How to use Max Weber’s ideal type in sociological analysis

Version 1: The ideal type in the objectivity essay from 1904

Weber’s discussion of the ideal type takes up some 20 pages in the Objectivity essay and is generally considered to be the main place where this concept is discussed in his work (Weber, 1949, 2012b). ⁵ The fact that this is the most important source for our general knowledge about the ideal type is correct. Anyone who is interested in Weber’s ideal type therefore needs to read this essay carefully.

But a few qualifications are also in place. One is that Weber’s discussion of the ideal type in this essay is hard to follow, not only due to the complexity of his thought but also because it is deeply embedded in various social science issues that were discussed at the time in Germany. To this should be added Weber’s own statement that his argument about the ideal type in the Objectivity essay was “partially incorrect.” And finally, the Objectivity essay attempts to simultaneously discuss the use of the ideal type in all of the social sciences, while the account in Economy and Society only deals with its use in sociology. ⁶

It is also clear that Weber’s presentation of the ideal type in the 1904 essay was deeply influenced by his idea that the social sciences differ from the natural sciences. In his view, the social sciences, or as he called them the cultural sciences, differ from the natural sciences on two crucial points. The first is that they have to deal with something that the natural sciences do not have to take into consideration, namely, that their objects of study – human beings – have values and assign meaning to what they do, and that this influences their actions.

The second point is that while the natural sciences typically try to establish laws, under which individual phenomena can be subsumed, the social or cultural sciences are primarily interested in studying and explaining individual phenomena. Reality was in Weber’s view inexhaustible from the viewpoint of the analyst; and although cultural values direct human actions to certain aspects of this reality, this does not diminish the fundamentally individual quality of these actions.

By the time that Weber wrote on the ideal type in Economy and Society, he would assign the analysis of individual phenomena exclusively to the historians (Weber, 1978: 19–29). The fact that Weber took this position may be one reason why Schutz would later argue that Weber’s first version of the ideal type was influenced by “his theory of history” (Schutz, 1967: 244, n. 26).

But let us return to the Objectivity essay. There also exists a very useful and practical quality to Weber’s discussion of the ideal type in this essay that is rarely emphasized in the secondary literature but which deserves close attention, especially by those who are interested in how to use the ideal type in concrete research. What Weber has to say on this point is grounded in his general view of concepts, which is Kantian in nature. He notes that “the basic idea of modern epistemology, which goes back to Kant, is that concepts are, and can only be, theoretical means for the purpose of intellectual mastery of the empirically given” (Weber, 2012b: 134–135, emphasis added). By “means” is meant the opposite of “ends.” Concepts, in other words, are tools, and not the end point of the analysis.

Weber then proceeds to give advice on how not to use social science concepts in an analysis (including ideal type concepts). What he says on this point can be summarized as follows:

Weber’s own special type of concept to be used in social science research, the ideal type, was constructed to overcome these and other deficiencies. It has the following qualities:

From what has just been said, it is clear that the ideal type can help the social scientist to successfully approach a new topic; to advance the analysis through a comparison of the ideal type to reality and, by doing so, discover something new. But all of this is only possible if the ideal type has been constructed in a correct way, and this is where we come up against what to my mind represents a confusing aspect of Weber’s notion of the ideal type in the Objectivity essay.

What is at issue here is how the element of values-meaning in the object of analysis should be handled when you construct an ideal type. I use the expression “values-meaning” to refer to Weber’s close association of these two concepts in his Objectivity essay. Culture, he says, is a value concept; it also involves meaning. Culture and values are in other words closely related.

This becomes problematic when Weber mentions a special operation that has to take place when you construct an ideal type. This is something he refers to as “gedankliche Steigerung” and it involves the values-meaning. This operation is generally seen as being absolutely central to the creation of the ideal type. It has alternatively been translated as “analytical accentuation” (Shils and Finch), “theoretical accentuation” (Bruun), and “conceptual accentuation” (Tribe; see Weber, 1949: 90; 1988: 190; 2004: 387; 2012b: 124).

But what exactly does analytical accentuation mean? What parts of the empirical phenomenon do you remove, if this is what you do; and what do you add when you carry out the accentuation? Values and meaning are not the same thing. The former refer to something we hold in high esteem and would like to see realized, the latter to how we understand things in general. Weber does not give a clear answer. Was this perhaps the reason why he later would say that his portrait of the ideal type in the Objectivity essay was “sketchy and therefore perhaps partially incorrect”?

We do not know, and on this point we can only speculate. We do know, however, that at about the same time as Weber wrote his Objectivity essay, he also worked on The Protestant Ethic, in which he makes an important use of the ideal type. If there exists a confusing mixture of values and meaning in the Objectivity essay, we should expect this to be the case also in The Protestant Ethic.

Weber has described how he constructed the concept of “the spirit of capitalism” in the following way:

A specifically historical formation like [the spirit of capitalism] can only be raised to conceptual clarity … through the synthesis of its individual components, as historical reality presents them to us. We do this in such a way that from the reality of the historically given we select in their sharpest, most consistent form those individual features which we find exerting their effect there in a variously arranged, fractured, more or less consistent and complete way, more or less mixed with other heterogeneous features, and combine them according to how they belong together, so producing an “ideal-typical” concept.

A close reading of this passage shows that Weber strove for “conceptual clarity” with his historical ideal type, and that this was accomplished through a “synthesis” of “individual components.” Exactly how Weber went about this is however somewhat unclear. Again, do you separate out the values of the actors from the meaning they invest their actions with, or do you merge the two in the ideal type? In the early stages of the formation of the spirit of capitalism, values and meaning tended to converge, as exemplified by someone like Benjamin Franklin who viewed his economic actions in ethical terms. Later in history, we also know that the meaning and the values diverged. “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so” (Weber, 1976: 181).

Another question that is of importance in this context is the following: Does the way you proceed when you construct an ideal type for an individual historical phenomenon, such as the spirit of rational capitalism in the West, differ from the way you proceed when you construct an ideal type for some phenomenon that is not historical in character, say, the way that the members of a religious sect behave? Again, Weber does not tell.

Version 2: The ideal type from 1920 in economy and society

The second important place in Weber’s work where he discusses the ideal type is in Chapter 1 in Economy and Society. This chapter was written in 1920, the year Weber died. According to Schutz, as we know, Weber only hints at the “thorough change” that the concept of the ideal type by this time had undergone in his work (Schutz, 1967: 244, n. 26). Anyone interested in Weber’s ideal type will agree with Schutz on this point: Weber’s ideas about the ideal (or pure type, as he now also calls it) clearly deserve more of a discussion than they get in the two and a half pages that are devoted to this topic in Economy and Society (Weber, 1978: 19–22).

To these two and a half pages (in Section 11 in Paragraph 1 in Chapter 1 in Part 1 of Economy and Society), it is important to add a few passages elsewhere in Paragraph 1 and in other writings from around the same time. ⁷ Still, the material is small in size, not least in comparison to the 20 or so pages devoted to the ideal type in the Objectivity essay.

Weber, as we know, felt that his presentation in the Objectivity essay had perhaps been partially wrong on some points because it had not been properly worked out; and presumably he tried to remedy this defect in the version he presented in Economy and Society. As Schutz notes, he now also switched the focus from a theory of history to one of sociology. Nonetheless, there also exists a distinct continuity between Weber’s general approach to the ideal type in the Objectivity essay and the version in Economy and Society. If nothing else, this is clear from Weber’s positive reference in Economy and Society to his depiction of the ideal type in the Objectivity essay (Weber, 1978: 22). ⁸

For the moment, however, let us focus on the shortcomings of Weber’s theory of the ideal type in the Objectivity essay. First, he did not explain how the element of values is related to the element of meaning in the concept of culture. Second, it was consequently not clear what he meant by the analytical accentuation that is at the very heart of the ideal type, and how it should be carried out in practical terms. Must an ideal type be centered around values as well as meaning or how should you proceed at this point?

In my view, it is clear that Weber had thought these problems through by the time he wrote the section on the ideal type in Economy and Society. In starting with the concept of meaning, it is important to stress that Weber is presenting us with a very specific type of sociology in Economy and Society which he calls interpretive sociology. In outlining the basic structure of this kind of sociology, as Weber carefully does in Paragraph 1 in Chapter 1, he eliminates all references to values and exclusively speaks of meaning. The concept of culture which tied them together has also vanished. ⁹

It is clear that Weber still considered the notion of values extremely important for sociologists to work with when he wrote Chapter 1 in Economy and Society. This can, for example, be illustrated by his concept of value-rationality in Paragraph 2. Still, values (as well as culture) are conspicuously absent from the basic unit of Weber’s sociology, namely, his concept of social action. Action, according to Weber’s definition, consists of behavior invested with meaning by the actor. And action is social when it is oriented to the behavior of others. Values and culture are nowhere mentioned.

The very first reference to the concept of the ideal type in Economy and Society is also to be found in Weber’s discussion of meaning and its role in sociology. He here distinguishes between three different types of meaning, each of which has been produced in a different way. While the sociologist, he says, may be interested in the concrete meaning of some actor or in the average empirical meaning of several actors, in the case of the ideal type, he or she should instead use the constructed meaning of hypothetical actors. Sociology, Weber (1978) also makes clear, is primarily interested in formulating “type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process” (p. 19, emphasis added). History, in contrast, is interested in “individual actions, structures and personalities possessing cultural significance” (Weber, 1978: 19, emphasis added; cf. Weber, 1978: 29). ¹⁰ Weber does not say what he means by “cultural significance” but presumably it contains a reference to values.

How then is the artificially created meaning of the sociological ideal type to be constructed? Weber’s answer is that you have to proceed in two steps. You first have to see to it that there exists what he calls “adequacy on the level of meaning” (sinnhaft adäquat). You then proceed to heighten or concentrate the meaning of the ideal types (gesteigerte Eindeutigkeit der Begriffe).

Adequacy on the level of meaning is defined by Weber in Paragraph 1 in Economy and Society in a straightforward manner. It is what is generally considered to be the “correct” way to act, given what someone wants to accomplish. As an example, Weber refers to a person trying to solve a problem in arithmetic. There exists a correct way of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and so on.

What is involved in adequacy on the level of meaning is that the meaning and the action have to fit each other, a bit like the hand in the glove. There exist, for example, rules in arithmetic; and these tell us how to proceed if we want to add, say 2 + 2. Or to take another example, say someone wants to get somebody else’s attention and decides to wave at him or her. In this case, you have to decide on the meaning (i.e. greeting someone) and also to engage in the type of action that goes with this meaning (i.e. raising your hand and waving it). Adequacy on the level of meaning, in brief, means that a meaning has to be accompanied by the action it implies.

But how do you heighten or concentrate the meaning element, something that is necessary, according to Weber, and also directly linked to the concept of adequacy on the level of meaning? How do you make it “as complete as possible”? (möglichst vollständiger Sinnadäquanz; Weber, 1978: 20). Weber’s answer to this question is crucial to an understanding of how the ideal type is created. What the sociologist now has to do, Weber says, is make a number of artificial assumptions about the (typical) individual actor. ¹¹ The most important of these are the following:

#1 That the typical actor acts in a rational way;

# 2 That the typical actor has complete information;

# 3 That the typical actor is totally aware of what he/she is doing; and

# 4 That the typical actor does not make any mistakes. ¹²

Each of these assumptions deserves a sentence or two, by way of explanation and also to emphasize their importance in the construction of an ideal type. To assume that the actor behaves in a rational way is a convenient point of departure for several reasons. It is for one thing usually easy to decide what constitutes a rational action. There is also the fact that many actions are today undergoing the process of rationalization.

The assumption that the actor has complete information is clearly unrealistic and artificial. Still, just by making this assumption, one’s attention is quickly drawn to a number of factors that limit the information an actor has; and to explore why this is the case is often fruitful. Something similar is true for the assumption that the actor is totally aware of what he or she is doing. Habit and tradition, for example, are often present in what we do. It is also possible to think of other factors that interfere with one’s attention, from strong emotions to various factors in one’s surroundings.

There is similarly a strong heuristic quality to the assumption that the actor does not commit any mistakes. Sociologists have not paid much attention to the role that mistakes play in social life, but a moment of reflection shows that it is easy to imagine a number of situations in which mistakes can take place and derail the intended action.

It should be pointed out that the ideal type also plays a role in the process of assigning causality in Weber’s interpretive sociology, and that this has implications for its construction. How to interpret what Weber says on this point is contested in the secondary literature, but is fairly straightforward in my view. ¹³ In brief, the ideal type should be constructed in such a way that the effect of the social action it describes is clearly linked to the motivation of the actor. This way, so-called “causal adequacy” is ensured (kausal adäquat).

To phrase it differently, what is meant with causal adequacy is that if the typical actor carries out some action, it should lead to the sought effect in a probable and decisive way. The action, in brief, should be of such strength that it leads to the intended result. Weber’s thinking on this point can be illustrated with the example that has already been used, of greeting a friend. If I want to greet a friend, I extend my hand, making in this way my action adequate on the level of meaning (the intention and the action fit each other). It is also causally adequate to the extent that it is likely to make my friend extend his or her hand in response to my action, since this was the motive for my action.

Or to take another example, this time from Weber’s list of basic sociological concepts in Chapter 1 in Economy and Society. The concept of “power” is here defined as a form of social action that can be carried out in a social relationship, despite the resistance of the other actor (Weber, 1978: 53). This means that if one actor decides to try to overpower some other actor who does not want this, he or she will try to do so in combination with a type of action that defeats whatever resistance the other actor will muster. If this succeeds, it is a case of power and causal adequacy. We can, in other words, use the concept of power to analyze what happens in this particular case. If the action does not succeed, we may perhaps want to call the action an attempt at power, but it basically has to be conceptualized in some other way. Perhaps it can be seen as a form of traditional action, which was once an effective form of power.

Once you have constructed the ideal type, Weber says, you should proceed in the same way as was suggested in the Objectivity essay. In other words, you should now compare the ideal type and the phenomenon you are interested in analyzing. Or, to put it a bit stronger, you need to confront the ideal type with reality. If the differences between the ideal type and the empirical case are too large, the ideal type should be changed or adjusted. If not, Weber says, you need to account for the difference. The latter represents the typical situation if a good ideal type is available.

What happens as a result of this confrontation represents the main payoff for using an ideal type. You now have both a general grip on the situation (thanks to the ideal type) and a way to analyze the specifics or the individuality of the case. Weber, however, does not say anything about the ways in which the analyst should proceed in a confrontation of this type. Whatever the reason may be for this, the analyst is left alone also at this point.

By way of summing up Weber’s argument so far in Chapter 1 in Economy and Society, we can say that he wants to show the reader how to construct and work with an ideal type in sociological research. As we know, Weber wanted Economy and Society to be like a textbook (Weber, 2012c: 826). His view can be presented in the form of a guide that outlines the steps that need to be taken when you use the ideal type in empirical research (see Table 1). ¹⁴

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

How to construct and use an ideal type in sociology, according to Max Weber.

# 1. Focus on the element of social action in the object of study, that is, on the behavior as well as the meaning with which this is invested. Comment: No analysis of social action can be carried out without first establishing the meaning with which the actor invests his or her behavior. # 2. Check that there is adequacy on the level of meaning, that is, that the meaning of the typical actor and his/her action fit each other. Comment: This is a procedure that can be carried out quickly and without difficulty. When a discrepancy appears, it needs to be explained. # 3. Make the following four key assumptions about the typical actor:  1. The typical actor acts in a rational manner.  Comment: It is often convenient to begin the analysis by making the assumption that social action represents a form of rational action – and then study why this may or may not be the case.  2. The typical actor has full knowledge of the situation.  Comment: Most actors lack full knowledge of the situation they are in, making this assumption a useful heuristic.  3. The typical actor is fully aware of what he/she is doing.  Comment: Since the role of habit, tradition and the like are common in social action, exploring this assumption is often helpful. The typical actor makes no mistakes.  Comment: Sociologists have not paid much attention to mistakes in social life, but these are often present and take various forms. # 4. In using the ideal type, check that causal adequacy is involved, that is, that the action involved (behavior plus meaning) will trigger the sought effect.  Comment: Unless the social action is powerful enough to make the actor realize his or her intention, the ideal type needs to be changed or another one used. # 5. Confront the ideal type with the concrete reality of the phenomenon that is being analyzed, and go from there.  Comment: Weber says little on how to proceed at this point, so the analyst is basically on his or her own. At this point of the analysis, it is also useful to look for side effects and totally unintended consequences of the social action.

Weber also says in Economy and Society that the ideal type can be of general help to the sociologist in primarily three ways. It can be used (1) for terminological purposes, (2) for heuristic purposes, and (3) for classificatory purposes (Weber, 1978: 21). ¹⁵ The most important of these is in my view (2) or the use of the ideal type to come up with new ideas. Clarity is always important, and classifications are useful, but the heart of a good sociological analysis consists of coming up with new ideas in analyzing social reality, verified by the facts.

While it is possible to look at the analysis in The Protestant Ethic as a very striking example of how an ideal type should be constructed and used according to the Objectivity essay, there exist no equivalent when it comes to the version of the ideal type that is presented in Economy and Society. This, however, does not mean that we lack concrete examples of the later version of Weber’s ideal type. In fact, there exist quite a few of these sociological ideal types in his work. In Chapter 1 of Economy and Society, the reader will, for example, find some 30 ideal types that are important to most sociological analyses. Chapters 2–4 contain many more ideal types, primarily to be used in studies of economic sociology (Chapter 2), political sociology (Chapter 3), and stratification (Chapter 4). And finally, there is Weber’s use of ideal types in his analyses in the rest of Economy and Society and in The Economic Ethics of the World Religions (Weber, 1978: 311–1372; and primarily Weber, 1951, 1952, 1958). In the latter studies, we find many examples of how Weber used ideal types in empirical sociological analyses.