

2007: Making development geography. Hodder Arnold.

24.

Loughna

Vicente

1997: Population issues and the situation of women in post-conflict Guatemala. International Labour Office.

25.

Luján Muñoz, Mañas

2000: Guatemala. In Piñar Mañas

J.L.

Sánchez

, editors, El tercer sector Iberoamericano: Fundaciones, asociaciones y ONGs. Tirant lo Blanch, 569–84.

26.

McIlwaine

Moser

C.O.N.

2007: Living in fear: How the urban poor perceive violence, fear and insecurity. In Koonings

Kruijt

, editors, Notes from fractured cities: Social exclusion, urban violence, and contested spaces in Latin America. Zed Books, 117–37.

27.

Mohan

2007: Participatory development: From epistemological reversals to active citizenship. Geography Compass 1, 779–96.

28.

Moser

C.O.N.

1993: Gender planning and development: Theory, practice and training. Routledge.

29.

Moser

C.O.N.

McIlwaine

2004: Encounters with violence in Latin America: Urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala. Routledge.

30.

Moser

C.O.N.

McIlwaine

2006: Latin American urban violence as a development concern: Towards a framework for violence reduction. World Development 34, 89–112.

31.

ODHAG (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala). 1998. Guatemala: Nunca Mas: Recuperación de la memoria histórica (recovery of historical memory) (REMHI). ODHAG.

32.

O’Gorman

2011: Conflict and development. Zed Books.

33.

Oslender

2007: Spaces of terror and fear on Colombia’s Pacific Coast. In Gregory

Pred

, editors, Violent geographies: Fear, terror, and political violence. Routledge, 111–132.

34.

Pain

Smith

S.J.

2008: Introduction. In Pain

Smith

S.J.

, editors, Fear: Critical geopolitics and everyday life. Ashgate, 1–19.

35.

Parpart

J.L.

Marchand

M.H.

1995: Exploding the canon: An introduction/conclusion. In Marchand

M.H.

Parpart

J.L.

, editors, Feminism/postmodernism/Development. Routledge, 1–22.

36.

Peet

Hartwick

2009: Theories of development: Contentions, arguments, alternatives. The Guilford Press.

37.

Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos (PDH). 2009: Informe Anual Circunstanciado 2009, http://www.pdh.org.gt/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8, last accessed on 12 November 2011.

38.

Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos (PDH). 2010: Informe Anual Circunstanciado 2010, http://www.pdh.org.gt/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8, last accessed on 12 November 2011.

39.

Radcliffe

S.A.

2005: Development and geography: Towards a postcolonial development geography? Progress in Human Geography 29, 291–98.

40.

Radcliffe

S.A.

2007: Latin American indigenous geographies of fear: Living in the shadow of racism, lack of development, and antiterror measures. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, 385–97.

41.

Rapley

2007: Understanding development: theory and practice in the Third World, 3rd edition. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

42.

Ribeiro

2005: Power, networks and ideology in the field of development. Série Antropologia, 378. Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, http://nrserver34.net/~danunb/doc/Serie378empdf.pdf, last accessed on 12 April 2012.

43.

Sandoval

2009: Patrullarán calles: Ejército apoyará tareas de la PNC en Escuintla. Prensa Libre, www.prensalibre.com, last accessed on 5 December 2011.

44.

Scheper-Hughes

1993: Death without weeping: The violence of everyday life in Brazil. University of California Press.

45.

Schirmer

J.G.

1998: The Guatemalan military project: A violence called democracy. University of Pennsylvania Press.

46.

Sollis

1995: Partners in development? The state, nongovernmental organizations and the UN in Central America. Third World Quarterly 16, 525–42.

47.

Sparke

2007: Geopolitical fears, geoeconomic hopes, and the responsibilities of geography. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, 338–49.

48.

Stepputat

1999. Repatriation and everyday forms of state formation in Guatemala. In Black

Koser

, editors, The end of the refugee cycle?: Refugee repatriation and reconstruction. Berghahn Books, 10–226.

49.

Stewart

2004: Development and security. Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Working Paper 3. University of Oxford.

50.

Stern

Öjendal

2010: Mapping the security-development nexus: Conflict, complexity, cacophony, convergence? Security Dialogue 41, 5–29.

51.

Sundberg

1998: NGO landscapes in the Maya biosphere reserve, Guatemala. Geographical Review 88, 388–412.

52.

Tadjbakhsh

Chenoy

2007: Human security: Concepts and implications. Routledge.

53.

Thomas

2001: Global governance, development and human security. Pluto Press and Arawak.

54.

Torres-Rivas

1999: Epilogue: Notes on terror, violence, fear, and democracy. In Koonings

Kruijt

, editors, Societies of fear: The legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America. Zed Books, 285–300.

55.

Torres-Rivas

2001: Democracy and the market in Guatemala. In Chase-Dunn

Jonas

Amaro

, editors, Globalization on the ground: Postbellum Guatemalan democracy and development. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 119–27.

56.

Wainwright

2008: Decolonizing development. Blackwell Publishing.

57.

Walker

Jones

J.P.

Roberts

S.M.

Frohling

O.R.

2007: When participation meets empowerment: The WWF and the politics of invitation in the Chimalapas, Mexico. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, 423–44.

58.

Watts

M.J.

1993: Development I: Power, knowledge, discursive practice. Progress in Human Geography 17, 257–72.

59.

World Bank. 2011: World development report: Conflict, security, and development, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf, last accessed on 29 September 2011.

60.

Wright

2004: From protest to politics, sex work, women’s worth, and Ciudad Juárez modernity. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94, 369–86.

61.

Yapa

1996: What causes poverty?: A postmodern view. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, 707–28.