Peri-urban local governance? Intra-government relationships and social capital in a peripheral municipality of Michoacán,Mexico

Abstract

The peri-urbanization process brings new challenges to governments of peripheral municipalities. They require stronger capacities to deal with economic, social and environmental impacts such as rural and urban in-migration, land speculation, conversion of agricultural and forestry land into urban uses, negative environmental externalities and de-territorialization and re-territorialization of livelihoods. Here, urban governance in the form of collaborative social networks seems to be crucial for better solutions for the benefit of people. However, the ability to manage collaborative networks is closely related to the way relationships are established inside the organization as well as its institutional context. Based on a social capital approach, this article explores the structure and processes of an intra-government network that lead its actors to work together to try to improve the quality of life of the local residents and control expansion of urbanization over agricultural land.

Keywords

social capital peri-urban territories adaptive institutional capacity governance in peri-urban territories

I Introduction

The world is urbanizing faster than ever before and urban centres in less developed regions are expanding rapidly over their rural peripheries with minimum control. Within this contemporary form of urbanization (new urban growth and development patterns), medium-size cities are very dynamic and therefore they are important in national, regional and local¹ development. Those fast-growing cities are surrounded by unplanned and highly heterogeneous territories² in which small farmers, slum settlers, industrial entrepreneurs and urban middle- and high-class commuters struggle to coexist. The continuous but uneven process of peri-urbanization³ is generally accompanied by rural and urban in-migration, land speculation, conversion of agricultural and forestry land into urban uses (such as housing, commercial and industrial areas, roads and recreational centres), deleterious effects on the environment and de-territorialization and re-territorialization⁴ of livelihoods (Seto et al., 2010; Simon, 2008).

Peri-urban territories are not necessarily limited by their political–administrative boundaries. Instead, limits are drawn by physical, social and virtual rural and urban networks that facilitate/reroute flows of people, commodities, goods and services, information, raw material and technology. These flows contribute not only to the (dis)articulation of the territory but also to its own transformation and are referred to as rural–urban linkages (Tacoli, 2006). Consequently, peri-urban territories gradually incorporate adjacent municipalities⁵ within their own dynamics and transformations, bringing new challenges to local governments. For instance, the loss of cultivable land due to land speculation causes significant pressure on local agricultural livelihoods as it reduces local food security and the ability to sell any surpluses to urban dwellers (Simon, 2006). Also, the constant transition of the population in these municipalities hinders the establishment of comprehensive local institutional arrangements to deal effectively with the diverse stakeholders’ interests. The increase in local population brings additional demands for urban infrastructure and housing, access to services and employment and secured land tenure. Such demands exceed the ability of governments to cope with emerging needs, which damage the immediate environment and create spatial inequality and consequently urban poverty traps (Arellano, 2011; Grant, 2010; Ugalde, 2007).

In this context, the governments of peripheral municipalities require a significant increase in financial resources, access to information and technology, enhanced administrative ability to manage and distribute such resources, and a stronger relational capacity to create synergy among different social actors inside and outside the municipality to find solutions to current patterns of urbanization (Aguilar and Escamilla, 2009; Allen et al., 2006; Bowyer-Bower, 2006; CONAPO–SEDESOL–SEGOB, 2012). The last is particularly relevant, since empirical evidence has shown that when local governments are too weak to deal with increasingly complex problems, urban governance in the form of collaborative social networks seems to be crucial not only to reduce transaction costs but also to negotiate and implement new rural and urban policies for social, economic, environmental and geographical integration necessary for local development (Leck and Simon, 2012; Parés et al., 2014).

Although the literature about governance mostly refers to partnerships and networks between civil society, organizations and various types and levels of government (Cammack, 2012; Huppé and Creech, 2012; Oh and Bush, 2014; Varda, 2011), neoliberal forms of urban governance have paid insufficient attention to different structures and processes (strategies and practices) across local regimes even within a single country (Blanco et al., 2014; Parés et al., 2014). This is important since local governments must occupy a central position within the local governance context to regulate service delivery and housing in terms of quality, quantity and location, to mediate conflicts between stakeholders, to plan land use, to avoid accumulation of property-related wealth issues, to coordinate economic policy and to provide institutions to regulate local behaviours and encourage local inclusion (Blanco et al., 2014). In this sense, the recent literature regarding planning and public administration maintains that intra-government relationships are fundamental to the creation and sustaining of governance processes, since the ability to manage collaborative networks between different partners for local good is related in the first place to the support, cooperation and coordination inside the organization and the contextual (institutional) particularities in which political actors are immersed (Agranoff and McGuire, 2006; Lau, 2013; Leck and Simon, 2012).

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to explore the structure of the intra-government network and the underlying mechanisms that coordinate the efforts of local government actors to try to improve the quality of life of residents and control the expansion of urbanization over agricultural land.

We use the social capital approach to analyze the structure and to unravel the underlying mechanisms (processes) of such networks. Under this approach, position within the network matters but also it is assumed that cooperation and coordination among its members are the result of a series of formal and informal feedback-loop processes of social engagement and reciprocal exchange of valuable resources such as information and knowledge that improve individual and collective adaptive capacities. In this sense, local political actors must not only have similar interests, but also the flexibility to follow certain formal and informal rules, norms and behaviours (which they justify in the context of their values and beliefs) so that they may continuously engage in a reciprocal exchange process within their network.

The municipality of Tarímbaro at the northern periphery of Morelia city, the capital of Michoacán state in Mexico, has been chosen as a case study because during the past 15 years, it has been greatly affected by the unplanned growth and expansion of that city. To control rapid expansion of urbanization over the most fertile agricultural land in the municipality and improve the quality of life of local residents, the current local government (2012–14) and the Ministry of Urbanism and Environment of Michoacán State have planned a local urban development programme that requires high levels of coordination and cooperation within the local government for its implementation.

II Social capital and local governance

Although social capital has been defined in many different ways, authors agree that the very nature of it relies on the idea that ‘the people who do better are somehow better connected’ (Burt, 2000: 347). Within the context of social capital, social relationships are seen as an individual/collective relational resource based on rules, norms and values. This resource is embedded in the social network of a person and has the ability to build trust and encourage reciprocity which contribute to the mobilization and acquisition of other resources; this creates for certain individuals/groups competitive advantages in the pursuit of their ends (Bebbington, 2003; Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 1999; Patulny, 2004; Putnam, 1995; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000;). These general characteristics of social capital are widely accepted. For this article, we define social capital as formal and informal institutionalized networks of social relationships that generate trust and facilitate cyclical reciprocal exchange processes for the benefit of people.

Within the context of local governance, social capital facilitates flows of resources (information and knowledge) within the network and across different actors through formal and informal mechanisms of social engagement and reciprocal exchange. This creates conditions for interactive learning, which contributes to the adaptive capacity of the network to solve more efficiently such complex problems as those created by uncontrolled urbanization (Adger, 2003; Brooks et al., 2005; Eakin and Lemos, 2006; Huppé and Creech, 2012; Ishihara and Pascual, 2009; Ivey et al., 2004).

1 Social networks

Lomnitz (1998) defined social network as ‘an assemblage of individuals/groups connected to one another through regular events of reciprocal exchange’ (p. 141). A significant feature of social networks is their hierarchical structure, which leads to differentiated access to a certain level of power to control, transform and/or distribute resources inside and outside the network and obtain benefits (Burt, 2000; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 1999).

Individuals and/or collective actors engaged in the network may have similar interests, but not all of them are equally connected to one another, and consequently, not all of them have the same capacity to negotiate and receive equal benefits from being connected. Position within the network determines the extent of symmetry in the distribution of power and benefits, as well as levels of trust and disposition to create and sustain reciprocal relationships. Therefore, by nature, social networks should facilitate but not necessarily determine the capacity of individuals/groups to exercise agency (Burt, 2000; Lin, 1999; Lomnitz, 1998). This is particularly relevant for bureaucratic local governments with a strong hierarchical organization that predisposes people to engage in patronage relationships. It is also relevant for peri-urban areas as they undergo change (from rural to urban). Networks (according to the interest of the most powerful members) are able to influence the transformation of the geographical space, and consequently the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of livelihoods (such as agriculture).

2 Social networks and social engagement

Studies have shown that individual/collective actors engage in a network when they share similar interests. Engagement in a network within the social capital context means that despite differences people are willing to institutionalize their relationships and therefore they agree to follow a series of obligations and reciprocities among the members of the network which predispose them to cooperate (Krishna and Uphoff, 2002; Ostrom and Ahn, 2009).

Within the new institutionalism literature, institutions (or rules of the game as North stated) can be formal or informal (North, 1994). However, they do not operate in isolation, but on the contrary they reinforce or oppose one another (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Formal institutions (such as laws, rules, clear sanctions, procedures and precedents) are created, communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted as official, such as state institutions (courts, legislatures, laws and bureaucracies), state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws and regulations) and other official rules that govern organizations (such as corporations, political parties and interest groups; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1994; Ostrom, 2000). Conversely, informal institutions (such as norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct (North, 1994)) are ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). According to North (1994), institutions arise by negotiations governed by power relationships, therefore they are not necessarily created (at least the formal ones) to be socially efficient, but to serve the interest of the most powerful.

While both formal and informal institutions shape individual and organizational behaviour, particular consideration of informal institutions is critical within the analysis of social capital in the context of local governance in peri-urban territories; this is because informal institutions shape the performance and outcomes of formal institutions (particularly weak institutions) in important and unexpected ways. In this sense, informal institutions have been seen over time as a source of corruption and inefficiency that need to be controlled and avoided. Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence has proved that when they are functional, they can provide opportunities for change (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; High et al., 2005; Lomnitz, 1988).

Informal institutions (or shared expectations) need to be distinguished from other behavioural determinants such as personal factors in which values and beliefs underlie a person’s attitudes towards the behaviour (behavioural beliefs)⁶ and towards certain social norms (normative beliefs;⁷ Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) that are beyond the scope of this article.

3 Social engagement and reciprocal exchange

There is plenty of evidence that networks relying on ongoing engagement promote trust⁸ and reciprocal exchange but also that reciprocity generates higher levels of trust (Agneessens and Wittek, 2012; High et al., 2005; Huppé and Creech, 2012; Lomnitz, 1988; Ostrom, 2000). Reciprocity is recognized as an internalized moral personal norm, and it is also a pattern of social exchange that mobilizes and facilitates access to valuable resources distributed in the network (capacities) such as knowledge and information but also services and material goods (Agneessens and Wittek, 2012; Lin, 1999; Lomnitz, 1988, 1998; Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). In the context of social capital, trust, trustworthiness and cooperation are integral parts of reciprocity (as a norm), but also reciprocity as a prevailing pattern of interaction needs to comply with normative obligations in order to overcome the free rider temptation and generate higher levels of trust and reciprocity (Agneessens and Wittek, 2012; Ostrom and Ahn, 2009; Uslaner, 2002). Higher levels of trust and reciprocity generate cognitive environments where actors can learn from each other and recognize mutual interdependence (vertical and horizontal) which generates the need for collaboration and coordination (Echabarría, 2001; Huppé and Creech, 2012).

Within the local governance literature, those kinds of networks have proved important since they are more likely to mobilize resources of the network in a collaborative process to solve complex problems (Huppé and Creech, 2012).

Nevertheless, different positions within the network generate relationships with asymmetrical distribution of power and therefore unequal conditions for trust, mutuality and reciprocity (Echabarría, 2001; Lin, 1999; Lomnitz, 1998). According to this logic, reciprocal exchange of a network’s resources can take many forms at various scales (Baird and Gray, 2014). It can be formal or informal. Formal exchange may be part of formal functions and obligations of each actor and usually is facilitated through formal channels. Bureaucratic public organizations are highly centralized and therefore much of their exchange will be vertical. Thus, formal horizontal exchange, while important, is unusual because organizational units within the same hierarchy perceive each other in terms of competence and conflict. Also, those kinds of relationships require hard work and are hardly ever rewarded by the organization (Echabarría, 2001). On the other hand, informal (vertical) exchange has been seen traditionally as a series of favours (which create a social debt) that are traded against loyalty and power and are facilitated through informal channels such as patronage (Lomnitz, 1988, 1998). More recently, empirical studies in social capital and organizational culture have drawn attention to horizontal informal exchange as an adaptive capacity of the network, which emerges as a response to the limited capacity of the vertical (formal) coordination. In this sense, public organizations with a certain stock of social capital are able to take further the idea of interdependency and have created informal horizontal channels of reciprocal relationships among units with similar status to mobilize resources to solve complex problems (Agranoff, 2006; Echabarría, 2001).

III The municipality of Tarímbaro

The municipality of Tarímbaro (total area 258.57 km²) lies in the extensive Morelia-Queréndaro valley at 1860 m above the sea level in the northern-central part of the state of Michoacán and to the north of Morelia,⁹ the state capital city Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Source: Based on maps from ARCGIS, 2014: http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=ad61dcd7dd244d4096c22a49cc97011f); CONABIO, 2008 : http://www.conabio.gob.mx/informacion/metadata/gis/destdv250k_2gw.xml?_xsl=/db/metadata/xsl/fgdc_html.xsl&_indent=no). Cartography design: Poncela, Lorena.

Between 1970 and 2000, the population increased steadily (by an average of 3.4 per cent annually). This growth rate was exceeded between 2000 and 2010 (6.13 per cent between 2000 and 2005 and 10.55 per cent between 2005 and 2010); within those 10 years, the population increased by 99.5 per cent (from 39,408 to 78,623 inhabitants) and the urbanized area expanded by 94 per cent (from 1660.32 ha to 3349.35 ha) mainly over highly productive agricultural land¹⁰ (INEGI, 2000, 2010; H. Ayuntamiento de Tarímbaro, 2014).

In 2010, Tarímbaro’s population was distributed in 70 settlements: 34 villages, 3 tenencias, 32 residential developments and a main city 12 km from the centre of Morelia City (H. Ayuntamiento de Tarímbaro, 2014). Of the total population, almost half resided in nine urban areas¹¹ (the main city, 3 tenencias and 5 residential developments) concentrated mainly in the southern part of the territory (INEGI, 2010; H. Ayuntamiento de Tarímbaro, 2014; Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Source: Based on Land Use cover maps for 1970 and 2011. Ignacio González and Larrazábal, Alejandra (2015). PAPIIT-DGAPA-UNAM (grant code IA301113), Municipal boundaries. INEGI (2010). Cartographic design. Larrazábal Alejandra.

This rapid urbanization of Tarímbaro has been attributed to the following:

First, the municipality was affected directly by the significant in-migration of people to Morelia, the lack of available space in the core, and the subsequent physical expansion and restructuring to the north, which encroached over Tarímbaro’s territory. This encroachment was mainly encouraged by the construction of highways that significantly improved physical connections and accessibility between this municipality and the central city.

Second, speculators in the form of private urban developers have been attracted by the promotion of inexpensive unserviced agricultural land; this results in massive land transactions and land conversion into middle- and lower-middle-income residential developments and the location of some industrial areas strategically in the southern part of the municipality alongside its two main highways, and also to some extent dispersed over the territory.

Third, as a municipality with a strong rural background, it has limited capacities to cope with processes of transformation due to peri-urbanization. Thus, for 15 years, it lacked a comprehensive urban development plan for land use regulation and protection of agricultural land from urban expansion.

Fourth, transactions involving agricultural unserviced land in peri-urban areas can present great business opportunities. Hence, corruption seems to be an element in the rapid urbanization of Tarímbaro. Corrupt behaviour to facilitate land transactions can be found among stakeholders at diverse levels ranging from local leaders, urban developers and political organizations to public sector workers (at local and state levels) and local and state authorities (CONAPO–SEDESOL–INEGI, 2007; Méndez-Lemus and Vieyra, 2015).

Consequently, rapid urbanization in Tarímbaro has led to unbalanced flows of people, commodities, goods and services, information, raw material and technology; this in turn has increased inequality in the distribution of geographical endowment and has promoted the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of livelihoods. Indeed, although most of the financial resources of the municipality are intended to cover the emerging needs of the new urban population, they are not enough to create infrastructure and services (including infrastructure for mobility, formal employment opportunities, education and health, transport services, access to drainage and drinking water and security) for local development; this shortfall has provoked high levels of marginalization in about 60 per cent of the urban population (CONAPO, 2010; H. Ayuntamiento de Tarímbaro, 2013). This inequality in the distribution of financial resources has also reduced the possibilities of physical improvements in rural areas where marginality is even higher.

Despite a considerable drop in the number of people working in primary activities, these activities occupy about 57 per cent of the total territory of Tarímbaro. In fact, agriculture is not only the base of the economy of the municipality, providing families with fresh and affordable food and livelihoods, but also it has been very much a part of the local culture of the original residents. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of farmers to external interests has been increased by exposure to factors such as pressure from speculators, gradual decline of production, pollution and depletion of water sources, social conflicts, theft of agricultural products and difficulties in selling crops in the local and regional markets due to low-priced imported goods (H. Ayuntamiento de Tarímbaro, 2014).

IV Methods

This article is an outcome of a broader project conducted in Tarímbaro from 2012 to 2014 that was aimed at exploring by multi-scale analysis the role of social capital in the adaptation of the agricultural systems to the peri-urbanization of Morelia City. The data for this article were obtained through semi-structured interviews carried out with local government actors in April 2014 (four authorities out of nine and seven officials out of seventeen), which were supported with participatory observations undertaken in the municipality since 2012 and more specifically observations during the work in progress. Government actors selected for interview had key functions that obliged them to participate in planning and implementation of the UDP.

To understand how they have coordinated efforts to improve the quality of life of the local residents and control the expansion of the urbanization over agricultural land, we used the social capital approach. This requires identification of the structure of respondents’ collaborative intra-government networks and the exploration of processes in the form of formal and informal feedback-loop mechanisms of social engagement and reciprocal exchange that generate trust among members and the mobilization of valuable resources such as information and knowledge; these promote certain forms of cognitive processes for members of the networks that have contributed to their individual and collective adaptive capacity (in terms of cooperation and coordination).

The schedule for data collection had three sections. The first obtained information about personal attributes and personal capacities of respondents such as age, sex, educational level, position and previous experience in public administration.

The second section identified the power structure of the collaborative intra-government network. A simple but effective strategy was to ask respondents (focal nodes or egos) to list their main collaborators (secondary nodes or alters) inside the municipality, concentrating on their formal roles rather than on their names or personal relationships (Liebowitz, 2005; Lomnitz, 1998; McCarty et al., 2007). Although the roots of associational activity of networks are likely to be personal (High et al., 2005), our method aims to portray the hierarchical mode of formal organization that to some extent predisposes certain forms of collaboration; the method should also detect underlying informal mechanisms, and these are also considered in the subsequent section. Social network analysis was used to create a sociogram representing the structure of the network based on the position of the nodes, the degree of connectedness of each actor based on explicit in and out connections as well as the identification of key actors that function as bridges (Borgatti, 2006; Borgatti et al., 1998; Liu, 2011). Power relationships were identified on the basis of their hierarchical position within the network. They were classified into two types: asymmetrical or vertical (determined by people placed in different hierarchies and therefore with unequal levels of power, such as authorities with officials and/or subordinates); and symmetrical or horizontal (represented by people within the same hierarchy but in different occupational backgrounds/areas; Burt, 2000; Lin, 1999; Lomnitz, 1998; Lozares et al., 2011). The degree of connection is a measure of local centrality (popularity) to see who is at the centre of a number of connections or who stands at the centre of attention (Liu, 2011). This is given by the directions of flow (in-degree when edges flow to a particular actor and out-degree when edges flow out from an actor) Ramírez et al., 2014). Finally, betweenness centrality is indicated by the number of shortest paths that pass through a given actor (vertex) and it is defined with respect to individual vertices. It is associated with the idea of the control that an actor has over the flow of information in the network (Liu, 2011; Sanz, 2003). We used NODE XL which is a MS Excel plug-in for social network analysis to visualize connections and analyze such measures.

The third section aimed to understand the underlying mechanisms (formal and informal feedback-loop processes of social engagement and reciprocal exchange of information and knowledge) of the network that make people work together. To identify processes of social engagement, we design a series of open questions contained indicators representing rules, clear sanctions, procedures and precedents as well as socially shared norms and understandings to select, recruit and predispose people to create and sustain reciprocal relationships. To analyze reciprocal exchange in this context, we referred back to the relationships uncovered by the sociogram and we assumed that behind them should be regular events of formal and informal reciprocity (of knowledge and information). These are not homogenous, since they depend not only on the position within the network and type of relationship (symmetrical or asymmetrical), but also on levels of trust given by the ongoing engagement and the recognition of interdependence given by all of the above which create certain cognitive conditions for collective learning. Therefore, we asked each ego to rank in a 3-point scale (with 1 being the lowest and 3 the highest) their perceptions of each alter regarding (a) intensity of interactions (in terms of formality, frequency and levels of trust), (b) recognition of interdependence (individual capacity, relational capacity and advice seeking/providing) and (c) some features of collective learning (information sharing, mutual learning and common vision) (Agneessens and Wittek, 2012; Huppé and Creech, 2012; Lomnitz, 1998). Narratives obtained from this section were analyzed through the Atlas ti programme to facilitate the integration of relational ideas but also to seek explanations. Quantitative data were analyzed with the SPSS programme to obtain basic descriptive statistical analysis and crosstabs to establish certain relationships.

V Attributes of respondents

The group of respondents or egos consisted of four authorities (the municipal president, the trustee and two councillors) and seven officials (the secretary of the municipality, five directors and a head of a department). Of these, nine were men and two women with average ages of 46 and 47.5 years, respectively. Education in terms of years of study was significantly higher among the officials group (15.6 years) than the authorities (9.25 years). In the first case, five out of seven had a bachelor degree, one had completed a technical degree and the one with lowest hierarchy had only finished high school. In contrast, in the group of authorities, only one (the municipal president) had a bachelor degree, two finished secondary school and one did not complete primary school.

Seven of the eleven respondents had had experience in previous local administrations ruled by the same political group and political party. Two of those who did not have previous experience (two directors) used to work in private organizations, one of them working for an urban developer that made huge investments in Tarímbaro in the preceding administrations (under a different political group and political party).

VI The structure of the collaborative intra-government network

The 11 respondents (egos) mentioned 50 collaborators (alters) who were connected through 107 flows (edges). A layered graph (Figure 3) merges all the ego-networks together and visualizes the resultant arrangements (edges correspond to collaborative relationships). While some collaborative relationships are symmetrical, the sociogram uncovered a highly bureaucratic structure in this network, since almost three-quarters of relationships are asymmetrical. Research into public network management suggests that when a network merges vertical and horizontal relationships, a central coordination is important (McGuire, 2006). Nevertheless, a strong top-down arrangement is considered inefficient because fragmentation of units hampers horizontal forms of collaboration and coordination (Echabarría, 2001; McGuire, 2006).

Figure 3.

Source: Own elaboration based on data collected. (NODE XL and Power point were used to visualizes connections).

1 Degree of connection

Connectedness is one of the most essential concepts associated with social capital and hence with collaborative social networks. In Tarímbaro, there is high variation in both in-degree connections (range 0 to 7) and out-degree connections (0 to 23). In this sense, we identified five key political actors who have great centrality since many edges radiate from them or go to them; these actors scored the highest in both measures simultaneously (Figure 3).

Actors in central positions are better informed about whatever occurs inside the network and they have access to a larger proportion of individuals in the network through their connections. Central actors may facilitate the generation, transfer and sharing of critical information, thereby reducing transaction costs for the organization; in return they have better opportunities and options to learn, acquire competitive advantages and improve their performance (Lin, 1999; Liu, 2011). Hence, it is not strange that, apart from director 1, all central actors occupy the highest levels in the hierarchy. Questions arise regarding the extent to which central actors in this network are using their position for the benefit of the network to solve urbanization issues rather than for their own profit. This point is related to engagement, trust and reciprocal exchange mechanisms within the network that will be explored in the following sections.

2 Betweenness centrality

In the social capital context, actors with high betweenness link together unconnected actors, creating opportunities for exploitation of information and for the control or expansion of benefits (Borgatti et al., 1998). Here, actors constitute ‘bridges’ within the network. In the intra-government network under study, seven actors showed significant high betweenness at different hierarchical levels (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Source: Own elaboration based on data collected. (NODE XL and Power point were used to visualizes connections).

While it is not surprising that bridging relationships were present within the highest hierarchies, the three bridges with highest scores were in fact among lower hierarchies and they occupy different positions within the structure of the municipal government. The question within the social capital context would be the extent to which they have the skills to connect actors and manage the flow of information efficiently.

Despite political experience, none of the councillors functions as a bridge; this could be related to the specific function each performs but may also be associated to lower educational attainment. Three members combine high values in both centrality and betweenness, which indicates the importance of such actors to the network. They are the municipal president, the municipal secretary and the trustee. They are the most powerful members of the network not only because of their strategic position within the highest hierarchies, but also because they are very well connected among the members and have demonstrated their ability not only to control the flow of information through the network, but also to transmit/impose preferences (such as knowledge, vision, rules of the game and so on) to the rest of the members.

VII Underlying mechanisms inside the network

1 Social engagement

In the social capital context, social engagement entails the selection not only of people who are willing to sustain reciprocal relationships, but also of people who, despite their differences in values and beliefs, agree to follow certain formal and informal rules that will ensure their commitment to the network and their continuous engagement.

In Tarímbaro, the social network of local government is engaged mostly through informal, rather than formal, institutional mechanisms. Indeed, while educational qualification and experience are desirable particularly for directors (according to formal institutions), selection and recruitment are based mainly on loyalty to the political party and, most specifically, to the local political group. According to some respondents, it is clear to everyone that only those who participated actively in the political campaign have the ‘right’ to be considered for a job since they demonstrated loyalty to the leader and the group. In this context, the municipal president decides both who will be hired and the rank of the person according to his/her abilities and/or recommendations. The latter comes from previous negotiations and understandings with other key stakeholders who have been important during the political election process.

Therefore, engagement has involved certain levels of trust previously developed through patronage relationships. In fact, the highly hierarchical network revealed in the previous section is nothing but a network of patron–client relationships. In this context, as people were offered job security (at least for three years) and political protection by the group, they are expected to repay their debt with gratitude, loyalty and work. Ongoing engagement is reinforced continuously in meetings where people are reminded of the operating rules of the network. Sanctions in the form of dismissals come in response to a lack of political compromise which is more evident during the first six months of the three years of the administration period. Findings are consistent with Lomnitz (1988) and her study of patron–client relations in Chile and Mexico. She affirmed that loyalty in unequal exchange relationships is the basis for political support.

In a context where intra-municipal relationships are based mostly on patronage, formal institutional mechanisms seem to complement the ongoing engagement but hardly ever the selection process. Indeed, clarity in the administrative functions, formal norms and regulations and the obligation to develop annual plans and programmes to direct activities and resources have been used to ensure that people will comply with the responsibilities of their jobs.

However, other forms of formal institutional mechanisms of engagement such as selection (activation), recruitment, promotions, training opportunities, administrative procedures, performance evaluation and formal sanctions have been contemplated by the Professional Civil Service Regulations for Municipal Administration.¹² Nevertheless, the regulations are hardly ever implemented in Tarímbaro since, as some respondents stated, they require exclusively dedicated human, administrative and financial resources. Consequently, training is in fact very limited and only a few courses arranged with some public institutions have been available for the staff to improve mainly communication and computer skills. This is important since selection is not based on knowledge and experience in solving particular problems efficiently. Promotions are very rare and everyone is willing to accept this from the outset. Formal sanctions are also unusual, and are limited to pay deductions in cases of unpunctuality or unjustified absences. There is no procedure manual to systematize administration methods, nor have formal protocols for performance evaluation been implemented.

2 Reciprocal exchange

Intensity of exchange

The Tarímbaro administration not only uses monitoring and evaluation meetings to secure ongoing engagement but also to exchange knowledge and information. Another form of interaction, perhaps less recognized but persistent and effective, is lobbying. Of the 107 relationships in the collaborative network (Figure 2), 55 per cent involve meeting at least once a week, 26 per cent between two and three times a month and only 19 per cent once a month or less. Overall, 65 per cent of meetings were regarded as completely formal, 29 per cent moved back and forth between formal and informal, and only 6 per cent were completely informal. Although frequency and formality of meetings were both significantly higher in symmetrical than in asymmetrical relationships; there was more flexibility in asymmetrical relationships, with formality and informality coexisting in an exchange of information and knowledge.

Although symmetrical relationships are less common, all of these involve interaction at least once a week but in an almost completely formal context. This suggests that, in essence, horizontal relationships are more a feature of obligation created by the position than the product of spontaneous need for coordination to exchange expert information and knowledge. The importance of informal forms of coordination within formal organizations (or groupware) is recognized in the literature; in particular, informal horizontal exchange of information and knowledge based on social capital is preferred for everyday problems in a given society (Agranoff and McGuire, 2006; Echabarría, 2001). Therefore, these horizontal relationships may be considered as a sign of the adaptive capacity of an intra-government network to find better solutions to problems in the context of urbanization (Blanco et al., 2014).

Finally, since patronage is the main form of social engagement, it is not surprising that all the collaborative intra-government relationships were perceived as trustworthy. Even more, respondents ranked the degree of trust as 77.2 per cent in asymmetrical and 67.9 per cent in symmetrical relationships. This reflects the strength of the patron–client relationships; between equals the logic of the relationship is slightly different. Such levels of trust not only derive from loyalty but also from positive experience of reciprocal exchange (most respondents have worked together in previous administrations). Respondents said they trust their colleagues because they have been faithful, responsible and supportive, have shared similar ideas and visions, have developed experience in their working area, and have given good results in their jobs so far. This coincides with the findings by Lomnitz (1988) that, in the Mexican political structure, relationships based on patronage survive administrative changes in their hierarchy and are characterized by trust developed through the long term. In other words, political actors have a group of loyal followers that accompany them from job to job in the civil service.

Recognition of interdependence

Networks with a certain stock of social capital can coordinate the mobilization of a wide range of material and non-material resources. In this sense, and considering the formality of horizontal relationships, coordination may adopt many forms such as formal and informal as well as hierarchical or non-hierarchical (Agranoff and McGuire, 2006; Echabarría, 2001). Coordination is a function of the recognition of interdependency, which in this study is represented as a perception of individual knowledge, relational capacity of each collaborator and advice seeking/providing. Responses were disaggregated into symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships.

The results indicate that while social engagement based on patronage assures that people will devote their work to the network, more precisely to the most powerful members, it will not guarantee the inclusion of members with the best knowledge or relational capacity to solve urbanization problems for the benefit of local people. Hence, it is not surprising that the perceived capacity of collaborators to occupy their current position scored low in both types of relationships, but particularly low in symmetrical relationships. The perceived relational capacity of collaborators was relatively high (65.2 per cent) in asymmetrical relationships, which was expected since subordinates must comply with the demands of their patrons. However, only 20 per cent of members involved in symmetrical relationships were perceived to have a high capacity to establish proactive relationships with other members of the network. This suggests that apart from patronage and highly centralized government (as noted above), perceptions about capacity to occupy a certain position and capacity to develop proactive relationships are important in the fragmentation of informal horizontal exchanges within the network.

Advice seeking/providing was perceived as very high in both types of relationships but particularly among the asymmetrical ones; this is consistent with the results regarding the two previous variables, whereas advice seeking and providing in symmetrical relationships can be the product of formal functions and position rather than recognition of interdependence.

Collective learning

In the context of social capital in local governance, reciprocal exchanges of information and knowledge are important because they can create collective conditions for learning and thereby for improving the adaptive capacity of the network to solve problems more efficiently (Adger, 2003; Brooks et al., 2005; Eakin and Lemos, 2006; Huppé and Creech, 2012; Ishihara and Pascual, 2009; Ivey et al., 2004). This kind of learning should be interactive within the network, with members sharing information and learning from each other. Egos perceived that collaborators are very much involved in collective learning from each other to improve their own performance, to share information and to negotiate (or perhaps impose) a collective vision. Slight differences occur in symmetrical and asymmetrical relations (80 per cent and 78.3 per cent, respectively).

Perceptions of high involvement in collective learning can be indicated by the frequency of evaluative and informative formal and informal meetings that members of the network must attend. Surprisingly, mutual learning scored the highest in horizontal relationships (100 per cent), although it dropped when the collective vision had to be negotiated (66.7 per cent). On the other hand, the high score of collective vision in asymmetrical relationships (79.7 per cent) was expected, since the nature of such relations is basically patronage and imposition of a common vision is more likely.

VIII How intra-government networks have worked in practice to plan and implement the UDP

One of the most important political compromises of Tarímbaro’s government (2012–15) was to create conditions that would guarantee social and economic stability by fostering urban development. Consequently, the local UDP was launched in January 2014. Its main purposes were twofold: first, to improve the quality of life of the residents and second, to control the expansion of urban areas over the valley, which is recognized as the most fertile irrigated agricultural area in the whole municipality.

Based on results of the preceding sections, three examples are used to illustrate how social capital (in terms of structure and processes) inside Tarímbaro’s intra-government networks has worked in practice to plan and implement the UDP .

1 Maintenance of water and sewage infrastructure in non-municipalized urban settlements

Maintenance of water and sewage infrastructure in the recently urbanized area is an essential task of the UDP to improve the quality of life of the residents. Nevertheless, progress in this matter is difficult to achieve since about 80 per cent of the new middle-and lower-middle-income urban settlements have not been municipalized (formally transferred to the municipality by urban developers). By law, such settlements are not entitled to maintenance of water and sewage infrastructure from government until their conditions are regularized. On the other hand, residents are not required to pay for the undersupplied service. Therefore, there are no reciprocal formal obligations between the two.

This is a major source of concern for the local government, since it is unable to obtain revenues, while the well-being of the local residents is deteriorating. This also decreases the popularity of this political group and puts at risk its ability to maintain its members in the government for the next local election. In this context, respondents recognize the limitations of the UDP and other formal regulations when seeking social outcomes that may benefit a large proportion of residents. For this reason, the Cabildo has resorted to ‘flexibility’ to deal with this problem. Flexibility in practice includes informal arrangements inside the local government and between the local government and the residents to influence implementation and service distribution. Such arrangements are reinforced (before or after implementation) through formal channels and rules to enforce obligations. Here, the asymmetrical and highly centralized structure of the local government facilitates this process since the most powerful members of the network are endorsing informal practices to ensure the provision of water services that otherwise would not be possible.

In this context, provision of drinking water and maintenance of water and sewage infrastructure in the new urbanized area is the responsibility of the Water and Sewage System Committee (COMAPAT). As a decentralized organization, the COMAPAT depends only on residents’ payments to operate. It is administrated by a general director who responds directly to the COMAPAT Government Board (composed of the municipal president, a counselor and five members of the civil society). As the Cabildo has given instructions to fulfil the demands of the residents in non-municipalized urban settlements, the government board modified the terms to provide temporary maintenance of infrastructure only if residents are willing to pay for the services.

To put into practice this resolution with the residents, the director of the committee has coordinated efforts with relevant order managers (auxiliary authorities outside the municipal seat that are responsive to people’s needs) to analyze various alternatives to deter non-payment. The most effective are the open assemblies organized by order managers to discuss with the residents the benefit of paying fees for water services. Once people are persuaded to pay, they select their own representatives to ‘formalize’ compromises with the COMAPAT through a written agreement. This agreement has no legal value whatsoever, but the parties involved have respected it because it was official. This practice has secured access to drinking water and drainage to residents in non-municipalized settlements. Also, it has reduced conflicts with residents and has generated revenue for the COMAPAT.

2 Control of land use change and addressing negative consequences

Rapid but also unrestrained urban expansion over agricultural land has provoked significant social, economic and environmental problems that were neither expected nor addressed by preceding administrations, and that have negative implications for the UDP. Therefore, attempts to control land use change to protect this valley from urbanization and address its negative consequences is one of the most important concerns of the municipal president. In this sense, he has made most of his strategic position within the network to not only spread his vision through formal meetings, but also through formal and informal channels to the rest of the members and the Cabildo to coordinate efforts to reduce land use change. For example, in contrast to previous administrations, all licences for large-scale construction must be authorized by the Cabildo. To reinforce this, the president has created a new position within the urban development area that controls the construction licences. This position is occupied by one of his most trusted collaborators, who reports directly to him.

Embarking in vertical collaboration to control land use change (and other important problems) is an obligation for the relevant officials, not only because of their functions and commitment to the network but also because at the beginning of the administration they signed a resign letter that guarantees their subordination to the president. To some extent, this kind of collaboration and coordination has been effective in significantly reducing land use change by large construction companies. Nonetheless, permission for land use change has been granted for the construction of warehouses, stables and some houses occupying less than 180 sq. m even in the valley. Vigilance to avoid illicit (large) construction is taken very seriously by this network, while unlawful small-scale construction has been tolerated to some extent. In fact, government has promoted small-scale constructions by local residents by reducing authorization fees and simplifying bureaucratic processes.

The formalizing of new arrangements is very much the task of the Cabildo, particularly when rules and norms are not enough or do not exist to deal with unexpected consequences of land use change. For example, one important unexpected problem that this government has faced in relation to land use change is that the past administration granted an unknown number of construction licences without leaving any official records of their existence. Some of those that have been identified are illicit. Others are lawful but are located in prohibited areas in the context of the new UDP (such as the valley). Here, the Cabildo has coordinated efforts to formalize strategies and practices to enforce the UDP. For instance, it has imposed new restrictions on urban developers who already had permission for construction, in order to guarantee better conditions for the local community and the municipality. This has discouraged immediate land use change. Also, it has prohibited any large-scale construction inside the valley even if the permission that was granted is lawful. Of course, this has brought legal processes against the municipality but the Cabildo has appealed to the territorial sovereignty and to the local UDP to defend local resources and local residents from external agents. At the moment of data collection legal processes were unresolved.

As in the maintenance of water and sewage infrastructure in non-municipalized urban settlements, the Cabildo also formalizes informal arrangements to lessen the social impact of long-term unresolved problems regarding unrestrained urban expansion. For example, in ‘La Cantera’, one of the low-income residential developments, the construction company deceived the residents and abandoned the project before it was completed. Hence, residents lack access to electricity, drinking water and complete paved roads. Here, the current government is advising residents to take legal action against the company (although it is difficult to track it since it has either been dissolved or has changed its name). Also, the Cabildo decided to allocate resources to support the residents, even though this residential development has not been municipalized. Nevertheless, financial resources in the municipality are very limited and ‘La Cantera’ is not the only residential development in this situation. So, while the municipal support is meeting some of the needs of the residents, it is not a permanent solution nor is it sufficient to solve this problem.

In practice, the formalization of informal arrangements and also the approval of new urban development projects (not necessarily visualized in the UDP) are undertaken in the Cabildo meetings. Prior to the meetings, councillors receive a schedule and written information about the main subjects to be analyzed and discussed. Nevertheless, some informants mentioned that in order to influence the views of particular councillors or the municipal president, they approach them informally before the meeting. For example, to guarantee the support of the authorities for a new development project, it is important that the proponent talks to the municipal president and/or the councillors before they meet. If the president thinks that such a project/idea is good enough to be approved/formalized by the Cabildo, he organizes an informal gathering before the formal meeting in order to persuade the ‘right people’ to ensure that it will be accepted. Cabildeo (or lobbying) is an informal channel for reciprocal exchange of information and knowledge which is used not only inside the government at different levels but also by the government to influence the views of residents to avoid land selling and land use change, and to prevent conflicts due to the implementation of new tourism projects. According to informants, Cabildeo is very well tolerated if its outcomes benefit people, the political party and/or the political group.

3 Intra-government and local citizen participation in planning and implementation of the UDP

Even though the officials and authorities selected in this study have key functions that oblige them to participate actively in the planning of the UDP, only a few of them were in charge of the whole process. The majority contributed with minimum specific information (and only when compelled to do so). In fact, the UDP was planned with limited intra-municipal participation and, therefore, with restricted opportunities to exchange expert information and knowledge to find better ways to deal with urbanization problems. Here, the limited recognition of interdependence is evident. In this sense, most informants accepted the transience of their participation in planning, the limits of their knowledge about the effects of urbanization in the territory and therefore the biases inherent in their contribution to the UDP. Therefore, urban development initiatives were more the result of the partial knowledge of a few members of the network rather than the collective vision of all those implicated. One example is the lack of horizontal coordination between the rural and the urban development areas. They differ in their knowledge and information about the UDP, they do not share much information and they do not recognize the need to work together despite the fact that securing agricultural livelihoods is one of the most important justifications of the UDP.

Nevertheless, all members of the network have to deal somehow with the consequences (expected or unexpected) of the UDP. In this endeavour, they have to undertake certain actions according to their formal functions. However, the limited horizontal coordination to implement the UDP and incomplete knowledge and information to make the programme work brings partial solutions to complex problems. For example, the economic development area has been searching for partnerships for financial investments to develop the industrial corridor (planned in the UDP), and there are no environmental regulations for the current local industries that have damaged their immediate environment. Also, to increase agricultural production, authorities in the rural area of the municipality have promoted and subsidized chemical fertilizers and pesticides to farmers with no concern for the health of the residents of the new residential development nearby in the valley.

Although analysis of relationships between local government and civil society is beyond the scope of this article, we note that hardly any public participatory initiatives were promoted with the civil society during the planning process of the UDP. One was the personal survey conducted by the current local government during the political campaign to identify the demands of the local population. Here, some demands were included in the UDP such as the need for infrastructure, while others such as security were ignored. This is important since this was the most urgent requirement voiced by the local residents. Another example is the public consultation required by law; this was confined to an exhibition in the main patio of the local government building of four technical maps representing the proposal, and access to the entire document was restricted to a copy held in the local urbanization office within that building.

IX Conclusions

The governance of peri-urban territories implies the creation of public–private collaborative networked initiatives to negotiate and implement new rural and urban policies for the social, economic, environmental and geographical integration necessary for local development. However, as local governments must play a strategic role to ensure that such development will improve the quality of life of residents, governance is also about intra-government relationships. In this endeavour, we argue that social capital embedded in intra-government networks is mandatory in facilitating internal coordination and collaboration to reach this outcome. Results from this study support these assumptions. However, the findings also indicate that social capital within the network is not enough to foster effective governance processes. Underlying mechanisms that give existence to this capital are equally important. This study has demonstrated that an old political power structure (predominantly vertical and highly centralized patronage arrangements with minimum horizontal informal arrangements) and flexible processes (mainly informal forms of engagement and exchange that are reinforced through formal channels) hinder the exercise of governance initiatives and limit the performance of the local government in controlling urbanization.

Of course, patron–client relationship has been very effective in promoting vertical coordination and collaboration in planning and implementing the UDP, as well as in spreading a collective vision of the importance of controlling the problem of land use change. Also, it has been effective in reinforcing informal understandings through formal mechanisms to benefit low-income residents. This probably has to be recognized as an emergent and innovative form of collective decision-making process for public good at the local level. Also, informal mechanisms to respond to the needs of the poor remain important when the formal ones are not enough or do not exist.

However, these self-same structures and practices have limited the conditions for collective learning and therefore the visualization of the complexity of the problem to create better urban policies to give long-lasting solutions to the residents. In this context, bureaucratic arrangements and the relatively low recognition of interdependence within this network have hampered informal horizontal relationships and the creation and maintenance of new organizational structures with more democratic forms of relationships inside the government. To foster peri-urban local governance processes, such relationships are essential because they create better conditions for learning and improving the individual and collective adaptive capacities of political actors, including their ability to relate with others proactively, either inside or outside the government.

Acknowledgements

Authors would like to thanks to Danielle Barriga for the support in qualitative data analysis, to Alejandra Larrazábal for the cartography design related to changes in land-use cover and Ann Grant for the outstanding editing work. Also we are very grateful with the political actors from Tarímbaro´s municipality that collaborated in this study and to the anonymous referees for their constructive comments which improved substantially this article.

Funding

The research on which this article is based was funded by the PAPIIT-DGAPA-UNAM project ‘‘Urban periphery and campesinos’ households: the role of social capital in the adaptation of agricultural systems to the peri-urbanization of the Morelia City’’ (grant code IA301113).

Footnotes

Notes

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