Connecting the dots: Liberal peace and post-conflict violence and crime

Abstract

From the early 1990s onwards, a number of countries emerging from civil conflict have undergone extensive democratic and economic liberal reform via a process of post-conflict peace-building. Underlying such a process is the hegemonic discourse of liberal peace that aims to reconstruct and develop post-conflict societies along the core ideas of democratization, economic liberalization, respect for human rights and rule of law. Its implementation is generally assumed to be universally beneficial and thus acceptable to all. However, this article suggests that this is not the case as such liberalization can produce inequality, exacerbate perceptions of relative deprivation that cause a resurgence in post-conflict interpersonal violence and crime. In order to shed light on the discrepancy between its normative positive assumptions with the contrasting reality of its outcomes, this article provides a necessary critique of liberal peace discourse by examining its liberal economic underpinnings. In doing so, this article proposes that the liberal peace agenda embodies inequalities and fails to consider the long-term impact of economic liberalization and its relationship with rising levels of post-war crime and violence. As such, the legitimacy of the liberal peace as a route to post-war development is put under the spotlight and subjected to theoretical scrutiny.

Keywords

liberal peace post-conflict peace-building relative deprivation violence crime

I Introduction

Since the early 1990s countries emerging from civil conflict have undergone extensive democratic and economic liberal reform via a process of post-conflict peace-building, an intervention undertaken by various governmental and non-governmental organizations, international financial institutions (IFIs), international and national bodies to rebuild war ravaged countries. Underlying such a process is the hegemonic discourse of liberal peace, which aims to reconstruct and develop post-conflict societies along the core ideas of democratization, economic liberalization, respect for human rights and rule of law (Newman and Richmond, 2006; Paris, 2004; Tschirgi, 2004). Such an approach has a two-fold objective; first to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict; and second, to create the foundations of a durable self-sustaining peace by encouraging economic, political and social development (UN, 1992). On this basis, the implementation of the liberal peace discourse is generally accepted to the extent that ‘liberalism and neoliberalism became so embedded that it was rarely questioned, let alone noticed’ (Richmond, 2010: 172).

As such, it is widely expected that the signing of a peace accords and subsequent liberal peace intervention will lead to ‘improved living standards, institutional restructuring, the transformation of political culture, the reshaping of social relationships and increased economic growth’ (Steenkamp, 2011: 357–58). Yet such changes fail to materialise for many citizens in post-conflict countries as they live a life blighted by poverty, underdevelopment and a continuation of violence and crime. For example, Guatemala, El Salvador, Afghanistan and South Africa are all described as having an ‘insecure peace’ (Hoglund and Soderberg Kovacs, 2010: 381) where civilian insecurity remains high due to the severity of criminal violence. In these countries, the political violence that characterized the civil conflict has transformed into a wave of social violence consisting of high levels of crime, inter-communal, gang and individual violence (Darby, 2006: 6).

This article adopts a critical stance towards liberal peace interventions, more specifically, by usefully employing critical social theory in order to reflect on the relationship between liberal peace theory and the post-conflict development problem of continued interpersonal violence and crime. It will be argued that the liberal peace interventions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War have failed to provide the socio-economic security needed for post-war peace and development to establish. Instead, the interventions have contributed to the increased occurrence of post-war violence and crime, which in turn threatens the consolidation of post-conflict development and security in everyday life. In the light of such evidence, the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions behind the liberal peace are questioned and subjected to theoretical scrutiny.

Post-conflict peace-building interventions have come under greater scrutiny in recent years from both policy and academic circles, not only in terms of their effectiveness in preventing the re-emergence of the conflict, but also their legacy of creating the foundations for a sustainable peace as their track record appears ‘less successful in promoting welfare goals, equitable human development and inclusive democratic politics’ (Newman, 2011: 1737). As such, there already exists a substantial critique of the liberal peace. For example, Paris (1997, 2004) has criticised the approach on the grounds that liberalization can actually be counterproductive to reconstruction efforts and actually exacerbate existing tensions. Chandler has criticised the approach as being an exercise of ‘empire in denial’ in which peace-building is more akin to state-building whereby Western external interveners assert their hegemony whilst denying the recipient state ‘the power which they yield’ (Chandler, 2006: 1). Pugh (2005) has criticized the economic liberalization aspect to the approach, suggesting that it aggravates socio-economic problems present in post-war societies that serves to heighten levels of poverty and thus push them into operating within shadow economies in order to survive. This article aims to build upon these critiques and contribute to the debate by providing empirical evidence and identifying the mechanisms through which the theoretical problems of liberalism arise in practice. Such an approach is seen as vital in gaining an enhanced and more refined understanding of the contradiction and tensions within liberal peace interventions that are often overlooked in the existing critical literature.

In line with the key objectives of this special edition, which aims to bring social theory back into issues of development, this article’s analysis of the relationship between the liberal peace paradigm and its influence on post-war violence and crime furthers our understanding on the ways in which inequality is (re)produced and consolidated in post-war development theory and practice. By examining the effect of post-war economic reconstruction (a key element of liberal peace) in causing economic marginalization and inequality that serve to exacerbate levels of post-war violence and crime, this article extends analysis not only on how inequality in post-war societies is formed, but also its impact on society by examining the causal relationship between economic liberalization and direct interpersonal violence and crime. As such, this article contributes to the growing critique regarding the economic theoretical underpinnings of the liberal peace. By adopting a critical approach to liberal peace-building interventions, this article questions the underlying economic assumptions inherent to post-conflict peace-building theory by proposing that such interventions embody inequality that has a detrimental impact on post-war peace and development.

The following article is split into three sections. The first section unpacks the origins of post-accord violence and crime, underlying the need to analyze its relationship with liberal peace. The second section expands upon the relationship in more detail, illustrating the ways in which post-war neoliberal economic liberalization exacerbates inequality, perceptions of relative deprivation which contribute in the manifestation of post-war forms of violence and crime. Finally, the third section reflects on what this unintended consequence of post-war violence and crime has upon the liberal peace.

II Unpacking the origins of post-accord violence and crime

The sheer number of post-conflict societies that have undergone extensive peace-building efforts and yet still witness high levels of violence and crime is in itself a justification for analyzing the roots of such post-war violence, its relationship with liberal peace-building and, in turn, the implications for the liberal peace theory that dominates post-war reconstruction efforts. The continuation (and increase) of violence and crime has a major impact on levels of insecurity, directly affecting social and economic development as it ‘threatens the ability of the newly achieved peace to improve the security situation for large sections of the population and hence the peace itself’ (Hoglund and Soderberg Kovacs, 2010: 381). Looking at the examples of Central America in the 1990s where international peace-building interventions were carried out in Guatemala and El Salvador, the unexpected increase in interpersonal violence and crime poses a major development challenge that limits the social, human and economic capital of its citizens (WHO, 2010). However as noted by Mac Ginty, liberal peace’s ‘near monopolistic’ dominance as the only form of peace available to post-conflict countries means that it may escape critical analysis (Mac Ginty, 2010: 153). Nonetheless, it is argued here that we need to critically analyze the relationship between post-conflict liberal democratic peace-building in respect to the role it plays in facilitating post-war violence and crime.

In the case of El Salvador, the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accord in 1992 and subsequent UN sponsored peace-building mission failed to produce the expected socio-economic improvements for positive social change to take place. Instead, there has been a minimal reduction in poverty levels: in 2005, 47.9 per cent of Salvadorans lived in poverty (ECLAC, 2010: 47) compared to 56 per cent in 1990 (Pearce, 1998: 592). It is not only the figures on poverty that are worrying, so too are the figures on inequality as the gap between rich and poor has grown more in the last 10 years than in any period over the last 100 years (Zamora, 2003: 5). Furthermore, violence and crime have spiralled out of control with the annual homicide rate in 2007 registering 68 per 100,000 people (Acevedo, 2008: 72). To contextualize the severity of this situation, according to the Pan American Health Organisation the average homicide rate per country is 0–5 per 100,000, with anything above 10 per 100,000 is classed as an epidemic (Acevedo, 2008: 72).

It is important to stress that the case of El Salvador is not unique; it reflects the many development challenges faced by societies emerging from civil war and transitioning to a state of peace, reconstructing society in order to build political, social and economic capital which will aid post-war development and the consolidation of a sustainable peace. Instead, the case of El Salvador highlights the inherent risk of ‘dysfunctional’ peace within liberal democratic peace interventions and the sharp contradictions between predetermined objectives (preventing a relapse into civil war and building a sustainable peace) with the reality of its consequences upon post-war socio-economic development and security. Instead, an overview of the effects of post-conflict peace interventions on recipient states reveals that they have the capacity to do more harm than good. For example, the liberal peace interventions in Kosovo, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka have built ‘no war, no peace’ situations rather than challenging and transforming them in order to construct the foundations of a durable self-sustaining peace (Mac Ginty, 2006a).

In the academic literature, the continuation of interpersonal violence and crime in post-accord societies is largely understood as a legacy of the armed conflict where the presence of ex-combatants and prevalence of weapons means that violence persists well into peace (Darby, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2006a; Muggah, 2006). Recent research by Steenkamp has extended analysis by looking at the role played by the civil war and subsequent peace accords in creating a culture of violence that tolerates and legitimizes violent behaviour and practices well into the post-war period (Steenkamp, 2009, 2011). Other academics point to the presence of weak post-war states that cannot fully guarantee the security of its citizens or enforce the rule of law, leading to the emergence of a security vacuum that allows criminal groups such as gangs, paramilitaries and vigilante groups to operate (Hagedorn, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2006c; Mehler, 2004). Academic debate has also speculated on the link between the liberal democratic peace and post-war violence and crime, with Paris suggesting that the ‘very strategy that peace-builders have employed to consolidate peace —political and economic liberalisation—seems, paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence’ (Paris, 2004: 6). Recent research conducted by Nagle (2010, 2009) on the impact of liberal economic development in post-conflict Northern Ireland shows that the positive assumptions associated with its potential to bolster economic performance and raise living standards are questionable as it can lead to more violence.

Building on from the aforementioned work on post-war violence and crime, this article examines the long-term impact of the liberal democratic peace on post-conflict development and in turn, what this means in regards to the theoretical underpinnings of the liberal peace. More specifically, the article focuses on identifying the ways in which the neoliberal economic policies implemented in post-conflict states have impacted on post-war development by aggravating the manifestations of post-war violence and crime. Drawing on empirical data concerning the effects of post-war interventions, this article proposes that the implementation of economic neoliberalism entombed within the liberal peace has had a detrimental impact on human development, directly undermining the human, social and economic capital that binds communities and aids development. As put by Mac Ginty, ‘the liberal peace is largely responsible for the regularity with which internationally sponsored peacemaking processes deliver stalled and dysfunctional peace’ (Mac Ginty, 2010: 146). As such this article analyzes the liberal peace beyond its technocratic positive nature. The article will show that the scholarly critiques of the liberal peace have tended to explain its less than successful track record by faulting either the manner it is implemented or the local structural conditions that sabotage the liberal democratic peace from taking root (see Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 6). However, these critiques have not sufficiently interrogated the paradigm of liberal peace in light of its causal association with post-accord violence and crime. Instead, this article proposes that to truly understand why the liberal peace is not delivering the expected development outcomes, and instead playing a facilitative role in post-accord crime and violence, we need to re-theorize and re-politicize the theory by examining its liberal economic underpinnings.

III Economic liberalization: An aid or obstacle to post-conflict development?

Development theory has long been influenced by war and its aftermath. Indeed, President Truman was prompted to introduce ideas of ‘development’ into American foreign policy by the need to rebuild Europe following World War II and secure it from the perceived threat of the Eastern Bloc. Since then, ‘liberal’ interventions have been closely connected to theories of development and change, both in terms of motive and objective. This deepened and intensified following the collapse of the ‘illiberal’ other with the end of the Cold War. The publication of the UN landmark document Agenda for Peace in 1992, reflected growing international recognition that a more holistic approach was needed in order to resolve rather than manage the growing number of intra-state conflicts. Consequently, countries previously plagued by violent civil conflicts began the process of negotiating the end to violence and embarking on a comprehensive peace-building process. Such a process aims to create a post-conflict state that is ‘sufficiently in touch with its society to be able to manage social conflicts through institutions of bargaining, consensus building, legislating, and gaining compliance from its population’ (Sisk, 2006: 132). It is an external peace intervention undertaken by those party to the negotiated settlement (external third parties and former warring parties) in order to prevent a relapse into violent conflict and assist in creating the foundations of a durable peace (Bertram, 1995; David, 1999; Maiese, 2003). Peace-building is indeed an ambitious strategy that attempts not only to deconstruct the structures of violence that led to the initial outbreak of violent conflict, but also to build new structures that will promote peace in the future (Sultan Barakat cited in Zeeuw, 2001).

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, various peace-building activities – such as establishing a rule of law, improving judicial and security institutions, establishing a liberal democracy, extending political rights, ensuring good governance and well-functioning state institutions – are carried out to create ‘a stable, participatory, liberal, democratic and capitalist state’ (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005: 451). The main objective in implementing these reforms is to create a liberal democratic peace. This is achieved by establishing an efficient and legitimate government to implement the reforms, which are based ‘on strengthening political institutions, consolidating internal and external security and revitalising the economy and society’ (Ball, 1996: 611). In turn, this encourages national reconciliation, social and economic improvements, and participation through reformed political institutions, reducing the socio-economic cleavages and mistrust that could cause a relapse into conflict (Jeong, 2002). It is this method in which liberal peace-building revitalizes the economy that is of key concern in analyzing the reasons for the manifestation of post-war violence and crime.

This article looks at the relationship between liberal peace and post-conflict violence in more detail, developing theoretical knowledge on how economic liberalization in post-war contexts can exacerbate inequality and thus aggravate perceptions of relative deprivation. It is argued here that key to understanding the link between liberal peace and post-war violence and crime, we need to unpack the theoretical underpinnings of the liberal democratic peace, specifically, the neoliberal economic pillar of the theory.

The formulaic post-war reconstruction approach is now seen as the ‘core business’ of the international and development community (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005). The framing of post-conflict counties as failed states by the international community has, according to Barbara, provided ‘“green-field” sites on which to test development theories’ (Barbara, 2008: 308). Similarly, Moore suggests that post-conflict contexts provide ‘the “level playing field” so loved by these neoliberal discourses’ (Moore, 2000: 13). Consequently, a neoliberal discourse of development began to be promoted in post-conflict states from the 1990s onwards in a diverse set of war-torn countries and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The neoliberal economic policies promoted in post-war countries are not dissimilar to the 1980s policies of the Washington Consensus advocated by the IMF and World Bank, which recommended structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to countries seeking aid (see Murray and Overton, 2011: 308). Such neoliberal post-war economic policies are based on neoclassical economics assumptions that the liberalization of the national economy, a reduction of the role of the state, extensive deregulation of labour markets and privatization of state economies would discourage state intrusion into the market and encourage economic growth and foreign direct investment (Nagle, 2010; Paris, 2004). The IFIs and other key actors of the international community involved in post-war reconstruction propose such economic reforms because they are seen as key to achieving peace in post-conflict societies, ‘if the invisible hand of the free-market can be liberated, it will provide the raw material to furnish democratisation and peacebuilding in divided societies’ (Nagle, 2010: 218). Thus, neoliberalism is seen as the elixir in the post-war reconstruction process; that an open deregulated economy is a source of peace because ‘[m]arkets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable’ (Bandow cited in Nagle, 2010: 222). In this sense, the assumption behind economic liberalization is that it leads to internal peace because it creates wealth ‘and wealthy individuals would turn against war in order to safeguard their gains. Economic growth and dissolution of traditional structures of distribution and power would result in economic and human development, and such gains as literacy, the development of middle class, etc’ (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 27).

It is expected that economic liberalization would lead to a ‘trickle down’ effect where even the poor are able to benefit thus providing economic freedom for all to participate in the global economy. Yet the expectation that this post-war approach to development would lead to positive social change is highly contested in the academic literature (Mac Ginty, 2010; Nagle, 2009; Paris, 2004; Steenkamp, 2011; Suhrke, 2011; Tadjbakhsh, 2009). As already mentioned, a number of post-conflict countries that have undergone democratic and economic reform via the process of liberal peace-building, continue to be characterized by poverty, inequitable economic development and continuing levels of violence and crime. Therefore, such peace interventions have been criticised for imposing a form of ‘disaster capitalism’, ‘which uses desperation and fear to constitute privatization strategies and land grabs before the locals are able to resist effectively’ (Nagle, 2009: 175). As noted by Steenkamp:

The international community can thus inadvertently create conditions favourable to post-accord violence through their promotion of the Liberal Peace that exacerbates social tension and can lead to violent conflict…[it] supports a hasty integration into the global economy, irrespective of the state and local population’s abilities and needs. This creates a vacuum within which violent perpetrators can continue to operate locally and the rapid globalisation opens up opportunities for organised crime. (Steenkamp, 2011: 362)

Post-conflict reconstruction, as put by Moore, ‘entails a lot’ (2000: 22), but at the same time, it faces a number of challenges. Two challenges that are of key importance in understanding the emergence of post-accord violence and crime in relation to the preceding liberal peace intervention is firstly the degree to which the intervention and subsequent peace-building programmes can be ‘synchronised with public aspirations’ (Mac Ginty, 2006b: 139); and second, ‘the extent to which reconstruction can facilitate rather than aggravate social and political cohesion’ (Mac Ginty, 2006b: 140). The first challenge relates to the expected peace dividend, and the problems that arise if it fails to materialize and expectations are not met. The second challenge relates to the ways in which the liberal democratic peace intervention as a reconstruction process can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to a resurgence in violent conflict. In assessing the degree to which these challenges lead to post-war violence and crime, analysis will focus on the role of neoliberal economic development which has been promoted under the rubric of liberal democratic peace interventions since the 1990s. In doing so, this article expands academic debate on the effects of post-war economic policy, arguing that the introduction of neoliberalism in post-conflict states serves to reproduce violence and crime by fostering conditions (inequality and the perception of relative deprivation) that are conducive to its manifestation.

As noted by Steenkamp, ‘the economic liberalisation that often accompanies democratisation typically increases income inequality’ (Steenkamp, 2011: 363). It is this increase in income inequality caused by economic deregulation and liberalization prescribed by the liberal peace which is of key concern in understanding post-war crime and violence as, ‘poverty by itself does not make people kill. To poverty must be added indignity, hopelessness, and grievance’ (Chua, 2004: 4). Theoretical debate concerning the link between inequality and deviant behaviour (violent and criminal) can be traced back to the writings of Robert Merton (1938) and his strain/anomie theory, which sought to explain a link between social structure and individual deviance. Central to Merton’s thesis is that strains or imbalances within the structure of society against specific individuals or groups would lead to deviant behaviour. His theory posits that the strains created by an inequitable social structure, where some can access success and others cannot, as a causal factor that motivates and encourages some to adopt criminal behaviour. Runciman (1966) developed the theory further by giving it the familiar term of relative deprivation. The theory proposes that groups compare their material deprivation with another reference group, and if they feel relatively deprived in comparison, it is likely that feelings of envy will arise (Runciman, 1966: 14). Essentially, the theory of relative deprivation boils down to the notion that inequality fuels social tensions; those who receive a lower income than others feel that they are dispossessed in a structure which is unfair, which thus causes ‘the poor to seek compensation and satisfaction by all means, including committing crimes against both rich and poor’ (Fajnzylber et al., 2002: 2). Key to this concept is the notion of relative poverty. If the majority of people within a nation see themselves as equally poor, so that all exist within a situation of absolute poverty, then they are unlikely to feel relatively deprived and thus unlikely to participate in deviant behaviour. However, if there is a benchmark group within society, which is used to compare the standing of others, logic follows that if someone feels relatively deprived in relation to that group, then they are highly likely to act and behave in a deviant manner.

In post-conflict societies, many talk of a peace dividend where there is the rising expectation amongst the local population that their standard of living will improve because there is no longer a conflict stifling economic growth. As noted by Coyne, the peace dividend, ‘is especially important for ensuring that potential spoilers buy into reconstruction efforts’ (Coyne, 2010: 303). Problems arise when such a peace dividend proves elusive to the majority, so that ‘a failure to achieve broad improvements in living standards would fuel social tensions and heighten the risk of renewed war’ (Boyce, 1995: 2067). This article argues that such social tensions manifest into interpersonal violence and crime rather than a return to civil war if economic development is uneven and directed at specific groups (on the grounds of ethnicity, religion or class) or regions (rural/urban, village/city); it may lead to inequality and in turn increased levels of violence and crime. Thus for those living in post-accord societies, the expected peace dividend in most cases proves to be illusory.

Key to this argument is that people are now aware of their relative poverty, in other words their relative deprivation in relation to others, because post-conflict peace-building has brought the concept of social democracy and opened people’s eyes to the existence of the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Therefore, for those in post-accord societies who do not benefit from a peace dividend, they are more likely to turn to the informal or illegal economy, such as drug trafficking, gang violence and crime, illegal arms sales and prostitution rings, as they are the only opportunities available (Mac Ginty, 2006c) as ‘the economic dividends of democratisation and the resulting disillusionment make crime an attractive option’ (Steenkamp, 2011: 363). For example in 2008 the UNDP report on human development, warned about the dangers of insufficient employment opportunities in El Salvador. The report estimated that the expected income of someone involved in criminal activity was 40 per cent higher than the average income (UNDP, 2008a: 257).

According to a report produced by the UNDPs Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery concerning post-conflict economic recovery, it stresses the importance that the approach to recovery is not, ‘about restoring pre-war economic or institutional arrangements; rather, it is about creating a new political economy dispensation. It is not simply building back, but about building back differently and better’ (UNDP, 2008b: 5). Such economic recovery is essentially transformative, but at the same time, the key determinant for such a transformation is economic growth. However, in some cases post-accord economic growth may appear to improve, registering yearly increases in the growth rate, yet the distribution of such economic gains may remain skewed and result in a peace which ‘bring[s] clear economic winners and losers’ (Mac Ginty, 2006b: 128). Therefore, uneven economic development in post-accord societies is seen as having the greatest potential in contributing to an environment conducive to violence and crime (Mac Ginty, 2006b). In the aftermath of violent conflict, countries begin to rebuild their economies, aiming to increase their economic growth as a means of sustaining peace and putting the country back on the road to development.

IV Critiquing the underpinnings of the liberal peace

In light of the argumentation and evidence presented in this article that neoliberal economic reform does not lead to the socio-economic improvements for the majority but instead acts as a driver for violence and crime, we need to pose the key question of what type of peace is produced, and more critically, on whose terms? In asking theses questions, we are able to critically interrogate the theoretical underpinnings of liberal peace, questioning its normative assumptions and instead politicize the interventions.

Within the academic literature the key actors, components and dynamics within the peace-building agenda have come under greater scrutiny (see Mac Ginty, 2006b), with critics terming the process ‘neoliberal peacebuilding’, ‘liberal internationalism’ and ‘Wilsonianism’ (Jeong, 2002; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2004), highlighting the externally driven and poorly-interpreted nature of post-accord peace interventions. Indeed, the poor track record of liberal peace interventions have caused many to suggest it is at a ‘crossroads’ (Lidén et al., 2009: 587), in ‘crisis’ (Cooper, 2007: 605; Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 1), or ‘backsliding’ in which there is ‘both a physical deterioration of peace during a peacebuilding process, or a retreat from the liberal peace framework itself on the part of international and local actors’ (Lidén et al., 2009: 594). However, it is important to note that those critical of liberal peace interventions are not a homogeneous group who share the same critical assessment. There is diversity in the liberal peace critique, as such, the critical school is split between the ‘problem solvers’ and the ‘critical theorists’ (see Campbell et al., 2011; Chandler, 2010; Newman, 2011; Paris, 2010; Tadjbakhsh, 2011). In assessing the failings of the liberal peace theory, two distinct critical groups emerge.

The first group adopts a ‘problem-solving’ approach in understanding its failings. They do not propose that the liberal peace be abandoned in light of its failings, but rather improve upon its efficiency in terms of how it is implemented and creating the ‘right’ environment within which it is to be implemented (Newman, 2011). As noted by Tadjbakhsh,

Problem-solving oriented scholars accept the model of liberal peace and value its ultimate goal of instituting liberal principles of universalism, egalitarianism, human rights and democracy as universally valid. What they lament are conditions on the ground in post-conflict situation that prevent the full realization of this goal. Rethinking sequencing, prioritization or local participation and the mechanisms through which liberal peace is delivered could in principle provide solutions for the failures and render the project more efficient. (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 2)

The second group adopts a fundamentally critical approach regarding the underpinnings of the liberal peace theory. Such critical theorists argue that liberal peace interventions are used to serve particular interests and agendas as they ‘construct, reproduce and maintain particular visions of order’ (Bellamy quoted from Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 4). Indeed, Jacoby’s informative analysis of post-war reconstruction efforts since World War II illustrates that it is used by the current hegemon (which he views as the United States of America) as ‘a valuable opportunity to preserve and extend an international order friendly to its principles, its security and its prosperity’ (Jacoby, 2007: 523). Critical theorists argue that liberal peace is essentially a Western ideology and form of governance that is imposed and thus far from an intervention that results in liberation and emancipation (Duffield, 2005). As such, critical theorists are concerned with various aspects of the liberal peace, such as its unintended consequence and impact on the lives of recipients in post-war societies. Ultimately, members of the critical school of thought are scathing in the results of the liberal peace because it ‘has ultimately failed in its goal, i.e. to provide security, democracy, rule of law, human rights and prosperity. It has created empty states, or a virtual peace, mainly populated by either compliant or predatory elites’ (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 3). Critical theorists propose that we need to rethink the liberal peace, question its theoretical underpinnings and thus its legitimacy and supremacy as the appropriate and thus only peace approach to be adopted in post-war contexts.

As such, discussion in the article now turns to analyzing the inherent problems within the liberal peace by asking the question: What does the manifestation of violence and crime in post-peace accord context tell us about the liberal peace theory? It is argued here that in light of the violent consequence of the liberal peace, a more critical approach towards post-war reconstruction efforts must be adopted, one that examines the means through which it is conceived, thus challenging the normative assumptions that the process will ultimately foster democracy and establish long-term sustainable peace and development. Such a critical approach is advocated because it moves beyond a ‘problem’ in efficiency-based analysis which questions ‘why institutions fail to take root, and whether the culprit is incomplete reforms, state capture, insufficient institutions, etc., some self-critical ethical reasoning can be key to understanding why outcomes are not the ones expected from formulaic institutional approaches’ (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 6).

Springer poses a key question to be considered in understanding the origins of post-war violence and crime and its relationship with the liberal peace theory, suggesting that we need to question ‘at one point neoliberalism as a bystander becomes neoliberalism as a conspirator to violence’ (Springer, 2010: 943). Analyzing the origins of post-war violence and crime in Cambodia, Springer observes that development officials place blame on the lack of good governance as the structural cause of the violence when it is actually an outcome of neoliberal economics (Springer, 2010). Indeed, Chua argues that the exportation of free market democracy to non-Western countries is the main cause of ethnic instability and violence as it creates a division between the minority rich and majority poor that has ‘led not to widespread peace and posterity, but to ethnic confiscation, authoritarian backlash, and mass killing’ (Chua, 2004: 187–88).

Critics of post-conflict neoliberal peace-building argue that free market-oriented policies, have resulted in increased inequality and poverty that has exacerbated local tensions and led to further divergence amongst locals ‘who do not have the professional skills or political clout to benefit from the market opportunities that reconstruction offers’ (Guttal, 2005: 78). It appears that in reality, not all are able to access the benefits of peace and capitalize on the expected peace dividends as, ‘the deregulation of economic activity and the stimulation of private enterprise take place in a context where ethical guidelines and a culture of ethical private business are absent’ (Steenkamp, 2011: 363). In other words, the installation of economic neoliberalism in post-conflict societies is more likely to benefit the interests of those elites (both local and international) who are positioned take advantage of their countries insertion into the global economy. On the other hand, for the non-elite the benefits of a liberalized economy are limited as they become adversely incorporated into the global labour market or marginalized altogether and thus forced many into operating within the illicit black market economy (Pugh, 2005). Citing the examples of Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, Guttal observes that post-conflict reconstruction has done little to improve the lives of locals and, ‘the resultant disparity in living standards contributes to rising crime, social unrest, conflict over land, water and other resources, and communal tensions that threaten to escalate into more serious civil conflict and violence’ (Guttal, 2005: 79). It would appear that the problem of renewed violence and crime in post-conflict settings is linked to the ways in which economic neoliberal peace-building exacerbates levels of deprivation.

V Conclusion

This article has provided the empirical evidence to show that economic liberalization does not foster prosperity and thus stability and peace, but instead, it has created a disenfranchised mass of citizens who have been incorporated into the global economy on unequal terms. They are forced to find employment in the informal sector or the illegal economy. The liberal peace has thus failed to provide the socio-economic development needed to foster peace and instead neoliberal economic development has created inequality, exacerbated perceptions of relative deprivation and caused some to adopt violence and criminal behaviour. By identifying the impact of neoliberal economic liberalization this article has expanded academic knowledge regarding its unintended consequence of exacerbating inequality, aggravating perceptions of relative deprivation and thus creating spaces for post-conflict violence and crime to manifest. For this reason, it is argued that the liberal peace is failing because of its liberal economic assumption regarding the transformative and pacifying effect of market liberalization on preventing violent conflict and aiding development and peace through prosperity. This article supports and furthers the arguments put forward by the critical theorists of the liberal peace who emphasize the ‘disconnect that exists between theoretical assumptions and practical outcomes behind “open societies” [democratization] and “open markets” [economic liberalisation]’ (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 6).

What is suggested in this article is not that the norms and values associated with liberal democratic peace are incompatible with the local norms and values inherent within the recipient country (they may well be). Rather, it agrees with the cortical theorist who propose that liberal democratic peace is underpinned by a ‘hubristic belief’ that assumes that post-conflict states are ‘failed states’, or ‘terra nullis’, a belief which ignores the already-existing institutions and practices in these states (Richmond and Franks, 2007). The experience of those countries that have experienced a rise in post-accord violence and crime serve to challenge the assumption held by peace-builders that a liberal order will naturally emerge once liberal democratic reforms have been implemented (Paris, 2004). This assumption is made at their peril; the arrival of interveners in a conflict-affected country does not imply that it is ‘year zero’: local complexities are already rooted in place (Pouligny, 2005: 502). Thus the imposition of post-war reconstruction reforms with the aim of establishing a liberal democratic peace serve to exacerbate inequality and thus fragment society, marginalizing some sections, with violent consequences. It is the neoliberal liberal peace paradigm adopted in post-conflict societies that breeds post-war violence and crime. For this reason, this article has contributed to the existing literature that is critical of the liberal peace and it’s under researched relationship with post-war crime and violence.

This article shows that we are forced to question the process of post-war development promoted by the international community—liberal democratic peace-building. In academic literature, scholars have drawn similarities between current post-conflict reconstruction efforts and the modernization model of development (Suhrke, 2007). The modernization paradigm of development was seen as the elixir for development success; a package of economic growth, political democracy, modern (western) attitudes and the establishment of a Weberian state. However, post-development theorists have questioned these goals of development ‘which for them entails the extension of the control of the Western world and its nationalist allies in the developing world’ (Rapley, 2004: 350). Similarly, critics of post-conflict development have questioned the motivation of the international community in promoting a liberal democratic peace that emphasizes political democratization and economic liberalization. Guttal proposes that motivations are actually less about ensuring peace, political stability and economic and physical security for locals and more about the interests of the interveners as ‘the project of “nation building” becomes captive to the economic and geo-political interests of those who finance and direct reconstruction’ (Guttal, 2005: 74). Jacoby argues that the drive to liberalize economies in post-war societies by encouraging market liberalization is not necessarily based on the justification that in doing so peace will be encouraged and a return to direct open violence discouraged but rather their implementation was ‘intended to benefit the donor over the recipient and to project the economic interests of the hegemon’ (Jacoby, 2007: 531).

As this article has shown, economic liberalization is not the key to sustainable peace and development in post-conflict societies; rather it is the cause of interpersonal violence and crime. This is because post-war development theory has fallen fowl to the same logic within modernization theory: that economic growth will trickle down and benefit all. As such, the article has served to clarify the debate concerning the negative effect of post-war economic liberalization by identifying the causal relationship between post-war manifestations of crime and violence and the theoretical assumptions and practices behind liberal peace-building. In doing so, the article has identified the mechanisms through which the theoretical problems of liberalism arise in practice and reflected on the implications this has on the debates within critical liberal peace theory.

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