Are Youth Bulges Necessary for Regime Transition?

Abstract

This study analyses a global sample of 58 country-level cases of revolutionary mobilization (2000–2022). It investigates the role that structural demographic factors (youth bulges) play alongside different agency-based factors (including strategies of protest and resistance) in bringing about regime transition. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is applied to assess conditions covering demography (percentage of the population aged 0–14), fertility rates, protest strategies (including violence, unarmed violence and nonviolence), democracy and freedom scores, along with protest size. Results reveal that the presence of a youth bulge is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Specifically, youth bulges are present in two identified pathways that capture (a) regime transitions which arose when movements adopted violence or unarmed violence in non-democratic contexts and (b) in democratic contexts where movements adopted nonviolent civil resistance. Youth bulges combined with strategic protest are key factors underlying regime transition in today’s world. This phenomenon is marked by causally complex interactions that are equifinal in nature.

Keywords

Economic development and industrialization Inequalities Political governance and civil society Protest Revolution

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