Abstract
Muslims in Europe are increasingly constructed as problematic and insular. This article examines whether this construction may be justified and the impact this has had on the attitudes of Muslims living in different countries in Europe. Over 70 percent of Bangladeshi, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims living in Britain, Germany and Spain, respectively, felt ‘at home’ in their country of residence. This sense of being at home, and whether the events of 11 September 2001 or 11 March 2004 affected this was associated with citizenship of or birth in Europe, experiences of victimization and perceived local social support. Citizenship, experiences of discrimination and strength of religious identities were associated with reporting British, German or Spanish identities. Rather than providing evidence of self-segregation, these findings emphasize the impact of the political and social marginalization faced by Muslim groups in Europe, which significantly affects their ability to feel themselves at home there.
Introduction
Commentators exploring processes of ethnic identification have frequently described the perceived importance of a fixed historical or ancestral ‘home’. For recent migrants, even those leaving inhospitable circumstances, the reconciliation of the longing of the known pre-migration home with the unfamiliarity of new residences has been described as inherently problematic, even where it is acknowledged that the new location brings benefits and the former location remains uninhabitable or even has ceased to exist in the way imagined (Muggeridge and Doná, 2006; Simich et al., 2010). Much research also presents second- and later-generation migrants as forever linked to pre-migration locations, through cultures transmitted via families and migrant communities that emphasize the importance of lineage and espouse the importance of (former) homelands.
This position is supported by a long tradition of work that defines home according to social and familial origins and historical geographical locations (Mallett, 2004; Rapport and Dawson, 1998). But these definitions adopt essentialized notions of ethnicity and home that do not consider the ambiguity and fluidity inherent in processes of ethnic definition (Barth, 1969; Weber, 1978), nor the ways in which globalization and technological advances have enabled the opening up of cultural identities to allow people to draw on a wide range of cultural resources when securing their social identities: Hall’s ‘cultural supermarket’ effect (1992: 303, see also Geertz, 1986; Lyotard, 1986). As part of this process, where, and if indeed anywhere, is ‘home’ also increasingly comes into question. As a consequence, migrants may engender a sense of home that does not relate to particular geographies, but to the maintenance of particular social practices (Berger, 1984) and roles, the presence of emotional support (Simich et al., 2010), and other opportunities that enable them to act out particular social identities: with home becoming a locale that is ‘simultaneously and indivisibly a spatial and social unit of interaction’ (Brah, 1996; Giddens, 1984; Saunders and Williams, 1988: 82). One of the functions of religiosity, in these contexts, may be to offer clear social identities, and associated social practices, to make this move from home to home less problematic (McMichael, 2002). Location in neighbourhoods inhabited by those with similar ethnic, cultural or religious identities has also been found to offer additional opportunities for social engagement and community involvement (Grewal et al., 2004) as well as improved social cohesion, trust and respect (Bécares et al., 2011).
But such work emphasizes the influence of internal processes of social affiliation and fails to acknowledge the role of external/excluding processes for social definition (Weber, 1978). It is argued that, in addition to the desires of minoritized groups to maintain ‘traditional’ cultures, dominant groups in host societies also act to restrict access to ‘majority’ affiliations through social exclusion (Jenkins, 1997; Karlsen, 2006). Interestingly, while the lived experience of migration may clarify a sense of those aspects of identity and home that are most important, the experiences of globalization, migration and other social and economic change mean that the homes of non-migrants might be felt to have changed beneath their very feet (Rapport and Dawson, 1998). The reaction to this impending sense of homelessness, anomie and alienation (Berger et al., 1973) is often to attempt to clarify the meaning of majority ethnic, national and supranational (Vidmar-Horvat, 2011) identities and their associated ‘homes’, frequently in ways that give recourse to nostalgia, what Hall calls ‘aggressive Little Englandism’ (1992: 308). These ‘reinforced’ identities are premised on the basis of perceived inherent differences between those considered new-comers and the supposedly indigenous population. Mallett describes the opportunities for ideas of home to offer security in ‘an increasing alien world’ (2004: 66) and to establish ‘boundaries that must be observed and respected by those who do not belong there’ (2004: 73). What is interesting, then, is the idea that perhaps the greatest fear of lost identities and the need for these boundaries and homes might occur with those who do not move. But evidence of this may be identified in the introduction of citizenship tests, which demand additional commitments from applicants, and the policy shift from multiculturalism to integration and cohesion (see for example, Home Office, 2001; McGhee, 2008).
In Europe and elsewhere governmental and media rhetoric has focused on Muslims as an ‘enemy within’: fanatical, insular and refusing to accommodate a more European and ‘civilised’ way of life (Dunn et al., 2007; Jackson, 2007; Kundnani, 2008). Fekete (2004) comments: Since Islam now [post-September 2001] represents ‘threat’ to Europe, its Muslim residents, even though they are citizens, even though they may be European born, are caught up in the ever-expanding loop of xeno-racism. They do not merely threaten Europe as the ‘enemy within’ in the war on terror, their adherence to Islamic norms and values threatens the notion of Europeanness itself. (2004:4)
Yet many Muslims feel positively about the European societies in which they reside. There is empirical evidence, from several studies, that a large majority of people from different Muslim groups think of themselves as being British (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2010; Maxwell, 2007). But there is also evidence that the common social and economic marginalization and victimization associated with being Muslim in Britain (Khattab, 2009; Peach, 2006) has led to the reinvigoration of minority political religious identities – especially among second-generation, working-class Muslims (Glynn, 2002; Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Ramamurthy, 2006; Valentine and Sporton, 2009). Indeed, findings from the ME study exploring reported rates of perceived victimization and disrespect describe ‘a perception of separation and marginalisation among younger Bangladeshi Muslims’ in Britain (Bruess, 2008: 887) that was not apparent among Turkish Muslims in Germany or Moroccan Muslims in Spain. Experiences of social exclusion may therefore conflict with a sense of access to national identities and contradict any sense of being ‘at home’ (Franz, 2007; Poynting, 2009).
The mobilization of Islam as a political organization in the UK was motivated by a number of incidents unrelated to 11 September 2001, such as the ‘Rushdie Affair’ in 1989 or responses to the ‘riots’ in northern England in 2001 (Dunn et al., 2007; Hussain and Bagguley, 2005; Poynting and Mason, 2007). Indeed, discourses around ‘Islamic terror’ began long before this time, rooted in terrorism studies (Jackson, 2007). But this ‘discrete field of academic research … has grown tremendously and gained genuine authority since the 11 September terrorist attacks’ (Jackson, 2007: 398). There is reason to assume that the reactions of other Europeans to these terrorist incidents will have had widespread implications for the social identity and sense of inclusion of many Muslims living in Europe. But data with which to explore the impact of these particular events and responses to them on the attitudes of different Muslim groups in Europe has, until now, been unavailable.
As ‘religious’ minorities, Muslims in Europe often have no legal rights protecting them from victimization: unlike Jewish or Sikh people, for example, who are considered ethnic groups for legal purposes (Bloul, 2008). 1 Further, European nations have frequently used concerns about a potential relationship between a perceived lack of support for assimilation and support for terrorism to redirect social policy towards greater monoculturalism and cultural homogenization, with elements of forced assimilation (although this has had a tendency not to focus on symbols of Christianity or Judaism). This situation is likely to have a separate, but reinforcing, effect on perceptions of the marginalized position of Muslims and (some) other religious groups in Europe, over and above those influenced by the other forms of victimization that they face. Jackson comments that: ‘we often feel at home in the world when what we do has some effect and what we say carries some weight’ (1995: 123), while participants in Simich et al.’s study described the importance of being treated with ‘dignity’ for considerations of home (2010: 207). It is likely, then, that the social exclusion and victimization experienced by Muslims living in Europe will affect their sense of being ‘at home’ there.
The ME study explored the attitudes, circumstances and experiences of three Muslim groups: Turkish Muslims living in Berlin, Germany; Moroccan Muslims living in Madrid, Spain; and Bangladeshi Muslims living in England. This article presents findings from analyses exploring how far people from these different Muslim groups agree with statements enquiring whether they think of themselves as ‘British’, ‘Spanish’ or ‘German’, feel at home in their country of residence and feel less at home since the events of 2001 and 2004 or not. It presents multivariate analyses of these outcomes and a number of indicators which that be considered influential on these perceptions: religious identity and religiosity; citizenship and place of birth; contacts with Bangladesh, Morocco and Turkey; perceptions of victimization; attitudes towards their local residential area; and socioeconomic status. We use this approach to address the specific issues outlined next.
Current rhetoric frequently contains an underlying assumption that Islam is inherently violent (Jackson, 2007), and considers strength of Muslim identity – and particularly the influence of ‘radical preachers’ and others in mosques – as a key obstacle to the winning of Muslim hearts and minds to ‘European ways’ (Khiabany and Williamson, 2008; Kundnani, 2008). We will explore whether there may be statistical evidence supporting such a position. ‘Anti-integration’ or anti-European attitudes may also be considered encouraged by links with ‘traditional’ societies from which Muslim populations migrated: in terms of enabling the maintenance of minority languages and other customs and identities, for example. We explore the impact of physical links with family, friends and others living abroad through international travel, and also links with wider social opinion through the use of different forms of news media. We also investigate the effects of experiences in, and perceptions of, respondents’ lives in their country of residence. We explore the impact of citizenship and place of birth, which can confer access to political and legal rights, and also provide a sense of national belonging (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). We also look at the impact of aspects of economic and social exclusion: whether the marginalization associated with unemployment or experiences of victimization – or perceptions that the society in which someone lives does not accept them and people like them – influences their sense of being ‘at home’ in, as well as thinking of themselves as a member of, a particular society. Finally, we consider how the characteristics of the residential area may affect these opinions: in terms of the perceived availability of both local social support and physical and other facilities appropriate for the living of the lives of Muslims in Europe.
The analyses also allow for national/ethnic differences in the indicators, motivated by variations in the relationships between the different Muslim populations and their countries of residence. Germany and Britain share a long history of immigration. Turkish Muslims migrated to Germany as guest workers from the late 1950s. Bangladeshi migration to Britain, which was similarly economically motivated, peaked in the 1980s. Muslims, in contrast, began migrating to Spain from Morocco only recently. Partly as a consequence of these variations in timing, the Bangladeshi and Turkish communities (in Britain and Germany respectively) are larger and longer established than the Moroccan community in Spain. It is estimated that there are around 119,000 registered Muslims with a Turkish passport in Berlin, 156,000 Bangladeshi Muslims in London and 20,000 Moroccan Muslims in Madrid.
The countries also differ in the extent to which they extend economic and political rights to migrants. As Commonwealth citizens, Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain usually have political, economic and legal rights, which are not offered to Turkish migrants in Germany without citizenship and, until 2000, eligibility for German citizenship was restricted to those with German ancestry. Changes to the citizenship laws in Germany in 2000 have made acquiring citizenship somewhat easier for those born in Germany since this time. However, the rate of uptake appears to have been particularly low among Turkish Muslims (Diehl and Blohm, 2003) perhaps because, while Turkish inheritance laws require Turkish citizenship, the new German laws require the surrender of alternative citizenships (as well as with a long period of residence, competence in the German language, a clean police licence and a substantial fee (Castles and Davidson, 2000)). Moreover, as this new law applies only to those born in Germany since 2000, it will be some time before its implications are felt among the majority of the population. These changes have also been met with a certain ‘moral panic’ among other Germans about their effect on the balance of power, particularly in relation to Muslims (Schiffauer, 2006). Like Turkish Muslims in Germany, Moroccan Muslims in Spain are not granted any political rights without citizenship, which (for Moroccans) is granted on the basis of long residence, birth in Spain, Spanish parentage or marriage, although the 2004 amnesty for undocumented Spanish immigrants has enhanced the political and legal rights of around 700,000 people, including many Moroccan Muslims.
Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain, Turkish Muslims in Germany and Moroccan Muslims in Spain frequently maintain identities and cultures distinct from those of the national majorities. These have occurred in distinct ways, however, which may have implications for the extent to which they might feel British, German or Spanish and at home there. Germany, until very recently, considered itself a non-immigration country that granted only provisional residence for immigrants – and forced the repatriation of refugees (Black, 2002). Turkish guest workers and their families therefore remained largely segregated from wider German society. The laissez-faire multiculturalism that predominated in Britain until recently, on the other hand, was more accommodating, and resulted in an emphasis on individual or ‘community’ identities and attempts to recognize cultural and ethnic differences within the concept of Britishness. Despite the amnesty, Muslims still occupy a precarious position in Spanish society, which will take time to redress, particularly as they face traditional Spanish identities frequently defined in direct opposition to ‘el moro’, or Moroccan Muslims (Zapata-Barrero, 2006).
Methods
The ME survey focused on three contrasting European capitals with relatively large Muslim populations, whose varying ethnicities, migration experiences and relationships with their countries of residence offered valuable opportunities for comparison. It was designed to collect information from Bangladeshi Muslims living in London, Britain, Turkish Muslims living in Berlin, Germany and Moroccan Muslims living in Madrid, Spain, between July and December 2004.
An aim of the study was to generate a known probability sample in the three sites as efficiently as possible, taking advantage of institutional particularities in each site to generate the sample. Bangladeshi people living in London who had been involved in a nationally representative quantitative survey, the Health Survey of England 1999 (Erens, Primatesta and Prior, 2001), were re-contacted with a request to participate in a telephone interview. Problems with data collection required that the survey be expanded to include England as a whole, although the residential concentration of Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain is such that they will still, in effect, have been drawn from a small number of urban areas. In Berlin, the comprehensive telephone directory allowed the efficient random sampling of people with Turkish names. In Madrid, access to a comprehensive listing of all Moroccan migrants was negotiated with the City Council and used to generate a random sample of names. The comprehensive nature of this list was supported by the policies in place to grant amnesty to ‘illegal’ migrants at that time. Data collection in Berlin and Madrid was achieved using face-to-face interviews. The three centres used identical questionnaires and bi-lingual interviewers. In each location, respondents were asked whether they identified as Muslim at the initial screening stage. Each survey aimed to interview 200 people. The achieved samples were: London (141), Madrid (205), and Berlin (225). The methods adopted in the study may have implications for the analysis, which will be discussed in more detail later.
Respondents were asked a number of questions exploring their lives in their country of residence. They were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with a series of statements, exploring feeling at home in your country of residence, and forms of ethnic identification, including:
‘I feel at home in Britain/Germany/Spain’; ‘I have felt less at home in Britain/Germany/Spain as a result of events since 11 March 2004’; ‘I have felt less at home in Britain/Germany/Spain as a result of events since September 11th 2001’; and ‘I think of myself as British/German/Spanish.’
They were also asked whether they were born in, or held citizenship of, their country of residence, and their attitudes towards their local residential area: whether they agreed or disagreed with statements that ‘this is an area where neighbours look after each other’ and ‘this area has good facilities for people like me’. Three indicators of attitudes towards discriminatory treatment were combined for analysis: perceiving people from your ethnic and religious group to be treated with respect by wider society, perceiving yourself to be a member of a group that is discriminated against and having been a victim of racially/religiously motivated abuse, assault or property vandalism in the year prior to interview. The specific questions asked were:
‘Would you describe yourself as being a member of a minority group that is discriminated against in this country?’ ‘In the last year, have you experienced verbal insults or abuse? ‘In the last year, have you experienced physical attack?’ ‘In the last year, have you experienced vandalism or destruction of property?’ ‘In your overall experience, how respectful are people in [Britain/Germany/Spain] towards [Bangladeshis/Turks/Moroccans]? Are they very respectful, somewhat respectful, somewhat disrespectful or very disrespectful?’
The indicator employed in the analyses separated: those who did not feel disrespected or discriminated against, and had not been verbally or physically attacked; those who felt they were a member of a group that experienced disrespect (but not discrimination and had not been personally attacked); those who felt they were a member of a group that experienced discrimination (but had not been personally attacked); and those who had been personally attacked.
In response to the varying education systems in place in the different countries, education was classified broadly and distinguishes between those with no educational qualifications, those with a school leaving certificate and those with higher level qualifications. Responses to the question exploring current employment status have been coded to reflect those currently: in employment or receiving training; unemployed or sick; or in other forms of employment.
Respondents were asked a number of questions about their religious identity and religiosity: whether they agreed or disagreed that ‘For others to know me as I really am it is important for them to know that I am a Muslim’; questions exploring ‘how important is religion to the way you live your life’; and a number of questions related to their religious practice. This analysis explores responses to the question: ‘How often do you usually pray in the Mosque? Is it five times a day, once or twice a day, only on Friday, only on religious holidays, or rarely or never?’
Respondents were asked ‘How often do you travel to Bangladesh/Turkey/Morocco? Is it less than once a year, 1–2 times a year or 3 or more times?’ Those travelling at least once a year were combined for the analysis. Respondents were also asked ‘in a typical week do you:
‘watch news in [Bengali/Turkish/Arabic] on television?’; ‘listen to news in [Bengali/Turkish/Arabic] on the radio?’; ‘read [Bengali/Turkish/Moroccan] newspapers?’; ‘read or listen to news in [Bengali/Turkish/Arabic] on the internet?’
Those answering affirmatively to any of these questions were combined for analysis.
Multivariate analyses of influences on European national identities and feeling at home in your country of residence. Odds ratios (95% confidence intervals).
Findings
The Muslims in Europe study. Sample characteristics.
Greater proportions of Turkish Muslims had been born in their country of residence, while greater proportions of Bangladeshi Muslims held citizenship of that country. Bangladeshi Muslims in the sample had fewer qualifications and were less frequently employed than Muslims in the other groups. Just under half of Moroccan Muslims agreed that they lived in an area where people ‘look after’ each other, compared with three-quarters of Turkish and nine in ten Bangladeshi Muslims. Two-thirds of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims agreed that their local area had facilities that were useful for them, compared with nine in ten Bangladeshi Muslims. Around a quarter of respondents in each group reported experience of racially motivated abuse, assault or vandalism in the year prior to interview.
Bangladeshi Muslims were more likely to describe their religion as being important in their lives than Muslims in the other groups. Interestingly, while two-thirds of Turkish Muslims reported their religion to be important to their lives, only 27 percent agreed with the statement that ‘for others to know me as I am it is important that they know I am Muslim’, compared with 71 percent of Moroccan and 81 percent of Bangladeshi Muslims.
Bangladeshi Muslims made less frequent visits to Bangladesh compared with those of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims (to Turkey and Morocco respectively), with fewer than one in twenty Bangladeshi Muslims and over half of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims travelling each year. Three-fifths of Moroccan, four-fifths of Bangladeshi and almost all Turkish Muslims in the sample accessed news reports in their first language every week.
In the regression models, Turkish Muslims in Germany had statistically significantly lower odds of agreeing that they thought of themselves as German (odds ratio (OR) 0.01; 95% confidence interval (CI), 0.00–0.04) compared with the likelihood that Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain thought of themselves as British (whose odds are set at 1.00) (Table 2). They also had significantly lower odds of agreeing that they felt at home in Germany, and higher odds of not feeling less at home since September 2001 or March 2004 compared with Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain. Moroccan Muslims in Spain also had significantly lower odds of agreeing that they thought of themselves as Spanish (OR 0.13, 95% CI 0.03–0.46) than Bangladeshi Muslims thought of themselves as British. There was no significant difference in the odds of not feeling less at home since the events of September 2001 and March 2004 between Moroccan and Bangladeshi Muslims, as the 95 percent confidence interval includes 1.00. Additional analysis indicated that this pattern was not a consequence of combining the two indicators and there was no evidence that the inclusion of the impact of the Madrid bombings introduced a bias in the findings. After adjusting for the other indicators in the model, the likelihood of Moroccan Muslims agreeing that they did not feel less at home since the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 was 1.33 (95% confidence interval: 0.39–4.50) times that of Bangladeshi Muslims. The likelihood of Moroccan Muslims agreeing that they did not feel less at home since the events of 11 September 2001 was 2.06 (95% confidence interval: 0.74–5.72) times that of Bangladeshi Muslims. In both cases, the confidence intervals include 1.00, suggesting that there was therefore no significant difference in the extent to which Moroccan Muslims in Madrid and Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain felt less at home where they lived following the bombings in Madrid in 2004 or in the USA in 2001.
Those who had been born in their country of residence were significantly more likely to feel at home there compared with those who had not. Those with citizenship of their country of residence were significantly more likely both to think of themselves as British, German or Spanish and to feel at home there compared with those without citizenship. Those who reported personal experience of racially/religiously motivated abuse, assault or vandalism had significantly lower odds, and were less likely to agree that they: thought of themselves as British, German or Spanish, felt at home in their country of residence and felt less at home since September 2001 or March 2004, compared with those who did not report that they were a member of a group that experiences less respect than others, experiences discrimination or had personal experience of discrimination. The upper limit of the confidence interval for feeling British, German or Spanish and for feeling less at home since September 2001 or March 2004 is 1.00 for those reporting experience of discrimination, which suggests that the variation between the odds has borderline statistical significance, but that the number of people in these categories prevents these variations reaching statistical significance. Those who agreed that they lived in an area where neighbours look after each other were significantly more likely to feel less at home since September 2001 or March 2004, and more likely to think of themselves as British, German or Spanish compared with those who did not feel they lived in areas with high levels of social support. There was also evidence of an association between reporting high levels of local support and feeling at home in Britain, Germany or Spain, but again the variation in odds was only of borderline significance in this sample.
There was evidence that those reporting their religion to be ‘very important’ to the way they lived their life were less likely to feel at home in their country of residence than those for whom religion was unimportant; that those reporting praying five times a day were less likely to think of themselves as British, German or Spanish and felt less at home in their country of residence, compared with those that rarely or never prayed; and those that agreed that their Muslim identity was an important part of their self-perception were less likely to think of themselves as British, German or Spanish, compared to those that did not, but again these relationships had wide confidence intervals and were not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, reflecting the small number of people in these categories. For example, 39 percent of respondents prayed five times a day, 37 percent said that religion was very important to the way they lived their lives, and 57 percent agreed that a Muslim identity was important to them.
Discussion
This article provides an opportunity to investigate which of a number of dimensions of Muslim identity and experience are influential for respondents’ sense of being British, German or Spanish and feeling at home where they live. Citizenship, reported experiences of victimization and strength of religious identities are shown to have important influences on forms of national identity in Europe among these groups. Similarly, feeling at home in the country of residence, and not feeling less at home since September 2001 or March 2004, appear to be influenced by having citizenship of, or having been born in, the country of residence, reported experiences of victimization and the perceived availability of local support networks. In contrast, measures of cultural identity and practice, such as importance of religion, religious practice and strength of religious identity were not related to these outcomes. Our findings therefore suggest that the drivers of any variations in these sentiments are associated more with experiences and perceptions of social exclusion than any lack of integration caused by the insularity, religious affiliation or religious practices of these groups. It is therefore European societies themselves who hold the key to an improved social cohesion with Muslim groups, a finding that appears to directly contradict much media rhetoric as well as government policy on the subject.
We have identified an inverse relationship between strength of Muslim identity and sense of British-, German- or Spanish-ness. Unfortunately, this work cannot shed further light on the nature of these relationships, although this effect was not driven by those elements of religious practice, the perceived importance of religion or the other indicators included in the models. Despite this, we feel it is too simplistic to assume that these strong Muslim identities necessarily predate and operate to deny access to forms of national European identity, as there is evidence that a reinvigoration of Muslim identities can also occur in direct response to social exclusion – from opportunities to adopt a sense of British- German- or Spanish-ness, as well as economic marginalization and victimization (Poynting, 2009; Valentine and Sporton, 2009). Indeed, the statistical associations we found here between feeling British, German or Spanish and at home in Europe and social exclusion at the institutional (measured as citizenship rights and place of birth) and more interpersonal (in the form of aspects of victimization) level support the interpretation that exclusionary processes are central. The lack of effect between those indicators included to identify the strength of links with pre-migration locations, which have been considered to prevent integration into post-migration environments, also support a perception that these identities are defined in response to relationships located within individuals’ current contexts rather than their histories and dreams.
Fewer than a third of respondents to Abrams and Houston’s (2006) study felt that Muslims living in the UK were generally accepted as ‘British’. Our findings suggest that the different ways in which these external attitudes manifest themselves directly impact on the extent to which Muslims feel able to consider themselves British (or German or Spanish) and ‘at home’ in Europe. Indeed, work by Hussain and Bagguley (2005) suggests that the political mobilization of (in this case) young British Pakistani Muslims is in response to the sense of frustration at the lack of support for their access to the rights associated with their strong ‘British’ identity, rather than a result of their links with a ‘fanatical’ Islam: For the younger generation, their British citizenship is central to their self-understandings and assertions of who they are, and for them the threat from the BNP [British National Party] is just as much a threat to their Britishness as citizens as it is to their ethnic identities … They are expressing and defending a British multicultural, multi-ethnic citizenship identity. (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005: 411, authors’ italics)
This work did not find a statistically significant relationship between forms of economic marginalization and thinking of yourself as British, German or Spanish, or feeling at home in Europe. Victimization, however, continues to be an important part of the experience of minority groups in Europe and influences the extent to which people feel able to access a sense of national identity in Europe and to feel at home in their country of residence. This finding supports other work acknowledging the influence of racialization in the development of forms of ethnic identity and group awareness (see, for example, Karlsen, 2004, 2006). The processes encouraging personal and group identification with particular religions and religious communities and their relationships with the forms of racialization and exclusion inherent in racial and religious prejudice need to be better understood (Byng, 2008). We hypothesize that the importance of local support identified in the significant associations between the extent to which the local area is perceived as one where neighbours look after each other and feeling at home where you live and less at home since September 2001 and March 2004 relates to the potential protection offered by this support against wider societal hostility (Bécares et al., 2009) and the sense of security that this affords. The role of these relationships would not appear related to the maintenance of particular (‘traditional’) cultural ties. The availability of local facilities for ‘people like me’ – which could also be considered related to the persistence of particular minoritized cultures or faiths – were not associated with (not) thinking of yourself as British, German or Spanish, or being at home there.
There are obvious limitations to this work as a consequence of its cross-sectional nature, the small sample sizes available and the variation in methodologies employed. This approach also combines heterogeneous groups, whose relationships with their country of residence, their ethnic and religious identities and many other things will vary. The persistent, but varying, nature of the associations with country of residence does little to expose the drivers of these, given that the relationships between the groups and their countries of residence vary in so many ways (as mentioned earlier). We have explored some broad aspects of these relationships. Understanding precisely how they are manifest in the lives of individuals in each of these groups will require more detailed investigation. It should also be noted that the use of telephone directories as the German sample source will bias the sample towards those with landline telephones. This may be those with longer and more stable residency. It is also possible that the telephone interviews used in Britain may have introduced some bias, but there is no evidence or a priori reason to suggest this to be the case.
This article provides innovative and valuable insight into the processes of identity development operating in these contexts. The theoretical contribution offered by the article relates to its identification of the strong British, German and Spanish identities held by members of the three Muslim groups examined and the presentation of evidence that the drivers of these sentiments are associated more with external processes of social exclusion than internally motivated processes of self-segregation. A particular value offered by the quantitative findings lies in their ability to show that these patterns are to some extent generalizable to different Muslim groups in different national contexts. Importantly, this article also offers methodological value through its ability to show that these patterns can be quantitatively modelled, with the opportunities this offers for the exploration of whether and how processes of identity development change in different contexts and over time.
The terrorist incidents of 2001 and 2004, and responses to them, have had an important impact on the lives of Muslims in different countries in Europe. But while these events have affected a sense of being ‘at home’ for some, we have found factors that can mediate this disruption. Rather than these protective influences being focused on religious identities or practices, or links with cultural traditions and pre-migration ‘homelands’, consistently they relate to the relationships between individuals and the societies in which they currently reside. The marginalization faced by many Muslims has an important influence on their ability to access national identities and to feel themselves at home in Europe. Improving cultural integration in Europe would therefore appear to be best achieved by treating people with respect and supporting them to live their lives free from the risk of social exclusion and persecution.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-163-25-0009].
