‘We are not terrorists’: Turkish Muslim organizations and the construction of a moral identity

Abstract

Muslims living in western Europe have to manage their religious identity in societies that tend to define Islam as a religion of violence and terrorism. The current study examines the ways in which two major Turkish Muslim organizations (Milli Görüş and Fethullah Gülen) in the Netherlands and Germany publicly define a morally acceptable identity by arguing ‘what we are not’. Empirically, the focus is on the debate about Muslim terrorism in the newspapers and magazines of these organizations. The organizations try to define a morally acceptable position by redrawing identity boundaries and redefining and essentializing the content of Muslim identity. By redrawing boundaries, terrorists are placed outside of Islam and a distinction with terrorism is made. In addition, the essential nature of Islam is presented to be compatible with the host society. It is maintained that Muslim organizations reveal the real face of Islam by encouraging and developing initiatives for integration and civic participation of Muslims in the host societies.

Keywords

Essentialism identity moral identity terrorism Turkish Muslims

Introduction

Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, Muslims in Western Europe experienced increased scrutiny and hostility (Allen and Nielsen, 2002). National and international security agencies started to closely monitor the Muslim community. In the media, Islam was readily linked with things negative and with terrorism targeting the western world, in particular. In the Netherlands, for example, an analysis of six years’ issues of a national newspaper found that ‘terrorism’ was the most frequently discussed topic in relation to Islam (D’Haenens and Bink, 2007). Public opinion was affected accordingly. For example, in 2005 the Pew Global Project found that 78 percent of Germans and 76 percent of the Dutch were concerned about Islamist extremism in their countries (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2005). Furthermore, in 2004 the Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung presented survey findings showing that 83 percent of Germans associate Islam with terrorism, 82 percent with fanaticism and radicalism and 78 percent with a safety threat (Noelle, 2004).

With the bombings in London and Madrid, and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, Europe was confronted with the phenomenon of ‘home-grown Muslim terrorists’: terrorist attacks by second- or third-generation Muslims who were born and raised in western European countries (Buijs, 2009). In addition, there have been Muslim youngsters from western Europe joining the fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Kashmir. These events increased the suspicions and doubts about Muslim and mosque organizations. For example, Mohammed Bouyeri was a regular visitor to the El Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and after the murder of Van Gogh ‘Democratic Muslim leaders were accused of having failed to control their flock, thus creating an us-them perspective’ (Buijs, 2009: 434). In addition, national branches of movements such as al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood are listed in the ‘Islamic Terrorist intentions and suspect cases’ in the reports prepared by the German Minister of the Interior (Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2008). Furthermore, influential (inter)national scholars, politicians and commentators claimed that Islam is a religion of violence. According to them, the acts of terror cannot be attributed to a few fanatic Muslims but rather form the essence of the Islamic faith (Lewis, 2002; Pipes, 1986).

One consequence of these developments for Muslims living in western Europe is that their religious identity is called into question. They are asked to explain who they are, what they believe in and what they stand for. In short, they have to manage their Islamic identity in host countries that often portray Muslims negatively and define Islam as a religion of violence. Identity negotiation is not only important for individual Muslims in their everyday lives (e.g., Peek, 2005; Şirin and Fine, 2008) but also for Islamic organizations. Their effort to represent and define Muslim identity is a serious endeavor with real social and political consequences. Many of these organizations are closely monitored by authorities and the media, and they need to do a good deal of ‘identity work’ to define a position that is morally acceptable for the wider society. These organizations sometimes face accusations that they condone or support terrorist acts targeting the western world, or that they at least are indirectly responsible because they propagate an orthodox or fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that hampers the integration of Muslims into the host societies (Buijs et al., 2006; De Koning, 2010). Hence, the equation of Islam and Muslims with radicalism, terrorism and violence is one of the problems Muslim organizations in western Europe have to deal with. As a consequence, Muslim movements and their leaders ‘are in the special role of constantly having to explain themselves, mostly in order to say who they are not’ (Klausen, 2005: 1).

The current study examines the ways in which the two major Turkish Muslim organizations in the Netherlands and Germany (the Milli Görüş and Fethullah Gülen movements) try to define a morally acceptable identity by ‘saying what we are not’. The central question is how these organizations publicly manage their Muslim identity in host societies that sometimes link their religion to terrorism and portray them as dangerous for society. Our analytical interest is in identifying and analyzing the types of ‘identity work’ that these organizations as ‘entrepeneurs of identity’ are engaged in. The empirical part contains an analysis of articles in three newspapers and magazines of the two organizations. The focus on written sources is deliberate. We are interested in the discursive strategies used for defining an acceptable Muslim identity in public. The newspapers and magazines offer an accessible and systematic source for studying this. There are, of course, many factors involved in the activities of these organizations and in their success in convincing the wider society. Research, for example, has examined the role of opportunity structures and citizenship regimes for political claims-making among migrants in general and Muslim groups in particular (Koopmans et al., 2005; Statham et al., 2005). Our aim, however, is to examine how Turkish Muslim organizations themselves define an acceptable Muslim identity.

The perspective adopted is that group identities form the social psychological basis of group action because people act upon the particular norms, beliefs and understandings associated with the relevant identity (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). This means that social influence derives from the way in which texts and statements invoke particular group understandings (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006). These understandings are not self-evident but construed and contested in discourse and therefore the changing result of continuous ‘group-making projects’ (e.g. Brubaker, 2004) in which activists and organizations play a key role.

Entrepreneurs of identity

There are many different perspectives and approaches to questions of identity (see Wetherell and Mohanty, 2010). Most scholars agree that ethnic, national and religious identities are not ‘simply’ about inner feelings and beliefs, but about social accomplishments and visible manifestations (e.g. Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008; Khanna, 2011). These identities refer to the question of what someone is taken to be socially, or who people are to each other. Various studies have shown that ethnic, religious and national identities are dynamically and actively produced in spoken interaction and written text (e.g. Holland et al., 1998; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008; Peek, 2005). People talk about their group belongings and they make discursive claims for, about and in the name of these groups. Language is a key formative aspect of social life and different kinds of identities are produced in spoken interactions: ‘Who we are to each other is accomplished, disputed, ascribed, resisted, managed and negotiated in discourse’ (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 4). This means that these interactions and the discursive acts should be examined for understanding how Turkish Muslim organizations try to define a morally acceptable Muslim identity.

Regular Muslim organizations face the problem that because of violence and terrorism directed at the western world, their religious identity is called into question. The ‘terrorist’ label questions their religious beliefs and practices, and makes them a legitimate target of exclusion, supervision, and control. As ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001; Reicher et al., 2005) these organizations need to produce, communicate and promote socially acceptable understandings of what it means to be a Muslim. They are involved in crafting an identity definition that is appropriate to their purposes and that deals with the terrorism interpretation that undermines their credibility.

Acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for serious wrongdoings forms a threat to one’s identity of being a responsible and moral collective. A likely response to this threat is the denial of in-group responsibility (Cehaji et al., 2009). Organizations can refuse to incorporate the negative elements into their collective identity in order to maintain a positive and moral group image. In principle, they can do so by: (1) redrawing the boundaries of the identity category; and by (2) redefining the identity content. Identity boundaries and identity content are two key parameters of social identities, including religious identities (Beyer, 2006; Herriot, 2007). The former defines who is included within the category of Muslims and thereby who can be held responsible and accountable. This means that Muslim organizations can try to reject group responsibility by excluding the perpetrators of the terrorists’ acts outside the category of Muslims.

The latter refers to the norms, values and beliefs that define the ‘true meaning’ of the religious identity, and thereby determine whether particular acts or practices are realizations of ‘who we really are’. Muslim leaders and organizations might try to define the nature of Islam in such a way that it is incompatible with terrorism and that responsible, moral conduct is an expression of the ‘true’ nature of Islam. Interestingly, this would mean that group essentialism in which ideas about unalterable, inherent and essential aspects predominate (Verkuyten, 2003) can be used to counter the negative implications of essentialist categorization by the majority society. Studies on racism and Islamophobia have examined the ways in which specific constructions function to essentialize and legitimize patterns of social power and group dominance (e.g. Solomos and Back, 1994; Wood and Finlay, 2008). In these studies, the socially constructed nature of identities is emphasized and anti-essentialism is often seen as a liberating discourse. However, most of these studies tend to ignore the possible instrumental effects of essence-related beliefs for minority groups (Verkuyten, 2003; Wagner et al., 2009). Terms such as ‘anti-anti-essentialism’ and ‘strategic essentialism’ that have appeared in the literature (Modood, 1998; Werbner, 1997) indicate that essentialist group beliefs do not only rationalize and justify discrimination and oppression, but can also question and challenge negative beliefs that justify exclusion, supervising and control.

We will examine constructions of ‘identity boundaries’ and ‘identity content’ as two possible strategies among two main Turkish Muslim ‘organizations’ that are active in the Netherlands and Germany. Our aim is to examine how in their official publications these organizations themselves define a morally acceptable Muslim identity by focusing on the ways in which they argue about radicalism and terrorism. Hence, our analytical interest is in identifying and analyzing discourses about Muslim terrorism and how these function in constructing a responsible and moral position for Muslims living in western Europe. In order to contextualize the research, a short description of the two organizations will be presented first.

Islamic community of Milli Görüş

The Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG; Islamic Community of Milli Görüş ) is the daughter organization of the Milli Görüş (MG; National Outlook) movement in Turkey and the umbrella organization of 13 federations in Europe. MG was established by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 as a political movement and was transformed into a political party in 1970. The movement’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) became the first ruling party in 1996 with an open Islamic agenda in the Republican period in Turkey (Yavuz, 1997). From the beginning MG has had a religious program with a focus on the establishment of Qur’an schools and vocational Imam- and preacher-schools, on campaigning against the bans on wearing the headscarf in schools and public sectors, and on religious education in the schools (Yavuz, 2003). This religious program can be seen as challenging the secular regime in Turkey, but campaigns against the banning of the headscarf in schools and universities are also interpreted as trying to promote individual liberties and human rights.

Milli Görüş has developed differently in Germany and the Netherlands. Although the movement established its first organization in 1971 in Cologne, its origin dates back to the foundation of the Turkish Union of Europe in 1976 in Germany (Karakaşoğlu and Koray, 1996). The movement adopted its current name, IGMG, in 1995, and is located in Kerpen, near Cologne (Şen and Sauer, 2006). IGMG maintains that they have 513 mosques and 87,380 members throughout Europe (323 mosques and 54,865 members in Germany), and that more than 300,000 people take part in their Friday prayers (Perspektive, 2003a).

In the Netherlands, informal groups connected to MG during the 1970s came together and established their first organization, Federatie van de Verenigingen en Gemeenschappen van Moslims (FVGM; Federation of Asssociations and Communities of Muslims) in 1981 (Canatan, 2001). There are two federations of IGMG in the Netherlands. The Dutch Islamic Federation – South (NIF) was established in 1987. It is located in Rotterdam and has 16 mosques.¹ Milli Görüş Netherlands – North Federation (MGN) was established in 1997 as an offspring of NIF. It is located in Amsterdam and has 21 mosques.² Although the establishment of two federations had practical reasons initially, Yükleyen claims that the north federation gradually took a more liberal path whereas the southern one follows the guidelines from the German Milli Görüş more closely (Yükleyen, 2009).

In both countries, Milli Görüs is involved in three types of activities. First are the activities related to the five pillars of Islam. The movement eestablishes mosques for daily prayer (Namaz), organizes pilgrimage tours (Hajj), collects and distributes alms (Zekât), and organizes the festival of sacrifices (Islamic Community Milli Görüş e.V., 2007). Second, there are activities that are oriented at integration in the host society, such as language and vocational courses, educational assistance and intercultural/religious dialogue. Third, the movement is involved in aid to deprived regions in the world and the helping of Muslims in conflict zones and countries hit by natural disaster.

Milli Görüş has gone through various changes since its foundation, not only because of generational shifts but also because of developments in the host societies (Schiffauer, 2010; Van Bruinessen 2001, 2004). It pioneered the foundation of mosques in western Europe during the 1970s. However, in that period the movement was predominantly oriented at the country of origin and devoted itself to the Islamization of Turkey. The Iranian revolution led to debates between the more moderate and more radical factions, and the movement got divided in 1980s after the secession of the pro-Iranian Cemalettin Kaplan (Canatan, 2001). The 1980 military coup in Turkey was a turning point as the Turkish republic started to install its version of Islam abroad through the Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (Directorate of Religious Affairs). IGMG has oriented itself towards the host society and struggled over the representation of Muslims in western Europe. However, rising Islamist politics in Turkey complicated this process. IGMG had given extensive support to the Welfare Party in Turkey at the end of the 1980s and the beginnings of the 1990s. After the removal of the party from power in 1997, IGMG changed its orientation towards the host society. Schiffauer (2010) conceptualizes this changed orientation as post-Islamism and maintains that IGMG has gradually taken another form in Europe and adopted a strategic shift away, for example, from law suits against the state.

Fethullah Gülen movement

This movement was established by an ex-preacher, Fethullah Gülen in the 1960s. Rather than the five pillars of Islam it focuses on the universal ethic of love, serving others and peaceful co-existence. Instead of verbal conveyance of Islam (tebliğ), the movement prefers to convince people by their religiously guided moral conduct (temsil) (Agai, 2009; Atay, 2009). The movement mainly follows the writings of Said-i Nursi and the books, sermon records and conversations of Fethullah Gülen. Although the movement has been increasingly vocal in the Turkish context by ‘demanding the recognition of faith-based and morally conservative ways of life’ (Turam, 2007: 9), it has appealed to ‘non-confrontational forms of interaction and cooperation’ (Turam, 2007: 10). In the western context, the movement emphasizes the importance of building cohesion and dialogue in the light of the teachings of their religious leader.

The movement has been active in Europe since the second half of the 1990s. It is not a mosque community but is active in education, media, entrepreneurship and interfaith/cultural dialogue. The movement claims to represent many Muslims in Europe because it has a long history of moderate Islam and tries to advance a positive image of Islam (Erdal, 2007). However, in countries such as the Netherlands, doubts about the purposes of the movement have been voiced and official inquiries into a possible ‘hidden agenda’ have been requested (Sharon-Krespin, 2009). This has led to a commissioned investigation and the report concluded that the movement’s activities were not hampering the integration of Muslims in the country (Van Bruinessen, 2010). Similarly, in Germany the leftist party, Die Linke asked parliamentary questions about the Gülen movement related to issues of integration, constitutional threat and extreme nationalistic feelings. In response, the government maintained that there was no evidence for constitutional threats but they did not respond to the other issues (Regierung, 2011).

The movement has the same organizational structure in Germany and in the Netherlands. Education is the central activity. It has more than 300 high schools, and eight universities in more than 100 countries worldwide. It has about 20 high schools in European Union (EU) countries (12 in Germany and five in the Netherlands) and has many educational centers that provide additional school support. In addition, the movement has established several business associations and two federations in both countries. The dialog activities are divided into two types. One promotes dialogue between different religious groups: the Stichting Islam en Dialoog is active in the Netherlands and Interkulturelles Dialogzentrum München is active in Germany. The other activity is to disseminate the teachings of the religious leader to the academic world and the production of knowledge about Fethullah Gülen. For this purpose, Dialoog Academie and Forum für interkulturellen Dialog are active in the Netherlands and in Germany, respectively.

Research material

We analyzed the written publications of the two Turkish Muslim movements. We collected all the issues of three newspapers and magazines: Doğuş (January 2003–April 2009) and Perspektive/Perspektif (January 2002–December 2009) connected to the IGMG, and Fethullah Gülen’s Zaman Hollanda (January 2007–December 2008). There also are two daily newspapers affiliated to these movements: Zaman (Benelux and Europe edition) to the Gülen movement and Milli Gazete to Milli Görüş. However, we did not analyze these newspapers because, unlike the magazines, they do not focus exclusively on the European context. In addition, IGMG regularly denies that Milli Gazete is related to IGMG and claims that Perspektive/Perspektif is its official publication.

Doğuş is published in the Netherlands, the first issue appearing in February 1999. It was a monthly newspaper until September 2007, and after that it appeared bi-weekly. The main language of the publication is Turkish. However, the number of pages in Dutch has increased recently. The editor of the newspaper maintains that the publication, with 50,000 copies, has the highest circulation among the (Turkish) Muslims in the Netherlands.³ In total, we collected 74 issues of Doğuş.

Perspektive/Perspektif is the official monthly publication of IGMG in Germany. The first issue was published in 1994, and Turkish and German are the languages used in the magazine. Although there have been more pages in German in the past (around 30%) the number of pages in German has been reduced since January 2005 (to around 15%). In addition, since January 2007 the pages in German mainly contain translations of key articles in Turkish. The magazine represents the official position of IGMG⁴ and its 15,000 copies are distributed to the members of IGMG in all European countries where the movement is active. We collected 83 issues of Perspektive/Perspektif.

Zaman Hollanda is the publication of the Fethullah Gülen movement in the Netherlands. The first issue had 10,000 copies and was published in October 2005. It was a monthly tabloid newspaper until January 2007, when it turned into a weekly. According to the former director of the Time Media Group, the newspaper did not reach its goal of establishing an intellectual magazine about Muslims in the Netherlands and therefore its publication was stopped in January 2009.⁵ We collected 83 issues of Zaman Hollanda.

In order to get a better understanding of the publications and organizations we also conducted in-depth interviews with the editors of these publications and with organizational leaders. Three interviews were carried out both in Germany and in the Netherlands for each of the movements.

Analysis

The thematic scope in these magazines is broad and despite the differences also quite similar. International and national news, activities of the local branches of the movements, Islamic teaching, family life and cultural activities are the main topics covered in these publications. Analysis of the material proceeded by first building up a data file of all the articles related to debates about Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany, and in the West more generally. Three topics were central in these debates. The first focuses on the link between Islam and terrorism and the negative perception of Islam as a consequence of terrorist attacks. The second topic relates to the compatibility of western and Islamic values, and the Euro-Islam debate more generally. The third is about integration into the host society. These three topics are interrelated but also differ in the ways in which they are defined and discussed in the magazines as we have shown elsewhere in relation to the last two topics (Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2012a, 2012b). In this paper our focus is on the first topic: the debate about Islam and terrorism.

A broader thematic analysis (Kellehear, 1993) was used with ‘terrorism’ as the particular theme of concern. In total, there were 186 articles that discussed the topic of terrorism: 74 in Doğuş, 83 (40 in German till January 2005, 43 in Turkish) in Perspektive/Perspektif and 29 in Zaman Hollanda. Since Zaman Hollanda is a weekly newspaper and its publication started after the main terrorist attacks in the West, there were no articles or news items exclusively focused on the issue of terrorism. We examined the articles separately for each of the three magazines and in each of the two countries. The articles were analyzed first in terms of identifying the main claims and arguments. Subsequently, analytical attention was focused on the ways in which a morally acceptable Muslim identity is defined in these articles.

There are clear differences between Milli Görüş and Fethullah Gülen, and there are national differences between Germany and the Netherlands. However, in the analysis it turned out that there were very few differences in the discursive strategies used in the three magazines and in the two countries. This indicates that there are a limited number of discursive ways for dealing with a ‘terrorist’ label (see Kuroiwa and Verkuyten, 2008). The fact that there was a limited number of discursive strategies to construe a particular identity is a common finding in discourse studies (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006). Because our central focus is on the identification and analysis of these discursive strategies, we treated the different articles as a single data set. We have included excerpts to illustrate the ways in which these Turkish Muslim organizations oriented to and managed the identity-threatening interpretations of radicalism and terrorism in their magazines. For reasons of space we have only included a limited number of extracts but there are many that make similar points.

Findings

Redrawing boundaries

A way to deal with a negative group image and in-group responsibility for wrongdoings is to focus on who is, and is not, included within the category of Muslims. One option is to argue that terrorist attacks are not committed by Muslims, or not motivated by Islam. The other is to explicitly condemn terrorist attacks and thereby exclude Muslim terrorists from their own moral community of responsible Muslims. Both strategies are present in the magazines.

Non-Muslim actors and non-Islamic motives

In the magazines there is no explicit denial that Muslims were behind the terrorist attacks in, for example, New York, London, Madrid or Istanbul. However, in several articles there are more subtle ways of reducing in-group responsibility. One is to attribute the main responsibility to non-Muslims and to portray the Muslim actors as mere instruments in the hands of others. The following excerpt is from the IGMG’s publication, Perspektive, which discusses the terrorist attacks that targeted a synagogue, a British bank and the British consulate, in Istanbul on November 2003.

Leading Muslim intellectuals, who comment on the terror attacks in Istanbul, emphasize that people who are able to conduct such big operations must cooperate with secret services that conduct these kinds of operations worldwide. They state that some secret services train terrorists rather than fight against them. (Perspektive, 2003b)

The reference to leading Muslim intellectuals gives some credibility to attributing the responsibility for the attack to secret services with which the terrorists must have cooperated. Secret services known to conduct global operations like this are the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Israeli MOSSAD (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) and the Russian FSB (Security Service of the Russian Federation). Thus, even when Muslim individuals committed these attacks, they are presented as instruments in the hands of intelligence services that are actually responsible and are targeting Islam. In the same article it is argued that trying to make Muslims responsible for these attacks only intends to ‘make “terror against Islam” by using the concept of “Islamic terror”’ (Dizman, 2003).

A similar line of argument can be found in Doğuş in relation to the murders of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn. Although the murderer of the latter was an animal rights activist, it is claimed that the Dutch intelligence agency (AIVD) deliberately did not prevent the murders in order to increase the pressure on Muslim minorities and to force the government to increase the budget of the agency. For example, Canatan maintains that:

As is often pronounced since the murder of Theo van Gogh, there are 150 Muslim extremists in the Netherlands. The intelligence service knows what they are doing and how they are working; and it monitors them as much as possible. But, not everything is under the control of AIVD. For example, Muhammed B. the murderer of Theo van Gogh is not one of them [150 extremists]. Muhammed B. was a case which showed that AIVD was not capable of locating his case …

There are conspiracy theories that maintain a counter argument, however. According to one of these conspiracy theories, AIVD actually knew and was monitoring Muhammed B., but they condoned the murder of Theo van Gogh. Why? There are two conceivable explanations for this. First, the Netherlands wants to get rid of extremists by having them crack each other, or wants to set measures which would not possible in normal times. For example, to deport radical Imams, to close the mosques such Imams work at, to prevent the importing of Imams… These are what we know… there can be some other things. Second, AIVD aims to get more budgets from the government and to become stronger. That is why they need to show that they are not able [to] control everything and are incapable! By removing Muhammed B. from the list, they [AIVD] gave an impression that there are some others who could not be monitored. The fact that a great amount of money has been injected to AIVD and the measures taken in the aftermath of the event [the murder of Theo van Gogh] shows that this theory cannot simply be ignored. (Canatan, 2004: 23)

A second, more subtle, way of redrawing boundaries is to argue that the attacks might have been committed by Muslims, but certainly were not motivated by Islam. As will be discussed below, both the Milli Gorus and the Gülen movements give clear accounts of why Islam cannot be the root cause or the central motivation for the terrorist attacks. But this raises the question of how these attacks should be explained. A first explanation given in some of the articles is to refer to socioeconomic circumstances rather than Islamic belief. For example, in several articles it is stated that terrorism is not a problem of Muslims as it can happen wherever there is despair (e.g. Zaman Hollanda, 2008a). Poverty and bad socioeconomic circumstances would be the main causes of terrorism making it an issue of desperate and poor people rather than of Muslims.

Second, in articles in Zaman Hollanda the motivation of the terrorist attacks is attributed to specific ideologies rather than to Islam. For example, a well-known Muslim scholar, Cevdet Sait claims that:

September 11 is an absurd event. Muslims do not grasp what is going on around them. The principle of Osama bin Laden is not an Islamic principle, his principle is the United Nation’s human rights laws. These laws would consider the murder of imperialists as fair and right. It is with this idea that Bin Laden is fighting against the USA, not with Islam. If he fights with an Islamic understanding, he should say that ‘even if you kill one thousand of our people, we will not defend ourselves’. (Zaman Hollanda, 2008b)

In these and other statements, Islam is denied as a motivation or justification for terrorist attacks. The reasons for terrorism are attributed elsewhere, such as socioeconomic circumstances and (misinterpreted) political ideologies. The result is that Islam is not responsible and that being a Muslim should not be associated with terrorism. It should be noted, however, that there were only a few articles that followed this line of argumentation. This reasoning goes against the established understanding in the western world that these terrorist attacks are closely linked to Islam which makes it difficult to present an alternative interpretation that is not seen as exculpatory. In the magazines, a more frequently used strategy was to explicitly condemn the terrorist attacks.

Condemning terrorism

There are several examples in the magazines where both organizations distance themselves explicitly and unconditionally from the terrorist attacks. For example, in condemning the terrorist attack in Istanbul, the president of IGMG, Yavuz Celik Karahan argues:

We condemn every act of terrorism, indifferent and irrespective of who committed it and against whom committed, without any conditions. This terrible act of terror which targeted a religious centre like a Synagogue even during praying time, not only brought grievance but also shook the Muslims living in Europe. (Perspektive, 2003b)

And in the same issue, Abdurrahman Dizman (2003) also condemns the attacks:

We should immediately state that this is an act of terror that we condemn loathingly … Whoever did it with whatever purpose, such an atrocity can be committed only by people who lack conscience, intelligence and faith.

In these extracts, it is argued that the IGMG unconditionally condemns every act of terrorism. Terrorism is defined as unacceptable whatever the reasons and circumstances. Similarly, in an interview in Zaman Hollanda a researcher of the Fethullah Gülen movement is approvingly quoted as saying that all members of this movement feel ‘abhorrence about things like terrorism’ (Zaman Hollanda, 2007a). Thus, by explicitly distancing oneself from any form of terrorism, a principled moral position is defined. Further, by arguing that Muslims living in Europe were shocked and abhorred the acts, the morality and responsibility of Muslims is demonstrated. This representation is further construed by defining terrorists as lacking a conscience, intelligence or faith. The implication is that Muslims do have these qualities and that a terrorist cannot be a Muslim. This line of argumentation is also used by Fethullah Gülen himself where he states that:

Terrorism cannot be a means for any Islamic goal, and a terrorist cannot be a Muslim, nor can a true Muslim be a terrorist. Islam orders peace and a true Muslim can only be a symbol of peace and the maintenance of basic human rights. (Gülen, 2001)

This is an example of an explicit contrast that defines an intrinsic incompatibility between terrorism and Muslims. Terrorists cannot be included in the category of Muslims and true Muslims cannot be terrorists. The perpetrators of terrorist attacks do not belong to the Muslim category. Therefore their acts do not undermine the moral identity of Muslims and Muslims cannot be held accountable for these acts. The emphasis on a ‘true’ Muslim indicates that there is also an implicit definition of the content of Islam and Muslim identity.

Redefining identity content

Beliefs and values that define the meaning of Muslim identity determine whether particular acts and practices are realizations of ‘who we really are’ and ‘who we are not’. This means that Muslim organizations can try to define the nature of Islam in such a way that terrorism is incompatible with the Islamic faith whereas responsible, civic conduct is the authentic expression of it.

Interpreting Islam

The magazines regularly make references to Western scholars, oliticians and opinion makers who argue that Islam is, in essence, violent and that acts of terror form an intrinsic part of the Islamic faith (Karacer, 2006; Taner, 2003; and Perspektive, 2008). It is stated in the magazines that ‘Muslims are defined as collectively guilty and attacks have occurred against Muslims in all European countries’.⁶

Reinterpreting Islam is a possible strategy for trying to re-establish an acceptable moral position. The ambiguity of religious texts provides opportunities for leaders and organizations to assert religious-based justifications for their religious identity and ‘acceptable’ behaviors towards the host society. In the magazines, and for denouncing the link between Islam and terrorism, many references are made to the ‘right interpretation’ of the main texts of Islam: the Quran, hadith, and the Sunnah (the trodden path of the Prophet Mohammed). ‘True’ Islam is presented as a religion of peace, justice and democracy. It is a religion that in essence would be oriented at harmony and equal rights for all. This interpretation construes the acts of terrorists as ‘un-Islamic’ or even ‘anti-Islamic’. People who commit terrorist acts in the name of Islam are either not Muslims or are severely misguided in their interpretation of the texts. For example, in an article ‘On religion and terror’, several Quran verses are discussed that would show the true nature of Islam. In one of the verses (Maide v. 8), it is stated:

Hey believers! Be people who follow Allah and present a testimony of justice. The enmity you feel towards a community should not let you commit unjust acts. Anger you feel towards a community should not let you behave unjustly. (Dizman, 2003)

In another article in Doğuş, it is maintained that the founding principles of Islam go against situations that lead to conflicts and war such as racism, exploitation and religious bigotry. The implication is that the terrorist attacks have no ground in Islam and the attribution of terror as intrinsic to Islam is unfounded (Uçar, 2003). Reference is also made to the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed in which it is stated that, when the prophet did send his army to a war, he gave the following order to his friends:

Do not damage the harvested fields, do not make unexpected attacks, do not touch people who find refuge in worship places like synagogues and churches, and protect children, old, and elderly people. (Dizman, 2003)

Many similar articles in the magazines discuss the ‘right’ interpretation of the holy texts in order to emphasize that Islam is a religion of peace rather than of violence and that a ‘true’ Muslim should and could never commit terrorist acts. Terrorism is not only contradictory to Islamic teachings but is also unimaginable for a genuine believer who has only peace and justice in his or her heart.

A particular focus in the magazines is on the concept of ‘Jihad’ that for some academics and in the public opinion in the western world is closely connected to terrorism and the Islamic faith. The importance of this concept would prove the intrinsic violence of Islam. In his book, İslam’ın Siyasal Söylemi (The political language of Islam), Bernard Lewis (2007), for example, states that the concept of Jihad is typically understood as referring to a holy war that is ordered by God and therefore forms a moral obligation for Muslims. The fact that this interpretation is well-known to the Turkish Muslim organizations is illustrated by the publication of a special issue of Perspective on religion and violence in February 2008. The issue discusses the concept of Jihad and one of the articles is entitled ‘Trying to understand Jihad!’ In this article it is stated:

Jihad is one of the most disputed and distorted Islamic concepts. In the eyes of the world public, the concept is almost identical with terror/violence and is therefore completely rejected. (Bilgü, 2008)

In contrast to this western interpretation of Jihad, an ‘undistorted’ understanding is presented, one that argues that Jihad is a way of life and that it should be understood as an effort to deserve the blessing of God. In addition, it is argued that the concept has no single meaning like ‘holy war’, but depending on the context it is used in different ways in the Hadith. It sometimes refers to self-discipline, ‘the most virtuous way of Jihad is to struggle with our desires and inclinations’ (Bilgü, 2008). At other times it refers to power abuse by the rulers, ‘the most auspicious way of Jihad is to speak out about right to the atrocious/furious sultan’ (Bilgü, 2008). A more elaborate example of the latter interpretation is from Zaman Hollanda:

There is one thing that Muslims cannot accept. That is injustice. If Muslims experience injustice, they will necessarily rebel against it. That shows us the real Jihad. Jihad is not terror. The ones who create the wave of terror cannot be Muslims. Either by Usame or by Kurds, attacks upon innocent people are out of Islam. (Zaman Hollanda, 2008a)

There is an explicit rejection of the proposition that the real Jihad would mean terror and that terrorists can be Muslims. It is argued that Jihad has to do with resistance against injustice and thereby has a moral and heroic meaning. The various examples of different and positive interpretations of the Jihad concept that are discussed in the magazines indicate that the western world would misunderstand the true meaning of Jihad, and that radical interpretations by violent Muslims are distortions.

Responsible Muslim organizations

Religious identities are enacted or performed in relevant behaviors and practices. Rejecting Muslim terrorism and claiming a morally responsible identity is one thing, but the acknowledgement and acceptance of it by others is something else. For this, the behaviors that are conventionally associated with such an identity should be expressed. In public discourse in western Europe, an acceptable and responsible Muslim identity typically means integration in, and loyalty to, the host society, and living by the nation’s constitution (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Muslim organizations in western Europe face the accusation that they condone or support terrorist acts, or that they, at least, are indirectly responsible because they propagate an orthodox or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam that hampers the integration of Muslims into the host country and presents a threat to the nation. These allegations are made, for example, in relation to the IGMG in the German Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, prepared by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Schiffauer, 2008;Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2005).

The IGMG is well aware of its image in Europe, and especially in Germany. For example, the general secretary of IGMG, Oğuz Üçüncü, states that ‘IGMG is the most controversial institute when it comes to the issue of “organized Islam”’ (Üçüncü, 2006). In denouncing these allegations, the IGMG stresses the congruity of its activities with the constitution and emphasizes its integrative role in European societies.

First, in the IGMG’s magazine it is explained that there is no contradiction between a life based on Islamic principles and following the national constitution. The activities for preserving Islamic culture and sustaining a religious life are actually justified under the constitution. For example, in an article on Islamic principles and the constitution, it is stated that IGMG creates space for Muslims to sustain a life based on Islamic principles and this is fully in line with the free and democratic principles of Germany (Yeneroğlu, 2005). It is argued that IGMG fully respects national laws and is bound by the constitution: they cannot be against the free and democratic principles because these actually allow them to live their lives as they desire.

IGMG’s most common strategy of proving their responsible Muslim identity is to focus on their integrative role in society. In several articles and issues of Perspective it is argued that the organization is a responsible and reliable partner for the authorities. Furthermore, by presenting various examples of specific initiatives and programs such as the organization of language and educational courses, the IGMG presents itself as actively contributing to the integration of Turkish Muslims in the host society, and of youth in particular. For example, in a special dossier on integration in the September–October issue in 2006, it is stated that:

Since its establishment, IGMG … sees the integration of Muslims into the society they live in as a primary duty, and has worked hard for this … Although facing difficulties with the local administration, IGMG realizes its carefully designed integration efforts in its branches and sees itself as a trustable partner of the state and society … The discussions on IGMG in the frame of domestic threat are first of all utopist, and furthermore they hinder the integrative role of such an important Islamic organization with a strong infrastructure and opportunities. (Üçüncü, 2006)

In this excerpt, the IGMG is presented as a socially responsible and trustworthy partner of the German authorities, a partner who wants to work together in addressing youth problems and who is able to fill existing gaps because of its organizational structure and its unique position in German society. It is the negative portrayal of the IGMG that would actually make it very difficult for the organization to fulfill its ‘primary duty’ of stimulating the integration of Muslims in Germany and in providing a future for Muslim youth. Thus, the good intentions of the IGMG and the opportunities that it provides cannot materialize because of the negative societal responses.

The Gülen movement portrays a similar image but tends to focus more on their specific beliefs. For example, in many issues of Zaman Hollanda the movement is described as representing peace and dialogue (Zaman Hollanda, 2007b). An example is the following:

Our philosophy brings people from one end of the world to the other together. It establishes dialogue between the people of different worlds and cultures. It teaches love, responsibility, high values to the people from different colors and nations. This is the biggest service to establishing universal peace. (Zaman Hollanda, 2007c)

In this and many other excerpts, Fethullah Gülen is presented as being committed to social cohesion, carrying the message of tolerance, representing a flexible and moderate Islam, and building bridges between cultures. In addition, the person of Fethullah Gülen is presented in the articles as the spiritual leader who embodies the peaceful and loving nature of Muslims. His virtues are the virtues of Islam and of all ‘true’ Muslims. Peacefulness, love and responsibility would define the real or authentic Muslim identity and these qualities characterize their leader.

To support this claim further, many examples are given of activities that contribute to dialogue and integration. The movement is active in education, business, media and intercultural meetings. The educational activities, for example, are discussed in terms of the movement taking its responsibility for the integration of Muslims in the host societies. Thus, by discussing the ideas of their spiritual leader and their activities, the Gülen movement presents itself as a group of morally responsible Muslims. Not violence or radicalism but dialogue and teaching would express the ‘true’ nature of Islam.

Discussion

Islam has moved to the centre of debates and politics in European countries and is at the heart of what is perceived as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Modood and Ahmad, 2007; Zolberg and Long, 1999). One consequence for Muslims living in western Europe is that their religious identity is called into question and that they constantly have to explain who they are not (Klausen, 2005). Defining a morally acceptable identity is particularly important for Muslim organizations that are monitored by authorities and the media. These organizations sometimes face accusations that they condone or support terrorist acts by propagating radical or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam (e.g. Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2008).

This article has examined some of the discursive strategies used in the magazines of two Turkish Muslim organizations in the Netherlands and Germany. The focus was on the construction of an acceptable Muslim identity by distancing themselves from the terrorist label. Group boundaries and identity content are two key parameters of collective identities and it was found that Muslim organizations try to define a morally acceptable position by redrawing boundaries and by interpreting what it means to be a ‘true’ Muslim.

The former implies that terrorists and terrorist attacks are defined as outside of Islam. Muslims would not be the main pepretators of the attacks and the terrorist acts would not be religiously inspired. Furthermore, their own morality and responsibility are demonstrated by explicitly and unconditionally condemning terrorism. Thus, by drawing boundaries a distinction is made between the terrorists and Muslim organizations that makes it possible to argue that ‘we are not like them’.

Identity content refers to the values, beliefs and practices that define and express Muslim identity. In the magazines the two Muslim organizations define terrorism as being incompatible with the Islamic faith. In contrast, responsible civic conduct is defined as the authentic expression of what it means to be a Muslim. Ambiguity of religious texts provide the opportunity to assert religious-based justifications for one’s true identity and authentic responsible behavior towards the host society, in contrast to the misguided terrorists and radical Muslims who reject the western world. These justifications refer to the essential nature of Islam and the true character of Muslims. In addition, this essential nature and true character is not only found in texts and intentions but is also expressed in behavior directed at integration and civic participation in the host society. It is argued that initiatives such as language courses, educational activities and intercultural dialogue demonstrate the real face of Islam and of Muslims living in the West. These references to the ‘essence’ of Islam and the ‘true’ nature of Muslims indicate that group essentialism can be an important political tool for minority groups (Verkuyten, 2003). Essentialist beliefs about groups do not only rationalize and justify existing social arrangements of dominance, but they can also question and challenge these arrangements and the negative images that justify exclusion, supervising and control. Terms such as ‘anti-anti-essentialism’ and ‘strategic essentialism’ (Modood, 1998; Werbner, 1997) indicate that group essentialism is not by definition oppressive but can be politically instrumental for minority groups. But whether essentialism serves peace and equality, rather than conflict and violence, depends on the goals of the group. Jihadi Salafist are also engaged in group essentialism but for different reasons and with different implications.

Acts of terrorism affect the relations within and among groups, but few studies have examined these acts through the lens of collective identity (see Myers and Stohl, 2010). We have focused on the ways in which Muslim organizations in western Europe discursively construct a morally acceptable identity in contrast to Muslim terrorism. The analysis shows that this identity is constituted through difference and constrast, and in relation to ‘what we are not’ in particular. The distancing from the terrorist label helps to construct a positive Muslim identity in which being a well-adjusted and responsible citizen is stressed. Thus, identity negotiation should not only be studied in terms of ‘who we are’ but also in terms of ‘who we certainly are not’ (Killian and Johnson, 2006; McCall, 2003). When one’s identity is called into question by an ‘extreme not-us’ such as terrorists, this can actually serve one’s cause because it raises the public interest and provides ample opportunities to explain ‘who we actually are and stand for’. In the last decade, sales of books about Islam have increased and Islamic academics and politicians have been frequent guests in talk shows providing a platform for Muslim voices (Dittrich, 2003). Besides, several EU countries initiated the formation of Muslim umbrella organizations such as Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in France, and Deutsche Islam Konferenz in Germany as partners on matters concerning Muslims. According to Perspektive, the 9/11 attacks opened a space for dialogue (Perspektive, 2002a, 2002b).

Our focus was on two different Turkish Muslim organizations and two countries. There are clear differences between these organizations and between the Netherlands and Germany. However, we found few differences in the ‘identity work’ in relation to distancing from the terrorist label. There were a limited number of discursive strategies used by both organizations and in the two countries for managing this negative portrayal. Research among other groups and in other national contexts has found similar strategies for managing the problematic linkage with terrorism (e.g. Kuroiwa and Verkuyten, 2008; Swart, 1995). These similar findings indicate that the discursive space for dealing with a problematic label such as ‘terrorism’ is restricted. More generally, there are typically a limited number of argumentative strategies and resources for challenging and justifying identity constructions and controversial ideological positions (Billig, 1988; Hellström and Nilsson, 2010).

The perspective in this article is that identities are given shape through narrative (e.g. Holland et al., 1998; Somers, 1994) and that framing and narrative encoding take place within a rhetorical context. That is to say, there are always competing stories and interpretations possible and there are a limited number of ways to fabricate identity definitions against these alternatives. This focus on discourse and discursive strategies does not mean, of course, that various structural and political factors are not important for the ways in which Muslim organizations operate and present themselves. Opportunity structures and citizenship regimes differ between countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, and can have an impact on the quantity and quality of the public claims-making and political activities of immigrant organizations (Koopmans et al., 2005). However, the level of group demands of Muslim organizations appears to be similar in different western European countries (Statham et al., 2005). More importantly, our aim was not to examine the role of opportunity structures but rather to identify the discursive ways in which the two Muslim organizations try to construe a moral identity in a societal context in which Islam is often closely linked to violence and terrorism. From our material we cannot determine whether these identity constructions represent explicit strategic choices. However, they do function in intergroup relations and guide people’s interpretations and self-understandings because social influence derives from the way in which group identities are defined (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Acts of framing and narrative encoding are key issues in determining how qualities, characteristics, events and circumstances are interpreted, presented and acted upon (e.g. Brubaker, 2004; Brubaker and Laitin, 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Group identities are the changing result of continuous ‘group-making projects’ that, among other things, implies an analysis of the discourses of organizations and leaders in bringing about a morally acceptable group understanding. This is what we have tried to present.

However, these identities are never finished and the organizations’ attempts and claims can be challenged by global and national developments. For example, an increase in global tensions and divergences between the Orient and the Occident may force Muslims in western Europe into a position of having to make local choices over loyalty. Furthermore, political and economic developments in the country of origin can have an effect, such as Turkey’s possible EU membership. Turkish Muslim organizations in Europe have strong links to Turkey and give transnational support to groups, parties and organizations in Turkey, both politically and economically (Amelina and Faist, 2008). In addition, the increased mobility of people can have an effect because it increases the ethnic and religious diversity of the Muslim population in western Europe. Muslim immigrants from Somalia, Afghanistan and Iran may establish new associations and organizations and give a different interpretation of the Islamic faith and practices. This development may raise new questions and tensions for the ways in which Turkish Muslim organizations understand and define themselves. New developments create new commonalities and discrepancies in an ongoing attempt to define a viable and acceptable Muslim identity.

Footnotes

Notes

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