Democratic discontent and support for mainstream and challenger parties: Democratic protest voting

Abstract

The literature disagrees over the extent to which defection from mainstream parties and support for challenger parties are related to individuals’ discontent with the functioning of democratic political systems. This article develops the democratic protest voting model, a theoretical framework to analyze how different forms of democratic discontent relate to the chance of defecting from mainstream parties and supporting left- and right-wing challenger parties. The empirical results reveal that voters tend to support parties that are aligned with the specific nature of their democratic discontent. These results imply that voting for challenger parties should not be conceptualized as a mere expression of protest decoupled from political preferences, but as a process of democratic protest voting that is informed by normative democratic preferences.

Keywords

Challenger parties democracy discontent mainstream parties protest voting

Introduction

During the last decade, growing discontent with the functioning of democracy has been paralleled with declining support for mainstream parties and an upsurge of challenger parties (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Foster and Frieden, 2017; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). This suggests that these two trends could be related. However, the literature disagrees over the extent to which support for challenger parties and defection from mainstream parties can be linked to ‘protest voting’. Some argue that citizens who are dissatisfied with the way their political system works increasingly support challenger parties as a way of protesting and signaling their discontent with the functioning of representative democracy (e.g. Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005). Others refute the ‘protest hypothesis’ arguing that the vote for these parties is driven by policy preferences and that, as a consequence, support for challenger parties is better explained by ‘policy voting’ (Van der Brug et al., 2000).

In this article, I integrate the protest and the policy voting hypotheses to analyze the relationship between democratic discontent and party choice in 15 Western European countries.¹ Following the protest hypothesis I posit that democratic discontent should influence the chance of defecting from mainstream parties and supporting different types of challenger parties (left- and right-wing challenger parties). However, since democracies are multidimensional, and individuals are unlikely to share a common normative idea of democracy, there must be different forms of democratic discontent. Based on this idea, the democratic protest voting model developed in this article proposes that citizens should vote for a party that is aligned with the specific shortcomings that, according to their democratic preferences, they perceive in their democracies.

To distinguish between different forms of democratic discontent I assess to what extent the democratic preferences or aspirations of individuals (i.e. what they expect from democracy) are realized for particular principles of democracy. The democratic principles considered in this article are based on models of democracy that range from the most minimalist to the most comprehensive models (Held, 2006). Besides principles related to basic liberal models of democracy like the freedom and fairness of elections or the protection of minorities’ rights, I also consider principles that go beyond procedural and minimalist models of democracy. These principles are, for example, the citizens’ involvement in decision-making through referendums (direct-democratic model of democracy) or the guarantee of economic equality (social-democratic model of democracy) (see Ferrín and Kriesi, 2016; Hernández, 2016; Huber et al., 1997)

The empirical analyses of this article draw on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) for 15 Western European democracies. This dataset allows me to study specific forms of democratic discontent, operationalized as the imbalances that individuals perceive between their democratic aspirations and evaluations for particular principles of democracy. The empirical analyses reveal that specific forms of democratic discontent are differently related to the probability of supporting mainstream and left- and right-wing challenger parties. Instead of voting for any challenger party, dissatisfied citizens support a party that is aligned with the specific shortcomings that they perceive in their democracy. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between different forms of democratic discontent that consider individuals’ normative preferences for different types of democracy when studying protest voting.

Democratic protest voting: Conceptualization

Voters tend to attribute problems in the functioning of democracy to mainstream parties, since they see these parties ‘as part of the system and, thus as part of the problem’ (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005: 137). As a consequence, individuals who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy and its key institutions are less likely to support mainstream parties. This has led to the conclusion that defection from mainstream parties can be considered an instrument citizens resort to in order to express their discontent with the functioning of representative democracy (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005). As a way of protesting, dissatisfied individuals are likely to abandon mainstream parties and vote for challenger parties instead (Vidal, 2018).

In the Western European context, most studies focus on the association between attitudes such as distrust towards representative institutions or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and the vote for populist parties, mainly on the far right. These attitudes are generally associated with a greater likelihood of supporting these parties (Bélanger and Aarts, 2006; Oesch, 2008). In Belgium and the Netherlands, negative orientations towards the political system increase the likelihood of supporting challenger parties located on both extremes of the ideological continuum (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013). Some authors suggest that growing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions also favors the emergence of new challenger parties like Podemos in Spain (Vidal, 2018). These studies indicate that support for challenger parties should be considered a form of protest vote, because attitudes reflecting discontent with the functioning of democracy and its main actors and institutions motivate citizens to support challengers. Hence, in most of these studies, protest voting is conceptualized and operationalized—often implicitly—as a vote casted for a non-established party because of one’s discontent with the functioning of democracy and its key institutions.

This view is challenged by those who argue that the decision to vote for challenger parties is more likely to be motivated by policy preferences than by a desire to protest spurred by discontent with the functioning of democracy and democratic institutions. This argument has been put forward by studies of anti-immigrant parties, which found clear support for the policy voting or rational-choice hypothesis, because, instead of discontent, policy preferences were the main factor explaining the support for these parties (Billiet and De Witte, 1995; Van der Brug et al., 2000, 2005). From the perspective of these authors, these findings clearly refute the protest voting hypothesis, since their definition of protest voting not only requires discontent to have a strong effect on the likelihood of supporting non-mainstream parties, but also that the support for these parties is not driven by policy preferences (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Van der Brug et al., 2000). From this perspective, protest voting is a purposive vote that is primarily casted against mainstream parties, who are held responsible for the dysfunctions of the political system, but, at the same time, it is a vote that is not driven by the desire to influence public policies (Van der Brug et al., 2000).

This characterization of protest voting is more explicit and useful in analytical terms than previous conceptualizations. However, it is also too restrictive, since, in principle, it treats protest voting and policy voting as two incompatible models of voting behavior. Protest voting is defined as a behavior detached from political preferences that can only be influenced by abstract, generic, and evaluative attitudes about the functioning of democratic institutions such as dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, a lack of trust in representative institutions, or a lack of political efficacy.² All these attitudes reflect some form of discontent, dissatisfaction, disenchantment and frustration with the functioning of democratic institutions. However, they are devoid of any substantive content. For example, while we know that those who express low satisfaction with how democracy works are not happy with their democratic regime, we do not know what it is they are not satisfied with or why. These are crucial aspects that must be taken into account when studying protest voting.

As Billiet and De Witte (1995: 194) note in their conclusion, ‘a sharp distinction between the rational-choice hypothesis and the protest hypothesis is partly a false one’. Support for challenger parties is unlikely to be exclusively motivated by either considerations related to individuals’ attitudes about the functioning of their democratic systems or by their policy preferences alone (see e.g. Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2017). In fact, recent studies indicate that the impact of discontent with the functioning of political systems on the vote for challenger parties is moderated by issue preferences (see e.g. Hernández and Kriesi, 2016; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018; Vidal, 2018). However, while valuable, these studies still characterize discontent as an empty feeling devoid of any normative considerations, and just analyze how its impact is moderated by issue preferences.

To analyze the way in which discontent with the functioning of democracy influences party choices, we need to incorporate elements of the policy voting hypothesis to the conceptualization of democratic discontent. We should move beyond a notion of democratic discontent characterized as an empty feeling towards the political system and incorporate a reference to normative preferences about how political systems ought to work. For this purpose, in this article, I introduce the democratic protest voting model, which combines elements of the protest and policy voting hypotheses. Building on the protest voting hypothesis, one would assume that democratic discontent should affect party choice, since those who are not satisfied with the functioning of their democracy are likely to express their discontent at the polls. However, following the policy voting model, which predicts that citizens will vote for parties that are in line with their policy preferences, we can assume that this should not occur independently of the nature of individuals’ democratic discontent, which is determined by their democratic preferences or aspirations and the extent to which these are fulfilled for particular principles of democracy. Hence, at the core of the democratic protest voting model lies the idea that the process by which discontent relates to party choices should not only be influenced by citizens’ desire to protest, but also by what citizens want to protest about.

Incorporating democratic preferences to the conceptualization of democratic discontent allows us to evaluate whether discontented citizens simply vote for challenger parties, or whether they vote for parties that are aligned with the specific shortcomings that they perceive in their democracies. Contrary to protest voting, which many have conceptualized—explicitly or implicitly—as a vote decoupled from political preferences, democratic protest voting is, in fact, informed by preferences about how democracies ought to ideally work. The democratic protest voting model integrates the protest voting hypothesis, which highlights the role that discontent plays for party choices, and the policy voting hypothesis, which emphasizes the relevance of preferences for voting decisions. Hence, I conceptualize democratic protest voting not as a vote detached from political preferences, but as a vote that is informed by individuals’ democratic preferences and the extent to which these are realized for particular principles of democracy.

To evaluate the democratic protest voting model, it is necessary to characterize the nature of individuals’ democratic discontent so that it reflects the specific deficiencies that, according to their democratic preferences, they perceive in their democracies. Democratic preferences or aspirations establish citizens’ ideal of democracy and set the benchmark against which the functioning of democracy is evaluated. For every specific principle of democracy (e.g. the protection of minorities’ rights), democratic aspirations indicate to what extent individuals consider that a particular principle should be present in a democracy. In turn, democratic evaluations indicate to what extent individuals think a particular principle is present in their democracy. A comparison of democratic aspirations and evaluations reflects whether the political system of a given country matches one’s democratic aspirations, whether it is underperforming, or whether it is overperforming. These different types of (im)balances between democratic aspirations and evaluations are summarized in Figure 1. If aspirations match evaluations (i.e. they are balanced), the system is performing according to one’s expectations. When aspirations are higher than evaluations, individuals perceive a democratic deficit since they consider that their political system is falling short of their expectations. If aspirations are lower than evaluations, individuals perceive a democratic surplus since they consider that their system is overperforming.

Figure 1.

Democratic surpluses and democratic deficits.

In the presence of democratic protest voting, democratic deficits and surpluses should be mobilized by different parties depending on the specific principle of democracy they refer to. To test this proposition, I rely on a theoretically derived set of five principles of democracy that are summarized in Table 1. These particular principles are selected because they are relevant for different models of democracy (Held, 2006). The first principle, the freedom and fairness of elections, lies at the core of most models of democracy and captures the essence of representative democracy (Schumpeter, 1976 [1942]). However, modern democracies are not just democracies, but liberal democracies. This implies some restraint of the powers of majorities in order to prevent the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and protect minorities’ rights (Dahl, 2006). Other theories go beyond this basic model of liberal democracy by incorporating additional and complementary principles. Economic equality is one of the most common non-procedural principles that theoretical models of democracy consider in order to ensure that economic inequality does not trump political equality (see e.g. Held, 2006: 257–308; Huber et al., 1997). Direct democratic mechanisms, which allow citizens to have a direct say on political decisions, are one of the principles that participatory models of democracy propose as a potential tool to improve the functioning of liberal democracies (Geissel and Newton, 2012). Finally, today’s democracies are deeply integrated and interdependent. This implies that governments cannot just be responsive to its own citizens, as classic democratic theories proposed. National governments also have to live up (be responsible) to their commitments to other governments and international institutions like, for example, the EU (Mair, 2009).

Table 1.

Principles of democracy.

Principle of democracy	Operational definition
Freedom and fairness of elections	National elections being free and fair
Minorities’ rights	The rights of minority groups being protected
Economic equality	Governments taking measures to reduce differences in income levels
Direct democracy	Citizens having the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums
Responsibility toward other European governments	Politicians taking into account the views of other European governments before making decisions

Note: Based on Ferrín and Kriesi (2016).

Democratic deficits and surpluses related to each of these principles of democracy should be mobilized by different parties. Theoretically grounded hypotheses can be formulated as to how perceiving a deficit or surplus for each of them should relate to the likelihood of supporting mainstream or left- and right-wing challenger parties. Relying on different principles of democracy and jointly considering democratic aspirations and evaluations allows me to test the central proposition of the democratic protest voting model, namely that citizens should be likely to cast a vote for a party that is aligned with the specific nature of their democratic discontent.

Democratic protest voting: Expectations

To analyze the democratic protest voting model, I conceptualize mainstream parties as those parties that usually lead or participate in national cabinets and that do not adopt an overtly critical stance about established national political elites (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Examples of these parties would be the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, or the Socialist Party (PS) in Portugal. Given the central role that these parties play in European democracies, individuals are likely to identify problems with the functioning of democracy with these parties (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005). As a consequence, one might generally expect democratic discontent to be negatively related to the likelihood of voting for mainstream parties. However, the approach here implemented is more specific in that it analyzes discontent in the form of imbalances between democratic aspirations and evaluations for particular principles of democracy. In this case, even mainstream parties might be capable of mobilizing voters that perceive surpluses or deficits for specific principles of democracy.

In opposition to mainstream parties, I define challenger parties as those parties that do not ordinarily lead or participate in national cabinets or that adopt an anti-elitist and critical stance about established national political elites. As pointed out by Hobolt and Tilley (2016), challenger parties provide an alternative narrative that defies the mainstream consensus, and they also highlight issues that are usually downplayed by mainstream parties. This alternative narrative is often complemented with a populist or antiestablishment rhetoric. Examples of these parties would be Podemos in Spain, the Front National (FN) in France, or the True Finns in Finland. Since they represent a clear alternative to established parties and usually emphasize the deficiencies of political systems, these parties should attract discontented voters (Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005). However, depending on whether they are located on the left or the right challenger parties clearly differ in the types of problems they address (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Thus, according to the democratic protest voting model, left- and right-wing challengers should attract voters with different forms of discontent.

I begin by considering how discontent related to a fundamental principle of democracy, the freedom and fairness of elections, should influence the likelihood of supporting these parties. Given that mainstream parties are an integral part of representative institutions and are also the main beneficiaries of the functioning of the electoral system, it does not seem likely that individuals who believe that elections are not fair enough (deficit) or who believe that elections should be less free than they currently are (surplus) will vote for mainstream parties. Hence, for this principle of democracy we should find a greater support for mainstream parties among those individuals for whom democratic aspirations and evaluations are balanced, and a lower support for mainstream parties among those perceiving a democratic surplus or a democratic deficit.

H1a: Individuals perceiving a democratic balance about the freedom and fairness of elections are more likely to vote for mainstream parties.

Conversely, those who perceive that elections are not fair enough, probably seeing them as favoring the political establishment, should be more likely to vote for left and right challengers as a form of protest, since these parties usually advocate for an overhaul of governmental institutions and procedures (March, 2011). Hence, those perceiving a democratic deficit for this basic principle of democracy should be more likely to vote for challenger parties.

H1b: Individuals perceiving a democratic deficit about the freedom and fairness of elections are more likely to vote for left- and right-wing challengers.

The expectations are different for the economic equality principle. Since the outbreak of the Great Recession, mainstream parties from the left and the right ‘have converged on a policy of austerity’ (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016: 972). Most mainstream parties advocate for, or have at least agreed to, a limitation of welfare redistribution. Therefore, these parties should receive fewer votes among those who believe that their democracies are underperforming with regard to the measures governments take to reduce economic inequality (deficit), and they should attract the votes of those who perceive a democratic surplus for this principle of democracy.

H2a: Individuals perceiving a democratic surplus about economic equality are more likely to vote for mainstream parties.

Left-wing challengers should be the main beneficiaries of citizens perceiving a democratic deficit in this dimension. Left-wing challengers reject austerity policies and welfare retrenchment and advocate for democracies characterized by greater wealth redistribution (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; March, 2011). In contrast, on the right, challenger parties are likely to adopt a market liberal stance or favor limited income redistribution in the form of ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kitschelt, 1995; Koster et al., 2013). Hence, while left-wing challengers should receive greater support among those perceiving a democratic deficit, it is not clear how imbalances between democratic aspirations and evaluations for this principle of democracy should relate to the likelihood of supporting right-wing challengers.

H2b: Individuals perceiving a democratic deficit about economic equality are more likely to vote for left-wing challengers.

Focusing on direct democracy, this is a feature of democracy that resonates well with challenger parties but that mainstream parties are not likely to promote. Mainstream parties are likely to collude to favor party centered mechanisms, since they are the main beneficiaries of those (Katz and Mair, 1995). In this case, the mainstream consensus implies favoring representative mechanisms to the detriment of direct forms of decision-making. As a consequence, citizens perceiving a democratic deficit should be less likely to support mainstream parties, and those perceiving a democratic surplus should be more likely to support them.

H3a: Individuals perceiving a democratic surplus about direct democracy are more likely to vote for mainstream parties.

In contrast, referendums are a favorite instrument of challenger parties because they offer a way of bypassing representative institutions, which are dominated by mainstream parties (Webb, 2013). Traditionally, direct democracy has been more salient in the agendas of right-wing challengers. These parties favor direct democratic mechanisms as a way of advancing the goals and interests of the ‘common man’ (de Lange, 2007). However, prominent left-wing challenger parties like Podemos in Spain have adopted a similar rhetoric. Hence, those perceiving that their democracies fall short of their expectations with regard to direct democracy should be more likely to support left- and right-wing challengers alike.

H3b: Individuals perceiving a democratic deficit about direct democracy are more likely to vote for left- and right-wing challengers.

In the case of the minorities’ rights principle, there is no theoretical guidance as to how imbalances between aspirations and evaluations should relate to the likelihood of voting for mainstream parties. This is not, however, the case for challenger parties. Theoretical accounts lead me to expect that imbalances for this principle of democracy should be related to the likelihood of supporting these parties, although differently for left- and right-wing challengers. On the right, challenger parties adopt an exclusionary view of society with regard to ethnic and cultural minorities (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Conversely, left challengers defend the rights of minority groups like migrants or refugees (Visser et al., 2014). As a consequence, perceiving a democratic surplus (perceiving that minorities’ rights are more protected than they should be in an ideal democracy) should increase the likelihood of casting a vote for right-wing challengers, while perceiving a democratic deficit (perceiving that minorities’ rights are less protected than they should be in an ideal democracy) should increase the likelihood of voting for left-wing challengers.

H4a: Individuals perceiving a democratic surplus about the rights of minorities are more likely to vote for right-wing challengers.

H4b: Individuals perceiving a democratic deficit about the rights of minorities are more likely to vote for left-wing challengers.

Finally, when it comes to the principle of responsibility towards other European governments, we could expect mainstream parties to mobilize democratic deficits and challenger parties to mobilize democratic surpluses. With few exceptions, mainstream parties have a positive view of the process of European integration (de Vries and Edwards, 2009). Hence, mainstream parties should be more attractive for those who perceive that governments do not take the opinions of other European governments sufficiently into account before taking decisions (deficit).

H5a: Individuals perceiving a democratic deficit about the responsibility towards other European government are more likely to vote for mainstream parties.

Conversely, challenger parties will represent an attractive option for those who think that in their democracies governments take too much into account the opinions of other European governments (surplus). Many right-wing challengers focus on strengthening national sovereignty by repatriating powers from supranational institutions (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016: 972). Similarly, left-wing challengers emphasize the deficiencies of how European integration is undertaken, although only a few of them defend the withdrawal of their countries from the EU (Ramiro, 2016). As a consequence, challenger parties from the left and the right should mobilize those who perceive a democratic surplus.

H5b: Individuals perceiving a democratic surplus about the responsibility towards other European governments are more likely to vote for left- and right-wing challengers.

Data and methods

The empirical analyses draw on data from the sixth round of the ESS fielded between 2012 and 2013. This survey includes a battery of questions in which respondents are asked to give their opinion—on a 0–10 scale—about the need and importance of different democratic principles in an ideal democratic system (democratic aspirations). These questions are followed by a battery asking respondents to evaluate—on a 0–10 scale—the extent to which they believe that each of these principles are present in their democracy.³

Using these survey items, I calculate the imbalance between aspirations and evaluations for each of the principles of democracy summarized in Table 1 by subtracting the aspirations from the evaluations (imbalance = evaluations – aspirations). The resulting measure ranges from −10 to +10, with 0 indicating that for a given principle of democracy, aspirations and evaluations are balanced, negative values indicating a democratic deficit (greater aspirations than evaluations), and positive values indicating a democratic surplus (lower aspirations than evaluations).

To operationalize the dependent variable, I classify the party respondents voted for in the last national election into three categories: mainstream, left-wing challengers, and right-wing challengers.⁴ The mainstream parties’ category includes parties that usually lead or participate in national cabinets and that do not adopt an overtly critical stance about established national political elites. The challenger parties’ category comprises parties that do not ordinarily lead or participate in national cabinets or that frequently adopt an anti-elitist and critical stance about established national political elites, and that can be classified as either left- or right-wing. Parties that do not fit any of these descriptions (mainly Green and other single-issue parties) are classified as ‘others’ and excluded from the analyses.⁵ Since Eastern European party systems are not fully institutionalized, the notion of mainstream and challenger parties is only applicable to Western Europe. Therefore, I restrict the analyses to the 15 Western European countries included in ESS-6.

The empirical analyses are conducted through a series of logistic regressions. Based on the party choice variable the first set of models assesses the likelihood of voting for a mainstream party (1) versus voting for any challenger party (0). The next models assess the likelihood of supporting a left-wing challenger (1) versus a mainstream party (0), and the likelihood of voting for a right-wing challenger (1) versus a mainstream party (0). Finally, to directly assess the different types of discontent that challenger parties mobilize, the final model compares the likelihood of voting for a left-wing challenger (1) versus a right-wing challenger (0).

The purpose of this article is to analyze how democratic discontent relates to the likelihood of supporting mainstream and left- and right-wing challenger parties. To isolate the impact of democratic discontent, one needs to control for variables that might be related to the likelihood of supporting these parties and to the measures of democratic discontent introduced in this article. The first set of control variables account for abstract feelings of political and societal discontent commonly analyzed as correlates of challenger parties’ support. These variables measure the extent to which respondents trust politicians and their satisfaction with the present state of the economy. The next set of control variables accounts for policy preferences that might be related to individuals’ democratic aspirations. These variables measure respondents’ general opinions about: (a) the extent to which gays and lesbians should be free to live their life as they wish; (b) the extent to which migrants make countries a better place to live; (c) the extent to which governments should reduce income disparities; (d) and the extent to which respondents believe that EU unification has gone too far.

All models also include controls for age, gender, education (measured in seven International Standard Classification of Education levels), political interest (with higher values representing higher political interest), feeling about household income (with higher values indicating greater difficulties to live with present income), and religiosity (with higher values indicating higher levels of religiosity). To account for the multilevel structure of the data, logistic regression models are estimated with country fixed-effects. To facilitate the interpretation of the models, I mean center and standardize all independent variables (except for gender) so that numeric inputs represent the effect of the mean ±1 standard deviation.

Results

Table 2 summarizes the results of the models specified to assess how democratic discontent relates to the likelihood of voting for a mainstream party (1) versus voting for any challenger party (0). Instead, in models 3 and 4 of Table 3, the dependent variable takes the value 1 for voters of left-wing challengers, and in models 5 and 6 of Table 3, the value 1 corresponds to voters of right-wing challengers. In both cases, mainstream parties are the baseline category (0). To compare the influence of democratic discontent on the likelihood of supporting different types of challenger parties in the final model of Table 3 (model 7), the dependent variable takes the value 1 for those who voted for a left-wing challenger and the value 0 for those who voted for a right-wing challenger.⁶ All the tables report odds ratios. Therefore, coefficients lower/higher than 1 for any imbalance variable indicate that as one moves from perceiving a democratic deficit (or balance) to perceiving a greater democratic surplus, the odds of supporting a given party decrease/increase. To better illustrate the impact of the imbalances between democratic aspirations and evaluations, Figures 2 and 3 summarize the change in the probability of voting for mainstream parties and left- and right-wing challengers across the range of the variables measuring these imbalances. In these plots, the vertical line denotes the point of perfect balance (0), where aspirations match evaluations; positive values located to the right of this line denote a democratic surplus; and negative values located to the left denote a democratic deficit.⁷

Table 2.

Logistic regression results: Mainstream parties’ voting.

	(1)	(2)
	Mainstream vs. challenger	Mainstream vs. challenger
Imbal. fair elections	1.21**	1.12
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Imbal. fair elections (squared)		0.90⁺
		(0.06)
Imbal. minorities rights	0.95	0.95
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Imbal. direct democracy	1.43**	1.43**
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Imbal. economic equality	1.21**	1.21**
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Imbal. responsibility	0.87**	0.87**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Satisfaction with economy	1.25**	1.25**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Trust politicians	1.55**	1.54**
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Political interest	0.86**	0.86**
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Feeling about income	0.89*	0.89*
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	1.76**	1.76**
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Education (ISCED)	1.23**	1.23**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender	1.16**	1.16**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Religiosity	1.70**	1.70**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Government redistribution	0.61**	0.61**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gays and lesbians free	1.16**	1.16**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Immigrants make country better	1.17**	1.16**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
European unification	1.35**	1.35**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	2.67**	2.68**
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓
Observations	13,727	13,727

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; entries are odds ratios. ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education.

p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01.

Figure 2.

Average adjusted predictions of voting for mainstream parties as a function of imbalances between aspirations and evaluations for different principles of democracy.

Figure 3.

Average adjusted predictions of voting for left- and right-wing challengers as a function of imbalances between aspirations and evaluations for different principles of democracy.

Table 3.

Logistic regression results: Challenger parties’ voting.

	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Challenger-left vs. mainstream	Challenger-left vs. mainstream	Challenger-right vs. mainstream	Challenger-right vs. mainstream	Challenger left vs. challenger-right
Imbal. fair elections	0.78**	0.89	0.85*	0.91	0.95
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.16)
Imbal. fair elections (squared)		1.16		1.11	1.07
		(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.16)
Imbal. minorities rights	0.82*	0.81*	1.25**	1.25**	0.58**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Imbal. direct democracy	0.76**	0.76**	0.67**	0.67**	1.26⁺
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.18)
Imbal. economic equality	0.69**	0.69**	1.01	1.01	0.65**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Imbal. responsibility	1.07	1.07	1.24**	1.24**	0.93
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Satisfaction with economy	0.73**	0.73**	0.82⁺	0.82⁺	1.17
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.20)
Trust politicians	0.78**	0.78**	0.51**	0.51**	1.59**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.24)
Political interest	1.15⁺	1.16⁺	1.15⁺	1.15⁺	1.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Feeling about income	1.52**	1.52**	0.81*	0.81**	1.46**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Age	0.63**	0.62**	0.54**	0.54**	0.98
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)
Education (ISCED)	1.10	1.10	0.58**	0.58**	1.40*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.19)
Gender	0.94	0.94	0.76**	0.76**	1.28*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.15)
Religiosity	0.50**	0.50**	0.83*	0.83*	0.54**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Government redistribution	2.56**	2.56**	1.10	1.10	1.92**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.26)
Gays and lesbians free	1.14	1.14	0.73**	0.73**	1.77**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.21)
Immigrants country better	1.74**	1.74**	0.43**	0.43**	3.87**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.51)
European unification	0.74**	0.74**	0.67**	0.67**	1.14
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.14)
Constant	0.01**	0.01**	0.40**	0.40**	0.02**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	10,992	10,992	11,011	11,011	2483

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; entries are odds ratios. ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education.

p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.

I begin by analyzing the impact of imbalances between aspirations and evaluations for the most basic principle of democracy: the freedom and fairness of elections. Focusing on mainstream parties, the results summarized in Figure 2 indicate that the relationship between imbalances for the freedom and fairness of elections principle and the likelihood of voting for mainstream parties presents the expected curvilinear pattern. When aspirations and evaluations are balanced, citizens are more likely to vote for mainstream parties. The probability of voting for these parties decreases as one moves further away from the point where aspirations and evaluation are balanced either in the direction of a greater democratic deficit or of a greater democratic surplus. Hence, perceiving a democratic deficit or surplus in this dimension reduces the likelihood of voting for a mainstream party, although it appears that the effect of perceiving a democratic deficit is substantially stronger. In fact, the quadratic term for the free and fair elections imbalance introduced in model 2 is statistically significant at the 10% level.

The results summarized in Figure 3 indicate that citizens perceiving an imbalance between aspirations and evaluations for the fair elections principle are more likely to vote for challenger parties. As democratic deficits grow larger, individuals become more likely to cast a vote for both left- and right-wing challenger parties. While the effect appears to be stronger for left-wing challengers, model 7 in Table 3 indicates that the differences between the two types of challenger parties are not statistically significant. Models 4 and 6 incorporate a quadratic term to assess if, besides mobilizing those perceiving a deficit, any of these parties can also attract the support of those voters who perceive a democratic surplus for this principle of democracy. In both cases, the quadratic term fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

In the case of imbalances between aspirations and evaluations for the minorities’ rights principle, the results of model 1 reveal that these are not significantly related to the likelihood of voting for mainstream parties versus voting for any challenger party. In contrast, they are significantly related to the likelihood of voting for left- and right-wing challengers. The coefficient lower than 1 for left challengers and the coefficient higher than 1 for right challengers indicate that, as predicted by the democratic protest voting model, this relationship runs in opposite directions for each type of challenger party. On the one hand, those who perceive that their democracies are underperforming with regard to the degree of protection they grant to minority groups (democratic deficit) are more likely to vote for left-wing challengers. On the other hand, those who perceive that in their democracies minority groups are more protected than what should be the case in an ideal democracy (democratic surplus) are more likely to vote for right-wing challengers. A two-standard deviation increase in the imbalance variable increases the odds of voting for a right-wing challenger by a quarter (OR = 1.25) and reduces the odds of supporting a left-wing challenger by approximately one-fifth (OR = 0.82). The results of model 7 confirm that the impact of this imbalance is different for left- and right-wing challenger parties. Overall, these results indicate that even if related to the same principle of democracy––the protection of minorities’ rights––the impact of discontent on the likelihood of voting for challenger parties is clearly different depending on whether citizens perceive a democratic deficit or surplus.

Focusing on the principle of direct democracy, there is, as expected, a negative relationship between perceiving a democratic deficit and the likelihood of supporting mainstream parties. In line with the position adopted by these parties, which are likely to favor representative mechanisms of decision-making, the results indicate that those perceiving a democratic surplus are more likely to vote for mainstream parties. This is the democratic imbalance more strongly related to the likelihood of supporting mainstream parties. A two-standard deviation increase in the direct democracy imbalance is associated with a 43% increase in the odds of supporting a mainstream party. This is a substantial effect since it is relatively close to the associated increase in the odds of voting for a mainstream party as a result of a two-standard deviation increase in trust in politicians (OR = 1.55), which is a common predictor of mainstream parties’ support.

In line with the notion that direct democracy is an instrument favored by challenger parties, both left- and right-wing challengers appear to mobilize those voters who perceive a democratic deficit about direct democracy. However, consistent with the view that calls for direct democracy are more prevalent in the discourses of right-wing challengers, perceiving a democratic deficit has a greater impact on the likelihood of supporting right-wing challengers. A two-standard deviation increase in the imbalance measure reduces the odds of voting for right-wing challengers by 33%, while this reduction is of only 24% in the case of left-wing challengers. Model 7 confirms that the difference between challenger parties in their capacity to mobilize this democratic deficit is statistically significant.

In the case of the democratic principle of economic equality, imbalances between aspirations and evaluations are significantly related to the likelihood of supporting mainstream parties. Perceiving a democratic deficit in this dimension depresses the likelihood of voting for this type of party. Those who perceive that, in their democracies, governments do not reduce economic inequalities as they should according to their ideal model of democracy are less likely to cast a vote for a mainstream party, and those who perceive a democratic surplus in this dimension are more likely to cast a vote for this type of party. Consistent with the expectation that left-wing challengers should be the most attractive option for those perceiving a deficit for this principle of democracy, the results indicate that as one perceives a greater democratic deficit one becomes significantly more likely to cast a vote for a left-wing challenger. However, this is not the case for right-wing challengers since imbalances for this principle of democracy are unrelated to the likelihood of supporting this type of party. In the case of left-wing challengers, though, this is the democratic imbalance with the strongest impact. A two-standard deviation increase in the imbalance measure is associated with a 31% drop in the odds of voting for a left-wing challenger.

Finally, in the case of imbalances related to the principle of responsibility of national governments towards other European governments, we observe a pattern that contrasts with all other principles of democracy examined above. In this case, mainstream parties are the ones mobilizing democratic deficits. Those who perceive that in an ideal democracy their governments should take more into account, the opinions of other European governments are more likely to cast a vote for a mainstream party. As for challenger parties, the results indicate that these parties attract those who perceive a democratic surplus. That is, those who think that their governments consider the views of other European governments more than they should in an ideal democracy. However, it appears that right-wing challengers are more successful in mobilizing this form of discontent, since, in comparison to challengers from the left, the impact of this imbalance is substantially stronger, and it is only statistically significant for right-wing challengers. The stronger impact of this imbalance among right-wing challengers could be related to the fact that, compared to those on the left, right-wing challengers are more likely to overtly reject European integration.

Discussion

A clear story emerges from these results. The process by which democratic discontent relates to party choices does not resemble a process of protest voting that is detached from normative political preferences. Depending on its nature (the type of principle of democracy it refers to and whether individuals perceive a democratic deficit or surplus), democratic discontent will make one more likely to vote either for a left- or right-wing challenger, and in some cases even more likely to vote for mainstream parties. Discontented citizens are more likely to vote for a party that is aligned with the specific shortcomings that they perceive in their democracy. Therefore, the process by which democratic discontent relates to party choices is not only influenced by citizens’ desire to protest, but also by what citizens want to protest about.

In line with the protest voting hypothesis, it is confirmed that individuals’ evaluations of the functioning of democracy are relevant for their party choices, but, at the same time, it is clear that these evaluations cannot be decoupled from normative democratic preferences if one intends to fully understand the way in which democratic discontent relates to party choices. These findings reveal the benefits of incorporating elements of the policy voting hypothesis to the study of protest voting. Instead of conceiving protest voting as a vote decoupled from political preferences, normative preferences about how democracies ought to work need to be incorporated to the conceptualization and operationalization of the main explanatory factor of the protest voting model: discontent with the functioning of democracies. Incorporating democratic preferences to the operationalization of discontent allows us to characterize the specific nature of individuals’ discontent by revealing to what extent democracies match their normative aspirations for specific principles of democracy.

For mainstream parties, the results indicate that, in most cases, perceiving a democratic deficit depresses the likelihood of supporting these parties. Those who perceive that their democracies are underperforming in the areas of fair elections, the direct involvement of citizens in decision-making, and the reduction of inequalities through income redistribution are less likely to cast a vote for these parties. This result is consistent with the notion that there is a mainstream consensus around the issue of reducing welfare benefits and with the idea that the parties that dominate a party system and benefit the most from the current political system are unlikely to favor direct forms of decision-making. In the cases of economic equality and direct democracy principles, mainstream parties are likely to adopt a position not only of favoring the status quo but also of reducing welfare benefits and promoting party-centered mechanisms of decision-making. Therefore, mainstream parties can attract voters who perceive a democratic surplus with respect to these principles. Finally, when it comes to the principle of responsibility of national governments towards other European governments, we observe that those who perceive a democratic deficit are not less but more likely to vote for mainstream parties. This is consistent with the view that, in most countries, there is a mainstream consensus that favors European integration. Hence, in some specific cases, even mainstream parties can mobilize democratic deficits.

In the case of challenger parties, the results indicate that for some principles of democracy, left- and right-wing challengers mobilize the same types of discontent. Those who perceive a democratic deficit for the principles of free elections and direct democracy are more likely to cast a vote for either of these two types of challenger parties. However, already with regard to the principle of responsibility towards the EU, we find some differences between these two types of parties, since only right-wing challengers appear to mobilize those perceiving a democratic surplus. In turn, the impact of imbalances related to the minorities’ rights principle on the vote for challenger parties highlights the importance of incorporating individuals’ democratic preferences into the analysis of protest voting. While both parties are likely to mobilize citizens, who perceive imbalances related to this principle of democracy, those who perceive a democratic deficit are more likely to vote for left-wing challengers and those who perceive a democratic surplus are more likely to vote for right-wing challengers. This result is in line with the democratic protest voting model, since on the right, challengers are likely to adopt an exclusive view regarding minorities, and on the left, they are, on the contrary, likely to defend the rights of these groups. In a similar vein, the results reveal that those perceiving a democratic deficit with regard to economic equality are not likely to vote for any challenger party but only for left-wing challengers.

What do these findings imply for the prospects of mainstream and challenger parties? Overall, the results show that democratic discontent should be considered a factor that could impact the future development of European party systems. In the case of mainstream parties and left-wing challengers, discontent related to the economic equality principle is one of the most relevant predictors of their support. While this result might be driven by the period in which the ESS was conducted (during the Great Recession), it also indicates that if the economic crisis and its associated increase in economic inequalities drag on, the support for mainstream parties might decrease even further, and left-wing challengers’ support might increase. In the case of right-wing challengers, perceiving a democratic surplus in the minorities’ rights dimension is one of the most relevant predictors of their support. Consequently, events such as a refugee crisis might imply an increase in the support of right-wing challengers, if a large influx of refugees modifies either individuals’ perceptions of the extent to which minorities are protected in their countries, or their preferences regarding the level of protection that minorities should enjoy in their preferred model of democracy.

Supplemental Material

eup-17-1365-File002 -Supplemental material for Democratic discontent and support for mainstream and challenger parties: Democratic protest voting

Supplemental material, eup-17-1365-File002 for Democratic discontent and support for mainstream and challenger parties: Democratic protest voting by Enrique Hernández in European Union Politics

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

For valuable comments and suggestions on previous versions of this article, I thank the editor and anonymous reviewers of European Union Politics, Eva Anduiza, Macarena Ares, Hanspeter Kriesi, Pedro Magalhães, Mariano Torcal, Alexander Trechsel, and Guillem Vidal.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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