Historicizing the state in development theory: Michael Mann’s model of social power

Abstract

Michael Mann seeks to explain the nature of power and its effects on the development of the state. His work has had a considerable impact within the field of macro-historical sociology, but has primarily been applied to Western case studies. This article builds upon an emerging literature that considers the expediency of using this lens to examine developing countries. It analyzes how the framework of social power can be used to provide a historical analysis of the reach, origins and effects of state power within developing countries. Through a consideration of Mann’s historiography, the article demonstrates the value of his social power framework for development theory.

Keywords

Michael Mann social power development theory history state power

This article discusses the value of using a framework of social power in order to examine the mechanisms of state power in developing countries. In particular, the paper demonstrates that Michael Mann’s historiographic model can be used to understand the ways developing states have organized social power. His framework focuses on relations between four networks of power—political, ideological, economic and military—and is a means for explaining social change and the development of a state. Mann’s work has predominantly focused on Western cases, but he has asserted that the framework can explain social change within any social situation (Mann, 1986). Thus far, it has only been used to analyze a small number of developing countries (see, for example, Chen 2008; Lange 2009; Mann 2005; see also a special issue of Studies in Comparative International Development, 2008), with most examples focusing on political power. This article contends that Mann’s combination of the nomothetic theorizing of sociology with historically grounded evidence not only adds to theoretical understandings of state development, but also contributes a much needed historical dimension to development theory. This article is organized into two parts. The first section examines the historical contribution which Mann’s framework can make, addressing the ahistorical position which much of the development literature takes. The second section considers how the model can historicize one particular aspect of development theory, state power, by focusing on its political and military dimensions.

I History and development theory

Mann’s model is a ‘history and theory of power relations in human societies’ (Mann, 1986: 1) combining historical idiosyncrasy with sociological theory. Using four distinct, but interrelated, networks of power, it is a means of exploring dynamics amongst groups within or between states. The basic premise rests on the idea that ‘societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power’ (Mann 1986: 1, emphasis author’s own). However, across societies and over time, there may be more extremes of each power type, described by Mann as the ‘messiness’ of societies (Mann, 1986: 4). By analyzing a society’s history through such dimensions, we can see how people, materials and territories have been organized and controlled. This gives greater insight into understanding how countries came to be what they are today. As such, Mann uses the framework to look at how the networks of power are employed by a variety of actors within societies in order for them to achieve their own or collective goals. Building on previous work applying his model to non-Western cases, this section of the article concentrates on the benefits a historical sociology framework of this type can have for development theory (Chen, 2008; Jacoby, 2004a; Lange, 2009; Lucas, 1998).

A use of Mann’s macro-historical sociological framework responds to calls not only for greater macro-theorization (Mohan and Wilson, 2005), but also for history to be taken into account in development discourse. It is, for instance, necessary to resist ‘monocausal explanations’ of development that offer scant regard for the heterogeneity of developing states’ formation. Here, there are obvious benefits in combining general nomothetic theorizing with historical empiricism (Booth, 1992: 4; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988: 684–86). This point has been elaborated thus:

The heterogeneity and diversity of the outcomes of social change have to be explained, and this inevitably leads to the relevance of historical studies documenting them. Specific cases of actual development trajectories…may not seem amenable to formulating the broad general views of possible world orders which are so alluring to development theory, but they can lead to the formulation of grounded theory which builds upon observation. (Van Donge, 1995: 283)

Jean-Philippe Platteau, for instance, uses a variety of disciplines to increase interdisciplinarity, forging research agendas which have ‘remained insufficiently investigated’ (Platteau, 1994: 537). A more recent study focuses specifically on the importance of history and an engagement with the work of historians for our understanding of development. The introduction states,

That judicious efforts to ‘think in time’ – i.e., to take seriously the scholarly research that specializes in disentangling complex interdependent processes as they have played themselves out in particular contexts across decades and even centuries – are a desirable and potentially fruitful basis on which to try to enhance the quality of the responses to some of the contemporary world’s most urgent policy problems. (Woolcock et al., 2011: 7)

Indeed, there has been an emerging critique that scholars need to not only acknowledge the historical processes underlying and framing their research, but that they should also actively engage with history to inform theoretical approaches to development (Bernstein, 2006; Hickey, 2009). Within thinking on poverty reduction, for example, there is a clear need to consider the ‘underlying processes’ of development and gain a deeper understanding of social change from a historical perspective (Hickey, 2009: 480–81).

Despite this, a search of journal databases reveals that there are only a small number of articles in each development-orientated publication which have contained the words ‘history’, ‘historical’ or ‘historiography’ within their titles since 1995. Table 1 shows this by comparing the numbers with the total article output for the same period of time. For example, over 17 years, it is only Third World Quarterly which has more than 20 instances of both history and historical within article titles; however, this only culminates in 2 per cent of the total output. World Development, which has the highest output over the period, reveals only a 0.4 per cent of articles which fall into these title categories. In another example, the UK’s Development Studies Association conference, held jointly with the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes at the University of York in 2011 consisted of 56 panels and working groups. One session, organized by the History and Economic Development Study Group, consisting of a general discussion on the development economist Arthur Lewis, along with two other separate individual papers, demonstrated the total extent of history focused presentations at this event. The two previous DSA conferences in 2009 and 2010, although shorter in duration, did not yield any papers or discussion groups on this topic. Although these examples do not account for those papers which contain historical content, this evidence does present a rough portrait of the level of historical output in development orientated forums.

The evidence and data presented indicate on a more general level that the study of development as ‘geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes’ has been sidelined in the literature (Hart, 2001: 650). As Mann’s framework of social power uses the past to understand contemporary dynamics, his method can be employed as a tool to redress such marginalization. As he puts it, his ‘historical–causal analysis of origins considers the conditions which gave rise to modern institutions relevant to understanding their present nature and likely persistence’ (Mann, 1994: 39, emphasis author’s own). In other words, his approach brings a level of analysis to research which can help explain how societies have worked in the past and how they have come to be structured. These can ensure that our understanding of development is extended beyond merely the analysis of interventions in poor countries and associated policy questions (Bernstein, 2006; Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Kothari, 2005).

Table 1

of instances of selected words in article titles between January 1995 and June 2012

Journal title	Total number of articles	History	Historical	Historiography
Development	1,408	5	1	0
Development and Change	1,125	9	3	0
Journal of Development Studies	822	4	1	0
Journal of International Development	2,027	7	2	0
Progress in Development Studies (Established in 2001)	625	1	0	0
Third World Quarterly	1,124	13	12	1
World Development	2,740	8	3	0

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

Employing the social power framework uses secondary sources to form an understanding of how societies change. This forges a direct link with the work of historians, enriching the ‘quality of scholarship and policy responses’ through expanding the amount of material available to the researcher (Woolcock et al., 2011: 4). Further, the use of history brings to the fore the importance of context. Mann’s model uses historical data in place of ‘a priori assumptions’ to draw out the links between the actions of individuals and the cultural circumstances, demonstrating that it is only possible to understand social change fully through the thorough employment of empirical, historical data (Jacoby 2004a: 407–08). Consequently, this methodology is of use for development theory through its ability to enhance our understanding of the structures which underpin development processes (Kanbur, 2011). In addition, Mann’s framework of social power, through its reliance upon history, is not prescriptive. It accounts for the uniqueness of individual states yet, due to its focus on four networks of power, it can be applied to different countries without dictating a prescribed route of development, thereby escaping the ‘dirty worlds of practical policy-making’ (Corbridge, 2007: 202).

II Social power and the state

Mann’s approach to social power looks specifically at the workings of the state. By territorially bounding and administering regulations and coercion, the state holds political power, which, in turn, leads to a greater control over the other power relations in society. When state elites accomplish this without routine negotiation or legitimacy from their society, then this form of political power is despotic (Mann, 1984). Conversely, if a state can implement its actions throughout its territory, whilst concurrently penetrating civil society groups who in turn legitimate or halt these actions, then it is organising infrastructural power (Mann, 1984). Through the use of these dimensions, measured over a period of time, it is possible to see how the state tries to organize its society and the other power relations within it. Moreover, it enables an evaluation of how non-state actors can challenge the power of the state. This section of the article looks at these aspects and shows how Mann’s model can provide a historical analysis of state capacity.

Development research has outlined a number of characteristics of high capacity states, including economic growth, democratization, citizenship and social welfare (Besley and Persson, 2007; Soifer and vom Hau, 2008; vom Hau, 2012). In order to achieve these, the state needs to effectively employ the resources which it has available to it. As Linda Weiss points out, such an infrastructural capacity can be thought of as the ability to ‘devise and implement policies that augment a society’s investible surplus, as opposed to merely redistributing existing resources’ (Weiss, 1998: 5). This ‘captures both the organisational and relational qualities of states’ and traces the methods through which states implement control and execute policies (vom Hau, 2012: 4). State capacities, within the development discourse can therefore inform us about the extent of the state’s social and spatial reach and provides a tool for assessing the strength of a state (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008). Apart from a few notable exceptions (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Lange, 2009), the development studies literature on state capacity remains comparatively ahistorical. General accounts focus on the measures which should be taken in order to produce developmental outcomes when faced with contemporary challenges such as liberalization and globalization (Jayasuriya, 2004; Robinson, 2008). Mann’s notion of infrastructural power is a conceptual framework which breaks down an analysis of state capacity through a historical lens; providing a technique to understand how the state penetrates social life and ‘implement[s] logistically political decisions throughout the realm’ whilst concurrently acting out the demands of its citizens (Mann, 1984: 113).

From this perspective, his framework focuses on measureable variables which concentrate on an assessment of the ‘resources at the disposal of the state for exercising control over society and territory’ (Mann, 1993; Soifer, 2008: 236). By considering the ways in which central elites attempt to extend state power over a period of time, processes of state formation are made prevalent. The analysis of the measurable variables changes depending upon the era, the demands of the state and the demands of its citizens. In his work on Western state development, Mann points to a number of processes which contribute to increased state capacity. First, a ‘division of labour between the state’s main activities which it co-ordinated centrally’; second, an increase in literacy, enabling messages to be communicated throughout the state; third, the development of coinage, weights and measures; and fourth, an increase in speed of the transmission of messages and transport of people and resources (Mann, 1984: 192). These measures contribute specifically to general state capacities, namely, the formation and growth of the bureaucracy and judicial apparatus (for example, property rights and rule of law), the means to collect revenue and an increase in legitimacy. In the form of measureable variables, such as the numbers of administrative personnel, police officers, judges; the size of the army or labour available to the state; money spent on welfare policies; or the amount of tax collected, these dimensions can be transposed to a historical analysis of the developing state to gauge the trajectory of its capacity (Mann, 1993: 389, 444).

Of these, ‘the most analytically relevant resource’ should be used for ‘measurement purposes’ (Soifer, 2008: 237). In the past five years, there has, for instance, been increasing reference to the role of taxation in developing countries (Bräutigam, 2008; DFID, 2009; Di John, 2006; Therkildsen, 2008). Although it has been acknowledged by international development bodies that taxation can no longer be seen as just a technical exercise, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding why developing countries have ‘“tax handles” that allow them to tax, but they do not seem able to utilize these handles fully’ (Alm et al., 2006: 8; DFID, 2009; GTZ, 2006). While acknowledging that there is ‘no simple road to better (or bigger) taxation in developing countries’ (Bird, 2010: 3), policy recommendations remain rooted in current European practice (Damme et al., 2008). There is thus a need to address the historical roots of taxation and to take into account the contexts which may affect its implementation. Using Mann’s detailed comparative account of the types of revenue collection which different states were able to implement during the nineteenth century and the reasons thereof may help to fill the gaps in this regard (Mann, 1993: 381–89). By carefully analyzing the regime types and the methods deployed, he has been able to assess the strength of state infrastructural power in each country in the years leading up to World War I. However, his analysis goes further by situating revenue collection alongside other measurable variables which increased state capacity during this period. He tracks the amount of non-military expenditure, such as education, post offices and the telegraph, which not only had a huge impact on literacy throughout these countries, but also ‘extend[ed] material and symbolic communications’ throughout the territory (Mann, 1993: 380).

There has been limited, recent scholarship which has applied a historical analysis of state capacity. Works from New Institutional Economics have taken a historical approach to the creation of institutions, with a particular focus on property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Mann’s concept of infrastructural power provides greater scope for investigating how these are built or hindered. It is a multidimensional concept which incorporates combinations of resources that can draw a picture of a state’s political power over time. It can, for instance, help to ensure that analyses of colonial legacies ‘expand beyond property right enforcement and recognize the multifaceted ways in which states affect developmental processes’ (Lange, 2009: 198). It also offers a more holistic way of understanding the role of security in the development of state power. For some, any study which endeavours to provide an explanation for the way in which developing countries behave, must have security at its heart (Ayoob, 1995). Indeed, the notion of securitisation has certainly become a central feature of the macro-policy discourse from Western donors and agencies over the last 20 years (Duffield, 2007). Debates have focused on the causality question of insecurity and civil wars in the developing world, by concentrating on ideas of either communal differences (such as ethnic, national or religious), the consequences of globalization, or the ‘failed state’ (Dannreuter, 2007). These tend to emphasize the importance of stability in providing a basis for the extension of a state’s infrastructural power and its claim to hold the monopoly over military power (Gros, 1996; Herbst, 1996/7; Jackson, 2002; Migdal, 1988).

In theorizing this claim, Mann deviates from traditional sociological theory which, following Weber, tends to assume that political power and the use of coercion and force are the combined basis of state action. Defining military power as ‘the social organization of concentrated lethal violence’, he argues that ‘[t]o equate physical force with the state often seems to make sense in the case of modern states which monopolize military force. However, conceptually they should be regarded as distinct’, as ‘[p]olitical powers are those of centralized, institutionalized, territorial regulation; military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized’ (Mann, 1986: 11; 2006: 351, emphasis author’s own). It is certainly clear that military groups can be wholly separate from the state, in some cases working against it, or organizing resistance from within. Mann demonstrates this distinction in his analysis of the military revolution between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe (Mann, 1986: 453–58). The advancement made in military technology changed the political structure of Europe and gave rise to a putative state system. Prior to this, military power was held by a variety of actors: lords, vassals, mercenary groups, often acting independently of what may have been deemed as the central, political authority. In another case, he reveals how a disintegration of the hold on political power by the Hutu MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy), led to a rise in patron-linked, but independently acting, paramilitaries in Rwanda prior to the coup which preceded the genocide in 1994. The import of over half a million machetes from China, which were distributed amongst Hutu adults, further added to the loss of the organization of military power by the MRND. Concurrently, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), constituting of Rwandan Tutsis, was building up an army and advancing from the Northeast of the country, challenging the power of the Hutu state (Mann, 2005: 428–48).

There is, therefore, an ‘unassailable argument’ in Mann’s theoretical thinking for the partition of political and military networks of power (Schroeder, 2006: 12). It can be used to provide a historical assessment of the use of violence by state and non-state actors, combining an analysis of political, ideological and economic organization of power at the same time. Therefore, in some societies, it is possible to see how military power has been monopolized by the state and its actions curbed according to law, however, in other instances, this network of power may have surpassed or been used to challenge the political power of the state, enabling independent military elites to possess substantial social power over others. As Mann elaborates, in many African cases ‘institutionalized, law-governed political power yields to the arbitrary violence of military power’ (Mann, 2008: 364). A model which conceptualizes military power as a separate dimension to that of the state can thus enable scholars to go beyond a perception that ‘security matters arise primarily out of internal and external processes by which human communities establish and maintain (or fail to maintain) machineries of government’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 49).

This allows us to theorize more richly both the reasons why militarized action may attempt to gain control over political, ideological or economic power relations and the possible consequences of such endeavours. First, the obvious ability of state elites, to construct or deconstruct conceptions of security within a state through their ability to deploy communication techniques far superior to those of their citizens can be better understood through a more fully theorised account of the distribution of social power within society (Buzan et al., 1998). These debates can be added to by accounting for the trajectories of history, looking at how some manage to gain certain powers in society and others do not (McDonald, 2008), thereby explaining regional variations and why security issues arise in some contexts on a national and sub-national level. In his consideration of ethnic cleansing cases, Mann not only uses his model to understand the deep-rooted power-relations which have led to these events, but also examines the ways in which political elites use ideological power in the preceding moments of violence to change, perpetuate or invent these histories (Mann, 2005).

This has implications for the literature on civil wars and its focus on the short-term causes of civil conflict (Collier, 2009: 231; also see Collier, 2006). Works from a rational choice and neo-classical economics perspective emphasise the pay-offs which accrue to individuals through the waging of violence and the opportunities presented to rebels causing them to instigate violent conflict (Nathan, 2005). Little is committed to a consideration of the long-term, historical and political economy causes of intrastate war (Hoeffler, 2012: 188). As Chris Cramer asks, ‘why must it be accepted that social phenomena are best apprehended through individual rational choice (and a very narrow notion of rationality) rather than relational rationality and social and historical constraints on choice?’ (Cramer, 2002: 1850). Mann’s model focuses on these structural constraints, confirming the role of agency, but also acknowledging that the decision to organize military power in opposition to the state ‘are influenced by and operate very much within specific conditions and social and historical features of change’ (Cramer, 2002: 1857). As he has shown in the case of Rwanda, the model of social power focuses on networks of power, how they interlink and how people in society attempt to use them to reach their goals. Through an analysis which distinctly separates military power from political power, a historically focused account can be portrayed which looks at the broader structures affecting actors in society over a period of time. Not only does this analysis overcome the short-termism of rational choice perspectives but it also opens up a debate on the extent to which the state and non-state actors can affect the stability and security of a society.

III Conclusion

This article has advocated the use of a historical approach to development, specifically when examining state power, utilising a framework of social power in order to do this. First, the paper presented the ways in which the framework can answer some of the criticisms which development theory has received regarding previous ahistorical approaches. Second, the benefits of using the framework have been documented through an analysis of discussions about state capacity in the development discourse, highlighting how a historical sociology approach can enhance thinking in this area. There is little doubt that such an approach can add a greater depth to development theory in explaining how societies have functioned, changed and developed through the actions of the state or non-state actors. Further, historical investigation provides explanations for states’ current forms. Through the application of primary or secondary data, the trajectory of a country’s development can be teased out, providing a much needed historical dimension to the study of developing states. Mann’s model of infrastructural power opens up a space for a multifaceted and longitudinal examination of state capacity. For example, measurable variables such as the number of law enforcers, courts or administrative personal can provide clues about the state’s ability to project its power across society, which consequently could have an effect on its capability to introduce or maintain taxation, property rights and education. Furthermore, Mann’s separation of political and military power provides a method to assess how a state’s capacity and ability to ensure stability can be challenged by looking at the role of state and non-state actors and how they have been able to organize military power in the past and present. This includes the numbers of armed men which they have at their disposal, the types of weapons and quantities, and the ways in which they attempt to organize power relations around them.

Using the social power model in part (Lange, 2009; Lange and Balian, 2008; Schensul, 2008; Slater, 2008; vom Hau, 2008), or in full (Chen, 2008; Jacoby, 2004b), scholars are seeing the benefits of employing this framework for research on states in development. The combination of historical and sociological theorizing with multidimensional variables of analysis provide a useful tool for understanding how actors organize social power in society, accounting for instances of social change when power relations intersect and change. In all, Mann’s framework of social power offers much for the study of development as a historical process.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Tim Jacoby and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Annie Rowling and Jackie Reilly-Romo for proofreading this paper.

References

Acemoglu

Johnson

2005: Unbundling institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 949–95.

Acemoglu

Johnson

Robinson

J. A.

2001: The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. The American Economic Review, 91, 1369–401.

Alm

Martinez-Vazquez

Rider

2006: Thinking about tax reform in the emerging global economy. In Alm

Martinez-Vazquez

Rider

, editors, The challenges of tax reform in a global economy. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc., 3–10.

Ayoob

1995: The Third World secuity predicament: State making, regional conflict, and the international system. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bernstein

2006: Studying development/development studies. African Studies, 65, 45–62.

Besley

Persson

2007: The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. NBER Working Papers 13028. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bird

2010: Taxation and development. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. The World Bank.

Booth

1992: Social development research: An agenda for the 1990s. The European Journal of Development Research, 4, 1–39.

Bräutigam

2008: Introduction: Taxation and state-building in developing countries. In Bräutigam

Fjeldstad

O.-H.

Moore

, editors, Taxation and state-building in developing countries: Capacity and consent. Cambridge University Press, 1–33.

10.

Bräutigam

Fjeldstad

O.-H.

Moore

, editors 2008: Taxation and state-building in developing countries: Capacity and consent. Cambridge University Press.

11.

Buzan

Wæver

De Wilde

1998: Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner.

12.

Chen

Y.-Y.

2008: Asian developmental states, autonomous power and the IEMP model. Paper presented at Political Studies Association Annual Conference – Democracy, Governance and Conflict: Dilemmas of Theory and Practice. Swansea.

13.

Collier

2006: War and military expenditure in developing countries and their consequences for development. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 1, 10–13.

14.

Collier

2009: The political economy of state failure. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25, 219–40.

15.

Corbridge

2007: The (im)possibility of development studies. Economy and Society, 36, 179–211.

16.

Cowen

Shenton

1996: Doctrines of development. Routledge.

17.

Cramer

2002: Homo economicus goes to war: Methodological individualism, rational choice and the political economy of war. World Development, 30, 1845–64.

18.

Damme

Misrahi

Orel

2008: Taxation policy in developing countries: What is the IMF’s involvement? DV406 Consultancy Project. The Bretton Woods Project.

19.

Dannreuter

2007: War and insecurity: Legacies of Northern and Southern state formation. Review of International Studies, 33, 207–326.

20.

DFID 2009: Why tax matters for international development and what DFID is doing about it. Briefing note.

21.

Di John

2006: The political economy of taxation and tax reform in developing countries.WIDER Research Paper, 74.

22.

Duffield

2007: Development, security and the unending war: Governing the world of peoples. Polity Press.

23.

Gros

J. G.

1996: Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the new world order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. Third World Quarterly, 17, 455–72.

24.

GTZ 2006: Nachhaltige Staatsfinanzierung durch Good financial governance. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [Sustainable public sector financing through good financial governance].

25.

Hart

2001: Development critiques in the 1990s: Culs de sac and promising paths. Progress in Human Geography, 25, 649–58.

26.

Herbst

1996/97: Responding to state failure in Africa. International Security, 21, 120–44.

27.

Hickey

2009: The politics of protecting the poorest: Moving beyond the ‘anti-politics machine’? Political Geography, 28, 473–83.

28.

Hoeffler

2012: On the causes of civil war. In Garfinkel

M. R.

Skaperdas

, editors, Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict. Oxford University Press, 179–204.

29.

Jackson

2002: Violent internal conflict and the African state: Towards a framework of analysis. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20, 29–52.

30.

Jacoby

2004a: Method, narrative and historiography in Michael Mann’s sociology of state development. Sociological Review, 52, 404–21.

31.

Jacoby

2004b: Social power and the Turkish state. Frank Cass Publishers.

32.

Jayasuriya

2004: The new regulatory state and relational capacity. Policy and Politics, 32, 487–501.

33.

Kanbur

2011: Commentary: Why might historians matter for development policy? In Bayly

C. A.

Rao

Szreter

Woolcock

, editors, History, historians and development policy: A necessary dialogue. Manchester University Press, 117–21.

34.

Kothari

2005: From colonial administration to development studies: A post-colonial critique of the history of development studies. In Kothari

, editor, A radical history of development studies: Individuals, institutions and ideologies. Zed Books, 47–61.

35.

Lange

2009: Lineages of despotism and development. The University of Chicago Press.

36.

Lange

Balian

2008: Containing conflict or instigating unrest? A test of the effects of state infrastructural power on civil violence. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 314–33.

37.

Lucas

1998: The tension between despotic and infrastructural power: The military and the political class in Nigeria, 1985–1993. Studies in Comparative International Development, 33, 90–113.

38.

Mann

1984: The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 25, 185–213.

39.

Mann

1986: The sources of social power volume I: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge University Press.

40.

Mann

1993: The sources of social power, Volume II: The rise of classes and nation–states, 1760–1914. Cambridge University Press.

41.

Mann

1994: In praise of macro-sociology: A reply to Goldthorpe. The British Journal of Sociology, 45, 37–54.

42.

Mann

2005: The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing. Cambridge University Press.

43.

Mann

2006: The sources of social power revisited: A response to criticism. In Hall

J. A.

Schroeder

, editors, An anatomy of power: The social theory of Michael Mann. Cambridge University Press, 343–96.

44.

Mann

2008: Infrastructural power revisited. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 355–65.

45.

McDonald

2008: Securitization and the construction of security. European Journal of International Relations, 14, 563–87.

46.

Migdal

J. S.

1988: Strong societies and weak states: State–society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press.

47.

Mohan

Wilson

2005: The antagonistic relevance of development studies. Progress in Development Studies, 5, 261–78.

48.

Nathan

2005: ‘The frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics’: Causes of civil war. Crisis States Discussion Papers. Crisis States Research Centre.

49.

Platteau

J.-P.

1994: Behind the market stage where real societies exist—Part 1: The role of public and private order institutions. Journal of Development Studies, 30, 533–77.

50.

Robinson

2008: Hybrid states: Globalisation and the politics of state capacity. Political Studies, 56, 566–83.

51.

Schensul

2008: From resources to power: The state and spatial change in post-apartheid Durban, South Africa. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 290–313.

52.

Schroeder

2006: Introduction: The IEMP model and its critics. In Hall

J. A.

Schroeder

, editors, An anatomy of power: The social theory of Michael Mann. Cambridge University Press, 1–16.

53.

Slater

2008: Can leviathan be democratic? Competitive elections, robust mass politics, and state infrastructural power. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 252–72.

54.

Soifer

2008: State infrastructural power: Approaches to conceptualization and measurement. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 231–51.

55.

Soifer

Hau

2008: Unpacking the strength of the state: The utility of state infrastructural power. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 219–30.

56.

Soifer

Hau

, editors, 2008: Revisiting state infrastructural power – Special edition. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43.

57.

Therkildsen

2008: Taxation and state-building with a (more) human face. DIIS Policy Brief: Fragile Situations. Danish Institute for International Studies.

58.

Van Donge

J. K.

1995: Development theory, the problem of order and history of the ‘longue durée’. Journal of Development Studies, 32, 282–88.

59.

Vandergeest

Buttel

F. H.

1988: Marx, Weber and development sociology: Beyond the impasse. World Development, 16, 683–95.

60.

vom Hau

2008: State infrastructural power and nationalism: Comparative lessons from Mexico and Argentina. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43, 334–54.

61.

vom Hau

2012: State capcity and inclusive development: New challenges and directions. ESID Working Paper No. 02. Effective States and Inclusive Development.

62.

Weiss

1998: The myth of the powerless state: Governing the economy in a global era. Polity Press.

63.

Woolcock

Szreter

Rao

2011: How and why history matters for development policy. In Bayly

C. A.

Rao

Szreter

Woolcock

, editors, History, historians and development policy. Manchester University Press, 3–38.