The global compact in relation to the migration-development nexus debate

In line with the recognition of the critical challenges propelled by human mobility, the global governance of migration has become a fundamental issue on the international agenda. In contrast to other transnational issues such as trade and finance, the creation of a United Nations (UN) institutional framework for the governance of migration has followed a complex and uncertain route (Betts, 2010).

Derived from the need to discuss pressing issues on the international migration agenda, a broader initiative for building a global migration regime was envisaged at the UN General Assembly in 2006 with its launch of the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UN-HLD). This was conceived of as a formal event with a strong emphasis on policy issues that would be held at the UN headquarters every 7 years. The first UN-HLD gave rise to the creation of a yearly, state-led, non-binding, related Forum, alternatively hosted by migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries – the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). To provide institutional support for this emerging process, the UN Secretary-General created an interagency coordinating mechanism, the Global Migration Group, integrating 15 entities of the UN system. It is important to note that the World Bank (WB) has stood as a key member of this Group playing a leadership role in establishing the dominant framework within which the debates surrounding the migration-development nexus have been entrenched.

These debates have been marked by a dispute between two competing and contrasting positions. The first one, which underlines the rationale of mainstream migration policies promoted by the WB, has been conceptualised as migration management (Ghosh, 2008). Under the umbrella of an apparently ‘neutral’ notion, new narratives have been promoted. The attempt is to ‘depoliticise’ migration, obfuscate the existence of divergent interests, asymmetries of power or conflicts, avoid obligations imposed by international law and promote the idea that managing migration can be beneficial for all stakeholders: countries of destination, countries of origin, migrants themselves and their families. This unrealistic triple-win scenario clearly favours the interests of the migrant-receiving countries. In the rhetoric of migration management: (a) neoliberal globalisation is taken for granted and not considered as part of the migration, development and human rights problematic; (b) a ‘good migrant’, regardless of his or her status and conditions, is flexible to market needs and eager to contribute to the development of his country of origin; (c) irregular migration is regarded as a problem generated outside the migrant-receiving country, ignoring its internal motivations (corporate demand for cheap and flexible labour) and the role of the State in spawning ‘illegality’ through limiting channels for ‘legal’ entrance far beyond actual labour and demographic needs (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010); (d) temporary or guest workers’ programmes are one of the best tools for regulating labour markets, ignoring the fact that guest workers are held virtually captive by employers or labour brokers who seize their documents, enabling high levels of exploitation, discrimination and social exclusion (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007); (e) return policies, either forced or voluntary, assume places of origin will benefit from the abilities, skills and values acquired by migrants in receiving societies; and (f) transit countries should prevent irregular migration flows to destination countries through the reinforcement of border control activities and counter-smuggling and trafficking efforts.

In contrast with this dominant view, civil society has played an important role in the debate within the UN-HLD and GFMD by promoting an alternative approach that centres on migrants’ human rights and have gained terrain in the deliberations with the support of migrant-sending countries and civil society participants. This approach seeks to contextualise the migration problematic by focusing on, and attempting to explain, the geopolitics and geoeconomics of uneven development and social inequalities in contemporary capitalism. From this viewpoint, neither migration nor development are approached as independent variables; they are inscribed within the broader historical context of neoliberal globalisation. At the same time, the relationship between migration and development is approached from a multidimensional perspective that encompasses economic, political, social, environmental, cultural, racial, ethnic, gender, geographical and demographic factors (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008; Glick Schiller, 2009). This alternative vision on the relationship between migration and development has been conceived, in contrast to migration management, as a human rights–centred approach.

While migration management is located in a national security doctrine, the alternative approach prioritises a human security framework. The former is tailored by a pattern that disregards human rights, vindicating corporate-driven public policies and temporary workers programmes as mainstream migration policies. This approach also embraces the remittances myth or mantra (Kapur, 2004) as a façade to hidden growing asymmetries among regions and countries and social inequalities as root causes of contemporary migration. In contrast, the alternative approach is based on an overarching human rights–based vision that promotes equitable and sustainable human development. Rather than opposing national sovereignty (vs the national security doctrine), it attempts to tackle the root causes of the problematic and not only its consequences, encouraging free circulation regimes and decent work for everybody.

Many contributions to the debate on migration and development, particularly in support of the human rights–centred approach, were made under the leadership of the progressive wing of civil society participants at the UN-HLD and GFMD. A key achievement and landmark of this process was ‘the 5-year, 8-point action plan’ position paper supported by hundreds of civil society organisations and networks from around the world and delivered to the 2013 UN-HLD. Beyond this significant accomplishment, which was incorporated into the final declaration of the 2013 UN-HLD, it is important to recognise that there has been a pendular process surrounding the debate on migration and development with a clear regressive trend.

In September 2016, the UN General Assembly formally designated the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as the UN migration agency. On that occasion, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted by its 193-member States, giving rise to an intergovernmental consultation and negotiation process that will culminate with the adoption of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Secure Migration. This initiative was at the centre of the 10th GFMD agenda which took place in Berlin in June 2017 and is gaining momentum in the many regional consultations supported by the IOM, scheduled to come up with a worldwide, institutional framework for global migration governance by September 2018. It cannot be emphasised enough that in the many position papers that have been produced throughout the Global Compact process, including the report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘Making migration work for all’ (UN, 2017), there have been significant efforts to change the dominant narrative on migration. Notwithstanding the high expectations that this process raised, and the extraordinary impulse given to it by its two co-facilitators, Mexican Ambassador Juan José Gómez Camacho and Swiss Ambassador Jürg Lauber, with the active and erudite role played by the Special Representative for International Migration appointed by the UN Secretary-General, Louise Arbour, unfortunately – given the nature of contemporary migration and the still dominant neoliberal transnational historic bloc ¹ – its final outcome is uncertain. The negative perceptions of migrants that permeate public opinion in most destination countries, the meagre outcomes of the 10th GFMD, and the decision by the United States not to participate in the process, stand as bad omens. In this regard, the observation made by Alexander Betts (2010) 7 years ago (p. 1) – ‘the overall picture of global migration governance remains incoherent, poorly understood, and lacks an overarching vision’ – continues to mirror the main challenges faced by counterhegemonic organisations and movements for building a socially just international migration regime capable of promoting free circulation standards and decent work for everybody.